Introduction
Ming China was a great power surrounded by a great number of polities. Some were hostile, some were friendly, but few of them were indifferent, and the Ming Empire had to develop appropriate policies towards all of them. This, it found, meant never to rely on only one instrument to deal with any of its neighbors, or to stick with one when circumstances had changed. Indeed, the Ming Empire made use of a wide range of foreign policy instruments, from trade embargos to gift-giving and spying, to name but a few. This article highlights this diversity in Ming China's foreign policy instruments.
This diversity has not always been fully appreciated in studies on this subject. This is especially the case for studies that have examined Ming China's foreign relations as one case among several in an attempt to make sense of premodern Chinese foreign relations more broadly. Various theoretical frameworks have been suggested for such an undertaking,Footnote 1 with the concept of the tributary system figuring prominently in many of them, a concept that continues to be widely debated among historians and political scientists.Footnote 2 Almost by necessity, this kind of integration into a broader framework has led to a reduction of Ming China's foreign relations to certain patterns, such as tribute exchanges. The aim here is not to fundamentally dispute the value of these more theoretical approaches, but rather to further illuminate what might get lost in them: the ‘multiplicity of practices’Footnote 3 that Ming China engaged in.
This multiplicity is evident when surveying the extensive scholarly literature on particular aspects of Ming China's foreign relations. This literature has investigated foreign policy decision-making,Footnote 4 foreign policy institutions,Footnote 5 foreign policy officials,Footnote 6 particular foreign policies,Footnote 7 and foreign relations with certain countries and regions.Footnote 8 Although these studies are invaluable for our understanding of Ming foreign affairs, their focus on specific aspects also means that the broader picture of Ming China's foreign policy is not always easily discernible. The point of this article is thus to bring this literature together to provide a proper overview of the wide range of Ming foreign policy instruments. This, of course, is a vast area—too vast for a single investigation—and this article cannot claim to provide a full picture. What it can do, however, is paint the subject in thick brush strokes, allowing us to see its broad contours. It should also be noted that in what follows the early Ming period is overrepresented in comparison to later periods. This has to do both with the importance of early Ming developments, for instance the establishment of the trade restrictions, which will feature prominently in the following section, and with the fact that the early period has been more widely explored by scholars of Ming China, thus providing more material.
The article is structured according to four categories of foreign policy instruments: economic, diplomatic, cultural, and military instruments. Of course, not every act can be easily categorized and some instruments may straddle the boundaries of two or more categories. However, while keeping these limitations in mind, these analytical categories can still provide us a useful guide through the thicket of Ming foreign policy practices. The focus throughout is on the instruments themselves. In their outcomes, the examined policies ranged from highly successful to woefully bad; what matters here is not what the Ming achieved but rather how they tried to achieve their goals. The same holds true for the objectives behind the employment of one instrument or another. Although I shall make some observations in this regard, it is not my aim here to explore them in depth. The focus throughout remains on the means themselves.
Economic Instruments
To understand specific economic policies towards other polities, we first need to grasp the underlying order that Ming China erected. Ming China came to institute a highly restrictive trading order, one that allowed for commerce to be conducted only via official tribute-bearing missions. Especially in the maritime sphere, with Chinese subjects themselves being prohibited from going out to sea, this marked a fundamental break with earlier models, the much more open trading orders established by the Tang, Song, and Yuan dynasties.Footnote 9 Thus, the early period of the Ming Empire is often seen as the epitome of a systematized Chinese tribute-trade system.Footnote 10 But even for the Ming dynasty the maritime prohibitions were more the product of contingent factors than part of a (or switch to plans) clearly laid-out plan, and private maritime trade was still permitted at the very beginning of the dynasty.Footnote 11 Maritime restrictions were soon implemented, however, probably because remnants of former warlord armies and Chinese traders linked up with pirates, leading to general instability in coastal areasFootnote 12 and a desire to make the economy the servant of political stability.Footnote 13 Heavy restrictions were also imposed on overland trade, though in this area government-controlled markets were set up with the aim of exchanging Chinese tea for Inner Asian horses, vital for the military efforts of the dynasty.Footnote 14 There were some twists and turns in the decades to come, but the basic perimeters of the restrictive system continued to exist for almost two centuries.Footnote 15 One should add that rather than solving the piracy issue, the restrictions themselves were likely a major cause in making it more severe, as, for instance, local officials in the regions affected by the ban clearly recognized.Footnote 16 Along with pirate activity, which spiked in the 1550s and early 1560s,Footnote 17 the commercialization of the economy and the increasing demand for silver put pressure on the trade prohibitions.Footnote 18 They were finally relaxed in 1567.
What did the imposition of trade restrictions mean in terms of Ming China's foreign policy instruments? Of course, the policy of directing foreign trade almost exclusively through official channels was in itself one of the most important policy instruments that the Ming Empire brought to bear on its foreign relations. But it also provided the foundation for all other instruments. The basic question of economic statecraft is how economic relationships with other polities should be ordered; it is from this order that all other economic instruments are derived. By centralizing trade, the Ming Empire, at least ideally, could exert some influence over those foreigners who wished to trade with it. It could reward those who were deemed good vassals, for instance, with more tribute-trade missions. Or it could cut polities off completely, which is how China tried to induce proper behavior in one of its more troublesome Central Asian neighbors.
The closest relationship that Ming China entertained with any polity in Central Asia was with Hami, an oasis town of both strategic and commercial importance. This town sent the third most tributary missions to the Ming court overall, after Korea and Ryukyu.Footnote 19 In the second half of the fifteenth century Hami was continuously threatened by another city-polity, Turfan.Footnote 20 During this period Ming China dealt vigorously with Turfan's incursions. Threats of war and military expeditions proved insufficient to deal with this problem, however. When Ahmad, the ruler of Turfan, continued to raid Hami even after some of his forces had been defeated by a Ming army, the Minister of War, Ma Wensheng 馬文升 (1426–1510), “decided that China needed a different strategy to defuse the threat Ahmad posed. With the Emperor's support, he suspended all trade and tribute from Central Asia to China.”Footnote 21 This proved to be an effective policy, since it cut off from trade with the prosperous Ming Empire not only Turfan, but also the other polities of Central Asia, who directed their anger at Ahmad.Footnote 22 This general trade embargo thus undercut Turfan's political standing within its region as well as its economic position more directly. In our times, this would be similar to a state not just sanctioning one country but sanctioning all its neighboring states as well. The policy worked; Ahmad returned the former ruler of Hami to his polity.
