As we begin the fourth volume of the Journal of Pension Economics and Finance, we are pleased that the Journal has begun to achieve important parts of its mission of being an influential contributor to the debate on pension provision. The Journal is now in about half of the top US academic libraries and is also indexed by EconLit and AgeLine. Pension and social security issues continue to be on top of the policy and research agenda in most major countries. As the first and only academic journal focusing entirely on pension economics and finance, the Journal of Pension Economics and Finance has been in a unique position to contribute to the public debate.

Since the inception of the Journal, it has been published in conjunction with the International Network of Pension Regulators and Supervisors (INPRS), a network setup and administered by the OECD. Because of the importance of pension supervision, it has become clear that a network such as the INPRS is not enough and as a result a new international organization, International Organisation of Pension Supervisors (IOPS), has been formed and will deal with issues relating to pensions supervision. The OECD will provide secretariat services for IOPS as it did for INPRS. Going forward, we are grateful to have the support from IOPS to be publishing the Journal in association with them. The OECD's private pension working party will handle more policy-related issues and we are also grateful to have the support from this group. Going forward therefore the Journal will be published in association with IOPS and the OECD.

This issue features two original research articles, three issues & policy articles and a book review section. The lead article is by Geoffrey Kingston and Susan Thorp (University of New South Wales, Australia) and addresses the issue of Annuitization and asset allocation with HARA utility. One of the puzzles in retirement economics is why individuals do not choose to purchase annuities and Kingston and Thorp explore in detail a real options model in which individual preferences obey the broad class of hyperbolic absolute risk aversion utility. The theory of Real Options argues that people might want to delay annuitisation at relatively younger ages because the price of life annuities might improve and annuitisation is irreversible. However, Kingston and Thorp show that the implications of a Real Options approach varies across individuals considerably. For example, when individuals have a desired consumption floor as opposed to CRRA preferences, they are more likely to want to purchase annuities earlier than later. It would be interesting to see empirical tests done in this area to test the relatively new Real Options theory as it applies to irreversible personal financial decisions, such as annuitization.

The article presents a method for calculating the cross-section internal rate of return on contributions to pension systems financed according to the pay-as-you-go principle. The method entails a procedure for valuing the contribution flow of pay-as-you-go financing, and identifies the complete set of factors that determine the cross-section internal rate of return. The procedure makes it possible to apply the algorithm of double-entry bookkeeping in analyzing and presenting the financial position and development of pay-as-you-go pension systems.

This issue features two research articles, three issues & policy articles and a book review section. The first article in the issue is by Berthold Wigger (University of Erlangen-Nuremberg). Wigger's article, “Public Pensions and the Role of Real versus Financial Capital”, revisits the Diamond (1965) model in light of the imperfect markets framework of Magill and Quinzii (2003). Whereas in Diamond (1965), the introduction of a social security system can make a transition generation better off, Wigger derives an equilibrium in imperfect markets in which the outcome is different. The essential difference is that in Diamond's model capital can be changed into consumption goods whereas in the Magill and Quinzii (2003) framework the investment in capital goods such as their housing is irreversible. Though the old benefit from the introduction of social security, the value of their capital goods declines. Hence, the abnormal gains observed by transition generations in social security may be offset elsewhere. This is a potentially relevant result for the US social security debate in which a key focus is how to allocate the legacy burden of social security.

A new explanation for the well-known reluctance of retirees to buy life annuities is due to Milevsky and Young (2002, 2003): Since the decision to purchase longevity insurance is largely irreversible, in uncertain environments a real option to delay annuitization (RODA) generally has value. Milevsky and Young analytically identify and numerically estimate the RODA in a setting of constant relative risk aversion. This paper presents an extension to the case of HARA (or GLUM) preferences, the simplest representation of a consumption habit. The precise date of annuitization can no longer be ascertained with certainty in advance. This paper derives an approximation whereby the agent precommits. The effect of increasing the subsistence consumption rate on the timing of annuity purchase is similar to the effect of increasing the curvature parameter of the utility function. As in the CRRA case studied by Milevsky and Young, delayed annuitization is associated with optimistic predictions of the Sharpe ratio and divergence between annuity purchaser and provider predictions of mortality.

