1 Bexley, Angie, ‘The Geração Foun, Talitakum and Indonesia: Media and memory politics in Timor-Leste’, Review of Indonesian and Malaysian Affairs 41, 1 (2007): 73Google Scholar, 86. See also Arthur, Catherine, ‘Painting their past: The Geração Foun, street art and representing notions of “East Timorese-ness”’, Sojourn 31, 1 (2016): 177–9Google Scholar.

2 Cited in Leach, Michael, ‘History on the line: East Timor history after Independence’, History Workshop Journal 61, 1 (2006): 225CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

3 Bell, Duncan, ‘Mythscapes: Memory, mythology, and national identity’, British Journal of Sociology 54, 1 (2003): 63–81CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed; Kolstø, Pål, ‘National symbols as signs of unity and division’, Ethnic and Racial Studies 29, 4 (2006): 676–701Google Scholar.

4 McWilliam, Andrew and Bexley, Angie, ‘Performing politics: The 2007 parliamentary elections in Timor-Leste’, Asia Pacific Journal of Anthropology 9, 1 (2008): 71Google Scholar.

5 I conducted fieldwork in Timor-Leste from June to August 2012. A primary medium of data collection was through personal interviews with voluntary participants from a wide range of social backgrounds.

6 Anderson, Benedict R. O'G., Imagined communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism (London: Verso, 2006)Google Scholar.

7 Anderson also wrote an article focusing on the East Timorese case, published before independence. See Benedict Anderson, ‘Imagining East Timor’, Lusotopie (2001): 233–9. Prior to regaining independence in 2002, the occupied territory was known by the English ‘East Timor’, formerly known as Portuguese Timor. The official name Timor-Leste was reinstated after 2002.

8 Morris, Ewan, Our own devices: National symbols and political conflict in twentieth-century Ireland (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2005), p. 1Google Scholar.

9 See Cohen, Anthony P., Self consciousness: An alternative anthropology of identity (London: Routledge, 1994), p. 55Google Scholar; Cohen, Abner, Two-dimensional man: An essay on the anthropology of power and symbolism in complex society (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974)Google Scholar.

10 Elgenius, Gabriella, ‘The origin of European national flags’, in Flag, nation and symbolism in Europe and America, ed. Hylland, Thomas Eriksen and Richard Jenkins (New York: Routledge, 2007), p. 26Google Scholar.

11 See Wallis, Joanne, Constitution making during state building (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), pp. 113–47Google Scholar.

12 See Hill, Helen M., Stirrings of nationalism in East Timor: Fretilin 1974–1978: The origins, ideologies and strategies of a nationalist movement (Otford, NSW: Otford, 2002)Google Scholar: especially pp. 61–92.

13 King, Dwight, ‘East Timor's founding elections and the emerging party system’, Asian Survey 43, 5 (2003): 747Google Scholar.

14 McWilliam and Bexley, ‘Performing politics’: 75.

15 Secretáriado Técnico de Administração Eleitoral, Rezultadu Provizorio Eleisaun Parlamentar 2012; http://www.stae.tl/elections/2012/rezultado/parlamentar (last accessed 27 July 2012). Note that this political party is different to the Conselho Nacional de Resistência Timorense (CNRT) resistance movement of the 1980s, discussed later in the article. The acronym is arguably a deliberate attempt to draw on the symbolic capital of the resistance era, furthered by its leadership by Xanana Gusmão (the former commander-in-chief of the resistance).

16 Myrttinen, Henri, ‘Resistance, symbolism and the language of stateness in Timor-Leste’, Oceania 83, 3 (2013): 213Google Scholar. Interestingly, Myrttinen highlights that the Conselho Popular Demokrátiku (CPD)-RDTL group does in fact see the 1975 national flag as legitimate, claiming it as their own and criticising Fretilin's monopolisation of this symbol. See also Wallis, Constitution making, p. 119.

