Hostname: page-component-76fb5796d-vvkck Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-04-28T21:50:33.803Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Herbert Spencer and the Spectre of Comte

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 January 2014

Sydney Eisen
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

“It is very interesting to compare Spencer and Comte,” wrote George Sarton in an essay lauding their efforts to embrace all knowledge in a grand synthesis. The comparison, indeed, was tempting for contemporaries, as it has been for students of ideas. Both Auguste Comte and Herbert Spencer were authors of new philosophic systems which, they believed, had been built on the firm foundations of science, and both were convinced that society should be reconstructed in accordance with the truths of their philosophies. The insistence of Positivists and some who were not Positivists that Spencer, consciously or not, had been influenced by Comte, and Spencer's repeated and fervent denials, made for a series of controversies that extended over half a century and ranged from the minutiae of priority to the more important issues of the classification of the sciences and the nature of religion.

The eclipse of both the Positive Philosophy of Comte and the Synthetic Philosophy of Spencer in the twentieth century hardly suggests the interest they aroused in the nineteenth. The unification of knowledge and the discovery of the laws of man and society were dreams which nineteenth-century science and philosophy hoped to realize. Comte and Spencer made their contribution in this area; and while both were attacked for erecting systems on questionable assumptions, and for their weakness in details, their extraordinary ability to amass quantities of information and to come up with penetrating generalizations attracted admirers and disciples. Few of their critics thought that what they had set out to do was not worth doing, or could not be done.

Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of British Studies , Volume 7 , Issue 1 , November 1967 , pp. 48 - 67
Copyright
Copyright © North American Conference of British Studies 1967

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1. Sarton, George, “Herbert Spencer, 1820-1920,” Scribner's Magazine, LXVII (1920), 699Google Scholar.

2. Simon, W. M., European Positivism in the Nineteenth Century: An Essay in Intellectual History (Ithaca, 1963), pp. 217–19Google Scholar.

3. Sarton, , “Herbert Spencer,” Scribner's Magazine, LXVII, 699Google Scholar.

4. For a bibliography on Spencer and Comte, see Simon, , European Positivism, p. 219Google Scholar, n. 53. To Simon's bibliography may be added: Bliss, Henry Evelyn, The Organization of Knowledge and the System of the Sciences (New York, 1929), pp. 349–50Google Scholar; Clergué, Georges, Etude sur le problème de la classification des sciences (Paris, 1930), p. 32Google Scholar; Flint, Robert, Philosophy as Scientia Scientiarum and A History of Classifications of the Sciences (Edinburgh, 1904), pp. 182-83, 227-41, 275Google Scholar; Stanley, H. M., “On the Classification of the Sciences,” Mind, IX (1884), 265–74CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

5. “Ethics,” the abstract science of the individual, was not part of the hierarchy as developed in Comte, Auguste, Cours de philosophie positive (1830–1842)Google Scholar. It was added in 1852 when Comte was writing the Système de politique positive (1851-54).

To distinguish between “abstract” and “concrete” in Comte's system, J. K. Ingram, an Irish Positivist, wrote: “A Science is abstract, if it discovers independently the laws of a distinct general order of phenomena; while if it derives its truths altogether from a combination of the results of other sciences, and does not rest on special inductions of its own, it is concrete…. A complete systematisation of concrete sciences is impossible, as beyond our feeble powers of Combination. It is only Abstract Science that we can truly systematise, and this not in an absolute sense, but sufficiently for our real needs.” Ingram, J. K., Human Nature and Morals, p. 82Google Scholar, as quoted in Beesly, Edward Spencer, “Explanation of Philosophical Terms,” in Comte, Auguste, A Discourse on the Positive Spirit, tr. Beesly, E. S. (London, 1903 [original French edition, 1844]), p. xGoogle Scholar.

6. Reviews of the Cours or parts of it appeared in the Edinburgh Review, LXVII (1838), 271–308,Google Scholar and in Blackwood's Magazine, LIII (1843), 397–414.Google Scholar Comte was praised highly in Mill, J. S., A System of Logic (London, 1843)Google Scholar, and in Lewes, G. H., A Biographical History of Philosophy (London, 1845–1846)Google Scholar. He had corresponded with Mill, Alexander Bain, and Lewes, among others, in the British Isles. He had a number of admirers at Oxford who formed the nucleus of organized Positivism in England.

7. Spencer, Herbert, The Classification of the Sciences to which are added Reasons for Dissenting from the Philosophy of M. Comte (New York, 1864), p. 43nGoogle Scholar. The reliability of the explanation depends on Spencer's memory, after fourteen years, as well as his motives. I am not suggesting that Spencer appropriated Comte's heading consciously, but the term is one that he might easily have picked up in conversation.

