Indonesia's national ulama council, the Majelis Ulama Indonesia, or MUI, has successfully transformed itself during the reform era reversing its earlier relationship with government. It is the MUI that now sets the agenda on appropriate ways to recognize, protect, and promote the majority faith. However it does not operate entirely separate to the state, indeed, there are numerous points of contact and mutual dependence between this group of Islamic scholars and state agencies.
This article offers two case studies on religious freedom demonstrating different aspects of the MUI's self-appointed role of national mufti. The first case study demonstrates how the MUI has taken control of the high ground of religious doctrine. Through its response to blasphemy cases and deviant Muslim activities the MUI defines appropriate, orthodox Muslim conduct. The second case study deals with the revised regime of halal food certification. Here the state has sought to bring the MUI back into its embrace, partly as a result of corruption scandals. In doing so, however, Islam continues to be further entrenched in state law and regulation.
Indonesian Islam was said to be deconfessionalized, reflecting the nature of the former authoritarian and bureaucratic state's engagement with various Islamic institutions. The changing role of the MUI demonstrates that the state and law are becoming increasingly confessionalized. This change has significant implications for Indonesia's democratic constitutional framework, evident in what these cases say about the enjoyment of the fundamental right of citizenship.
1 Traditionally a scholar independent of the state and qualified to provide religious rulings. See, for example, Hooker, M. Barry, Indonesian Islam: Social Change through Contemporary Fatawa (Crows Nest: Allen & Unwin and University of Hawaii Press, 2003), 1.
2 At the time of this article's publication, the major elements of the halal certification process were in place, but the many implementing regulations were yet to be proclaimed.
3 Effendy, Bahtiar, Islam and the State in Indonesia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003), 14.
4 Antoun, Richard T., “Fundamentalism, Bureaucratization and the State's Co-optation of Religion: A Jordanian Case Study,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 38, no. 3 (2006): 369–93.
5 Eisenstadt, S. N., “Bureaucracy and Bureaucratization,” Current Sociology 7, no. 2 (1958): 99–124.
6 Antoun, “Fundamentalism, Bureaucratization and the State's Co-optation of Religion,” 376.
7 Fenwick, Stewart, “Yusman Roy and the Language of Devotion: ‘Innovation’ in Indonesian Islam on Trial,” Studia Islamika 18, no. 3 (2011): 497–529; Fenwick, Stewart, “Faith and Freedom in Indonesian Law: Liberal Pluralism, Religion and the Democratic State,” in Religion, Law and Intolerance in Indonesia, ed. Lindsey, Tim and Pausacker, Helen (London: Routledge, 2016), 68–94.
8 Fenwick, Stewart, Blasphemy, Islam and the State: Pluralism and Liberalism in Indonesia (New York: Routledge, 2017).
9 Menchik, Jeremy, Islam and Democracy in Indonesia: Tolerance without Liberalism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016).
10 See Syafiq Hasyim, “Council of Indonesian Ulama (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, MUI) and its Role in the Shariasation of Indonesia” (PhD diss., Free University of Berlin, 2013).
11 Hefner, Robert W., Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 12–20.
12 Indonesia, Majelis Ulama, Himpunan Keputusan Musyawarah Nasional VIII Majelis Ulama Indonesia [Collected decisions of the Eighth National Conference of the MUI] (Jakarta: Secretariat Majelis Ulama Indonesia, 2010). All translations from the Indonesian in this article are provided by the author.
13 A fatwa (plural fatawa) is an opinion on a point of Islamic law by a Muslim religious scholar, issued in response to a request by an individual, traditionally not considered to be binding or of general application.