17 This conflict over claims to symbolic capital is an example of Bourdieu's ‘social relations’. He argues that ‘“social problems” are social relations: they emerge from confrontation between two groups, two systems of antagonistic interests and theses’. Bourdieu, Pierre, ‘The production of belief: Contribution to an economy of symbolic goods’, Media, Culture and Society 2, 3 (1980): 269Google Scholar.

18 Bourdieu, Pierre, ‘Social space and symbolic power’, Sociological Theory 7, 1 (1989): 22Google Scholar.

19 Harrison, Simon, ‘Four types of symbolic conflict’, Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 1, 2 (1995): 258Google Scholar.

20 Lowenthal, David, The heritage crusade and the spoils of history (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 234–5Google Scholar.

21 Josh Trindade, cited in ‘Fumbled flag has Timorese worried’, The Lost Boy Blog, 26 May 2009; https://starting-points.blogspot.co.uk/2009/05/fumbled-flag-has-timorese-worried.html (last accessed 22 Jan. 2018).

22 ‘I understand [the meaning of the colours] but only a little … The national flag means a lot. Its meaning is about all Timorese people, people who died, people who are alive …. They are all in it. The flag is everyone's.’ Personal interview, Dili, July 2012. Interview and transcript in Tetun. Translation my own.

23 Schatz, Robert T. and Lavine, Howard, ‘Waving the flag: National symbolism, social identity and political engagement’, Political Psychology 28, 3 (2007): 333Google Scholar.

24 Cerulo, Karen, ‘Symbols and the world system: National anthems and flags’, Sociological Forum 8, 2 (1993): 243Google Scholar.

25 Bryson, Lucy and McCartney, Clem, Clashing symbols? A report on the use of flags, anthems and other national symbols in Northern Ireland (Belfast: Institute of Irish Studies for the Community Relations Council, 1994), p. 4Google Scholar.

26 Jonathan Leib and Gerald Webster, ‘Rebel with(out) a cause? The contested meanings of the Confederate battle flag in the American South’, in Eriksen and Jenkins, Flag, nation and symbolism in Europe and America, p. 31.

27 See McWilliam and Bexley, ‘Performing politics’, pp. 66–82; Leach, Michael, ‘Valorising the resistance: National identity and collective memory in East Timor's Constitution’, Social Alternatives 21, 3 (2002): 43–7Google Scholar; Hohe, Tanja, ‘Totem polls: Indigenous concepts and “free and fair” elections in East Timor’, International Peacekeeping 9, 4 (2002): 69–88Google Scholar; Traube, Elizabeth, ‘Planting the flag’, in Life and land in Timor-Leste: Ethnographic essays, ed. McWilliam, Andrew and Traube, Elizabeth (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 2011), pp. 117–40Google Scholar.

28 Hohe, ‘Totem polls’: 16.

29 See Governo de Timor-Leste; http://timor-leste.gov.tl (last accessed 7 Feb. 2012).

30 Frente Revolucionária do Timor-Leste Independente, Conferência Nacional, Documentos Aprovados (Sydney, 1998), p. 18. Available at: Fundação Mario Soares, http://www.fmsoares.pt/aeb_online/visualizador.php?bd=BIBLIOTECA_DIGITAL&nome_da_pasta=07708.014&numero_da_pagina=1 (last accessed 24 May 2013). Details about the Fretilin flag's symbolism come from a Fretilin manual, given to members who attended the National Timorese Convention in Portugal, 25–27 April 1998. This information was kindly shared by an individual present at this conference.

31 It is noteworthy that the original meaning attributed to the yellow segment of the national flag was also the natural richness of the land; however, this meaning was changed prior to the restoration of independence in 2002, to distance the flag from its Fretilin origins. See Leach, Michael, Nation-building and national identity in Timor-Leste (New York: Routledge, 2017), p. 170Google Scholar.

32 Sawer, Marian, ‘Wearing your politics on your sleeve: The role of political colours in social movements’, Social Movements Studies 6, 1 (2007): 41Google Scholar.