Yet this policy could not work in isolation, as the Ming discovered about two decades later. When Turfan returned to its conquering ways, seizing Hami in 1513, and the Ming again tried to block all trade from the region, the leader of Turfan went on the offensive. He raided the border incessantly until the Ming finally gave in and lifted the embargo. The Ming Empire had by then lost its military standing in this region.Footnote 23 Without military backing the trade embargo could not be kept up. In the end, preventing border troubles became more important than regaining control over Hami. Permitting trade was the price to be paid for this.
This was not the only time the Ming had to determine whether permitting trade or cutting it off would be the better policy. The Ming establishment was not always apt to make the wisest decision. For instance, when the Mongol leader Esen expressed his desire for more trade, the Ming slashed the permitted amount even further, leading to a violent reaction.Footnote 24 A more enlightened policy in this regard was initiated in 1570–71, though only after severe factional battles at the Ming court.Footnote 25 In a settlement with the Mongol leader Altan Khan (1507–1582), the Ming established trading facilities at the border, while the Mongols, at least those under Altan Khan's leadership, stopped their incessant raiding. This helped stabilize the border.Footnote 26 By that time several Chinese high officials had recognized that trade was the most appropriate foreign policy instrument to be employed towards the Mongols. For instance, Gao Gong 高拱 (js. 1541), a grand secretary, noted of the Mongols, “For the sake of our national security we have no option but to meet their needs in order to control them. They are not the type we can control by ethics and principles.”Footnote 27
This idea did not only apply to the northerners. In 1523 two Japanese families, the Hosokawa 細川 and the Ōuchi 大内, who both sent ships on a tribute mission to China, started to fight each other in Ningbo, and in the process they laid waste to parts of the city. The Chinese literati elite was understandably outraged, and some argued for the cessation of Japanese tribute missions, and hence of trade.Footnote 28 But when the Japanese returned in 1540, after a seventeen-year hiatus, the Ming leadership decided that it was better to allow tributary missions to continue. As Yan Song 嚴嵩 (1480–1567), the senior grand secretary and one of the most powerful officials at that time, argued, “Our principle guides us to punish those who do not submit to us, but declining their request for tribute is not a proper way of controlling them.”Footnote 29
While the Ming sanctioned bad behavior by reducing trade or blockading it altogether, it also increased the amount of permitted trade to reward desirable conduct. Korea and Ryukyu were two particularly trusted vassals, and as such they did not have to show a tally to prove that they were on a proper tribute missionFootnote 30 and were allowed a number of tribute missions, and hence opportunities for trade, that most other countries could only dream of.Footnote 31 More missions, of course, meant more opportunities to trade (though, at least for the Koreans, it also gave the early Ming emperors more opportunities to make demands).
But the Ming authorities were not only permissive, for instance by removing some trade restrictions, they also actively assisted the trade of select polities. The Ryukyuans were thus supplied with ships for their tribute missions by the early Ming rules, part of a wider package of preferential treatments for the island kingdom.Footnote 32 While the Ryukyuans would come to be seen as one of the few vassals that truly behaved according to Chinese ideals,Footnote 33 the reason for this early preferential treatment probably lay elsewhere, in Ming China's state security. It is likely that the Ming Empire wanted to use Ryukyu as a trade link between Japanese pirates and China, thus keeping the pirates at bay while lessening their need for marauding. The Chinese probably also wanted to acquire information about the pirates from Ryukyu. Moreover, Ryukyu was seen as a potential intermediary with Japan, a role it fulfilled in 1432.Footnote 34 No matter the reasons, in terms of Ming foreign policy instruments, Roderich Ptak has quite appositely spoken of Ming “development assistance” for this island kingdom.Footnote 35
To summarize, the newly founded Ming Empire soon instituted a wide-ranging policy that heavily restricted foreign trade. The basic aim was probably to cement the political stability of the emerging polity. The Ming then made use of this trade order to pursue more specific goals. Of course, economic statecraft was only one feature of Ming foreign policy; more often than not, it came in combination with other means, diplomacy being one of them.
Diplomatic Instruments
We again have to start our exploration by delineating the basic perimeters, the general pattern of diplomatic relations, that existed between Ming China and other polities. As noted above, every foreign polity that wished to trade—and there were many—had to come on official tributary missions. For this purpose, investiture by the Chinese Son of Heaven was usually necessary.Footnote 36 Tribute, trade, and investiture were thus closely tied to one another. In this section we shall first take a look at what might be called the ideal pattern of Ming China's interactions with others. After that, we shall examine diplomacy more broadly, focusing on two diplomatic instruments, admonishments and the establishment of marriage ties, neither of which turned out to be a great success.
The ideal pattern of Ming China's exchange with other polities may be told as follows: a ruler is invested with a title, he (rarely sheFootnote 37) sends tribute, his envoys perform the necessary rituals at the Ming court, the Ming emperor (or a subordinate) bestows gifts on these envoys, and after these envoys have received the opportunity to trade, they return home. No doubt plenty of exceptions can be found to this ideal pattern. But of greater interest for our purposes is how the Ming Empire made use of each of these elements to pursue its foreign policy goals.
The Ming turned out to be quite proactive in investing others, especially during the early period of the dynasty. Ming titles proliferated especially in the northern regions. “The practice was ancient,” as Frederick Mote notes, “but the scope of its use in Ming times was new.”Footnote 38 Still, titles were not bestowed willy-nilly. The Ming had two major foreign policy choices to make at this stage: who was to receive investiture, and what title was he to receive.
