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Enhancing Navigator Competence by Demonstrating Maritime Cyber Security

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 April 2018

Odd Sveinung Hareide ,
Øyvind Jøsok ,
Mass Soldal Lund ,
Runar Ostnes  and
Kirsi Helkala
Odd Sveinung Hareide*
Affiliation:
(Norwegian Defence University College, Royal Norwegian Naval Academy, Navigation Competence Center, Bergen, Norway) (Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Joint Research Program in Nautical Operations, Norway)
Øyvind Jøsok
Affiliation:
(Norwegian Defence University College, Cyber Academy, Lillehammer, Norway) (Child and Youth Participation and Competence Development Research Program, Inland Norway University of Applied Sciences, Lillehammer, Norway)
Mass Soldal Lund
Affiliation:
(Norwegian Defence University College, Cyber Academy, Lillehammer, Norway)
Runar Ostnes
Affiliation:
(Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Department of Ocean Operations and Civil Engineering, Aalesund, Norway)
Kirsi Helkala
Affiliation:
(Norwegian Defence University College, Cyber Academy, Lillehammer, Norway)
*
(E-mail: oddsveinung.hareide@sksk.mil.no)
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Abstract

As technology continues to develop, information and communication technology and operational technology on board ships are increasingly being networked, and more frequently connected to the Internet. The introduction of cyber systems changes the work environment with the aim of decreasing the workload for the navigator, but at the same time introduces more complexity and vulnerabilities that in turn may alter the competencies needed to perform safe and efficient navigation. Contemporary examples of how cyber-attacks can distort situational awareness and interfere with operations are needed to enhance the navigator's competence through increased system awareness. This paper demonstrates some of the possible attack vectors that a cyber-attack can present to a ship, as well as discussing the plausibility and consequences of such attacks. In this study we provide a practical example to better understand how one can demystify cyber threats in order to enhance the navigators' competence.

Keywords

MaritimeCyber SecurityHuman FactorNavigation

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
The Journal of Navigation , Volume 71 , Issue 5 , September 2018 , pp. 1025 - 1039
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Navigation 2018 

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