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Major General William Dobbie and the Defence of Malaya, 1935–38
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 24 August 2009
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The Singapore naval base, first conceived in 1919 and endorsed by the British Cabinet in 1921, was the cornerstone of British strategic plan in the Far East. Dubbed as the Singapore strategy, the plan entailed the building of a secure naval base in Singapore. As Britain could not afford to station a separate fleet in the Far East, the main British fleet would sail to the Far East and operate from Singapore in the event of a crisis.
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References
1 Major General William Dobbie, G.O.C. Malaya to Brigadier D. F. Anderson, Directorate of Military Operations and Intelligence, War Office (W.O.), letter, 17 Mar. 1936, paras. 6, 8, WO 106/2441.
2 Singapore Sub-Committee, “First Interim Report”, 27 Feb. 1925, CAB 16/63; and Cabinet Minutes 12 (25) 2, 2 Mar. 1925, CAB 23/49.
3 The Bible, Acts 9:1–19. Dobbie would have heartily endorsed this phrase as he was a prayerful Christian who conducted Bible studies for his officers. See Hay, Ian, The Unconquered Isle: The Story of Malta, G. C. (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1943), pp. 81–85Google Scholar; and Percival, A.E., The War in Malaya (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1949), pp. 14–15Google Scholar.
4 Dobbie (1879–1964) was G.O.C. from Nov. 1935 to Jul. 1939. He was subsequently knighted and promoted to Lieutenant General.
5 “Malaya: Period before Relief”, Chiefs of Staff (C.O.S.) Paper No. 557, 6 Apr. 1937, paras. 2–3, CAB 53/30.
6 Enclosure in Admiralty (Adm.) to Overseas Defence Committee (O.D.C), M. 0753/24, 16 July 1924, included in “Singapore: Establishment of a Naval Base”, O.D.C. Paper No. 136, 16 July 1924, CAB 8/9. Also reproduced as Appendix A in “Singapore: Establishment of a Naval Base. Scales of Naval, Military and Air Defences”, O.D.C. Paper No. 511-M, 23 Dec. 1924, CAB 8/9.
7 Adm., “Naval Situation in the Far East”, C.I.D. Paper No. 119-C, 31 Oct. 1919, ADM 1/8571/295; CAB 5/3; and FO 371/3822.
8 “Singapore: Development as Naval Base”, O.D.C. Paper No. 501-M, 7 June 1921, para. 41, CAB 8/6; and “Notes by Naval Members of O.D.C”, 5 May 1921, para. 8, as enclosure in “Naval and Military Situation in the Far East”, O.D.C. Paper No. 63, 6 May 1921, CAB 8/8. The O.D.C.'s recommendation was approved by the Cabinet on 16 June 1921. See Cabinet Minutes 50 (21) 3, 16 June 1921, CAB 23/26.
9 Secretary, Adm. to Secretary, W.O., No. M. 01104/22, 9 Sept. 1922, reproduced as enclosure in O.D.C. Paper No. 113, 9 Sept. 1922, CAB 8/9.
10 Adm. Board Minutes, 13 Dec. 1923, ADM 167/67.
11 See Neidpath, James, The Singapore Naval Base and the Defence of Britain's Eastern Empire, 1919–1941 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), pp. 88–89Google Scholar. See also C.O.S. Paper No. 546, 16 Jan. 1937, CAB 53/30.
12 There were some minor differences in estimates over the period, but 42 was the accepted norm. An example of the variations was the estimate, by Vice Admiral Frederick Dreyer in 1932, that it would take the fleet 38 days to reach Singapore, provided the fleet's tankers were despatched 10 days before that. Dreyer was then the Deputy C.N.S. See Deputy C.O.S. 1st Mtg., 8 Feb. 1932, CAB 54/1.
13 Beatty repeated this intention at a meeting of the C.I.D. in 1925. See C.I.D. 193rd Mtg., 5 Jan. 1925, CAB 2/4. See also Neidpath, , Singapore, p. 102Google Scholar.
14 “Singapore: Scale of Attack and Scale of Defence”, C.I.D. Paper No. 312-C, 7 Mar. 1928, CAB 5/7. The paper was first discussed at C.O.S. 66th Mtg., 1 Mar. 1928, CAB 53/2.
