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County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union: Embracing the Endorsement Test
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 24 April 2015
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In County Of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, the United States Supreme Court held that the establishment clause of the first amendment of the Constitution did not permit Allegheny County, Pennsylvania to allow a local Catholic group to display a nativity scene inside the county courthouse. At the same time, however, the Court permitted a city display of a Chanukah menorah next to a Christmas tree on the steps of the Pittsburgh City Hall. The Court divided 5-to-4 in invalidating the creche and 6-to-3 in upholding the menorah, with no single opinion commanding a majority of the Court on the question of the Chanukah symbol. More importantly, the majority opinion officially adopted the Endorsement test, a new analytical tool which uses a case-by-case balancing approach in which constitutional judgments concerning religious symbols are dependent upon the physical setting of the particular practice.
The Endorsement test originates from a 1984 case, Lynch v. Donnelly, in which the Court upheld a city-sponsored nativity scene that was surrounded by Santa's reindeer, a wishing well and candy canes. Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion stressed that the result in each case should turn on the “unique circumstances” and “particular physical setting” involved. Her opinion specifically focused on whether the practice at issue would be perceived as a government endorsement of a religious belief. By incorporating the use of “perspectives” during the decision-making process, the Endorsement test reflects the contribution of neutrality as a theoretical standard which recognizes that individuals perceive the world differently, and that one individual's neutrality may be another's bias.
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References
1. 109 S. Ct. 3086 (1989).
2. “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion. …” U.S. Const. amend. I.
3. 465 U.S. 668 (1984). See infra notes 69-87 and accompanying text.
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5. Id.
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18. See infra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 31-41 and accompanying text.
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33. Id. at 3135. Compare Everson, 330 U.S. at 18 (majority opinion) (since the government transported public school students, the concept of neutrality suggests that parochial school students receive similar transportation) with 330 U.S. at 58-60 (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (the concept of neutrality has been adhered to since all students may attend public school).
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42. See infra notes 57-65 and accompanying text. A number of commentators have criticized the imprecision of the Lemon test. See Beschle, supra note 20, at 163-66; Cornelius, supra note 20, at 3-4, 15-19; Feder, , And A Child Shall Lead Them: Justice O'Connor, The Principle Of Religious Liberty And Its Practical Application, 8 Pace L. Rev. 249Google Scholar; Howard, A.E.D., Baker, J.W., Derr, T.S., Church, State, and Politics 21 (1981)Google Scholar; Hurt, supra note 20; Smith, supra note 20, at 315; Valauri, supra note 20, at 86; See also Loewy, supra note 20.
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52. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
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56. Walz, 397 U.S. at 674.
57. 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
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59. McCollum v. Board of Educ, 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
60. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 313-14 (1952) (this type of program “respects the religious nature of our people and accommodates the public service to their spiritual needs.”)
61. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
62. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
63. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
64. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
65. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984). See also Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (while ignoring the Lemon test, the Court upheld prayers opening legislative sessions led by a state-paid chaplain. The Court emphasized the historical acceptance of the challenged practice.)
66. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
67. Edwards v. Aguillard, 107 S. Ct. 2573, 2578-79 (1987); Witters v. Washington Dep't of Services for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 488-89 (1986); Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 389 (1985); Wallace, 472 U.S. 38, 56 & n.42 (1985).
68. See infra notes 198-201 and accompanying text.
69. A number of commentators have expressed dissatisfaction with the Lynch decision. See Beschle, supra note 20; Braveman, supra note 20; Dorsen, , The Nativity Scene Case: An Error Of Judgment, 4 U. Ill. L. Rev. 837 (1985)Google Scholar; Loewy, supra note 20, at 1063-65; Tribe, supra note 20, at 610-11.
70. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 679-80.
71. Id. at 681.
72. Id. at 684 (quoting Lemon, 403 U.S. at 619-22).
73. Id. at 682.
74. Id. at 687.
75. Brief of the National Jewish Committee and the National Council of the Churches of Christ in the United States of America as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 3.
76. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 683.