In the north, especially, the bestowal of titles was one means to exert at least a modicum of control over those who otherwise felt no allegiance to the Ming emperor. Though for many northerners the trading privileges associated with investiture were probably of greater value than the titles themselves,Footnote 39 the paraphernalia of investiture were not entirely meaningless.Footnote 40 This provided an opportunity for the Ming: several Chinese Supreme Commanders tried to exploit and deepen divisions among the Mongols by bestowing titles on particular leaders.Footnote 41 The overall efficacy of this policy may be doubted;Footnote 42 but that it was not entirely without any effect was demonstrated when a Mongol leader complained to the Ming about the high title given to Altan Khan, which he felt changed the natural order among the Mongols by seemingly putting Altan Khan above him.Footnote 43
Binding others to its purpose was a major Ming goal in bestowing titles on Jurchen leaders in the northeast. Here the Ming were in direct competition with the Koreans, who also tried their best to instill loyalty among the Jurchens with titles and trading rights.Footnote 44 In its relations with polities located at the other end of the empire, in Tibet, the Ming rulers were also not shy in bestowing titles. In this region an important factor was Ming China's claim to be the legitimate successor of the Yuan dynasty. In accord with this understanding, early Ming emperors, from Hongwu to Xuande (1368–1435), bestowed titles on anyone from Tibet who held office during the Yuan reign, when Tibet was more closely connected to the empire. But the Ming also acknowledged realities on the ground, as they did elsewhere, and gave titles to local powerholders.Footnote 45 After all, those who had the power to be a nuisance along the border needed to be controlled—keeping the border calm was one of the major purposes of these titles.Footnote 46 (Buddhism also played an important role here, a point to which we shall return later.) While Tibetans had no trouble appreciating the benefits of tribute-trade that came with holding a title, Chinese investiture was also not without intrinsic value. The Phagmodru rulers of Central Tibet, for instance, used Ming titles and seals in their domestic decrees, indicating that Ming investiture mattered for their legitimacy.Footnote 47
Investiture was more important still for those foreign leaders who associated it with their right to rule.Footnote 48 This was the case among some East Asian polities, especially Korea and Vietnam.Footnote 49 In particular, for a Korean ruler like Chungjong (r. 1506–45), who plotted his way to power, Ming investiture was essential. The Ming leadership initially refused to invest him and would only do so after he had sent several embassies to the Chinese court.Footnote 50 Instead of granting or withholding investiture, the Ming could raise or reduce the rank of the other party. The title of king (or prince) (wang 王) was bestowed on those that were deemed important enough. Altan Khan received such a title and so did leading Tibetan figures.Footnote 51 How effective changes in title were as a foreign policy tool depended on the other country; many countries probably were happy as long as trade kept on flowing. For Vietnam, however, it mattered. Having been reduced in rank in the middle of the sixteenth century,Footnote 52 Vietnamese envoys flocked to the Chinese court to ask for the reinstatement of the original title, as they also told their Korean interlocutors in Beijing.Footnote 53 Thus, the Ming held a not entirely ineffective foreign policy tool vis-à-vis countries that cared about investiture: it could turn them into supplicants.
Foreign envoys who arrived at the Ming court had to bring tribute. Ming China also made use of this second element of the ideal foreign relations pattern to further its overall goals. The Ming rulers were in general satisfied with receiving some local products as tribute without any greater value for the Chinese state economically or otherwise; much more important to them was the symbolic acknowledgment of Ming supremacy. This was, however, not exclusively the case. Horses were highly valued, and the early Ming rulers encouraged Central Asian countries to bring them as tribute.Footnote 54 The early Ming emperors in general showed a greater inclination to make demands on tributaries than the later rulers. This was especially the case for Korea, which had to deliver huge quantities of gold and silver as tribute.Footnote 55 This form of tribute was only canceled in 1429, after repeated Korean appeals to Ming compassion.Footnote 56
Once the tribute-bearing envoys arrived at the Ming court, the Chinese leadership was given the opportunity to make another choice: how to conduct the diplomatic ritual in front of the emperor. In most cases this was not really guided by much of a decision; that the envoys had to perform the correct ritual was pretty much a given. But even here choices could be made, either to lessen a potential source of friction or to show displeasure. Probably the only example of the former case is the Yongle emperor's treatment of the envoys of the mighty Timurid Empire. When these envoys proved unwilling to kowtow before the emperor, and only bowed, Yongle (r. 1402–24) “ignored” this since he “was so eager for good relations.”Footnote 57 The Japanese envoys of 1540 were received very differently. The Ming leadership was still quite upset with the Japanese for their riotous behavior in Ningbo in 1523. To properly convey this sentiment, the Jiajing emperor (r. 1521–67) refused to meet the envoys in person.Footnote 58
After the envoys had completed the appropriate rituals, they were usually showered with gifts, both for themselves and for their ruler. This was not the only channel for foreign rulers to receive gifts; the Ming, for instance, also sent them along with investiture envoys. Gifts had the same purpose as titles and ranks: to reward good behavior and bind foreign rulers closer to the Ming Empire. For instance, in 1407 the king of Champa received, according to official records, silver and silks “to commend him for having dispatched troops to assist in the expedition against Annam.”Footnote 59 One especially valuable gift was the four-clawed dragon robe, which was bestowed on deserving foreign leaders.Footnote 60 The Ming rulers also made use of clothes to make distinctions among polities. The Yongle emperor wanted to symbolize a familial relationship with foreign rulers and for this purpose bestowed imperial clothes on them. The rulers of Korea and Japan received clothes reserved for princes (i.e. imperial children), while the leaders of Ryukyu, Vietnam, and other countries were given those of imperial grandchildren.Footnote 61 In the case of close polities like Korea, clothes were also bestowed on other members of the king's family.Footnote 62 Ideally, from the Chinese perspective, the foreign rulers would wear Ming clothes in their role as sovereign, visualizing the link between Ming supremacy and domestic rule. This was the case, for instance, in Ryukyu. Official posthumous portraits of Ryukyuan rulers show them dressed in Ming-style attire.Footnote 63