15 Adm. Board Minutes, 11 July 1929, ADM 167/79.
16 Kennedy, Paul, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery (London: Macmillan, 1983), pp. 289–90CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
17 By 1940, the Italian navy had increased to 6 battleships, 7 heavy cruisers, 12 light cruisers, 61 fleet destroyers and 105 submarines. See ibid., p. 294; and Roskill, Stephen, The War at Sea (London: HMSO, 1954), 1, pp. 60–61 and Appendix HGoogle Scholar.
18 For the growth of the German navy, see Roskill, , War at Sea, 1, pp. 51–61 and Appendix GGoogle Scholar.
19 Kennedy remarked that the “go-ahead” simply came too late to be effective. See Kennedy, , Naval Mastery, pp. 267–98Google Scholar. And Arthur Marder commented: “It was then too late to build up to levels that took into account the real possibility of a war against the Axis and Japan simultaneously.” See Marder, , Old Friends, New Enemies: The Royal Navy and the Imperial Japanese Navy, Strategic Illusions, 1936–1941 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), p. 18Google Scholar.
20 Higham, Robin, Armed Forces in Peacetime (London: Foulis, 1962), p. 218Google Scholar. For the strength and disposition of the Royal Navy in 1939, see Roskill, , War at Sea, 1, pp. 47–50 and Appendix EGoogle Scholar.
21 For analysis of the naval developments in the 1930s, see Neidpath, , Singapore, pp. 122–51Google Scholar; Kennedy, , Naval Mastery, pp. 274–98Google Scholar; and Marder, , New Enemies, pp. 3–19Google Scholar.
22 “Malaya: Period before Relief”, C.O.S. Paper No. 557, 6 Apr. 1937, para. 10, CAB 53/30. The Straits Settlements (S.S.) government asked for the latest guidelines on the period before relief on 12 June 1936, and the matter was referred to the C.O.S. by the O.D.C. See “Period before Relief”, C.O.S. Paper No. 546, 16 Jan. 1937, CAB 53/30.
23 “Far East Appreciation, 1937”, C.O.S. Paper No. 596, 14 June 1937, paras. 235, 339–42, CAB 16/182; and CAB 53/32.
24 C.I.D. 312th Mtg., 4 Mar. 1938, CAB 2/7. See also C.I.D. 292nd Mtg., 15 Apr. 1937, CAB 2/6. Lord Chatfield was First Sea Lord from Jan. 1933 to Nov. 1938. The period before reprovisioning was set at the recommendation of the O.D.C.
25 “Malaya: Period before Relief”, C.O.S. Paper No. 848 (J.P.), 27 Feb. 1939, CAB 53/45. The joint planners were instructed to examine this problem by the C.O.S. on 15 Feb. 1939 in view of the issues raised in the “European Appreciation, 1939–40”. For the European appreciation, see Gibbs, Norman, Grand Strategy: Rearmament Policy (London: HMSO, 1976), pp. 421–38, 657–67Google Scholar.
26 “The Despatch of a Fleet to the Far East”, S.A.C. Paper No. 16, 5 Apr. 1939, CAB 16/209. The S.A.C. was the Strategical Appreciation Sub-Committee which was formed by the C.I.D. in Feb. 1939 to examine further the implications of the “European Appreciation, 1939–40”.
27 C.I.D. 355th Mtg., 2 May 1939, CAB 2/8. See also Marder, , New Enemies, pp. 52–66Google Scholar, for naval policy during the period.
28 C.O.S., “Malaya: Period before Relief”, C.I.D. Paper No. 502-C (also as C.O.S. Paper No. 920), 6 June 1939, CAB 5/9; and CAB 53/50. The C.O.S. took into consideration a report of the O.D.C. on the implications of extending the period before relief to 90 days. See “Malaya: Period before Relief”, O.D.C. Paper No. 698-M, 10 May 1939, included as annex to this C.O.S. paper.
29 C.I.D. 364th Mtg., 6 July 1939, CAB 2/9. The Tientsin crisis erupted in June 1939, and it showed all the more the exposed and weak position of the British in the Far East. For the C.O.S. report on the crisis, see “Situation in the Far East”, C.O.S. Paper No. 931, 24 June 1939, AIR 20/288; and CAB 16/183A.
