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Strategy stability in complex populations

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 July 2016

W. G. S. Hines
W. G. S. Hines*
Affiliation:
University of Guelph
*
∗ Postal address: Department of Mathematics and Statistics, University of Guelph, Guelph, Ont., Canada NIG 2W1.
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Abstract

In biological populations, several strategies for engaging in intraspecific contests may be present. Investigations of stability show that the mean strategy in use in the population can prove stable but that neutrally stable and gradually changing polymorphisms in strategy are to be expected when the contest affects reproductive success.

Keywords

CONDITIONAL ESSCOMPLEX POPULATIONSEVOLUTIONARILY STABLE STRATEGIESINTRASPECIFIC CONFLICTSMULTICOMPONENT POPULATIONS

Information

Type
Research Papers
Information
Journal of Applied Probability , Volume 17 , Issue 3 , September 1980 , pp. 600 - 610
Copyright
Copyright © Applied Probability Trust 1980 

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Footnotes

Research supported by National Research Council Operating Grant A6187.

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