The final element of the ideal pattern was the stay of the foreign envoys in the Ming capital, initially Nanjing, then Beijing after 1421. The residence of foreign envoys, the Huitongguan 會同館,Footnote 64 was not only the great meeting place of the peoples of Asia, it was also the place where envoys could finally make their trip worthwhile in material terms—that is, it was here that they were allowed to trade. This gave the Ming one more instrument, if not necessarily a powerful one. The Ming could show its satisfaction with those countries that were closest to itself, the ones that always behaved properly: Korea and Ryukyu. The envoys of these two countries were the only ones exempted from the rule that trade was permitted only every five days. Korean and Ryukyuan envoys could trade much more freely.Footnote 65
Having delineated the ideal pattern of exchange and the ways the Ming could use each step as a foreign policy instrument, we can now turn to diplomacy more broadly. Ming China did not establish any resident embassies in foreign countries. Diplomacy was conducted via envoys who went to foreign lands to fulfill specific purposes, among them the acquisition of desirable products that were lacking within the empire itself.Footnote 66 The choice of envoys itself was an important instrument in trying to connect with others. The Ming leadership made, for instance, full use of the fact that people of various ethnicities resided in the empire, sending out Mongols to Mongolia,Footnote 67 Tibetans to Tibet,Footnote 68 and Koreans to Korea.Footnote 69 These Ming embassies usually arrived at foreign capitals with edicts, letters, or other missives in hand. The Ming leadership fully understood the importance of proper diplomatic communication. In 1407 it established the Siyiguan 四夷館, the Board of Translators, which included eight departments, meaning eight languages were taught and studied there.Footnote 70 The major purpose for establishing this institution was to enable the Chinese leadership to properly communicate with the tributary envoys arriving from all over the known world at the Ming court.Footnote 71 But translation was also vital for outward messages. For instance, a Ming edict of 1453, addressed to a Mongol leader, was written not only in Chinese but also in Mongol.Footnote 72 Another important diplomatic language of which the Ming made much use was Persian.Footnote 73 Embassies were also accompanied by interpreters, who had learned useful phrases from glossaries that allowed them to communicate on a range of topics.Footnote 74
This ability to communicate with polities around the world also made it easier to make use of one diplomatic instrument: admonishments. Here the Ming Empire took on the role of political mediator between two warring parties, mostly in Southeast Asia.Footnote 75 These admonishments were sometimes relayed via missions, sometimes handed directly to the tributary envoys at the Ming court. This practice began early. In December 1369 Hongwu (r. 1368–98) sent two envoys to Vietnam and Champa with an imperial proclamation. ChampaFootnote 76 had earlier used the occasion of a tribute mission to the Ming court to complain about Vietnamese attacks. The proclamation read in part:
I am the ruler of all under Heaven. I control disorder and assist those in peril. These are things which principle dictates. I am now sending an envoy to examine this matter and to instruct you in the proper way to show your awe of Heaven and to not act beyond your own status. … Rulers of these two countries, you should both listen to my words, each observing the Way, and be content in your present circumstances.
The Veritable Records of the Ming Dynasty (Ming shilu 明實錄) adds, “When the proclamations arrived, the two countries heeded them and ordered that the troops cease fighting.”Footnote 77 In light of the fact that Champa told the Ming only two years later that Vietnam had invaded its territory, the accuracy of this statement can be doubted.Footnote 78
In 1481, after Champa had already been incorporated into Vietnam, Malacca (Melaka) sent envoys to the Ming court to express its fear of Vietnam and ask for Chinese help. The Ming minister of war argued that “warnings about future actions should be issued.” Thus, the Vietnamese ruler received this admonishment: “Both your country and Melaka follow the Court's calendar. You should maintain good relations with them and act as a screen for the Court.” The Malaccans, on the other hand, received the sage advice that they “should train soldiers and horses to defend against them.”Footnote 79
As the continuous appeals to the Ming court by Malaccans and others demonstrate, the Chinese empire was seen as a vital factor in the affairs of Southeast Asia.Footnote 80 Local aggressors even thought necessary to apologize and promise to reform their conduct. But the inefficacy of Ming admonishments underlines that this foreign policy instrument was, in the end, mostly useless. This was even the case when the imperial instructions came with straightforward military threats (also illustrating that the use of diplomatic and military instruments were not always neatly kept apart). For instance, Ayutthaya (Siam) received this message in 1407, after other polities had complained about its aggressive behavior: “The Li bandits of Annam, both father and son, previously met disaster. You can take warning from that.”Footnote 81 This referred to the Chinese invasion of Vietnam not long before. However, as long as Ming China was not generally willing to back up its admonishments with the use of military force, they remained ineffective as foreign policy tools. Ayutthaya apologized to Ming China several times after it had been admonished—and after a while continued as before.Footnote 82 In the end, there was truly no good reason why China would actually employ military force. None of the countries in Southeast Asia posed a serious threat to its economic or security interests. Towards the end of the fifteenth century, the Ming lost interest in getting involved at all. The distant foreigners needed to deal with their own issues.Footnote 83
If admonishments were mostly an ineffectual tool of foreign policy, the attempt to establish marriage alliances, especially with Korea, was outright harmful to Ming China's external relations. Unlike many of the preceding dynasties, for instance the Han and Tang, Ming China did not send princesses to foreign lands to marry the local rulers.Footnote 84 Instead, it followed in the footsteps of the Mongol Yuan in pursuing marriage ties with Korea.Footnote 85 The Korean elite had intermarried with the Mongol Yuan elite for the last hundred years, thus establishing deep familial ties between the Yuan empire and the kingdom on the peninsula. According to Cui Jing,Footnote 86 Hongwu wanted to drive a wedge between this relationship and thus asked Korea to send women to the Ming court. This was rebuffed. But under Yongle a renewed demand for women from Korea was heeded. These women came from official families, and as such, as Cui notes, this should not be seen as simply the fulfillment of an emperor's personal desires. Yongle asked for women three times during his reign; two times he did so around the time that he set out for his first military expedition against the Yuan remnants, in 1408–09. It is thus possible that he tried to solidify the relationship with Korea before moving against the Mongols. However, if under Yongle there might have been a broader strategic purpose behind this practice, this soon ceased to be the case. Under Xuande (r. 1425–35) the desire for pleasure ruled. Wiser heads prevailed after Xuande's passing; there were no more demands for tribute girls from Korea.