30 Colonial Office (C.O.) to Governor of S.S., 22 July 1939, AIR 2/1351.
31 C.O.S. Paper No. 16, 7 Sept. 1939, CAB 80/1; C.O.S. Paper No. 49, 26 Sept. 1939, CAB 80/3; C.O.S. 7th Mtg., 8 Sept. 1939, CAB 79/1; and C.O.S. 32nd Mtg., 29 Sept. 1939, CAB 79/1.
32 This was the term used by Paul Haggie. See Haggie, , Britannia at Bay: the Defence of the British Empire Against Japan, 1931–1941 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), p. 167Google Scholar.
33 See para. 2 of report in “The Situation in the Far East in the Event of Japanese Intervention against Us”, C.O.S. Paper No. 592 (Revise), 15 Aug. 1940, CAB 80/15.
34 Ibid., para. 16 of Annex I.
35 As pointed earlier in this article, the exception was the year 1924, when the period before relief was considered to be 28 days in favourable circumstances and 42 days in unfavourable circumstances.
36 Marder, , New Enemies, pp. 15–19Google Scholar; and Roskill, , War at Sea, 1, p. 560Google Scholar. The Japanese naval expansion was closely monitored by the British. See report by Captain H.B. Rawlings, Naval Attache, Tokyo, 10 Aug. 1937, FO 371/21044; “Imperial Japanese Navy: Annual Report, 1938”, 4 Apr. 1939, ADM 1/9588; and Sir Robert Craigie, “Japan: Annual Report, 1939”. 1 Jan. 1949, AIR 23/1970.
37 In Feb. 1939, Admiral Sir Roger Backhouse stated that if all the capital ships were pulled out of the Mediterranean. Britain could send only 5 capital ships to the Far East, and 7 by Sept. He noted ruefully that “5 or 6 ships against a Japanese Fleet of 10 ships plus her full strength in other classes of ships is not adequate in the proper sense of the word”. See First Sea Lord. “The Despatch of a Fleet to the Far East”, S.A.C. Paper No. 4, 28 Feb. 1939, CAB 16/209. The C.O.S. confirmed that the minimum required for a naval war against the Japanese was 7 capital ships, and this number could be obtained by Sept. 1939 if capital ships were withdrawn from the Mediterranean. See “Situation in the Far East”, C.O.S. Paper No. 931, 24 June 1939, AIR 20/288; and CAB 16/183A.
38 “Singapore: Development as Naval Base”, O.D.C. Paper No. 501-M, 7 June 1921, para. 22, CAB 8/6.
39 Ibid., para. 42.
40 For British intelligence reports on Hainan, see Far East Combined Bureau (F.E.C.B.), “Hainan Island”, Index No. 102, 1st Ed. C., 4 May 1940, WO 208/894; and F.E.C.B., “Aerodromes etc. in Hainan”, 28 May 1941, AIR 23/1970.
41 The Spratly Islands, a group in the South China Sea, were claimed by both France and Japan since the 1920s. They are 650 miles from Singapore. See Marder, , New Enemies, p. 45Google Scholar.
42 For the implications of Japanese bases in north Indo-China, see the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee's report, “Japanese Threat against Burma and Malaya”, J.I.C. Paper No. 323, 20 Oct. 1940, FO 371/24715; and WO 208/870.
43 Saigon to Foreign Office (F.O.), No. 155, 29 July 1941, FO 371/27765; WO 208/873; and WO 208/1080.
44 Executive Planning Section, “Scale of Attack on Malaya”, E.P.S. Paper No. 146, 12 Jan. 1941, Annex B, CAB 122/25; and WO 208/870. The journey from Japan was based on the distance between Singapore and Nagasaki. In Dec. 1941, the Japanese invasion force sailed from Samah (Hainan), Saigon and Phu Quo Island (off Cambodia). See the Japanese account in “A Summary of the Operational Plan of the Japanese Navy for Landing in Malaya”, 3 May 1951, Box 7, A.L. 1335, J.A.L. Series, Imperial War Museum (I.W.M.).
45 The famous Japanese ‘Zero’ fighters had a normal range of 1,160 miles and long range of 1,930 miles in 1941. See Willmott, H.P., “A6M Zero” in Classic Aircraft of World War II (London: Bison Books, 1981), p. 230Google Scholar. According to Lieutenant General Okumiya Masatake, when the Japanese designed the ‘Zero’ in 1937, it took into consideration the distance between Saigon and Singapore. It was one of the reasons why such a long-range fighter was built. See Marder, , New Enemies, p. 306Google Scholar.