8. Spencer, Herbert, An Autobiography (New York, 1904), I, 399, 422, 435, 461Google Scholar.

9. Ibid., I, 461; Spencer, Herbert, “The Filiation of Ideas,” in Duncan, David, Life and Letters of Herbert Spencer (New York, 1908), II, 321Google Scholar.

10. Ibid., II, 317, 320-21; letter from Spencer to Lewes, Mar. 21, 1864, in Spencer, , Autobiography, II, 568.Google Scholar

11. On Feb. 6, 1854, George Eliot wrote to Charles Bray: “Herbert Spencer, who never praises but upon compulsion and who has no knowledge of the original to help him, says that it [Harriet Martineau's translation] appears to him perfectly lucid and that the difficulty lies in the matter not in the form.” Haight, Gordon S. (ed.), The George Eliot Letters (New Haven, 1954–1955), II, 139–40Google Scholar. In a footnote Haight adds that this letter establishes Spencer's claim that he knew nothing of Comte When he wrote Social Statics. Eliot's statement, as the preceding paragraphs in the text demonstrate, cannot be taken literally.

12. Duncan, , Spencer, I, 93.Google Scholar

13. Letters to his father, Jan. 20 and Feb. 27, 1854, in Spencer, , Autobiography, I, 515, 517Google Scholar (in the second letter he acknowledged borrowing “altruism” and “sociology” from Comte). It is surprising, in view of his association with Lewes, that he did not read Lewes's articles on Comte when they were first published in the Leader in 1852.

14. Spencer, , Classification … Reasons, p. 42nGoogle Scholar. Spencer's recollections are not altogether consistent. In the Autobiography, I, 518Google Scholar, he says that he did not read the divisions on “biology” or “sociology” and probably not the one on “chemistry” either.

15. Letters to A. Campbell Fraser, Jan. 26 and 28, 1854, in Duncan, , Spencer, I, 96–97;Google Scholar letters to his father and mother, Feb. 17 and 27, 1854, in Spencer, , Autobiography, I, 516–17Google Scholar; Spencer, , “Filiation of Ideas,” in Duncan, , Spencer, II, 340Google Scholar.

16. Spencer, Herbert, “The Genesis of Science,” Recent Discussions in Science, Philosophy, and Morals (New York, 1871), p. 165Google Scholar.

17. Ibid., pp. 190-201.

18. Spencer, , “Filiation of Ideas,” in Duncan, , Spencer, II, 321–22Google Scholar.

19. Some of Spencer's sharpest thrusts, e.g., that the idea of sequence was not inherent in the facts but was a product of the mind, and that there was constant interaction among all the sciences in their development, were misdirected, since Comte had said very much the same thing. Spencer, , “Genesis of Science,” Recent Discussions, pp. 171–85Google Scholar. On one point Spencer fully agreed with Comte, namely, that the formulation of a correct classification was essential, and that such a theory would have important consequences for the education of the individual which “rightly conducted must have a certain correspondence with the evolution of the race.” Ibid., p. 234.

20. From the British Quarterly Review, XXII (Oct. 1855), 597Google Scholar, as quoted in Haight, , George Eliot Letters, II, 219nGoogle Scholar.

21. Spencer was about to take off for Paris on holiday after suffering some nervous disorders following unfavorable comments on his Principles of Psychology, when John Chapman asked him to deliver £23 to Comte from the sales of Martineau's translation. Elliot, Hugh, Herbert Spencer (New York, 1917), pp. 32–35CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

22. Letter from Comte to H. D. Hutton, Dec. 17, 1856, in Lettres d'Auguste Comte à divers (Paris, 1902–1905), IGoogle Scholar, Première Partie, 624; letter from Spencer to his mother, Oct. 20, 1856, in Duncan, , Spencer, I, 107;Google ScholarSpencer, , Autobiography, I, 577–78Google Scholar.

23. Letters from Spencer to E. L. Youmans, Oct. 28, 1863, and Youmans to Spencer, Dec. 14, 1863, in Fiske, John, Edward Livingston Youmans (New York, 1894), pp. 152-53, 169Google Scholar. Spencer's statement, which followed the letter to the New Englander in the Illustrations, had been offered to Youmans by Spencer for purposes of publication. Spencer, Herbert, Illustrations of Universal Progress (New York, 1864), pp. xiv–xviGoogle Scholar; Fiske, , Youmans, pp. 173–74Google Scholar. But Youmans preferred to give a somewhat different impression by introducing it with: “We take the liberty of making an extract from a private letter.” One sentence referring to Huxley — “Professor Huxley pointed out to me passages in his own writings in which he spoke of Comte in language almost contemptuous” — was left out of the printed statement in the Illustrations.