14 Hosen, Nadirsyah, “Behind the Scenes: Fatwas of the Majelis Ulama Indonesia (1975–1998),” Journal of Islamic Studies 15, no. 2 (2004): 147–79, at 149–50. In contrast, according to Mohammad Atho Mudzhar, a proposal was made by Soeharto in 1970 to form the national body but this went unanswered as ulama did not want “to be used by the government.” Mudzhar, Mohammad Atho, “The Council of Indonesian ‘Ulama’ on Muslims’ Attendance at Christmas Celebrations,” in Islamic Legal Interpretation: Muftis and Their Fatwas, ed. Masud, Muhammad Khalid, Messick, Brinkley, and Powers, David S. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), 230–41, at 236.
15 See Hosen, “Behind the Scenes,” 150; see also Ichwan, Moch Nur, “‘Ulamā’, State and Politics: Majelis Ulama Indonesia after Soeharto,” Islamic Law and Society 12, no. 1 (2005): 45–72, at 48. For a detailed history of earlier regional and national ulama councils, see Noer, Deliar, Administration of Islam in Indonesia (Jakarta: Equinox, 2010), 81–90. The earliest regional body identified in this account was established in West Java in 1958 specifically for security reasons, and it was under the auspices of a military commander, although not all pre-MUI ulama councils were government controlled. There are two large or mass Muslim organizations in Indonesia: Nahdlatul Ulama (Awakening of the Ulama), Indonesia's largest nongovernmental Muslim organization; and Muhammadiyah, the second largest. Numerous other Muslim organizations have played an important role in public life in the past, and these and other contemporary organizations, including those with hardline or Islamist views, are discussed below.
16 The Ministry of Religion supports this account of the formation of the MUI. See Kementerian Agama [Ministry of Religion], Kompilasi Peraturan Perundang-Undangan Kerukunan Hidup Umat Beragama [Compilation of laws and regulations on harmony in the life of the religious community], 9th ed. (Jakarta: Badan Litbang dan Diklat [Research, Development and Training Institute, Ministry of Religion], 2007), 25–27.
17 Hooker, Indonesian Islam, 60; Nico Kaptein describes it as “an attempt by the government to involve the ˋulamâ’ in its developmental policy in an institutionalized way.” Nico Kaptein, J. G., “The Voice of the ˋUlamâ’: Fatwas and Religious Authority in Indonesia,” in “Autorités religieuses en islam,” special issue, Archives de sciences sociales des religions 49, no. 125 (2004): 115–130, at 121. Similarly, Abdullah Saeed observes that Soeharto's aim was to keep political Islam at bay and nurture an “apolitical Islam in order to use it as a tool in the economic and social development programme of the New Order.” Saeed, Abdullah, “Introduction: The Qur'an, Interpretation and the Indonesian Context,” in Approaches to the Qur'an in Contemporary Indonesia, ed. Saeed, Abdullah (London: Oxford University Press, 2005), 1–16, at 8. The MUI has also been grouped together with other examples of “state mufti” appointed in the Islamic world during the twentieth century. Muhammad Khalid Masud, Brinkley Messick, and David S. Powers, “Muftis, Fatawas, and Islamic Legal Interpretation,” in Masud, Messick, and Powers, Islamic Legal Interpretation, 3–32, at 27. On the nature of the early Indonesian state as a “bureaucratic state,” see Lindsey, Tim, “Monopolising Islam? The Indonesian Ulama Council and State Regulation of the ‘Islamic Economy’,” Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies 48, no. 2 (2012): 253–74, at 254–56. On the bureaucratization of Islam in Indonesia, see Sezgin, Yüksel and Künkler, Mirjam, “Regulation of ‘Religion’ and the ‘Religious’: The Politics of Judicialization and Bureaucratization in India and Indonesia,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 56, no. 2 (2014): 448–78.
