We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 September 2009
Existing accounts of the Madiun incident or revolt of September 1948 suggest that it was a mainly domestic incident, with little direct link to international communism, whether through instructions or the international communist line. This paper argues that there were in fact strong links to both. The revolt was closely linked to the return of veteran communist Muso, who arrived from Europe after discussions with communists there, and with a mandate to help the PKI to reform its policies.
1 This overview is based on Poeze, Harry A., Tan Malaka, strijder voor Indonesië's vrijheid; Levensloop van 1897 tot 1945 ('s-Gravenhage: Nijhoff, 1976)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Poeze, Harry A., Verguisd en vergeten; Tan Malaka, de linkse beweging en de Indonesische Revolutie, 1945–1949 (Leiden: KITLV, 2007)Google Scholar.
2 McVey, Ruth T., The Soviet view of the Indonesian revolution, Southeast Asia Program (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 1957)Google Scholar, analyses the Soviet vision of the Indonesian revolution. Her sources and conclusions are followed here. On this period, see pp. 11–37. Bräker, Hans, Kommunismus und Islam; Zur-Religions- und Asienpolitiek der Sowjetunion; Band I, 2 Kommunismus und Islam; Islam und sowjetische Zentral- und Südostasien-Politik (Tübingen: Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1971), pp. 342–54Google Scholar, generally confirms her findings, based on his own reading of Soviet sources. Zhdanov's speech was only published in Indonesia in May 1948 by the journal Revolusioner as Situasi politik internasional.
3 Efimova, L.M., ‘Who gave instructions to the Indonesian communist leader Musso in 1948?’, Indonesia and the Malay World, 31, 90 (2003): 173–4CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
4 Ibid., pp. 175–8 (quotations on pp. 175–6 and 178).
5 Ibid., pp. 180–1.
6 Ibid., pp. 181–4 (quotations on pp. 182 and 183). The agreement between Muso, Suripno and De Groot was presented on 8 Sept. 1948 to the Dutch ministers involved (National Archives, The Hague, Archive-Drees 164 en Archive-Beel 25).
7 Ibid., pp. 184–5 (quotation on p. 184).
8 Boden, Ragna, Die Grenzen der Weltmacht; Sowjetische Indonesienpolitik van Stalin bis Breznev (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2006), p. 77, note 60Google Scholar. Boden quotes the Russian word ‘ukazat’ which is here translated as ‘instructed’, but could well be read as ‘ordered’. This letter is dated 4 July, when Muso had already commenced his journey.
9 Ibid., pp. 77–9; Efimova,'Who gave instructions', pp. 185–6.
10 Klement Gottwald, the communist leader who took over power in Czechoslovakia in Feb.–Mar. 1948. He reorganised a coalition cabinet with communists to become a communist-dominated cabinet, with some non-communist ministers as window-dressing.
11 Efimova, ‘Who gave instructions’, p. 178.
12 Thompson, Virginia and Adloff, Richard, The left wing in Southeast Asia (New York: Sloane, 1950), pp. 153–5, 226–7Google Scholar, quote a number of informants, but are cautious. Sacks, Milton, ‘The strategy of communism in Southeast Asia’, Pacific Affairs, 23 (1950): 231CrossRefGoogle Scholar, concludes Moscow's coordination is probable. McVey, in McVey, Ruth T., The development of the Indonesian Communist Party and its relations with the Soviet Union and the Chinese Peoples Republic (Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Center for International Studies, 1954), pp. 52–6Google Scholar, and The Calcutta Conference and the Southeast Asian uprisings (Ithaca, NY: Modern Indonesia Project, Southeast Asia Program, Department of Far Eastern Studies, Cornell University, 1958), argues against a direct link between conference and revolt. Another view is found in Lattimore, Owen, The situation in Asia (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1949), pp. 198–9Google Scholar, followed by Brimmell, J.H., Communism in South East Asia; A political analysis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1959), pp. 255–63Google Scholar. The latter concludes that ‘the stage was prepared for the wave of violence which swept through India and South East Asia in the next few months’. Marxism in Southeast Asia; A study of four countries, ed. Frank N. Trager (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1959), pp. 263–8, weighs all arguments and considers the Conference the place where Moscow instructed communists to start armed revolt, with the partial exception of Indonesia where Muso's return made an end to internal differences of opinion. Jacques Leclerc, ‘Entretien avec Kath Olive’, Parijs, 24.9.1985, in KITLV, Collectie-Leclerc H 1327-373, contains an extensive report of the Conference by Australian delegate Kath Olive, then Kath Bacon. She did not notice any instruction. Francisca Fanggidaej, of the Indonesian delegation, denies being given guidelines. She left the Republik on 20 July 1947, together with Suripno, to represent the Youth Federation at the WFDY Congress in Prague (August 1947). From there she went to London, where she lodged with the Information Office of the Republik. In Indonesia she worked with the Information Service of Pesindo. Her selection was because of language abilities, not rank. She was not a PKI member (Francisca Fanggidaej, interview Zeist, 17.3.2000). PKI leader Aidit denied that the Conference had exercised influence on Indonesia, when asked by the newspaper Sin Po (‘D.N. Aidit: Omong kosong adanja “Komperensi Nanning” dan “Brigade Sukarela Internasional”’, Sin Po, 14 Aug. 1953).