24. Laugel, Auguste, “Les études philosophiques en Angleterre,” Revue des deux mondes, XLIX (1864), 930, 953, 956, 957Google Scholar.

25. Spencer, , Autobiography, II, 127–28Google Scholar; letter from Spencer to Youmans, Mar. 26, 1864, in Duncan, , Spencer, I, 148.Google Scholar Spencer sent the statement of the British scientists to Youmans, requesting that, if he found it of any use, he should not mention his (Spencer's) name. Spencer had originally gathered these testimonies for his letter to the New Englander. See letter from Spencer to Youmans, Jan. 3, 1864, in Fiske, , Youmans, p. 173Google Scholar.

26. Spencer, , Classification … Reasons, pp. 4-9, 11Google Scholar.

27. Spencer, , Autobiography, II, 128–29Google Scholar.

28. Spencer, , Classification … Reasons, p. 30Google Scholar.

29. Comte had argued that the physical aspects of the mind should be studied as part of biology and the cognitive aspects as part of sociology. He rejected the subjective introspective study of the mind which was pursued in his day. His partial adherence to the phrenology of Franz Joseph Gall made him an easy subject of ridicule. The science of ethics which he added to the original hierarchy was, in effect, individual psychology.

30. Spencer, , Classification … Reasons, pp. 37–41Google Scholar.

31. Ibid., pp. 42-45. At the end of Reasons he says: “I believe that there are scattered through his pages many large ideas that are valuable not only as stimuli but for their actual truth.” Ibid., p. 48.

32. Ibid., p. 47.

33. Mar. 26 and May 18, 1864, in Fiske, , Youmans, pp. 175, 181Google Scholar.

34. Duncan, , Spencer, II, 321–22Google Scholar.

35. Spencer, Herbert, First Principles (London, 1862), pp. 216, 490, 446–47Google Scholar.

36. Spencer, , Classification … Reasons, pp. 22–23Google Scholar.

37. Duncan, , Spencer, II, 321-22, 340Google Scholar. Spencer was already revising First Principles in June 1864. Letter from Spencer to Youmans, June 8, 1864, in Fiske, , Youmans, p. 182Google Scholar. For the revisions see Spencer, , First Principles (2nd ed.; London, 1867), pp. 285Google Scholar (where he uses almost the exact words of the Classification), 337n, 540-51. For the extent of the revision see the Preface to the second edition, in which Spencer juxtaposes the new table of contents with the one of the first edition.

38. Letter from Spencer to Youmans, June 8, 1864, in Fiske, , Youmans, p. 182Google Scholar.

39. Mar. 21, 1864, in Spencer, , Autobiography, II, 565–72Google Scholar. I do not have Lewes's letter to Spencer.

40. After the exchange Spencer called on Lewes and Eliot for the first time in Apr. 1865. By Sep. friendly relations seem to have been restored, at least with Eliot. Haight, , George Eliot Letters, II, 140nGoogle Scholar; IV, 145n, 209.

41. Littré, Emile, Auguste Comte et la philosophie positive (2nd ed.; Paris, 1864), pp. 286–306Google Scholar; Simon, , European Positivism, p. 248Google Scholar; the Preface to the second edition of the Classification may be found in Spencer, , Recent Discussions, pp. 59–60Google Scholar.

42. Letter from Mill to Spencer, Apr. 3, 1864, and Spencer's reply, Apr. 8, in Duncan, , Spencer, I, 149–50Google Scholar. Also see the interesting comparison of the first and eighth editions (1843 and 1872) of Mill's Logic for references to Comte, , in Simon, , European Positivism, pp. 275–79Google Scholar.

43. Letter from Mill to Spencer, Mar. 11, 1865, in Duncan, , Spencer, I, 155;Google ScholarMill, John Stuart, Auguste Comte and Positivism (London, 1907CrossRefGoogle Scholar [originally published in the Westminster Review, 1865]), pp. 5, 33-35, 43, 45-46; for further elaboration of Mill's view see also pp. 7-8, 33-46, 102-04. Mill's criticism of Spencer for considering H. T. Buckle a member of Comte's school probably was responsible for the omission of the reference to Buckle in the third edition of the Classification. Mill also pointed out that Spencer's assertions that feelings rather than ideas govern the world, and that society rests on character and not intellect, were very much part of Comte's philosophy and not antagonistic to it. Ibid., pp. 102-03.

