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Evolutionarily stable strategies with two types of player

  • Peter D. Taylor (a1)
Abstract

A definition of ESS (evolutionarily stable strategy) is suggested for games in which there are two types of player, each with its own set of strategies, and the fitness of any strategy depends upon the strategy mix, of both types, in the population as a whole. We check that the standard ESS results hold for this definition and discuss a mate-desertion model which has appeared in the literature in which the two types are male and female.

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Postal address: Department of Mathematics, Jeffery Hall, Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario, Canada K7L 3N6.
References
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Dawkins, R. and Carlisle, T. R. (1976) Parental investment and mate desertion: a fallacy. Nature, London 262, 131133.
Grafen, A. and Sibly, R. (1978) A model of mate desertion. Anim. Behav. 26, 645652.
Haigh, J. (1975) Game theory and evolution. Adv. Appl. Prob. 7, 811.
Maynard Smith, J. (1974) The theory of games and the evolution of animal conflicts. J. Theoret. Biol. 47, 209211.
Maynard Smith, J. (1977) Parental investment: a prospective analysis. Anim. Behav. 25, 19.
Taylor, P. and Jonker, L. (1978) Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics. Math. Biosci. 40, 145156.
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Journal of Applied Probability
  • ISSN: 0021-9002
  • EISSN: 1475-6072
  • URL: /core/journals/journal-of-applied-probability
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