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The “Case” for Independent Courts: The Insurance Theory of Judicialization in Autocracies

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 December 2024

Taraleigh Davis Open the ORCID record for Taraleigh Davis [Opens in a new window]
Taraleigh Davis*
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science and International Studies, Bradley University, Peoria, IL, USA
*
Email: tdavis4@fsmail.bradley.edu
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Abstract

Why would authoritarian rulers allow for an independent judiciary that could constrain their power? This study extends the insurance theory of judicial independence to autocratic contexts, arguing that when leaders perceive a higher risk of losing office, they become more likely to tolerate or create independent courts as a safeguard against potential post-exit reprisals. Using a novel two-stage analytical approach, I construct a hazard rate for each country year from the Geddes et al. (2014) autocratic regime dataset, based on factors directly observable to autocratic leaders. This hazard rate serves as a proxy for perceived risk of losing power. My findings provide robust evidence that higher perceived risk is significantly associated with greater judicial independence in autocratic regimes, even when controlling for economic development, regime longevity, and court age. This research offers crucial insights into autocratic governance, demonstrating that promoting judicial independence can be a calculated strategy for regime survival rather than merely a democratic concession.

Keywords

courtsjudicial independenceauthoritarianism

Information

Type
Special Issue Article
Information
Journal of Law and Courts , Volume 13 , Issue 1 , April 2025 , pp. 35 - 50
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2024. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Law and Courts Organized Section of the American Political Science Association

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