13 McVey, The Soviet view, pp. 38–46, and before in McVey, The development, pp. 52–6, and, The Calcutta Conference.
14 Poeze, Verguisd en vergeten, pp. 679–81.
15 Ibid., pp. 716–17.
16 Ibid., pp. 747–59.
17 Ibid., pp. 763–70.
18 Ibid., pp. 770–5. A number of sources, as well as Hatta, connect the Suripno agreement with Soviet recognition of Israel. The Islamic world had to be ‘compensated’ and the agreement served the purpose.
19 Ibid., pp. 759–60.
20 McVey, The Soviet view, pp. 52–7.
21 The mandate is mentioned in an interview with PKI leader Ngadiman (‘P.K.I. tidak akan berontak’, Sin Po, 14.12.1949). Also in my interview with Soemarsono, Jakarta, 23 Oct. 1980. On this subject, see also Swift, Ann, The road to Madiun; The Indonesian communist uprising of 1948 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1989), pp. 57–8Google Scholar.
22 Revolusioner, 19 Aug. 1948.
23 ‘Pengaroeh Communist direpoeblik aken bertambah hebat’, Sin Po, 16 Aug. 1948.
24 ‘Djalan baru’ was reprinted many times. I used the fifth impression of 1951. According to its foreword (p. 3), this was an unchanged reprint. There are no indications that reprints have been changed (McVey, The Soviet view, p. 58, n. 113). In my possession is a draft of this resolution (‘Rantjangan resolusi’), probably originating from the Dutch Foreign Affairs Ministry. It looks to be the draft that Muso put before the PKI leadership. ‘Djalan baru’ then is the outcome of the discussions, or confrontation, between Muso and the politburo.
25 Djalan baru untuk Republik Indonesia (Koreksi besar Musso); (Rentjana resolusi Polit-Biro untuk dimadjukan pada kongres ke-V dari Partai Komunis Indonesia; Disetudjui oleh konperensi CC PKI pada tanggal 26 dan 27 Augustus 1948) (Djakarta: Bintang Merah: Tjetakan ke-V, 1951), pp. 5–6. This part was not included in the draft.
26 Ibid., pp. 6–10. The draft does not differ significantly. The draft already contained the lines on the self-critique — the PKI leaders knew at once what was expected.
27 Ibid., pp. 10–11. The draft does not contain the strong wording on the parties' merger. The emphasis in the draft on the role of peasants was changed for a more orthodox accent on the workers' role.
28 Ibid., p. 11. In the draft CPN, in particular Paul de Groot, influenced by French communist leader Jacques Duclos, is mentioned as the sole culprit. This was mitigated to a general reference to west European sister parties.
29 Ibid., pp. 12–16. In the draft there was no reference to Amir.
30 Ibid., pp. 16–18. The Hatta repression was not in the draft.
31 Ibid., pp. 18–20.
32 Ibid., pp. 21–6. The draft is, understandably, shorter.
33 Ibid., pp. 27–8.
34 FDR journalist Soerjono heard Amir say this at a FDR meeting (Soerjono, ‘On Musso's return’, Indonesia, 29 (1980): 61).
35 For a survey: Poeze, Verguisd en vergeten, pp. 1101–11.
36 Ibid., pp. 1113–7.
37 Ibid., pp. 1117–27, sorting out the reactions to Amir's long communist past.
38 Ibid., pp. 1136–42.
39 The complete version, translated into English, is in John Hamlin, American Consul to Secretary of State, ‘English translation of speech made by Muso at mass meeting’, Singapore, 30 Sept. 1948, in National Archives, Washington, 856D.00B09.3048. The anecdote about the empty chair in Wibisono, Jusuf, Bertamasnja dibelakang tabir besi (Bandung: 's-Gravenhage: Van Hoeve, 1953), pp. 103–4Google Scholar and Gouda, Frances, American visions of the Netherlands East Indies/Indonesia: US Foreign policy and Indonesian nationalism, 1920–1949 (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2002), p. 276CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
40 For a survey and analysis of developments in Surakarta, see Poeze, Verguisd en vergeten, pp. 1149–89.
41 Sources are Soemarsono, ‘De Madioen-affair’, 11 Nov. 1949, pp. 4–5, in National Archives, The Hague, PG 979; interview Soemarsono, Jakarta, 23.10.1980; Hariandja, ‘Pokok2 Peristiwa Madiun’, p. 7, in KITLV, Collectie-Leclerc H 1327-286, also Nita, ‘Tentang provokasi Madiun: Sebuah pengantar studi’, in Hersri Setiawan, Negara Madiun? Kesaksian Soemarsono pelaku perjuangan, pp. 181–211. Forum Studi Perubahan dan Peradaban, Jakarta, 2002: 190–1. And from an unsuspected source, the Antara photographer reporting Muso's tour mentions the departure of Wikana and Setiadjit to Madiun (Antara, 8 Oct. 1948). There is more detail in Poeze, Verguisd en vergeten, pp. 1201–4.
42 Based on the conclusion in the chapter on the Madiun Revolt in Poeze, Verguisd en vergeten, pp. 1387–91.