18 Lindsey, “Monopolising Islam,” 255; see also Ichwan, “‘Ulamā’, State and Politics,” 45.
19 Hosen, “Behind the Scenes,” 154; see also John Olle, “The Campaign against ‘Heresy’: State and Society in Negotiation in Indonesia” (paper presented at the 16th Biennial Conference of the Asian Studies Association of Australia, Wollongong, Australia, June, 26–29, 2006), http://pandora.nla.gov.au/pan/124461/20110211-1446/coombs.anu.edu.au/SpecialProj/ASAA/biennial-conference/2006/proceedings.html (under “Olle”). Another formula is offered by Noorhaidi Hasan, who argues that the establishment of the MUI was the New Order's attempt to “domesticate the social force of ulama.” Hasan, Noorhaidi, “Reformasi, Religious Diversity, and Islamic Radicalism after Soeharto,” Journal of Indonesian Social Sciences and Humanities 1 (2008): 23–51, 26.
20 Mudzhar, Mohammad Atho, Fatwa-fatwa Majelis Ulama Indonesia: Sebuah Studi tentang Pemikiran Hukum Islam di Indonesia, 1975–1988 [Fatwas of the Indonesian Ulama Council: A study of Islamic legal thought in Indonesia] (Jakarta: Indonesian-Netherlands Cooperation in Islamic Studies, 1993). Hosen also refers to arguments raised by Islamic scholars that the MUI received requests for fatawa because it was seen as trusted, and legitimate (and not merely supportive of policy). Hosen, “Behind the Scenes,” 155. Hooker, Indonesian Islam, 60, quotes Mudzhar's study of fatawa, Fatwa-fatwa Majelis Ulama Indonesia, 122–23, as finding that only three out of a total of twenty-two fatawa demonstrate “any sort of government policy influence.”
21 Hosen, “Behind the Scenes,” 154, quoting Mudzhar, Fatwa-fatwa Majelis Ulama Indonesia, 120.
22 Hosen, “Behind the Scenes,” 152; Noer, Administration of Islam, 90.
23 Majelis Ulama Indonesia, Profile of MUI: Retrospective of the Indonesian Council of Ulama—35 Years of Remarkable Progress (Jakarta: Majelis Ulama Indonesia, 2010). These groups include the controversial hard-line organizations Hizbut Tharir Indonesia and Front Pembela Islam (Islamic Defender's Front) based on a deliberate program to bridge radical and moderate Islam. See Lindsey, “Monopolising Islam,” 260; Ichwan, “‘Ulamā’, State and Politics,” 49. It is not a mass organization and therefore lacks a membership base from which it might raise funds. See Lindsey, “Monopolising Islam,” 262.
24 Menchik, Tolerance without Liberalism, 81 (noting that Soeharto intended the MUI to represent Indonesia at the Organisation of Islamic States and the World Muslim League).
25 MUI, Profile of MUI.
26 MUI, Himpunan Keputusan Musyawarah Nasional VIII Majelis Ulama Indonesia; see also MUI, Profile of MUI.
27 Hosen, “Behind the Scenes,” 154; Hooker, Indonesian Islam, 60.
28 Lindsey, “Monopolising Islam,” 262. There is a brief reference to the receipt of state funds in MUI, Profile of MUI.
29 Lindsey, 259.
30 Hasyim, “Council of Indonesian Ulama,” 72.
31 Hasyim, 72.
32 Hasyim, 74.
33 Lindsey, “Monopolising Islam,” 260. At the time of writing the commission structure had not changed.
34 Lindsey, 261–62.
35 MUI, Himpunan Keputusan Musyawarah Nasional VIII Majelis Ulama Indonesia.
36 Hooker, Indonesian Islam, 230.
37 Lindsey, Tim, Islam, Law and the State in Southeast Asia, vol. 1, Indonesia (London: I. B. Tauris, 2012), 131.
38 MUI, Himpunan Fatwa Majelis Ulama Indonesia [Collection of MUI fatawa] (Jakarta: Secretariat Majelis Ulama Indonesia, 2010), 73–74.