33 Ibid.: 41–2.

34 For an analysis of Frelimo and the MPLA, see Luke, Timothy W., ‘Angola and Mozambique: Institutionalizing social revolution in Africa’, Review of Politics 44, 3 (1982): 413–36CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Bell, J. Bowyer, ‘Contemporary revolutionary organizations’, International Organization 25, 3 (1971): 507–9Google Scholar.

35 Wise, Amanda, ‘Nation, transnation, diaspora: Locating East Timorese long-distance nationalism’, Sojourn 19, 2 (2004): 157Google Scholar. Indeed, several members of the Fretilin leadership who were exiled after the Indonesian invasion spent the years of the occupation in Mozambique.

36 Shoesmith, Dennis, Political parties and groupings of Timor-Leste, 3rd ed. (Canberra: Australian Labor Party, 2011), pp. 28–31Google Scholar.

37 Sawer, ‘Wearing your politics on your sleeve’: 42.

38 Interestingly, the only Marxist-Leninist political party in Timor-Leste today, the Partido Socialista de Timor (PST) does not enjoy large popular support and received only 2.41 per cent of the vote in the 2012 parliamentary elections (Secretáriado Técnico de Administração Eleitoral, Rezultadu Provizorio Eleisaun Parlamentar 2012). Fretilin is arguably aware of the lack of support for such an ideology in the twenty-first century and thus distances itself from any Marxist origins.

39 Gusmão, Xanana, Resistir é vencer! To resist is to win! The autobiography of Xanana Gusmão, ed. Niner, Sara (Richmond, Vic.: Aurora; David Lovell, 2000), p. 135Google Scholar. Though Gusmão resigned from Fretilin in December 1987, the links between the party, its flag, and the resistance movement were entrenched throughout the 24-year struggle against the Indonesian occupation.

40 Hohe, ‘Totem Polls’: 81.

41 Anderson, ‘Imagining East Timor’: 238.

42 See for example, Fanon, Frantz, The wretched of the earth, trans. Constance, by Farrington (London: MacGibbon & Kee, 1965)Google Scholar.

43 While the Portuguese resolved to devolve power back to their colonies, decolonisation seemed to have been centred on Angola and Mozambique. In Timor-Leste, the same process was not implemented or completed and the Portuguese withdrew abruptly as a result of the civil war between the UDT and Fretilin.

44 A third political party, Apodeti, was in favour of integration into Indonesia, though it was small and had minimal popular support. See further Pinto, António Costa, ‘The transition to democracy and Portugal's decolonization’, in The last empire: Thirty years of Portuguese decolonization, ed. Lloyd-Jones, Stewart and Pinto, Antonio C. (Bristol: Intellect, 2003)Google Scholar, especially pp. 30–31.

45 Anderson, ‘Imagining East Timor’: 237.

46 Ibid.

47 Simonsen, Sven Gunnar, ‘The authoritarian temptation: Nation building and the need for inclusive governance’, Asian Survey 46, 4 (2006): 577CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Identification with the Catholic faith could be understood as a means of distinguishing the East Timorese national community from the predominantly Muslim Indonesia. It could also be argued that the number of conversions to Catholicism stemmed from the Indonesian policy of Pancasila that was enforced in all territories, including Timor-Leste. See Weatherbee, Donald E., ‘Indonesia in 1984: Pancasila, politics and power’, Asian Survey 25, 2 (1984): 187–97Google Scholar; Morfit, Michael, ‘Pancasila: The Indonesian state ideology according to the New Order government’, Asian Survey 21, 8 (1981): 838–51Google Scholar.

48 Simonsen, ‘The authoritarian temptation’: 577.

49 Golden, Jill, ‘When the diaspora returns: Language choices in post-Independence Timor Lorosa'e’, in The regenerative spirit: vol. 2 (Un)settling, (dis)locations, (post-)colonial, (re)presentations — Australian postcolonial reflections, ed. Williams, S., Longeran, D., Hoskings, R., Deene, L. and Bierbaum, N. (Adelaide: Lythrum, 2004), p. 118Google Scholar.