46 The possibility of shore-based air attack on Singapore was first examined by the Joint Oversea and Home Defence Committee on 10 Feb. 1937 at the request of the C.O.S. The committee agreed that the Japanese might try to establish air bases within range of Singapore in the Dutch East Indies or Thailand. This was unlikely to succeed as it would be strenously opposed by the Dutch and there was no sign that this would be allowed by the Thais. But the situation should be watched closely. See “Singapore: Possibility of Shorebased Air Attack”, C.O.S. Paper No. 566, 4 Mar. 1937, CAB 36/13; and CAB 53/30.
47 J.I.C, “Probable Scale of Japanese Air Attack on Malaya”, J.I.C. Paper No. 327, 13 Aug. 1941, AIR 20/289; CAB 79/13; and WO 208/870. This paper was discussed at C.O.S. 287th Mtg., 14 Aug. 1941, AIR 20/289; and CAB 79/13.
48 For a comparison of British and Japanese air power in the Far East, see Richards, Dennis and Saunders, Hilary St. G., Royal Air Force, 1939–1945, Vol. 2: The Fight Avails (London: HMSO, 1954), pp. 6–11Google Scholar.
49 For early examples of the monitoring of Japanese landing operations, see Military Attache, Tokyo to W.O., 21 Feb. 1931, WO 106/135; and C.-in-C. China Station to Adm., 19 Sept. 1937, WO 208/2197.
50 Haining to Dobbie, letter, 25 Nov. 1937, WO 106/2441. These reports were received in Singapore. See Dobbie to Haining, 28 Oct. 1937, WO 106/2441.
51 “Singapore: Reinforcements from India”, C.O.S. Paper No. 805, 14 Dec. 1938, CAB 53/42.
52 Major General Lionel Bond, G.O.C. Malaya to W.O., letter C.R.M.C. 37406/G, 13 Apr. 1940, para. 3b, AIR 2/7174: WO 32/9366; and WO 106/2440. The Japanese 5th Division which spearheaded the invasion of Malaya was specially trained in landing operations for over 20 years. See Tsuji, Masanobu, Singapore: The Japanese Version (London: Constable, 1960), p. 56Google Scholar.
53 Sir Shenton Thomas, “World War Two”, Oct. 1954. Thomas Papers, British Association of Malaysia (B.A.M.) Collection, Royal Commonwealth Society (R.C.S.); and Kirby, S. Woodburn, The War Against Japan (London: HMSO, 1957), 1, Appendix 1Google Scholar. See also memo. by Thomas, , 7 11 1941, in Proceedings of the Federal Council, 1941 (Kuala Lumpur: Government Printer, 1941)Google Scholar.
54 Interview with Sir Hilton Poynton, Croydon, 13 Dec. 1982. Poynton served in the Colonial Office from 1927 to 1966, and as Permanent Under-Secretary from 1959 to 1966. From 1940 to 1941, he was in the C.O.'s Defence Dept., dealing with matters relating to the defence of Malaya. See also Crown Colonist, Dec. 1941, p. 532; and report by Lieutenant Commander H. Ainslie, 29 Apr. 1942, para. 3, ADM 199/357.
55 “China Station Colonial Intelligence Report”, June 1941, Vol. 3, pp. 11–12, WO 33/1834.
56 The armoured cars and tanks could be to the advantage of either the invaders or defenders, depending on who were in possession of these weapons and how they were used. The Japanese could only use them if they could transport and land these heavy weapons or capture them.
57 Kirby, “Notes on Singapore”, n.d., but probably written in late 1934, p. 4, attached as enclosure in Colonel Thomas Hutton to Lieutenant Colonel A.E. Percival, 13 Jan. 1936, P21/41, Percival Papers, I.W.M.
58 Dobbie to Anderson, W.O., letter, 17 Mar. 1936, WO 106/2441. Quoted at the beginning of this article.
59 Colonel W.F. Anderson, W.O. to Dobbie, letter, 9 Jan. 1936, WO 106/2441. The draft of this letter was approved by Major General Sir John Dill, D.M.O.I.
