A political revolution now under way among Western countries may have drastic repercussions on the poor. For most of the post-war period, government programmes designed to raise the income share of the poor proliferated and expanded. In the wake of the world-wide slowdown in economic growth following the first oil embargo of 1973, critics argued that the gains from redistributional programmes are far outweighed by adverse side-effects that reduce work and savings. These arguments have been taken with increasing seriousness. In the United States, England, Germany, and even in the Netherlands and Scandinavia, public income transfer programmes have been or are being cut back. On the face of it, only France and Italy seem to be resisting this trend; Switzerland, though it partook in the rapid expansion of the earlier period, has temporarily reached a plateau in spending.

In this article, the first of two, the recent developments and current situation in the private rented sector are examined. Four roles for the sector are identified: housing those who traditionally lived in the sector, housing the young and mobile, providing accommodation with employment and acting as a tenure of last resort for those unable to find accommodation in the majority tenures. The types of household to be found in each sub-sector are described and their reasons for being in the sector and what they obtain are analysed. Different types of landlord are identified and their reasons for letting examined. The problems encountered by tenants and landlords in each sub-sector are described, leading to the conclusion that the private rented sector urgently requires considered and effective attention from policy makers.

Complex images of the differences between public and private activities are endemic in modern capitalist societies. Numerous examples can be found in the field of social policy, but this paper focuses on the historical dialectic between public and private pension arrangements. It compares the interaction over time in a number of countries of the central principles of solidarity and equivalence which have shaped the development of pension provision. Then it illustrates how an understanding of contemporary pressures for the privatization of pension arrangements as a response to the fiscal crisis of welfare states cannot be divorced from their historical and institutional contexts. The paper concludes that pluralistic pension systems offer the best prospect for rational policy analysis and debate provided that a continuing critique of, and dialogue between, the different sectors is encouraged to flourish.

This is a study of the prevailing state pension systems in Britain and the US in the context of a philosophy of welfare that has developed over the last decade. In this philosophy state welfare systems are justified in terms of their maximizing liberty and autonomy rather than merely social justice. It is argued that the state earnings-related pension scheme in Britain and social security in the US, because they are ‘unfunded’ and paid for out of current taxation, are not merely inefficient but also reduce the independence of individuals and impose high burdens on future generations. It is argued that no philosophical justification can be given for this imposition. The major theoretical flaw in state-managed pension arrangements, it is claimed, is the confusion of the welfare principle with the insurance principle.

This second article examines the future of the private rented sector in terms of the types of household that will continue to demand accommodation, the types of landlord that will be prepared to continue to let and the match between the requirements of the two groups. It is predicted that, under present policies, the sector will continue to decline but that the problems that will arise will come more from the mismatch between demand and supply than from the absolute size of the sector. The article then examines possible policies that might help to alleviate these problems. It argues that neither a completely free market system nor strengthening existing controls is likely to prove acceptable. Finally, it suggests a number of possible ways forward within a system of partial controls.

American social welfare spending, broadly defined, increased faster than GNP in the years 1950 to 1978. The extra spending was directed mainly at the traditional welfare population categories of the aged, disabled, and female family heads. The extra funds were provided chiefly by payroll taxes and wage diversions. The social benefits that flowed from the extra social welfare spending include improved economic security and reduction in income poverty. These benefits, which are non-quantifiable, are supplemented by the quantifiable addition to GNP which arises from a more highly-educated labour force. The quantifiable social costs associated with the extra social welfare spending include a loss of potential GNP due to induced reduction of hours at work and extra resources used up for education and health care. The reader's judgement of the worth of the non-quantifiable social benefits is critical to his or her overall evaluation.

Arguments for replacing the welfare state with more ‘self-reliance’ are morally questionable. Relying upon state assistance is importantly different from merely receiving it. Furthermore, ‘self-reliance’ as it is currently advocated amounts to reliance upon families. They must necessarily have discretionary control over needed resources in a way that state administrators of ‘welfare rights’ need not; and that makes those vulnerabilities morally more objectionable than equally heavy reliance upon state services.