50 Martin, Ian, Self-determination in East Timor: The United Nations, the ballot, and international intervention (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001), p. 16Google Scholar.

51 Pouyé, Raphaël, ‘“Shadow states?”: State building and national invention under external constraint in Kosovo and East Timor (1974–2002)’, Research in Question 13 (Feb. 2005): 1–60Google Scholar.

52 Hohe, ‘Totem polls’: 72.

53 Cabral, Estêvão and Martin-Jones, Marilyn, ‘Writing the resistance: Literacy in East Timor 1975–1999’, International Journal of Bilingual Education and Bilingualism 11, 2 (2008): 156–7Google Scholar; Ramos-Horta, José, Funu: The unfinished saga of East Timor (Trenton, NJ: Red Sea, 1987), p. 39Google Scholar.

54 Moore, Samuel, ‘The Indonesian military's last years in East Timor: An analysis of its secret documents’, Indonesia 27 (2001): 9–44Google Scholar.

55 Ibid.: 71.

56 Bartu, Peter, ‘The militia, the military, and the people of Bobonaro’, in Bitter flowers, sweet flowers: East Timor, Indonesia and the world community, ed. Tanter, Richard, Selden, Mark and Shalom, Stephen R. (Sydney: Pluto, 2001), p. 81Google Scholar.

57 Mari Alkatiri is the Secretary General of Fretilin and has held the office of Prime Minister of Timor-Leste from 2002–2006, and from 2017 to the present.

58 ‘The objective of a government is not to “construct” national unity. Rather, this is the objective of all the Timorese people. … in a time of peace, democracy and independence, the whole process of planning should be considered from a bottom-up perspective’. Alkatiri, Mari, Timor-Leste o caminho do desenvolvimiento: Os primeiros anos de governação [Timor-Leste the road to development: The first years of governance] (Lisbon: Lidel, 2005), pp. 26–8Google Scholar. Translation my own.

59 Image taken from the World Flag Database website; http://www.flags.net/INDN.htm (last accessed 15 Mar. 2017).

60 Moore, ‘The Indonesian military's last years in East Timor’: 23–4.

61 Bartu, ‘The militia, the military, and the people of Bobonaro’, p. 82.

62 Moore, ‘The Indonesian military's last years in East Timor’: 23–4.

63 Schatz and Lavine, ‘Waving the flag’: 332.

64 Elizabeth Traube, ‘Unpaid wages: Local narratives and the imagination of the nation’, Asia Pacific Journal of Anthropology 8, 1 (2007): 21–2. Today, corruption and the apparent lack of a legitimate, functioning executive and judiciary has meant that those who did not suffer or who collaborated under the Indonesian occupation are now privileged and undeservedly enjoying power. Traub sums up that ‘an educated but undeserving minority appeared to be expropriating the profits of nationhood, while “the [common] people continued to suffer” (povu terus nahatin)’ (ibid.: 22).

65 Taylor, John G., East Timor: The price of freedom (London: Zed, 1999), p. 69Google Scholar.

66 Scheiner, Charlie, ‘Things fall apart’, Estafeta: Voice of the East Timor Action Network 5, 3 (1999)Google Scholar; http://etan.org/estafeta/99/autumn/things.htm (last accessed 1 Oct. 2012).

67 Pouyé, ‘Shadow states?’, pp. 48–9. The fact that this phrase was also uttered in reference to the flags of the Portuguese colonisers could question the loyalty felt towards ‘national symbols’. Whether or not this loyalty to the national flag is changeable, the strength of loyalty felt was evidently such that people would fight and die under the flag.

68 Hohe, ‘Totem polls’: 77. Ideas of self-sacrifice during the resistance are also invoked by other political parties such as CNRT, ASDT and UNDERTIM as a means of rallying electoral support, by flying the flag of Falintil, for example. Due to space constraints, I cannot elaborate on this aspect of parties’ campaign strategies here.