60 Imperial Defence College, “Staff Appreciation on the Defence of Singapore”, Exercise No. 3, 1934, para. 29, WO 106/5136; and “An Appreciation of an Attack on Singapore from the Japanese Point of View”, 1935, paras. 12–16, WO 106/5698.
61 Dobbie to W.O., letter, 17 Mar. 1936, para. 7, WO 106/2441. See also Neidpath, , Singapore, pp. 158–59Google Scholar.
62 Ibid., para. 1.
63 Ibid., paras. 6, 8.
64 Compare this, for example, with Kirby's unofficial report of 1935, which suggested that mobile forces be despatched from Singapore to supplement the forces on the mainland. See Kirby, “Notes on Singapore”, n.d., but written late 1935, as enclosure in Colonel Thomas Hutton to Lieutenant Colonel A.E. Percival, 13 Jan. 1936, P21/41, Percival Papers, I.W.M.
65 According to the C.O.S. Far East appreciation of June 1937, the regular Indian and Malay battalions plus one volunteer battalion would be withdrawn from the mainland for the defence of Singapore, leaving the defence of the Malayan mainland to “5 weak volunteer battalions”. See “Appreciation of Situation in the Far East, 1937”, C.O.S. Paper No. 596, 14 June 1937, paras. 216–17, CAB 16/182; and CAB 53/32.
66 Dobbie to W.O., No. 5757, 2 Mar. 1936, WO 32/4183. Dobbie followed this up with a letter, stating that the C.-in-C. China Station agreed with his recommendation. The width of the channel from Pengerang to Changi was given as approximately 6 miles. See Dobbie to W.O., letter, 10 Mar. 1936, WO 32/4183.
67 W.O. note, 7 Mar. 1936, WO 32/4183. See also minutes of meeting on 6-inch gun defences at Singapore, 11 Mar. 1936, WO 32/4183; and WO 196/18.
68 W.O. to Treasury, Memo. No. 41, 25 Aug. 1936, WO 32/4183. Treasury approval was obtained in Sept. See Treasury to W.O., 23 Sept. 1936, WO 32/4183.
69 Dobbie to Dill, D.M.O.I., letter, 19 June 1936, WO 106/2441.
70 Dobbie to Major General Robert H. Haining, letter, 8 Feb. 1937, para. 4, WO 106/2441. Haining took over from Dill as the D.M.O.I.
71 Ibid. The Penang exercise was held from 26 Feb. to 1 Mar. 1937.
72 These command exercises were “designed partly to train and test the units taking part, but primarily to examine definite defensive problems”. They included beach defence of Singapore, sabotage at Singapore, defence of the naval base and the defence of the east coast of Johore. See Dobbie to Haining, letter, 2 Oct. 1937, WO 106/2441.
73 “Singapore: Combined Operations Exercise, 2 Feb. 1938 to 5 Feb. 1938”, as enclosure in C.-in-C. China Station to Adm., letter, 15 July 1938, ADM 1/9903.
74 From 1939 to 1942, Dobbie served with distinction as Governor and C.-in-C. of Malta, which was awarded the George Cross in Apr. 1942 for its valiant stand against the Axis onslaught. See Attard, Joseph, The Battle of Malta: An Epic True Story of Suffering and Bravery (London: Hamlyn, 1980)Google Scholar; and Hay, Unconquered Isle. Some regretted that Dobbie was not in Malaya when the war broke out. This was expressed by Cecil Lee in an interview in London on 2 Aug. 1984. Lee was an expatriate business executive and a member of the Federated Malay States Volunteer Corps.
75 The Local Defence Committee was a civil-military body chaired by the Governor. It dealt with matters of immediate local concern like food supplies, civil defence, land and internal security.
76 Dobbie to Dill, D.M.O.I., letter, 26 Mar. 1936, WO 106/2441.
77 Dobbie to W.O., letter C.R.M.C. 32845/G, 16 Nov. 1937, para. 4, WO 32/4188.
78 W.O. to Dobbie, letter, 7 Mar. 1938, WO 32/4188. The C.O.S. raised the period before relief to 70 days in Apr. 1937 and this was approved by C.I.D. in Mar. 1938. See earlier part of this article.
79 Memo. on “The Need for Armoured Fighting Vehicles in Malaya Command”, para. 4, as enclosure in Dobbie to W.O., letter C.R.M.C. 33523/G, 27 Jan. 1938, WO 32/9366.