39 Hosen, “Behind the Scenes,” 169; Kaptein, “The Voice of the ˋUlamâ’,” 9. This can be distinguished from Hooker's category of “bureaucratic” fatawa, which is how he describes Islamic rulings on medical ethics issued by the Ministry of Health over many years. Indonesian Islam, 62–63. It has been noted that fatawa “assume a variety of local forms, differing in language and literary style, conventions of inclusion and exclusion, and usage of characteristic rubrics.” Masud, Brinkley, and Powers, “Muftis, Fatawas, and Islamic Legal Interpretation,” 24.
40 Hooker, M. Barry and Lindsey, Tim, “Public Faces of Syariah in Contemporary Indonesia: Towards a National Madhab?,” Australian Journal of Asian Law 4, no. 3 (2002): 259–94, at 286; Mudzhar, Fatwa-fatwa Majelis Ulama Indonesia. The other organizations are Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, both mentioned above, and Persatuan Islam, or Persis, the Islamic Union, a conservative Muslim organization known for opposing secular nationalism during the twentieth century.
41 Hooker, Indonesian Islam, 229–30; Ichwan, “‘Ulamā’, State and Politics,” 49. No fatwa is, strictly speaking, considered binding; the issue here is whether or not the MUI's collection of rulings would have precedence over those rulings made by another organization for consideration by its members.
42 Kaptein, “The Voice of the ˋUlamâ’,” 2–7. He also describes fatawa following a traditional style dating from the nineteenth century and being requested by Muslims from Southeast Asia of scholars in the Middle East, and others issued in the early twentieth century in Indonesia, also following a question-and-answer format.
43 See, for example, Jimly Asshiddiqie, Konstitusi dan Konstitutionalisme Indonesia [The Indonesian constitution and constitutionalism] (Jakarta: Indonesian Constitutional Court, 2005).
44 In 2014 Adams was appointed a justice of the Mahkamah Konstitusi, the Indonesian Constitutional Court. This section draws on Adams, Wahiduddin, “Fatwa MUI dalam Perspektif Hukum dan Perundang-undangan” [MUI fatwa from the perspective of law and legislation], in Fatwa Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI) dalam Perspektif Hukum dan Perundang-Undangan, ed. Mudzhar, Mohammad Atho and Yusuf, Choiril Fuad (Jakarta: Puslitbang Kehidupan Keagamaan, Badan Litbang dan Diklat, Kementerian Agama, 2012), 3–16.
45 The issue here is the implementation of Islamic moral norms in legislation. In the case of pornography, the development and passage of law between 2005 and 2008 seeking to prohibit certain forms of social and even artistic practice caused controversy due to claims it was designed to impose Islamic standards. See Lindsey, Islam, Law and the State, 445.
46 Adams, “Fatwa MUI dalam Perspektif Hukum dan Perundang-undangan.”
47 Regarding the MUI and Islamic finance, see Lindsey, “Monopolising Islam,” 264–65.
48 The MUI has a virtual monopoly over the process of halal certification; see Lindsey, “Monopolising Islam,” 269.
49 Adams, “Fatwa MUI dalam Perspektif Hukum dan Perundang-undangan.”
50 MUI, Mengawal aqidah Umat: Fatwa MUI Tentang Aliran-Aliran Sesat di Indonesia [Guarding the faith of the Islamic community: MUI fatawa on deviant sects in Indonesia] (Jakarta: Sekretariat Majelis Ulama Indonesia, 2007), 1.
51 MUI, Mengawal aqidah Umat, 4.
52 The guidelines require that prior to a ruling (penetapan) on deviancy being issued, the MUI must research the activities or teachings concerned, and engage with the leadership of the group or sect. See MUI, Mengawal aqidah Umat, 4–5. This includes a process of validation or clarification, together with the provision of advice so that those concerned will abandon the incorrect thoughts, opinions, or acts and return to the right path.
53 For a discussion of the Islamic concept of bida'ah, innovation in practice, in the context of a prosecution under Indonesia's blasphemy regime, see Fenwick, “Yusman Roy and the Language of Devotion.”
