Fascination with the history of the South American rubber boom never wanes. Its innate dramatic quality, the extraordinary touches of the bizarre which spice its narrative, and the ironic blend of climax and catastrophe which distinguish almost every aspect of its development have all proved sufficient guarantee against oblivion. Drawn by the curiosity of circumstances such as these, travellers have since penetrated the region to see for themselves the remains of former prosperity, and to marvel upon the strangely assorted flotsam of that great economic bonanza still left littered along the banks by the boom's swiftly retreating tide. A journey along the South American ‘rubber rivers’ is likely to tempt even the most phlegmatic observer to philosophize upon the vagaries of fortune in general—and upon Amazonia's experiences in particular.

During the period since the Revolution of 1952 and the later agrarian reform a new settlement type has been created in the northern Altiplano and the sub-tropical valleys of the Yungas of La Paz. New nucleated settlements have been built by the rural people, largely spontaneously, and they represent a break with the dispersed pattern of dwellings that was the characteristic form of rural settlement prior to 1952.

One of the most provocative statements in Jewell and Patterson's recent textbook on the American legislative process is that there is an inherent contradiction between political party and committee leadership. They posit: ‘Where committees are strong and independent, party leadership is weak. Where party leadership is strong, the committees are either weak or simply agents of the party leaders.’ As an example, the authors argue that congressional committees in the United States are strong, proud and independent, whereas the leadership of political parties is comparatively weak. This independence is based in part on the fact that chairmen of committees are selected by seniority and traditionally have not been removed by party leaders. Party lines are often crossed in the voting within committee, and chairmen have considerable say over whether a bill will be reported out or not.

Since the dramatic widening of the international economy in the last quarter of the nineteenth century foreign capital and enterprise have played a prominent role in the export trades of the primary producing countries. That so much initiative should have come from outside is not surprising since the timing of the entry of these countries into world markets was determined by the demands of the industrial nations rather than by their own level of commercial preparation. The establishment of foreign businesses inevitably brought mixed reactions in the host countries, stemming from the recognition that, while local capital and enterprise could not cope with the sudden commercial expansion, foreign interests were in a position to exploit that very fact. Primary producing countries, therefore, sought to impose statutory regulations on export companies designed to safeguard the producers and, more generally, to harmonize business operations with the government's conception of the national interest.

By April 1938, Lázaro Cárdenas had altered the course of modern Mexican history. The hacienda system had virtually disappeared to be replaced by smallholdings and by collective and semi-collective ejidos. The church-state quarrel, cause of so much bloodshed in the 1920s, had largely subsided; the Catholic Church had supported the government against the foreign oil companies, even seeking to help the government collect money to pay for the nationalization. Both the nation's agrarian and urban workers had formed powerful, well-organized unions ready and able to defend their members' newly won gains. Most important to subsequent developments, however, was the government's expropriation of the foreign oil companies in March of 1938. The oil companies had defied every twentieth-century Mexican government; nationalization temporarily united Mexicans as never before in the nation's history. Although these accomplishments, especially the land reform and oil expropriation, established Cárdenas's credentials as the most radical of modern Mexican presidents, his subsequent behaviour has made many, especially on the extreme left, question his sincerity.

Historical writing in English on the diplomatic aspects of the Brazilian naval revolt of 1893–4 tends to be based on United States sources and, consequently, an American interpretation runs through most writing on the subject. This interpretation regards the revolt as an attempt to restore the monarchy by the insurgents with secret support from the European Powers, especially Britain, who were jealous of the increasing American political and economic influence in the newly established Republic of Brazil.

On 31 January 1849 the representative of the Peruvian government, General Osma, and the Committee of Spanish American Bondholders signed an agreement in London on the terms for settling debts to British investors which had been in default since October 1825. More than a year before, the Peruvian president had spoken of his administration's desire ‘to bring this matter at once to a termination, and revive the credit which the Republic lost in Europe almost at the same time as it came into existence’ Peruvian credit was, as hoped, restored by the act of good faith in 1849, and was further boosted by the government's growing income from the guano trade, which had been in operation for almost a decade. Having wiped the slate clean in 1849, Peru went on to expand its overseas debt commitments and become, in the space of a few years, the largest Latin American borrower on the London money market. The year 1849, therefore, marks a notable turning point in Peruvian financial history.