80 Dobbie to Pownall, D.M.O.I., 14 June 1938, WO 106/2441. See also “Report on Tactical Exercise Without Troops: Defence of Johore, held at Mersing, 27–29 Sept. 1937”, as enclosure in Dobbie to W.O., letter C.R.M.C. 30760/35/G.I., 4 Nov. 1937, WO 32/4187; and “An Appreciation of the Defence Problem in Johore”, May 1938, as enclosure in Dobbie to W.O., letter C.R.M.C. 34300/G, 19 July 1938, WO 106/2440.
81 Dobbie to Anderson, W.O., letter, 17 Mar. 1936, para. 6, WO 106/2441.
82 Dobbie to Dill, D.M.O.I., letter, 19 June 1936, WO 106/2441.
83 “The Defence of the Fortress of Singapore”, May 1937, paras. 20–24, P21/41, Percival Papers, I.W.M.
84 Dobbie to W.O., letter C.R.M.C. 32845/G, 16 Nov. 1937, para. 2, WO 32/4188.
85 Memo. on “The Need for Armoured Fighting Vehicles in Malaya Command”, paras. 4–9, enclosure in Dobbie to W.O., letter C.R.M.C. 33523/G, 27 Jan. 1938, WO 32/9366. See also paras. 6–7 of the letter.
86 Dobbie to Haining, D.M.O.I., letter, 2 Oct. 1937, para. 5, WO 106/2441. This turned out to be a prophetic utterance! The Japanese attack came on 7–8 Dec. 1941, and the British air reconnaissance was badly hampered by the North East Monsoon.
87 “Report on Tactical Exercise Without Troops: Defence of Johore, held at Mersing, 27–29 Sept. 1937”, as enclosure in Dobbie to W.O., letter C.R.M.C. 30760/35/G.I., 4 Nov. 1937, WO 32/4187. Relevant paras, in page 9 of Appendix A and summary of conclusions. Dobbie again emphasized this conclusion in a letter to Major General Henry R. Pownall, the new D.M.O.I. See Dobbie to Pownall, 14 June 1938, WO 106/2441. After the fall of South Vietnam in 1975, many refugees arrived in Malaysia and Singapore in similar ramshackle boats.
88 Haining, D.M.O.I. to Dobbie, letter, 30 Nov. 1937, WO 106/2441. Haining was replying to Dobbie's letter of 2 Oct. 1937. One wonders why it took so long for the defence establishment to discover that it was possible to land on the east coast during the N. E. Monsoon.
89 Memo, by C.I.G.S., para. 2, as enclosure in “Retention of the Indian Infantry Battalion at Taiping”, C.I.D. Paper No. 480-C, 15 Nov. 1938, CAB 5/9.
90 Military Attache, Tokyo to W.O., 21 Feb. 1931, WO 106/135.
91 Dobbie to Haining, D.M.O.I., letter, 28 Oct. 1937, para. 5, WO 106/2441.
92 Dobbie to Haining, D.M.O.I., letter, 5 Jan. 1938, para. 2, WO 106/2441. See also Dobbie to W.O., letter C.R.M.C. 33523/G, 27 Jan. 1938, WO 32/9366.
93 Memo. on “The Need for Armoured Fighting Vehicles in Malaya Command”, paras. 4–5, as enclosure in Dobbie to W.O., letter C.R.M.C. 33523/G, 27 Jan. 1938, WO 32/9366. See also Dobbie to Pownall, D.M.O.I., 14 June 1938, WO 106/2441. Dobbie estimated the Japanese landing craft capacity at 20,000 to 30,000 men. See Dobbie to W.O., letter C.R.M.C. 34300/G, 19 July 1938, para. 4, WO 106/2440.
94 Dobbie to Haining, D.M.O.I., letter, 2 Oct. 1937, para. 8, WO 106/2441. Dobbie first approached the W.O. in Oct. 1936 for some armoured fighting vehicles as reserve behind the Singapore coast, but in Feb. 1937 accepted the W.O.'s ruling that the existing machine gun carriers would be adequate for the purpose. See Memo. on “The Need for Armoured Fighting Vehicles in Malaya Command”, para. 1, enclosure in Dobbie to W.O., letter C.R.M.C. 33523/G, 27 Jan. 1938, WO 32/9366.