54 MUI Fatwa Number 7/MUNAS VII/MUI/11/2005 (July 28, 2005), on pluralism, liberalism, and secularism in religion. Some scholars neglect to include reference to religion, presenting the fatwa as being against “all forms of pluralism, liberalism and secularism.” See Ichwan, Moch Nur, “Towards a Puritanical Moderate Islam: The Majelis Ulama Indonesia and the Politics of Religious Orthodoxy,” in Contemporary Developments in Indonesian Islam: Explaining the “Conservative Turn,” ed. van Bruinessen, Martin (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2013), 60–104, at 82.
55 MUI Fatwa Number 7/MUNAS VII/MUI/11/2005.
56 Presidential Decree 1/1965 Concerning Prevention of Abuse and/or Disgrace of Religion (Pencegahan Penyalagunaan dan/atau Penodaan Agama), later Law 1/PNPS/1965.
57 Badan Koordinasi Pengawasan Kepercayaan Masyrakat (Coordinating Body for the Monitoring of Mystical Beliefs in Society), known as BAKORPAKEM, the national team is complemented by regional teams and is led by the intelligence division of the Attorney General's Office, pursuant to Decision of the Attorney General 108/JA/5/1984, on the establishment of the coordinating body for the monitoring of mystical beliefs in society. The public prosecutor has a legislative mandate to monitor belief systems and prevent the misuse or insult to religion under art. 30 of Law 16/2004, on the public prosecutor.
58 This provision is arguably the one that comes closest on its face to a notion of blasphemy as it is most clearly applicable in cases of a religious offense. Other provisions in the Criminal Code (discussed in the text accompanying this note) are more easily interpreted as offenses against religion which may, or may not, carry elements of an offense against religion or religious stipulations. For this reason I have described the legal framework as a “de facto blasphemy regime,” as the most frequently used provisions are those in the Criminal Code. For a detailed discussion, see Fenwick, “Yusman Roy and the Language of Devotion.” On the distinction between the forms of offense, see Adji, Omar Seno, Hukum (Acara) Pidana Dalam Prospeksi [Criminal procedure in action] (Jakarta: Penerbit Erlangga, 1984); Margiyono, Muktiono and Rumadi, Irianto, eds., No Middle Road: A Public Examination of the Decision of the Constitutional Court Concerning Review of Law No. 1/1965 (Jakarta: Indonesian Legal Resource Center, 2011).
59 Lindsey, Islam, Law and the State, 413–16.
60 Olle, “The Campaign against ‘Heresy.’”
61 Crouch, Melissa, “Law and Religion in Indonesia: The Constitutional Court and the Blasphemy Law,” Asian Journal of Comparative Law 7, no. 1 (2012): 1–46; Lindsey, Islam, Law and the State; Sihombing, Ulil Parulian et al. , Injustice in Belief: Monitoring the Results of Cases on Blasphemy of Religion and Religious Hate Speech in Indonesia (Jakarta: Indonesian Legal Resource Center, 2012).
62 Crouch, “Law and Religion in Indonesia,” 12.
63 Crouch, 1, 14.
64 Margiyono and Rumadi, No Middle Road, 6.
65 See generally Fenwick, “Yusman Roy and the Language of Devotion”; Lindsey, Islam, Law and the State, 418–19; Olle, “The Campaign against ‘Heresy.’” A study of thirty-seven cases of prosecutions or other instances of alleged blasphemy bears out this conclusion (in five cases the study does not record criminal action). See Sihombing et al., Injustice in Belief, 9–57. At least seventeen of the thirty-seven cases involved Islamic sects. The study identifies MUI involvement in nine instances, of which four include the issue of fatawa. There were ten cases in which other Islamic organizations made objections to conduct or religious practices, or brought the matter to the attention of police, or were otherwise implicated in protest action (including the Ministry of Religion, the Front Pembela Islam, and the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (Indonesian Mujahidin Council). Protest action, raids on premises, or other violent mob activity occurred in fifteen of the thirty-seven cases reported and in ten of these there was both a form of protest action and the involvement in some form of an Islamic organization.