The idea of following the Yuan in using marriage ties as a policy instrument was not necessarily a bad one. But the way it was conducted, as a forceful demand for human tribute, could only outrage the Koreans. And indeed, the Korean elite felt humiliated and came to resent the Ming for these requests.Footnote 87 Thus, more likely than not, the discontinuation of this practice was beneficial for the relationship between the two polities. In its relations with Korea the Ming leadership had anyway a much more powerful arrow in its foreign policy quiver: its cultural attractiveness.
Cultural Instruments
Much has been written on the cultural basis of the tributary order. Scholars have noted the importance of the Chinese perception of world order, based on Confucian ideals, according to which the world was hierarchically ordered.Footnote 88 Viewed from the perspective of the regional order, some scholars have further argued that (Confucian) culture played a vital role in determining how China interacted with other polities.Footnote 89
Chinese self-understandings and the cultural proclivities of others serve here as the background; what matters much more for us are the specific cultural instruments that the Ming dynasty employed in attempts to further its goals. Cultural policies have the general purpose of developing an appreciation of one's own culture in a foreign polity, or, where this appreciation already exists, of further solidifying the common bond. This can be achieved through the active dissemination of culture. Today there are countless channels through which culture flows towards other states, some highly government directed, some less so. Novels, movies, national institutes—these and many other disseminators of culture exist. The Ming government also was active in this regard, disseminating cultural objects to foreign lands, and inviting students to learn about its mores.
We shall begin our examination with Confucian cultural instruments, and then turn to Buddhist instruments. For a cultural policy to be effective, the recipient must at least have some inclination towards appreciating the underlying culture. Hence, the effectiveness of Confucian-based cultural instruments was heavily circumscribed in regions where there was little desire to share in its values. This did not stop the Ming from trying. In 1441, for instance, in an attempt to keep Confucian ideals alive among the former rulers of China, the Mongol leader Esen (r. 1438–53/54)Footnote 90 was presented with a Mongol translation of the Classic of Filial Piety.Footnote 91 His reaction is not recorded; but Esen, the scourge of mid-fifteenth century China, certainly was anything but filial to the Chinese emperor. Other efforts were also not crowned with visible success. Yongle distributed thousands of exemplars of a didactic text written by the Chinese empress to foreign polities. Among them were many Southeast Asian countries, for instance Ayutthaya, which received one hundred copies of one work in 1404; but it is unlikely that this led to any major changes in their perceptions of the Ming, let alone their policies towards them.Footnote 92
Ming policies towards countries that admired the civilization of the Middle Kingdom were geared towards strengthening already existing cultural ties. The Ming bestowed editions of the Confucian classics on Korea and Vietnam or gave them permission to acquire these works.Footnote 93 The Vietnamese envoys at the Ming court gladly took up this offer; they became vital disseminators of Chinese books in their homeland.Footnote 94 The Ming also made sure that those who shared to a greater or lesser extent the Confucian lifeworld of the literati elite, that is, the envoys from Japan, Vietnam, Korea, and Ryukyu, were all housed together in the southern building of the Huitongguan.Footnote 95 Here they not only interacted with each other,Footnote 96 but also met Ming officials at the banquets held for foreign envoys,Footnote 97 thus strengthening their cultural bonds. Interactions between Chinese literati and East Asian envoys were not confined to Beijing. The Japanese, for instance, also interacted with Chinese literati in the harbor city of Ningbo.Footnote 98 While these exchanges were not necessarily state-directed, by creating an environment in which these exchanges could occur, Ming China at least allowed for a deepening of cultural appreciation.
The Chinese government also invited foreign rulers to send some of their subjects as students to Ming institutions of higher learning. Initially only Korea responded favorably to this invitation.Footnote 99 But Ryukyu was soon to follow, and became an especially eager participant in this undertaking, as shown in Ming records.Footnote 100 Ming China also trumpeted this to foreign lands. For instance, in 1397 it sent a message to Ayutthaya (asking it to transmit this message further to others), which read in part:
But who does not know that the king and the prime minister of Greater Ryukyu have sent their sons and younger brothers to receive our Chinese education, that the Emperor gave them winter and summer clothing and that when they were ill he sent doctors to examine them. The Emperor's heart is greatly imbued with both benevolence and righteousness.Footnote 101
While these proclamations probably had little effect on those polities, when it comes to Ryukyu itself, the invitation of students should be considered a resounding policy success. On the one hand, it acculturated those who dealt directly with the Chinese government into its mores. For instance, one Ryukyuan student served also as tribute envoy for his country.Footnote 102 On the other hand, these students contributed to the establishment of closer cultural bonds between China and the island kingdom. These students became elite members of Ryukyuan society, and in this position became transmitters of Chinese civilization.Footnote 103 Next to the economic and diplomatic instruments discussed above, Ming China's cultural policies vis-à-vis Ryukyu helped in turning the island country into one of its most loyal tributaries. In 1579 the Ming empire demonstrated its appreciation by noting in an imperial edict brought to the kingdom that Ryukyu was “singularly worthy to be known as a land where ritual propriety is observed.”Footnote 104
Much more could be said about the role of Confucianism in Ming foreign policy, but we shall move on now to Buddhism and its place in China's external affairs. The early Ming emperors vigorously embraced Buddhism, and many of the later emperors followed them. Only under the Jiajing emperor, a dogmatic Daoist, was there outright hostility.Footnote 105 Since Buddhism was also central in many foreign countries, it was possible to establish cultural ties based on this belief system.