77. Id. at 687 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
78. Id. at 688.
79. Id. at 692.
80. Id. at 694.
81. Id. at 690.
82. See supra notes 31-41 and accompanying text.
83. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
84. Id. at 692.
85. See infra notes 146-66 and accompanying text.
86. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 693 (O'Connor, J. concurring) (emphasis added).
87. Id. at 692.
88. See Beschle, supra note 20; Feder, supra note 42; Hurt, supra note 20; Loewy, supra note 20. See also Braveman, supra note 20, at 384-85. But see Smith, supra note 20 (the Endorsement test is doctrinally flawed and defective).
89. Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 3093-94.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 3094-95.
92. 842 F.2d 655, 663 (3rd Cir. 1988).
93. Id. at 662.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 663.
97. See supra notes 77-87 and accompanying text.
98. Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 3100.
99. Id. at 3101 (quoting Wallace, 472 U.S. at 70 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment) and quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added in Allegheny)).
100. Id. at 3103. See supra notes 69-76 and accompanying text.
101. Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 3104.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 3143 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
105. Id. at 3137 (Kennedy, J. concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part.)
106. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (citing Friedman v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Bernalillo County, 781 F.2d 777 (10th Cir. 1985) (Latin cross on official county seal)).
107. Id. at 3124 (Brennan J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
108. Id. at 3128 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
109. Id. at 3135 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part.) See infra notes and accompanying text.
110. Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 3135 (Kennedy, J. concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
111. See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
112. Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 3138 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part.)
113. See supra notes 77-87 and accompanying text.
114. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
115. Id.
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117. Id. at 4.
118. Dorsen, supra note 69, at 859.
119. Smith, supra note 20, at 290.
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125. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 303 (Brennan, J. concurring).
126. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 716 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan has suggested that history has removed the religious elements from various practices. See infra note 157 and accompanying text.
127. See McCreary v. Stone, 739 F. 2d 716 (2d Cir. 1984) (a disclaimer can rectify a situation where viewers might mistakenly attribute the private action to the state).
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129. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). See Loewy, supra note 20, at 1051 (the intoleration of segregated railroad cars and courtroom seating occurs “because of the discomfort of the [accompanying] message [of inferiority], not the seats.”)
130. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
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132. Tribe, supra note 20, at 611.
133. Mann, supra note 116, at 6.
134. See. e.g., Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
135. See, e.g., Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
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137. Tribe, supra note 20, at 611 (emphasis in original).
138. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 76 (O'Connor, J. concurring).
139. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
140. Marshall, supra note 7, at 537.
141. See Witters v. Washington Dept. of Services for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 493 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
142. Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 3104.
143. Id.
144. L. Tribe, supra note 122, at 1296.
145. Dorsen, supra note 69, at 860.
146. Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 3141 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
147. Id. at 3142 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
148. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
149. Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 3142 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 3143.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 3121 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
154. Id. at 3106.
155. Id. at 3106 & n.46 (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 693 (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
156. Id. at 3106.
157. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 716 (Brennan J., dissenting).
158. L. Tribe, supra note 122, at 1224. See Dorsen, supra note 69, at 847 (“the issue is how the Court should rely on history.”).
159. Loewy, supra note 20, at 1053 n.35 (Compare Justice Rehnquist's sources in Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 91 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) to reject the “wall” metaphor with the equally authoritative sources used by Justice Rutledge to reach the contrary conclusion in Everson, 330 U.S. at 28 (Rutledge, J., dissenting)).
160. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
161. Dorsen, supra note 69, at 849.
162. Choper, , The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling The Conflict, 41 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 673, 676–77 (1980)Google Scholar.
163. Beschle, supra note 20, at 164 & n.80.
164. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 237 (Brennan, J., concurring) (Justice Brennan also noted Chief Justice Marshall's wise aphorism that “it is a Constitution we are expounding”). Id. at 230.
165. Minow, supra note 37, at 839.
166. Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 820 (1973) (White, J., dissenting).