The paper introduces an unfunded public pension program into an overlapping generations framework recently proposed by Magill and Quinzii (2003). The crucial distinction of the Magill and Quinzii framework is that the financial value of a firm may be lower than the replacement value of its capital. The present paper shows that in this framework unfunded public pensions negatively affect the financial value of firms but have no effect on real capital accumulation and welfare.

Within a model featuring demographic uncertainty, this paper studies a pension reform where public pension benefits are indexed to the total wage bill rather than to the average wage level. This implies a decline in the variability of contribution rates and an increase in the variability of replacement rates. While thus shifting some of the adjustment burden following demographic shocks to pensioners, the trade-off in risks is found to be fairly moderate.

In this paper, we assess the welfare costs and gains of different scenarios of pension reforms in France, using a life-cycle model including various sources of heterogeneity and distinguishing between socio-occupational groups. The pension reforms considered combine features regarding the generosity of the pension system as well as features regarding the financing schemes: PAYG, the build-up of a temporary fund and that of a permanent one. We focus on both macro and distributional issues. It appears that (i) a considerable increase in savings is to be expected, even in the case where pensions remain generous, (ii) a considerable crowding-out effect would occur in the case of the constitution of a fund trust, (iii) reducing the generosity of pension seems relatively more beneficial to low-income low-life expectancy agents, while (iv) postponing the legal retirement age benefits relatively more high-income high-life expectancy agents.

Knowledge of the distribution function of the stochastically compounded value of a series of future (positive and/or negative) payments is needed for solving several problems in an insurance or finance environment, see e.g. Dhaene et al. (2002a,b). In Kaas et al. (2000), convex lower-bound approximations for such a sum have been proposed. In case of changing signs of the payments however, the distribution function or the quantiles of the lower bound are not easy to determine, as the approximation for the random compounded value of the payments will in general not be a comonotonic sum.

In this paper, we present a method for determining accurate and easy computable approximations for risk measures of such a sum, in case one first has positive payments (savings), followed by negative ones (consumptions).

This particular cashflow pattern is observed in ‘saving–consumption’ plans. In such plans, a person saves money on a regular basis for a certain number of years. The amount available at the end of this period is then used to generate a yearly pension for a fixed number of years. Using the results of this paper we can find accurate and easy to compute answers to questions such as: ‘What is the minimal required yearly savings effort, α, during a fixed number of years, such that we will be able to meet, with a probability of at least (1−ε), a given consumption pattern during the withdrawal period?’

The foreign property rule (FPR) requires that no more than 30% of the assets held in tax-deferred retirement savings accounts be foreign property. The FPR is supposed to increase the value of the dollar and reduce its volatility and decrease the cost of capital and promote investment in Canada as well as decrease the extent of inequality inherent in these plans. On the basis of evidence from the easing of this regulation from 20% to 30% over the period 2001/02 we find that it accomplishes none of these objectives. There was no measurable impact on the exchange rate predicted from the Bank of Canada's forecasting equation; the capital outflow from the change amounted to no more than two days trade in the foreign exchange market over the period 2000/01; Canada's equity markets did significantly better internationally when the FPR was eased than in the prior two-year period. Finally, closer inspection reveals that the rule exacerbates income inequality by imposing the largest costs on lower middle-income groups. We estimate that the increase in the FPR from 20% to 30% increased Canadians expected income by between 500 million and one billion dollars annually by permitting greater portfolio diversification. The complete removal of the FPR would increase income by an estimated additional 1.5 billion to 3 billion dollars annually.

This paper examines the potential impact of government matching contributions on personal-account participation in the President's Commission on Strengthening Social Security's Model 3 for Social Security reform. Given the government's choice of four plan-design parameters, the magnitude of the match is determined solely by the differential return personal-account assets receive above the notional return, referred to as the ‘personal-account premium’, akin to the equity premium. The impact of matching on personal-account participation is simulated for older workers (ages 40 to 65) in the first wave of the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) using empirical estimates from a structural model of the impact of employer matching on participation in corporate 401(k) plans. For a personal-account premium of three percentage points, which implies a match rate of 7.5% for middle- to lower-income workers, the simulations imply that 72% of mid-career and older workers would participate in voluntary personal accounts. The response of participation to matching is very inelastic; it seems not unlikely that participation by mid-career and older workers would achieve the mid-range assumption by the Commission of 67%. There is substantial heterogeneity in participation across subsets of older workers: participation would be the lowest for low-educated, minority, female, and unmarried mid-career and older workers.