Ming China used Buddhist cultural instruments in dealing with several polities, both in East and Inner Asia. In the case of Japan this was a wise choice. Buddhist monks were pivotal in Japanese foreign affairs, for instance as writers of diplomatic letters.Footnote 106 Hongwu was well aware of Japan's Buddhist leanings, sending two Buddhist monks as envoys to Japan in 1372. According to one of these Chinese monk-envoys, Hongwu had told them before their mission, “We have heard that the sovereign and ministers as well as the noblemen and the common people [of Japan] all know to worship Buddha and to respect the Buddhist clergy. It is only priests such as you who can win their trust.”Footnote 107 The Ming thus tried to use Buddhism to establish more amicable relations with Japan (though this would not come to pass until after Hongwu for a variety of reasons that cannot be discussed further here).Footnote 108 The Ming continued to use Buddhist monks as envoys to Japan in the coming decades, for instance in 1402, under the Jianwen emperor (r. 1398–1402),Footnote 109 showing that China saw the usefulness in establishing a cultural link based on Buddhism.
Buddhism also featured in the interactions between the Ming and other East Asian polities. Vietnamese monks who made their way to the newly founded Ming capital Nanjing were welcomed with open arms. A Chinese mission to the southern neighbor in 1385 asked for twenty more Vietnamese monks to be sent to the Ming capital.Footnote 110 But Buddhism as a foreign policy instrument could only succeed when the other side shared a certain devotion for it. Thus, when the Ming sent Buddhist objects as gifts to their Korean neighbors, who were just undergoing a period of widespread Confucianization, this “created particularly awkward situations,” as Marsha Haufler has pointed out.Footnote 111
Buddhist objects were much more appreciated as gifts in Tibet. Frequent exchanges of Buddhist objects between China and Central Tibet, among them statues and monk habits, are documented in Ming records.Footnote 112 It was in China's relationship with Tibetan polities that Buddhism played the greatest role as a foreign policy instrument. This was already evident under Hongwu who, for instance, sent a Buddhist monk to Tibet, Nepal, and India to collect scriptures. This envoy not only returned with the desired sutras but also with emissaries of various lands, including central Tibet.Footnote 113
The Ming emperors also made an effort to properly accommodate Tibetan monks arriving at the Ming capital on tribute missions by building Tibetan Buddhist monasteries.Footnote 114 Tibetans were thus given special treatment and housed apart from virtually all other foreign envoys who usually stayed in the Huitongguan. This went beyond the housing of envoys: up to two thousand Tibetan monks lived in lamaseries in Beijing, receiving financial support from the imperial house.Footnote 115 Ming China also actively sought out high-ranking Tibetan Buddhist lamas, inviting them to the imperial court, most famously the Fifth Karmapa.Footnote 116
In all of these activities one should not ignore the personal beliefs of the emperors.Footnote 117 But in addition to personal inclinations, there was also a larger foreign policy goal, namely the desire to spread Ming authority throughout the Buddhist realm. In a letter to one Tibetan Buddhist hierarch, Yongle called himself “balacakravartin, the great Da-Ming emperor.” Thus, “the Chinese ruler clearly represented himself not only as the Son of Heaven in Confucian terms but also as an enlightened, consecrated Buddhist sovereign.”Footnote 118 At least for Yongle, his important role within the Buddhist lifeworld was recognized. For instance, one Tibetan source elevated him to the same level as Khubilai Khan as a benefactor of Tibetan Buddhism.Footnote 119
The Ming authorities thus readily employed Buddhist cultural instruments in their relationship with Tibet. Buddhist gifts were bestowed, monasteries provided, special invitations handed out, and declarations made in a shared cultural script. Whatever the ultimate purpose, cultural policies helped in establishing relations that were overall stable and peaceful. This was much less the case for Ming attempts to “civilize” northern peoples by using Buddhist cultural instruments. For instance, a Ming mission to the far northeast, to the Wild Jurchens, erected a Buddhist temple, but this attempt at conversion failed miserably.Footnote 120
The Ming pursued a much more vigorous Buddhist policy vis-à-vis the Mongols. After the fall of the Yuan dynasty, Buddhism had suffered a decline among the Mongols, but it had not entirely vanished, thus still offering a cultural link. On the Mongol side, for instance, the Oirat leader Esen employed monks as members of his missions to the Ming court.Footnote 121 The Ming side also early on recognized the desirability of establishing Buddhist ties. For instance, as Ban Shin'ichirō has argued, the Ming probably rebuilt a stupa in the imperial borderland in Hexi 河西 to develop friendly relations with the Mongols living in this area.Footnote 122
But the employment of Buddhism was still limited during this early period; the Ming had to wait until the mid-sixteenth century, when under the leadership of Altan Khan Mongols converted en masse to Tibetan Buddhism.Footnote 123 Though Ming China played no role in this conversion, which was based on a direct link between Mongolia and Tibet,Footnote 124 it immediately recognized its importance and tried to shape it in its favor. When Altan Khan asked China to supply him with Buddhist monks and sutras, the Ming happily complied.Footnote 125 Moreover, as Henry Serruys has noted, the Mongol movement to translate Buddhist sutras into Mongol “was strongly encouraged by the Ming who detected in it a softening and civilizing influence upon their erstwhile enemies.”Footnote 126
Among Ming officialdom some saw this policy as a complete success. For instance, Xiao Daheng 蕭大亨 (1532–1612), who occupied throughout his career many high-ranking positions including Minister of War, wrote in 1594: “The customs of the barbarians used to be savage and cruel, and for a long time it was impossible to civilize them. But since they submitted and began to pay tribute, they have conceived a great regard for the Buddhist faith.”Footnote 127
How much the Ming empire actually contributed to this development is certainly debatable. But here we need only note the importance the Ming leadership itself put on cultural foreign policy instruments, of which it employed a great variety. The use of these instruments did not always lead to success, even in combination with economic and diplomatic instruments. When all these instruments failed to foster the correct conduct in others, Ming China could pursue a different, a more violent, path.
