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Identifying the analytical implications of alternative regulatory philosophies

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 May 2015

Art Fraas*
Affiliation:
Fraas is a visiting fellow and Morgenstern is a senior fellow at Resources for the Future. Fraas served as chief of the Natural Resources, Energy and Environment Branch in the OMB Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs from 1987 to 2008. Morgenstern served in various senior positions in EPA’s Policy Office 1983–1995.
Richard Morgenstern*
Affiliation:
Fraas is a visiting fellow and Morgenstern is a senior fellow at Resources for the Future. Fraas served as chief of the Natural Resources, Energy and Environment Branch in the OMB Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs from 1987 to 2008. Morgenstern served in various senior positions in EPA’s Policy Office 1983–1995.
*
*Resources for the Future, 1616 P St, NW, Washington, District of Columbia 20036-1400, USA, e-mail: fraas@rff.org
Resources for the Future, 1616 P St, NW, Washington, District of Columbia 20036-1400, USA
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Abstract:

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The core analytical elements of Executive Order 12291 are widely seen as having been embraced by both Democratic and Republican administrations. Some critics argue, however, that this embrace is superficial and serves more as a cover for political decisions. To address this question, this paper examines the analytical priorities presented in the annual Report to Congress on the Benefits and Costs of Federal Regulations over the period from 1997 to 2012. While there is general agreement across administrations on such broad issues as the importance of benefit-cost analysis in providing a shared framework and discipline to the analytic process, we identify important differences in five areas: monetization of benefits, scope of costs considered, behavioral economics, intergenerational benefits, and the general equilibrium impacts of regulation. All are active and exciting issues in the current scholarly work on regulation. These cross-administration differences appear to reflect a relatively modest shifting across political parties on issues where reasonable people might disagree, rather than major ideological swings in approach.

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © Society for Benefit-Cost Analysis 2014

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