The passing of the Workmen's Compensation Act 1897 did not affect an injured worker's rights to sue for damages at common law or under the Employers' Liability Act 1880. However, the evidence suggests that these alternative remedies declined in importance until the 1930s when certain court decisions and acts of Parliament gave them renewed significance. For several reasons Beveridge was antipathetic towards unmodified retention of the alternative remedy, but he proposed the establishment of an official committee for the purpose of making a full inquiry. As a result, the Home Secretary, Herbert Morrison, appointed the Monckton Committee on Alternative Remedies. The Committee's majority report largely endorsed the TUC's viewpoint in recommending maintenance of the alternative remedy. Subsequent legislation, the Law Reform (Personal Injuries) Act, permitted reduction of damages where industrial injuries benefit was secured; otherwise injured workers' rights to sue were perpetuated, albeit with questionable results. Down to the present day the costly alternative remedy survives, despite lack of evidence that it achieves either of its supposed objectives, namely, the compensation of personal injury victims or the deterrence of carelessness.

This article describes the processes of assessment and administration of certain aspects of the supplementary benefit scheme in a social security office in Northern Ireland. Based on evidence obtained observing staff-claimant interaction and interviews with over fifty unemployed claimants, the analysis attempts to demonstrate that a combination of resource constraints, staff attitudes and beliefs, and claimant tactics gives rise to practices which sustain and reproduce the categories ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’ at the very same time that staff insist that such practices are actually intended to vitiate this distinction.

The paper deals with the evolution of the welfare state in Israel and the impact it has had on the structure of Israeli society. It outlines the major phases of its development and stresses the social and political forces that shaped the process of trial and error in which these have evolved. The achievements and limits of the Israeli welfare state are analysed in the context of its particular circumstances as a developing industrial society that has also to cope with the integration of its various ethnic immigrant groups and with maintaining the morale of the population in face of the continuous threat to its national security. In conclusion the paper reviews the roots of the current crisis and outlines the possible strategies to deal with it, within the framework of Israeli society and in an international perspective.

Two results are established in this paper. First, economic efficiency is an appropriate aim of policy under most definitions of social justice, including those of libertarians, utilitarians, Rawls and socialists; an increase in efficiency, in other words, can raise social welfare under all these theories of social justice. Second, when production is fixed, no distribution can be socially just unless it is also efficient. Though the weight it is given will vary under different definitions of social justice, economic efficiency is therefore not simply a constituent aim of utilitarianism, but an important goal, whatever one's ideology. Considerations of efficiency are therefore of general relevance to the formulation of social policy.

The combination of economic recession and political reaction — which might be expected to lead to an increase in inequality — has been accompanied in the United Kingdom by an intellectual critique of the egalitarian impact of social welfare provision. This paper examines the pattern and trend of inequality and redistribution in recent years in the light of these economic, political and intellectual pressures. The paper demonstrates that inequality has increased since 1976 and that the increase has been more marked since 1979. The main factor causing this increase was the less equal distribution of market incomes, a major effect of the recession. Tax changes were a secondary factor, whilst changes in social benefit programmes had little effect. While social spending did not bring about greater overall equality, it combated and significantly modified the pressures towards greater inequality. The impact of recession is particularly apparent in the changing composition of the bottom of the income distribution: the elderly are being replaced by the unemployed as the inhabitants of the lowest levels of economic welfare.

The issue of black youth unemployment has become a central aspect of government race relations policies over the last few years, particularly in the aftermath of the 1981 street disturbances. This paper attempts to locate the various stages of response to this question, both at the level of ideology and of policy. It argues that although the policies pursued have been legitimized as helping young blacks, they have failed to mount an effective response to the employment crisis facing this group. In addition, it is argued that policies have tended to ignore the question of racism and to concentrate on the supposed cultural and personal handicaps which young blacks inherit from their cultural background. It concludes by questioning the ideology of equal opportunity, which is the core concept underlying government responses to racial discrimination, and argues for a more critical analysis of recent interventions premised on this notion.

The article examines the impact of the redundancy payments legislation on women workers. The legislation's adequacy and appropriateness for women is assessed and the assumptions and values enshrined within it are analysed. The article demonstrates that the provisions of the legislation are disadvantageous to women in comparison to men, and that they in effect discriminate against them both directly and indirectly. Moreover, it is suggested that women's particular vulnerability to unemployment and redundancy may be partly explained by the actual mechanics of the redundancy legislation. It is argued that the legislation is based upon a male-dominated conceptualization of work and so fails to consider the position of women in the labour market — a market which by its very nature leads to gender inequalities.

A report from the Child Poverty Action Group (CPAG) showed that £900 million a year of social benefits are unclaimed. Supplementary benefit accounts for most of this. Three out of ten people entitled to claim are not getting the benefit which is their due. The lowest take-up rates are among working families with children. Only half of those entitled to Family Income Supplement are receiving it. The take-up of rent rebates by families with dependent children is 58 per cent and of rate rebates 45 per cent.