Military Instruments
The Ming empire, like any major polity in history, used its power to shape the conduct of others. Some scholars have put this fact at the very heart of Ming foreign relations. For instance, Yuan-kang Wang has argued that “it was Chinese preponderance of power that made many Asian polities accept the tributary arrangement.”Footnote 128 While it remains open to debate which factors underpinned Ming China's tributary order—a debate that would need to take into consideration not only that a mixture of factors played a role, but also that this mixture may have differed from relationship to relationship—the immense power of the Chinese empire certainly allowed it to make use of a range of military instruments to shape the conduct of others.
War itself was more often than not a last resort. More frequently, the Ming threatened military violence, thus trying to have its foreign policy designs impressed on others without actually having to bear the cost of fighting—sometimes these were idle threats, on other occasions the mobilization of troops soon followed. The direct application of force, or the threat of its use, would, however, have been much less effective if the Ming had no conception of its opponents; it had to gather information on them. While this information was no doubt also useful for diplomacy, ultimately, information-gathering served the purpose of military preparedness, and it is as such that we shall discuss it here as the first major military instrument that the Ming employed in its foreign relations. Then we shall move on to military threats, and finally to war.
Ming China had no designated spy agency; the collection of information on foreign polities was conducted more or less ad hoc. We can divide this into two major forms of activities: spying during wartime for immediate military purposes, and general information-gathering that helped to better understand the outside world. As Kawagoe Yasuhiro has noted, the first type is difficult to grasp due to a lack of extant sources. However, based on available evidence, he has shown that spy-craft flourished around the time of the Tumu incident of 1449, when Ming China clashed with the Mongols under the leadership of Esen. These “spies” (really soldiers designated for particular tasks) gathered intelligence on the enemy while also conducting other activities such as sabotage.Footnote 129
The second type of activity, gathering all kinds of information on foreign lands, was much broader. For this purpose, the Ming court made use of its own envoys. Ming emissaries to Tibet, for instance, gathered information on the geography and the political circumstances of this region.Footnote 130 Another example is the diplomat Chen Cheng 陳誠 (1365–1457), who wrote several essays on his travels to the Timurid Empire, containing much useful information about this major foreign power.Footnote 131 In this regard, Ming envoys fulfilled a function similar to today's resident ambassadors, sending home useful information about their host countries.
Foreign envoys were also an important source of information. Yongle, for instance, “often personally questioned recent arrivals from the west on the conditions of the route they had travelled with the goal of learning about the eastern and Oirat Mongol tribes.”Footnote 132 Chinese officials continued to learn about recent developments in Central Asia from envoys, which was also reflected in the maps of this region created by Ming mapmakers.Footnote 133 (Mapmaking was in general an important military instrument. During the sixteenth century, with the two major enemies being the Mongols in the north and the Japanese pirates in the south, maps were produced both of the northern region and the coastal areas. The latter also included a map of Japan.Footnote 134)
The Ming leadership also received intelligence of military importance directly from some of its tributaries. The Ryukyu Kingdom, for example, loyal vassal that it was, warned the Ming dynasty at the end of the sixteenth century of the impending Japanese invasion of Korea.Footnote 135 Although the Ming had not set up a proper channel of intelligence-exchange, its establishment of friendly relations with Ryukyu meant that it could trust in its tributary to provide vital information. Ming China's position within the East Asian order also turned it into a conduit of important intelligence. After the war, Ryukyu promised the Korean king, to his delight, that it would send information on Japan to the Ming court, which in turn would relate them to Korea.Footnote 136 The Ming thus took on a nodal position in the East Asian intelligence network, giving it the ability to distribute important information.
Military threats were another frequently employed instrument. Threats always had a specific aim, some of greater importance than others. Among the less important aims were the more determined “invitations” to become vassals of the Ming empire that some foreign leaders received, as when a Ming envoy to Boni, a polity often identified as Brunei,Footnote 137 threatened his host with “a great army” if he did not submit.Footnote 138 Related to the tributary order, Hongwu also threatened the polity San Foqi,Footnote 139 which he suspected of hindering foreign envoys from reaching Chinese shores. An edict, to be transferred via Ayutthaya and Java, included this unambiguous message: “If the Emperor is angered, he can send a general with 100,000 men to cross the seas and mete out punishment.”Footnote 140 Nothing came of this; but the willingness to use military threats as foreign policy means is evident.
Military threats were also part and parcel of early Ming foreign policy in Northeast Asia. In 1381 Hongwu, increasingly frustrated with Japanese conduct, had the Ming Ministry of Rites send out two letters, one each to the two people he considered to be the rulers of Japan, in which he threatened both of them with military action.Footnote 141 Hongwu also threatened the neighbor in the northeast, Korea—both the Koryŏ dynastyFootnote 142 and the succeeding Chosŏn dynasty, which he intimidated with talk of a “punitive expedition.”Footnote 143 In the case of Korea the military instrument soon ceased to be of much importance: relations were amicable, and other instruments, diplomatic and cultural ones foremost among them, took center stage. This was not the case for another direct neighbor and member of the East Asian cultural sphere, Vietnam. In Ming relations to this southern neighbor we can see the frequent employment of military threats.
Discord between China and Vietnam was rampant during the Ming period, beginning with Hongwu's reign. In 1396, after a Chinese official in a province bordering Vietnam complained that the southern neighbor had invaded a Ming prefecture, the diplomat Chen Cheng was sent south to chastise the Vietnamese king. In letters sent to the king, Chen, next to appealing to Confucian morality, threatened military action if Vietnam were not to return to its border.Footnote 144 In 1406 (to note a major instance of the use of war as an instrument) Ming China invaded Vietnam and occupied it for about two decades.Footnote 145 Ultimately, because Vietnam was annexed to the Ming Empire, this was a war of expansion, though the initial cause of this war is still being debated.Footnote 146
This military adventure ended in a debacle, and Ming China returned to its original borders in the 1420s; but this did not end discord with Vietnam. After the Ming occupation, border conflicts persisted.Footnote 147 Vietnam's actions towards other polities were also noticed with growing apprehension. When in 1475 it became clear that Vietnam had occupied Champa, Chinese officials counseled against rash actions, but they also argued that “We should instruct the grand defenders, regional commanders and other officials to supervise their troops in arranging firm defense, so as to prevent the calamity of a surprise attack.”Footnote 148 An attack by Vietnam was not ruled out. In the following years Champa continued to make entreaties to the Ming court, calling for help. In 1490, after Champa again complained to China, the Vietnamese envoy at the Ming court was told by the Ministry of Rites to stay within its borders. “Otherwise, the Court will suddenly become greatly angered and the Imperial troops will crush your territory and it will be like the events during the Yong-le reign (1403–24). Can you afford not to repent!”Footnote 149 However, at this point Ming China had no real interest in getting any deeper involved in this conflict.Footnote 150
The conditions within Vietnam finally pushed China to all-out military mobilization. When the Jiajing emperor noticed that the throne in Vietnam had been usurped, he thirsted for military intervention.Footnote 151 The Ming Empire sent its military to the south, clearly showing that this time military threats were not empty. War was only averted when the Vietnamese usurper abased himself before the Ming army.Footnote 152 While this did not achieve Jiajing's desired restoration of the Le dynasty, it clearly re-established Vietnamese submission to Ming China. A threat backed by the actual mobilization of military forces is more convincing than mere words.