66 Constitutional Court Decision 140/PUU-VII/2009. Several case studies were referred to in the application. However, due to the nature of judicial review in Indonesia, constitutional challenges proceed separate to any individual cases as there is no nexus between the general courts, which hold jurisdiction for trials and appeals, and the power of constitutional review. The Court is thus not an appeal court on constitutional issues for matters arising in the general courts. Instead, it hears in principle applications regarding provisions of statutes claimed to be contrary to the constitution. See, for example, Butt, Simon and Lindsey, Tim, The Constitution of Indonesia: A Contextual Analysis (Oxford: Hart, 2012), 87–88. See also Fenwick, Stewart, “Administrative Law and Judicial Review in Indonesia: The Search for Accountability,” in Administrative Law and Governance in Asia: Comparative Perspectives, ed. Ginsburg, Tom and Chen, Albert H. Y. (London: Routledge, 2009), 329–358.
67 The hearings of the Court were marked by protest action by Islamic groups who displayed banners outside the Court, attended hearings, interjected during evidence, and at times allegedly intimated witnesses in and around the court. Margiyono and Rumadi, No Middle Road, 28–33; Menchik, Jeremy, “Productive Intolerance: Godly Nationalism in Indonesia,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 56, no. 3 (2014): 591–621, at 612–13.
68 Margiyono and Rumadi, No Middle Road, 28–33; Menchik, 612–13.
69 A set of five principles understood as embodying the state philosophy, also including humanity, state unity, democratic life, and social justice.
70 This article holds that human rights may be restricted by law on grounds that include satisfying “just demands” based on morality, religious values, security, and public order. Freedom of religion is nonetheless enshrined in two articles of the Constitution, 28E and 29. The first was introduced, along with wide ranging human rights amendments, following the fall of President Soeharto, and the second has existed since Independence.
71 Hooker, Indonesian Islam, 212–16.
72 Hooker, 217–19.
73 Hooker, 216.
74 Ichwan, “Towards a Puritanical Moderate Islam,” 71; Lindsey, Islam, Law and the State, 132. This section draws throughout on Ichwan and Lindsey.
75 Ichwan, “Towards a Puritanical Moderate Islam,” 72–73.
76 Lindsey, “Monopolising Islam,” 262.
77 See also Künkler, Mirjam and Stepan, Alfred, “Introduction: Indonesian Democratization in Theoretical Perspective,” in Democracy and Islam in Indonesia, ed. Künkler, Mirjam and Stepan, Alfred (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013), 3–23, at 21–22.
78 A figure broadly consistent with the figure of EUR 300,000 cited by Hasyim, “Council of Indonesian Ulama,” 70.
79 Margareth Aritonang and Ina Parlina, “MUI, Govt Wrangle over Halal Certification,” Jakarta Post, February 28, 2014, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/02/28/mui-govt-wrangle-over-halal-certification.html.
80 Hasyim, “Council of Indonesian Ulama,” 70.
81 “Astaga! Label Halal” [Good God! Halal labeling] Tempo, February 24–March 2, 2014.
82 Natasha Erviani, “Religious Levy Costs Queensland Abattoirs Thousands Each Month,” Courier Mail, October 20, 2014, https://www.couriermail.com.au/news/queensland/religious-levy-costs-queensland-abattoirs-thousands-each-month/news-story/c1ebc330573bfcd879f79d3bf52411bc.
83 “‘Bukan Penyelenggara Negara, Saya Boleh Terima Gratifikasi” [Not being a state official, I am permitted to receive gratuities], Tempo, February 24–March 2, 2014, https://majalah.tempo.co/read/144776/bukan-penyelenggara-negara-saya-boleh-terima-gratifikasi (in Indonesian).
