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Appointments and attrition: time and executive disadvantage in the appointments process

  • Gary E. Hollibaugh (a1) and Lawrence S. Rothenberg (a2)
Abstract

While the importance of political appointments is a matter of consensus, theorists and empiricists generally focus on different considerations, such as ideology and confirmation duration, respectively. More recently, there have been efforts to integrate empirical and theoretical scholarship but, to date, no empirical analysis assesses theoretical expectations about the relationship between temporal concerns and nominee ideologies. We fill this gap by examining theoretical predictions and related expectations about how the passage of time affects the President’s choices of nominees. We find that executives are disadvantaged as days pass and Presidents propose nominees with whom they are less ideologically compatible over time.

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Corresponding author
*Corresponding author. Email: gary.hollibaugh@pitt.edu
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Replication materials are available at https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/RQHRKE.

Cite this article: Hollibaugh GE, Rothenberg LS. 2019. Appointments and attrition: time and executive disadvantage in the appointments process. Journal of Public Policy 1–19, doi:10.1017/S0143814X18000442

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