44. Spencer refrained from adopting the new title in 1867 because Thomas Huxley and John Tyndall had objected to it. Letters from Spencer to Youmans, Jan. 22, 1868, and Youmans to Spencer, Mar. 4, 1868, in Fiske, , Youmans, pp. 249–50Google Scholar. He finally settled on it as a result of another comparison with Comte. In 1869-70 John Fiske delivered a series of lectures at Harvard (published with the help of Youmans in the New York World) in which he grouped Comte and Spencer as “positive” philosophers. Spencer complained bitterly to Youmans and tried to impress upon Fiske the vast differences between his own system and Comte's. He made his point. Fiske was thereafter less favorably disposed towards Comte and used the term “Cosmic Philosophy” to describe Spencer's system. Spencer did not like Fiske's new designation either and in the fall of 1871 adopted “Synthetic Philosophy.” Spencer had rejected Fiske's suggestion that he use “Evolution Philosophy.” See Berman, Milton, John Fiske: The Evolution of a Popularizer (Cambridge, Mass., 1961), pp. 18, 35, 75–77CrossRefGoogle Scholar; letter from Spencer to Youmans, Dec. 4, 1869, in Duncan, , Spencer, I, 206;Google Scholar letter from Spencer to Fiske, Feb. 2, 1870, in ibid., I, 207-08, and in Clark, John Spencer, The Life and Letters of John Fiske (Boston, 1917), I, 366–70Google Scholar; Fiske, , Youmans, pp. 219–20nGoogle Scholar; letter from Youmans to his sister, Dec. 2, 1871, ibid., p. 290.

45. July 30 and Sep. 1, 1867, in ibid., pp. 235-36, 238. Youmans's reaction may have been prompted by Spencer's unhappy reference to a statement in Lewes's new edition of the biographical history — The History of Philosophy from Thales to Comte (London, 1867), p. 654Google Scholar: “Mr. Spencer is unequivocally a positive philosopher, however he may repudiate being considered a disciple of Comte.” Letter from Spencer, June 7, 1867, in Fiske, , Youmans, p. 233Google Scholar; Duncan, , Spencer, I, 172.Google Scholar

46. The two copies of the second edition of the Classification (New York, 1870)Google Scholar that I have seen do not differ from the first (except for an appendix) and did not contain the new Preface. I have not been able to locate a copy of the second British edition. The Preface, however, appears wherever Spencer republished the Comte material in collections of his essays. In the third edition (1871), both British and American, minor changes were made in the text. The only French translation I have been able to locate was made from the third edition by F. Réthoré.

47. The whole history of the classification of the sciences is dealt with in Bain, Alexander, Logic (London, 1870), Pt. 1, pp. 229 ffGoogle Scholar. Bain, like Mill, had broken with Comte but continued to defend his classification against Spencer. Ibid., pp. 234, 241.

48. Spencer's troubles were not over by any means, for Comte's classification found a staunch defender in Lester F. Ward, the American sociologist. Ward, who was not a Positivist, not only preferred Comte's arrangement of the sciences to Spencer's, but insisted that there was very little difference between them, thus implying that Spencer had borrowed from Comte. Convinced that Spencer was carrying forward Comte's great work in philosophy, he reminded him that it would in no way harm his reputation to give credit where it was due. For Ward's exchange with Spencer and for his fluctuating views regarding the relationship between the two classifications, see Ward, Lester F., Dynamic Sociology (New York, 1883), I, 97, 98, 104-05, 119, 134, 135, 142–49Google Scholar; Ward, Lester F., Pure Sociology (2nd ed.; New York, 1911 [1st ed., 1903]), pp. 66–69Google Scholar; the abstract of a paper on the classifications in Science, new series, III (1896), 292-94; Brown University Library, letters to Ward from Spencer, E. S. Beesly, Richard Congreve, Frederic Harrison, 1883-96, Ward Papers. I wish to thank Mrs. Christine D. Hathaway, special collections librarian, for her assistance in making the material in the Ward Papers available to me.

49. Attempts to classify the sciences go back at least as far as Bacon. In the nineteenth century there were many classifications. Simon speaks of “the popular pastime of classifying the sciences.” Simon, , European Positivism, p. 106Google Scholar.

50. Toward the end of his life Spencer came closer to the Positivist viewpoint on some of these issues.

51. There is a shred of evidence, which I have not been able to pursue, that Spencer came into contact with Comte's ideas before 1850. Some of Spencer's earliest articles (1843-44) were published in Zoist, a mesmeric journal, with a Comtean flavor. See Webb, R. K., Harriet Martineau: A Radical Victorian (New York, 1960), pp. 245–53Google Scholar.