84 Direktorat Jenderal Bimbingan Masyarakat Islam [Directorate General of Islamic Community Guidance], “Ketua Penasehat MUI Minta Klarifikasi Amidhan Soal Isu Sertifikasi Halal” [Chair of MUI advisory board seeks clarification from Amidhan on the halal certificate issue], Bimasislam, March 4, 2014, https://bimasislam.kemenag.go.id/post/berita/ketua-penasehat-mui-minta-klarifikasi-amidhan-soal-isu-sertifikasi-halal (in Indonesian).
85 Aritonang and Parlina, “MUI, Govt Wrangle.”
86 Aritonang and Parlina.
87 Aritonang and Parlina.
88 Aritonang and Parlina.
89 See “UU Jaminan Produk Halal Berikan Kepastian Hukum Bagi Konsumen” [Law on halal product assurance gives legal certainty to consumers], September 25, 2014, http://www.hukumonline.com/berita/baca/lt54241d9c5a5ed/uu-jaminan-produk-halal-berikan-kepastian-hukum-bagi-konsumen.
90 Yohannie Linggasari, “Pemerintah Akan Bentuk Badan Jaminan Produk Halal” [Government to form agency for halal product assurance], CNN Indonesia, January 21, 2015.
93 Lindsey, Islam, Law and the State, 135.
94 Lindsey, 105.
95 Lindsey, 105.
96 Lindsey, 108–09.
97 See Salim, Arskal, Challenging the Secular State: The Islamization of Law in Modern Indonesia (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2008), 172. There has, however, never been a stark distinction between the ministry and Islamic organizations. Members of the two major Islamic organizations, Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, have enjoyed at different times in modern Indonesia greater or lesser influence in the ministry; see, for example, Ricklefs, M. C., A History of Modern Indonesia Since c. 1200 (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), 375.
98 Moch Nur Ichwan, “Official Reform of State Islam: State Islam and the Ministry of Religious Affairs in Contemporary Indonesia (1966–2004)” (PhD diss., University of Tillburg, 2006), 15. Ichwan here summarizes the concept as used by Niewenhuijze, C. A. O., “The Indonesian State and ‘Deconfessionalized’ Muslim Concepts,” in Aspects of Islam in Post-Colonial Indonesia: Five Essays (The Hague: W. van Hoeve, 1958), 180–243, and argues that the adoption of the notion of Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa and the establishment of the Ministry of Religion were “the two major elements in what [Niewenhuijze] refers to as the ‘deconfessionalisation’ of Islam in post-colonial Indonesia.” Ichwan, 15.
99 Otto, Jan Michiel, “Sharia and National Law in Indonesia,” in Sharia Incorporated: A Comparative Overview of the Legal Systems of Twelve Muslim Countries in Past and Present, ed. Otto, Jan Michiel (Leiden: Leiden University Press, 2010), 433–90, at 480.
100 Sezgin and Künkler, “Regulation of ‘Religion’ and the ‘Religious,’” 451, 472. Salim points out that—once legislated—Islamic law ceases to be religious law. Salim, Challenging the Secular State, 177. Going further, Hooker would appear to argue that bureaucratizing Islam through codification is a trivialization of Islamic law. Hooker, Indonesian Islam, 25.
101 See, for example, Lindsey, “Monopolising Islam,” 262.
102 Olle, “The Campaign against ‘Heresy,’” 6.
103 Butt, Simon, “Regional Autonomy and Legal Disorder: The Proliferation of Local Laws in Indonesia,” Sydney Law Review 32, no. 2 (2010): 177–97, at 181.
104 Effendy, Islam and the State in Indonesia, 224.
105 Eisenstadt, “Bureaucracy and Bureaucratization,” 99.
106 Eisenstadt, 99.
107 Hooker, Indonesian Islam, 243–45.
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