69 Hohe, ‘Totem polls’: 79.

70 Wallis, Constitution making during state building, pp. 117–18.

71 Throughout the 1980s, the resistance movement (which included armed, clandestine, diplomatic, and political wings) underwent many reforms. The reforms resulted in the formation of the non-partisan umbrella group Conselho Nacional de Resistência Maubere (CNRM) in 1987. The final reform was in 1998, when the CNRT name was decided, and which was the official and final name of the resistance movement until independence in 2002. See Sarah Niner, ‘A long journey of resistance: The origins and struggle of CNRT’, in Tanter et al., Bitter flowers, sweet flowers, pp. 21–2. CNRT and Falintil flag images from FOTW Flags of the world, https://flagspot.net/flags/tl.html (last accessed 28 Mar. 2017).

72 See Wallis, Constitution making during state building, p. 119.

73 Leach, Nation-building and national identity in Timor-Leste, p. 161.

74 UNTAET Constitutional Affairs Branch, ‘National flag’, Constitutional Commission public hearings executive summary, Dili (Sept. 2001). Available at: www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/etimor/DB/db190901.htm (last accessed 15 Feb. 2017). This debate took place and was formally considered by UNTAET's Constitutional Affairs Branch after public consultation. Popular opinion over the flag debate was divided along regional lines and political opinion on other aspects of nation-building, including decisions about national holidays and official languages. See Leach, Nation-building and national identity in Timor-Leste, pp. 157–9.

75 Ibid., p. 161. UN observers at the time also affirmed that ‘there was equal and strong support for both the RDTL and CNRT flags, both having been used in the struggle for independence’. See UNTAET Constitutional Affairs Branch, ‘National Flag’.

76 Richard Tanter, Mark Selden and Stephen R. Shalom, ‘East Timor faces the future’, in Tanter et al., Bitter flowers, sweet flowers, p. 245.

77 Wallis, Constitution making during state building, p. 88.

78 The adoption of the 1975 national flag is protected by the Constitution under Article 156, which stipulates that this decision is ‘incapable of future revision’. Cited in Leach, Nation-building and national identity in Timor-Leste, p. 170.

79 Wallis, Constitution making during state building, pp. 117–18.

80 Lurdes Silva-Carneiro de Sousa, ‘Some facts and comments on the East Timor 2001 Constituent Assembly elections’, Lusotopie (2001): 309. Emphasis in the original.

81 Cited in Wallis, Constitution making during state building, p. 118.

82 Indeed, the 1974 civil war was fought between Fretilin and the UDT. The UDT's endorsement of the 1975 flag in particular is testament to its change in meaning and distancing from Fretilin roots.

83 Fretilin supporters protested because they believed that the new government had been formed illegally, that Fretilin had received more votes in the election than any other party, and claimed that Gusmão's new government had unlawfully usurped the democratically elected government. See ‘Troops desecrate Fretilin flags’, The Age, 21 Aug. 2007; http://www.theage.com.au/news/national/troops-desecrate-fretilin-flags/2007/08/20/1187462178157.html (last accessed 24 May 2013).

84 See Traube, Elizabeth, Cosmology and social life: Ritual exchange among the Mambai of East Timor (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), p. 51Google Scholar.

85 ‘Troops must fly a flag of respect’, The Age, 22 Aug. 2007; http://www.theage.com.au/news/editorial/troops-must-fly-a-flag-of-respect/2007/08/21/1187462262475.html (last accessed 23 May 2013).

86 The contemporary ASDT party has historical connections to Fretilin: the original party was formed in 1974, but later transformed into Fretilin as it stands today. In 2000, Xavier do Amaral ‘resurrected’ the original ASDT, which now co-exists alongside Fretilin. See Shoesmith, Political parties and groupings of Timor-Leste, pp. 18–20.

87 Kertzer, David I., Ritual, politics and power (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), p. 6Google Scholar.

88 McWilliam and Bexley, ‘Performing politics: The 2007 parliamentary elections in Timor-Leste’, p. 76.

89 Personal interview, Dili, July 2012. Interview and transcript in English.