This paper discusses fees and costs of pension companies in transition economies drawing on examples from four countries – Croatia, Hungary, Kazakhstan and Poland – where second pillar pensions have the longest history of implementation. It finds that at current levels, charges are likely to reduce returns on individual account balances by around 1% per annum on average. Exact rates vary by country and company. Fee structures are complex and, generally speaking, poorly understood by consumers. The limited information on costs that is available suggests that, by and large, companies are able to meet their operating costs within a few years after starting operations. There are large sunk costs in setting up business. As a result the industry displays strong economies of scale. Based on the available evidence, the paper estimates fixed costs to be of the order of $35 per account per year (the 95% confidence interval is $21–$49 per account per year). Given costs of this order of magnitude, individual accounts need to be of the order of 4–6% of average wages for the second pillar to be viable i.e. to deliver a return greater than what can be expected from an unchanged first pillar.

Immigration is often thought of as a measure suited to mitigate the fiscal consequences of demographic ageing for unfunded public pension schemes. Building on Sinn (1997), the paper explores in some more detail the conditions under which immigrants are a net fiscal asset for national pension budgets not only on a temporary basis – i.e., as long as they are paying contributions and before they start drawing benefits – but also in the long run. Illustrative simulations are provided for the cases of Germany, Italy, the UK, and the US. It turns out that the value of immigrants depends on the nature of the pension scheme (Bismarck vs Beveridge). Also, it is strongly affected by the immigrants' characteristics in terms of skills and fertility. Furthermore, effects differ substantially for the cases of temporary vs permanent migration.

Preparations are underway to revise national accounting to implement actuarial recording of pension liabilities for corporations and government as an employer. This paper extends this to unfunded public pensions with the help of ‘implicit tax’ in pension contributions. The clearest advantages of the revision appear in situations where pension liabilities are shifted from the corporate sector to government, and where part of the public pension system is privatized. The proposed revision raises public debt and deficit to new orders of magnitude. The paper provides a framework for setting the debt and deficit targets under both current and proposed definitions.

This paper takes a look at the modeling side of pension fund management. It is based on interviews with pension fund managers, regulators, consultants, and academics in four countries – the Netherlands, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The objective was to understand, through the experience of market participants, the role of modeling in managing defined-benefit pension funds. The 28 defined-benefit pension funds participating in the study have a total of €334 billion ($436 billion) assets under management. The findings of our study show that modeling is now considered an indispensable tool by many market participants. The need to manage the risk inherent in defined-benefit pension plans is the key motivation behind the growing use of modeling. In the Netherlands, for example, where private-sector plans did not experience serious underfunding problems after the 2000 market crash, the use of modeling is widespread and well-integrated in the decision-making process. Dutch regulators have recently mandated a risk-based approach and specified broad principles of sound modeling, including the marking to market of assets and liabilities.

Over the last half century UK defined benefit pension schemes have followed the cult of the equity by investing a large proportion of their assets in equities. However, since the turn of the millennium this cult has faced two serious challenges – the halving of equity prices, and the complete rejection of equity investment by the Boots pension scheme in 2001. This paper summarises the history of the cult in the UK and the arguments advanced at the time to support its adoption. It then presents the case for the cult (excluding taxation, risk sharing and default insurance). This is followed by a detailed consideration of the validity of this case, including an examination of the relevant empirical evidence. It is concluded that, in the absence of taxation, risk sharing and default insurance, the asset allocation is indeterminate; and depends on the risk-return preferences adopted by the trustees.

This paper shows that the capital market effects of population aging and pension reform are particularly strong in continental European economies such as France, Germany, and Italy. Reasons are threefold: these countries have large and ailing pay-as-you-go public pension systems, relatively thin capital markets and less than benchmark capital performance. The aging process will force the younger generations in these countries to provide more retirement income through own private saving. Capital markets will therefore grow in size and active institutional investors will become more important as intermediaries. The aim of this paper is to show that these changes are likely to generate beneficial side effects in terms of improved productivity and aggregate growth.