Ming China was well-prepared to make use of military instruments.Footnote 153 How willing it was to actually employ them is a different question. Wan Ming has argued that the first Ming emperor, Hongwu, was fundamental in shaping the foreign policy of the Ming Empire by instituting a non-intervention policy towards many polities in Northeast and Southeast Asia (excluding the Mongol polities of the north). After his reign, aside from the invasion of Vietnam under Yongle, this policy was followed. This was not some eternal feature of the Chinese tributary system, as Wan emphasizes, but rather a policy specific to the Ming Empire.Footnote 154 And indeed, overall, especially when compared to the preceding Yuan dynasty and the succeeding Qing dynasty, Ming China was less of an expansionist polity. It should be added, though, that the southern part of the empire, especially Yunnan, which had been integrated into the Ming Empire under Hongwu, remained a zone of frequent wars that involved the Ming state, natives, and regional powers.Footnote 155
While the Ming (mostly) eschewed expansionism, this did not mean that China foreswore the use of force as military instrument during this period. Especially in the north, military means, if deemed necessary, were seen as an acceptable way to advance Chinese interests,Footnote 156 even if there was not always agreement on how best to employ them.Footnote 157 But the use of force was also employed against other polities. The Zheng He voyages, though not clearly driven by expansionist designs, were supposed to impress on others the greatness of the Ming Empire, in wealth and military power.Footnote 158 For this purpose, the use of force was not excluded as an instrument. As the Ming History (Ming shi 明史) put it a few centuries after the voyages, “When a ruler did not submit, he [Zheng He] used military force to intimidate him.”Footnote 159 Zheng He and his forces, for instance, intervened militarily in Sri Lanka, effecting a change in regimes.Footnote 160 (This is not to suggest that the Zheng He voyages should be looked at solely as a military instrument; one can also relate them to other categories, especially diplomatic instruments, since they also helped in fostering diplomatic ties with the Ming and other polities.)
As any major state would, the Ming also employed military force to defend itself, be that against piratesFootnote 161 or Portuguese,Footnote 162 to name but two enemies. The Ming also used force to protect some of its more important tributaries. This was, however, not a common feature of Ming policy. As noted above, the Ming did try to adjudicate between its tributaries; but it rarely intervened militarily. One exception was Hami. The Ming campaigned against Turfan to keep this important oasis town free of outside influence and close to China.Footnote 163 Another vital factor in this intervention was that some Ming officials felt that they had to employ military force to demonstrate China's power. As one official involved in this campaign noted: “If a heavenly dynasty like ours cannot fight the enemy outside of the Chia-yü [Jiayu] Pass, how can we prove our strength to the various barbarians?”Footnote 164 The most important intervention was arguably the military assistance that the Ming Empire sent to help Korea against the Japanese invasion at the end of the sixteenth century. This was a major military effort, one in which the protection of a loyal tributary and self-defense against a foreign polity that wished to conquer China aligned.Footnote 165 It was also a successful effort, preventing the Japanese occupation of Korea and preserving the Ming as the leading polity in the East Asian order.
More instances of the use of military force could be named, but here it is only important to note that military instruments, along with economic, diplomatic, and cultural ones, played an important role in the foreign policy of the Ming Empire.
Conclusion
This article has shown that Ming China made use of a wide range of foreign policy instruments. It imposed trade restrictions and provided economic benefits; it handed out titles, bestowed gifts, and admonished its tributaries; it distributed texts, sent Buddhist monks as envoys, and tried to find common cultural ground; and it spied, threatened, and fought. A survey of these and other means reveals that Ming foreign policy was multifaceted and dynamic.
As noted in the introduction, one limitation of this study is the focus the early Ming. A deeper exploration of late Ming foreign policy instruments would not only be worthwhile in its own right, but would also allow a broader examination of changes over time. Another useful comparison would be across dynasties. The Ming both broke with earlier practices—for instance in its maritime prohibitions—and built on them, as in its attempt to create marriage alliances with Korea. A more systematic study of these continuities and discontinuities would be fruitful.
What can already be noted based on this study, is that there was no categorical difference in the instruments employed towards Inner and East Asian polities. This is not to say that there were no differences. For instance, Confucian cultural instruments found much greater use, and more enthusiastic receivers, in the East Asian cultural zone. However, this divergence should not be overemphasized. Trade restrictions were as much considered toward the Mongols as they were towards the Japanese. Military threats were also not only employed against the steppe peoples; Vietnam, for instance, found itself frequently at the receiving end. Cultural policies were also not reserved only for the “Confucian” sphere; Buddhism provided links to Tibet, as indeed it did to Japan. In the diplomatic sphere we also find similar acts, such as the provision of the title of “king,” throughout all of Asia. Again, all of this is not to say that there were no differences. The relationship that Ming China entertained with Chosŏn Korea was indeed quite different from, say, the one it had with Mongol polities. However, an appreciation of such differences should always go hand in hand with a recognition of the similarities.
