Acs, A. and Cameron, C. M. (2013) Does White House Regulatory Review Produce a Chilling Effect and “OIRA Avoidance” in the Agencies?
Presidential Studies Quarterly
Adolph, C. (2013) Bankers, Bureaucrats, and Central Bank Politics: The Myth of Neutrality. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
Allison, P. D. and Waterman, R. P. (2002) Fixed-Effects Negative Binomial Regression Models. Sociological Methodology
Anonymous (2011) OIRA Avoidance. Harvard Law Review
Balla, S. J. (1998) Administrative Procedures and Political Control of the Bureaucracy. American Political Science Review
Bertelli, A. M. (2016) Bureaucratic Autonomy in the U.S. Separation of Powers: Evidence from Cabinet Departments. Public Organization Review
Bolton, A., Potter, R. A. and Thrower, S. (2016) Organizational Capacity, Regulatory Review, and the Limits of Political Control. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization
Boushey, G. T. and McGrath, R. J. (2015) The Gift of Gridlock: Divided Government, Bureaucratic Autonomy, and the Politics of Rulemaking in the American States. Unpublished Manuscript, Fairfax, VA: George Mason University.
Boushey, G. T. and McGrath, R. J. (2017) Experts, Amateurs, and the Politics of Delegation in the American States. Journal of Public Administration, Research, and Theory
Canes-Wrone, B. (2003) Bureaucratic Decisions and the Composition of the Lower Courts. American Journal of Political Science
Carpenter, D. P. (2001) The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Carter, D. B. and Signorino, C. S. (2010) Back to the Future: Modeling Time Dependence in Binary Data. Political Analysis
Clinton, J. and Lewis, D. E. (2007) Expert Opinion, Agency Characteristics, and Agency Preferences. Political Analysis
Clinton, J. D., Lewis, D. E. and Selin, J. L. (2014) Influencing the Bureaucracy: The Irony of Congressional Oversight. American Journal of Political Science
Croley, S. (2003) White House Review of Agency Rulemaking: An Empirical Investigation. University of Chicago Law Review
Devins, N. and Lewis, D. E. (2008) Not-So Independent Agencies: Party Polarization and the Limits of Institutional Design. Boston University Law Review
Dewatripont, M., Jewitt, I. and Tirole, J. (1999a) The Economics of Career Concerns, Part I: Comparing Information Structures. The Review of Economic Studies
Dewatripont, M., Jewitt, I. and Tirole, J. (1999b) The Economics of Career Concerns, Part II: Application to Missions and Accountability of Government Agencies. The Review of Economic Studies
Downs, A. (1967) Inside Bureaucracy. New York: Little, Brown.
Haeder, S. F. and Yackee, S. W. (2015) Influence and the Administrative Process: Lobbying the President’s Office of Management and Budget. American Political Science Review
Heinzerling, L. (2014) Inside EPA: A Former Insider’s Reflections on the Relationship Between the Obama EPA and the Obama White House. Pace Environmental Law Review
Hume, R. J. (2009) How Courts Impact Federal Administrative Behavior. New York: Routledge Press.
Hurley, P., Brady, D. and Cooper, J. (1977) Measuring Legislative Potential for Policy Change. Legislative Studies Quarterly
Kaiser, F. M. (1980) Congressional Action to Overturn Agency Rules: Alternatives to the “Legislative Veto”. Administrative Law Review
Kerwin, C. M. and Furlong, S. R. (2011) Rulemaking, 4th ed.
Washington, DC: CQ Press.
Knott, J. and Miller, G. J. (1987) Reforming Bureaucracy. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
LaRocca, R. T. (2006) The Presidential Agenda. Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press.
MacDonald, J. A. (2010) Limitation Riders and Congressional Influence Over Bureaucratic Policy Decisions. American Political Science Review
MacDonald, J. A. and McGrath, R. J. (2016) A Race for the Regs: Unified Government, Statutory Deadlines, and Federal Agency Rulemaking. Unpublished Manuscript, Fairfax, VA: George Mason University.
Marvel, J. D. and McGrath, R. J. (2016) Congress as Manager: Oversight Hearings and Agency Morale. Journal of Public Policy
Mashaw, J. L. (1994) Improving the Environment of Agency Rulemaking: An Essay on Management, Games, and Accountability. Law and Contemporary Problems
Meier, K. J. (2000) Politics and the Bureaucracy: Policymaking in the Fourth Branch of Government, 4th ed. Orlando, FL: Harcourt Publishers Inc.
Neustadt, R. (1960) Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents. New York: Free Press.
O’Connell, A. J. (2008) Political Cycles of Rule An Empirical Portrait of the Modern Administrative State. Virginia Law Review
O’Connell, A. J. (2011) Agency Rulemaking and Political Transitions. Northwestern Law Review
Olson, M. K. (1996) Substitution in Regulatory Agencies: FDA Enforcement Alternatives. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization
Potter, R. A. (2017) Slow-Rolling, Fast-Tracking, and the Pace of Bureaucratic Decisions in Rulemaking. Journal of Politics
Shipan, C. R. (2000) The Legislative Design of Judicial Review: A Formal Analysis. Journal of Theoretical Politics
Shipan, C. R. (2004) Regulatory Regimes, Agency Actions, and the Conditional Nature of Congressional Influence. American Political Science Review
Shipan, C. R. (2005) Congress and the Bureaucracy. In Quirk P. J. and Binder S. A. (eds.),
Institutions of Democracy: The Legislative Branch. New York: Oxford University Press, 432–460.
Skryzcki, C. (2003) The Regulators: Anonymous Power Brokers in American Politics. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
Sunstein, C. R. (2012) The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs: Myths and Realities. Harvard Law Review
Teodoro, M. P. (2011) Bureaucratic Ambition: Careers, Motives, and the Innovative Administrator. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Wilson, J. Q. (1989) Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It. New York: Basic Books.
Wood, B. D. and Waterman, R. W. (1993) The Dynamics of Political-Bureaucratic Adaptation. American Journal of Political Science
Yackee, J. W. and Yackee, S. W. (2009) Divided Government and U.S. Federal Rulemaking. Regulation and Governance