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How does news exposure shape citizens' perceptions of and behavioral responses toward corruption?: information acquisition, blame attribution, and behavioral response

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 February 2023

Jeeyoung Park Open the ORCID record for Jeeyoung Park [Opens in a new window]  and
Kiyoung Chang Open the ORCID record for Kiyoung Chang [Opens in a new window]
Jeeyoung Park
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, Sungshin Women's University, Seoul, Korea
Kiyoung Chang*
Affiliation:
Department of International Studies, Kyonggi University, Suwon, Korea
*
*Corresponding author. E-mail: kychang@kyonggi.ac.kr
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Abstract

This paper mainly deals with the relationship between citizens' levels of news exposure and their behaviors toward the president's corruption scandal in South Korea. In particular, we examine how an individual's level of news exposure affected his/her level of political information about the corruption scandal, perception of then President Park Geun-hye's responsibility for corruption, and participation in anti-Park protests or counter-protests. In this paper, we argue that more exposure to consistent news reports of the president's corruption increases the amount of information citizens with different political dispositions have in common. The more their sets of political information overlap, the closer their perceptions and behavioral choices regarding a corruption scandal are likely to be.

Keywords

Corruption scandal in South Koreanews exposureperception and behavioral response
Type
Research Article
Information
Japanese Journal of Political Science , Volume 24 , Issue 1 , March 2023 , pp. 136 - 152
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press

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