167. Johnson, supra note 37, at 839.
168. L. Tribe, supra note 122, at 1293. See also Marshall, supra note 7, at 533-34 (for an observer, “how endorsement is perceived depends largely upon one's initial outlook.”).
169. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 685.
170. N. Redlich, “Nativity Ruling Insults Jews,” N.Y. Times, March 26, 1984. L. Tribe, supra note 122, at n.66.
171. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 703 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
172. Id.
173. Tribe, supra note 20, at 611 (emphasis in original).
174. See, e.g., United States v. Carotene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
175. Dorsen, supra note 69, at 861 (emphasis in original).
176. Id. at 863-64. Professor Dorsen cites Palmore v. Sidoti, 104 S. Ct. 1879, 1882 (1984) (where racial prejudice is concerned, “[t]he Constitution cannot control such prejudices but neither can it tolerate them.”).
177. 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
178. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
179. Smith, supra note 20, at 291 & n. 103.
180. 647 F. Supp. 1194, 1199 (E.D. Tenn. 1986).
181. Minow, supra note 37, at 48.
182. Id. at 32. See also id. at 46 & n. 172 (citing James, W., “On a Certain Blindness In Human Beings” in On Some of Life's Ideals 3 (1912))Google Scholar (“What interests us, given who we are and where we stand, affects our ability to perceive.”). See also Cardozo, B., The Nature of the Judicial Process 167 (1921)Google Scholar (when Justices enter the world of the subjective their evaluation is subject to other forces: “Deep below consciousness are other forces, the likes and the dislikes, the predilections and the prejudices, the complex of instincts and emotions and habits and convictions, which make the man. …”).
183. Minow, supra note 37, at 15.
184. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 694 (“[A]lthough evidentiary submissions may help answer [whether the objective observer will perceive endorsement of religion], the question is, like the questions whether racial or sex-based classifications communicate an invidious message, in large part a legal question to be answered on the basis of judicial interpretation of social facts.”). Justice O'Connor distinguishes her Endorsement test from the “reasonable person” standard in tort law where factual questions are answered by the jury.
185. Minow, supra note 37, at 60.
186. Id. at 32.
187. Id. at 70.
188. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
189. Minow, supra note 37, at 81.
190. 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
191. Id. at 552.
192. Minow, supra note 37, at n.277 (citing Matsuda, , Liberal Jurisprudence and Abstracted Visions of Human Nature: A Feminist Critique of Rawls' Theory of Justice, 16 N.M.L. Rev. 613, 630 (1986))Google Scholar.
193. Minow, supra note 37, at n.185.
194. L. Tribe, supra note 122, at n.185.
195. Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 3144 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
196. Id. at 3144-45 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
197. Id. at 3145 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (quoting American Jewish Congress v. Chicago, 827 F.2d 120, 130 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting)).
198. Id. at 3120 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
199. 791 F.2d 1561 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 939 (1986).
200. 827 F.2d 120 (7th Cir. 1987).
201. Allegheny, 842 F. 2d at 655. See supra notes 92-96 and accompanying text.
202. 895 F.2d 953 (4th Cir. 1990).
203. 891 F.2d 1024 (2nd Cir. 1989).
204. Id. at 1028.
205. 726 F. Supp. 184 (S. D. Ohio 1989).
206. Id. at 191.
207. Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 3120 (O'Connor, J. concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
208. See Mann, supra note 116, and Redlich, supra note 170.
209. See L. Tribe, supra note 122, at 1187. See also Minow, supra note 37, at 93 (a continuing skepticism about the reality endorsed by the Court is the only guard against tyranny); Tribe, L., Constitutional Choices 7 (1985)Google Scholar (“In matters of power, the end of doubt and distrust is the beginning of tyranny.”)
210. L. Tribe, supra note 122, at 1296. Professor Tribe quotes Justice Brennan in Schempp, 374 U.S. at 241 (Brennan, J., concurring) who wrote, “practices which may have been objectionable to no one in the time of Jefferson and Madison may today be highly offensive to many persons, the deeply devout and the non-believers alike.”