This article introduces the internationalism motif in Bahá’i political and legal thought and Bahá’i; arguments concerning the place of divine legal claims in contemporary debates about models of world order. In contrast to theories such as the clash of civilizations thesis of world politics—which view divine legal and political claims as a likely source of conflict and violence—the relative and progressive concept of revelation in the Bahá’i Faith argues for religion as a potentially unifying and foundational force in the evolution of a universal civilization. Bahá’i perspectives on internationalism also illustrate a distinct concept of divine law articulated within the Persianate and Muslim traditions of nineteenth century political and legal thought.

To say that authority is the cornerstone of any law or legal system is to state the obvious. Authority not only defines the law but in effect constitutes it formally and substantively. There can be no functioning law or legal system without an underlying structure of authority that may in turn derive from another power-based or authority-based substrate, such as a state. This much we take for granted.

Although it is commonplace for the Western lawyer or jurist to view the state as a body wielding and exercising legal authority, such a view is neither obvious nor normative for his Muslim counterpart, and even less obvious by far to the Muslim masses around the world. Yet, paradoxically, the great majority of today's Muslim countries run their legal systems on the operative—and very concrete—assumption that it is the state that produces legal authority. In other words, within the national body politic of each modern Muslim country there lies a source of legal power that presumably legitimizes and enforces both the public actions of the law and the provisions that govern the private sphere.

Much that is intriguing about medieval modes of proof lies in the tension that existed within them. In the practices of the ordeals, compurgation or wager of law and judicial duel, faith mingled with superstition, justice with mercy, divine providence with human manipulation. When history was conceived as “wholly a uniform drift towards better things,” these practices were proclaimed as undoubtedly barbaric, irrational, and “the most extravagant and preposterous.” Later historians offered functionalist interpretations; they showed how medieval institutions of proof reflected the living conditions of the time or served legitimate socio-political functions. Suitable as their creed is the charitable dictum of Baron Bramwell that “because the world gets wiser as it gets older, … it was [not therefore] foolish before.” A related body of scholarship evaluates the methods of proof as means of fact-finding, and supports the conclusion that they were not as ineffective as they may seem. Their epistemic function, as we will see, has been defended along different naturalistic lines.

Professor Richard Weisberg wrote of The Merchant of Venice, “[p]erhaps no text except the Bible and the United States Constitution has so implicated audiences in fierce straggles for dominance and control.” The remark's seeming hyperbole diminishes when one considers the controversy that surrounds nearly every production, with one New York school district going so far as to remove the text from its curriculum as a consequence of debate over the showing of the BBC's 1981 production of the play to students. It is no different when one turns to the legal scholarship though, arguably, it is the legal Academy's general silence regarding the play that most soundly articulates its rejection of it. It is a silence that cannot be ignored given Merchant's centrality to matters of law. And indeed, when legal theorists do turn their attention to the play, once again it spurs contentious debate.

Though most literary critics agree that the play is thematically rich, presenting a “parade of binaries,” for legal scholars the primary tension is between law and mercy and how, or whether, justice unifies that tension within itself. This question has generated widespread and vehement debate among legal scholars. It is the same with the literary criticism.

In the Nebraska Constitutional Convention of 1871, the debates between Oliver Mason, first Chief Justice of the Nebraska Supreme Court, and Experience Estabrook, first District Attorney of the Territory of Nebraska, were frequent and contentious. The two well-respected delegates squared off over many issues, but arguments over the proper role of religious freedom in the newly made State of Nebraska proved to be the most passionate and heated. Although Mason and Estabrook led the discussion over religion, neither had conventional religious beliefs.

Recently several governments have contracted with religious agencies to provide welfare services. For instance in the United States, George W. Bush has furthered the idea of “charitable choice” and the idea that churches should develop social welfare. In Australia, with the dismantling of the Commonwealth Employment Services (C.E.S.), contracts for the provision of “employment services” have been tendered out, with the result that the majority of services have been given to various religious agencies. This paper explores the significance of this development in the context of what I call enterprise theology.

Enterprise theology is a form of discourse that is addressed to certain members in the community whom it is envisaged need special help and correction. There are two components of this expression.

From the nineteenth-century exhortations of legal ethics pioneer David Hoffman to the current pop culture provocations of Al Pacino, the story of the legal profession has been told through the religious imagery of the priesthood. While this analogy certainly has a bit of rhetorical flourish at its core, it reflects the widespread perception of the unifying, central role that the law plays in modern American society. Past eras may have looked to religion as the common framework under which everyday existence proceeds, but the law has long since usurped it. So while priests, as administrators providing access to that unifying framework in their role as mediators between God and man. were once essential figures in the collective life of society, today their place has been taken by lawyers, who provide access to our common framework of legal rights and privileges.