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The Origins and Development of Executive Branch Czars

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 August 2013

MITCHEL A. SOLLENBERGER
Affiliation:
University of Michigan–Dearborn
MARK J. ROZELL
Affiliation:
George Mason University

Abstract

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Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © Donald Critchlow and Cambridge University Press 2013 

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References

1. The formal title for Montgomery was the Director for Recovery of Auto Communities and Workers.

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3. Executive Order 13509 74 FR 30903 (23 June 2009).

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71. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126, footnote 162 (1976).

72. United States v. Hartwell, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 385, 393 (1867).

73. 99 U.S. 508, 511–12.

74. 424 U.S. 1, 126.

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96. See Executive Order 11592, 36 FR 8555 (6 May 1971).

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103. Executive Order 13503, 74 FR 8139 (19 February 2009).

104. John Cornyn, Statement at Hearing, “Examining the History and Legality of Executive Branch ‘Czars,’” 6 October 2009, 2, http://judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/10-06-09%20Cornyn%20testimony.pdf (accessed 11 May 2012).

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