95 Dobbie to Haining, D.M.O.I., letter, 5 Jan. 1938, paras. 1, 9, WO 106/2441; and Dobbie to W.O., letter C.R.M.C. 33523/G, 27 Jan. 1938, paras. 3–8 and attached memo, entitled “The Need for Armoured Fighting Vehicles in Malaya Command”, WO 32/9366. See also summary of conclusions in “Report on Tactical Exercise Without Troops: Defence of Johore, held at Mersing, 27–29 Sept. 1937”, included as enclosure in Dobbie to W.O., letter C.R.M.C. 30760/35/G.I., 4 Nov. 1937, WO 32/4187.
96 Dobbie to Dill, D.M.O.I., letter, 10 Jan. 1936, WO 106/2441. Dobbie was critical of the A.O.C. Far East, Group Captain Sydney W. Smith. He said it was “remarkably difficult to get a straight answer to any question” from Smith. Inter-service co-operation was not good.
97 Dobbie to Haining, D.M.O.I., letter, 25 Mar. 1937, para. 5, WO 106/2441; Haining to Dobbie, letter, 6 Feb. 1937, para. 9, WO 106/2441; Haining to Dobbie, letter, 31 July 1937, WO 106/2441; and Dobbie to Haining, No. 6312, 22 Sept. 1937, WO 106/2441. The sites for air bases included Kluang, Penang, Alor Star, Sungei Patani, Taiping, Ipoh and Kuala Lumpur.
98 Colonel D. F. Anderson, W.O. to Dobbie, letter, 6 Feb. 1936, WO 106/2441.
99 Haining, D.M.O.I. to Dobbie, letter, 9 June 1937, para. 6, WO 106/2441.
100 Haining to Dobbie, letter, 6 Feb. 1937, para. 9, WO 106/2441. Dobbie appeared to agree to this point when he noted that a strong R.A.F. “should be able to make the establishment by the enemy of a land air base a very difficult operation, if not an impossible one”. See Dobbie to Haining, letter, 25 Mar. 1937, WO 106/2441.
101 Haining to Dobbie, letter, 6 Feb. 1937, para. 9, WO 106/2441.
102 Dobbie's concern was shared by Colonel A. E. Percival, who was his Chief Staff Officer from Mar. 1936 to Dec. 1937. Percival later served as G.O.C. from 16 May 1941 to 15 Feb. 1942. When he gave a background lecture in Jan. 1937 to officers attending an exercise, Percival mentioned that the enemy might try to launch shore-based air attacks on Singapore from “either somewhere in Malaya or in some of the adjoining territory”. The lecture was probably approved by Dobbie in advance. See “The Strategical Problems of Singapore”, Jan. 1937, P23/69/1 & P23/69/2, Percival Papers, I.W.M.
103 Dobbie to Haining, D.M.O.I., letter, 25 Mar. 1937, para. 8, WO 106/2441. Dobbie's prediction about French Indo-China was fulfilled in 1940–41. Indeed, he was the first officer ever to consider the possibility of the Japanese establishing advanced bases in French Indo-China. This author had not found any such reference to French Indo-China before this date. For a subsequent Malaya Command memo, about the possibility of the Japanese establishing advanced air bases in British, Dutch or Thai territories, see “The Defence of the Fortress of Singapore”, May 1937, paras. 10–13, 37, P21/41, Percival Papers, I.W.M. It was estimated in this memo, that the range of a bomber aircraft would soon be increased to 500 miles.
104 “Singapore: Possibility of Shore-based Air Attack”, C.O.S. Paper No. 566, 4 Mar. 1937, CAB 36/13; and CAB 53/30.
105 W.O. to Dobbie, letter 098/4000/M.0.2, 31 July 1937, WO 32/4188.
106 Dobbie to W.O., letter C.R.M.C. 32845/G.L, 22 Sept. 1937, WO 32/4188.
107 Dobbie to W.O., letter C.R.M.C. 32845/G, 16 Nov. 1937, para. 3, WO 32/4188. The W.O.'s reply was that the situation was kept constantly under review. See W.O. to Dobbie, letter 098/4000/M.0.2, 7 Mar. 1938, para. 7, WO 32/4188.
108 “The Defence of the Fortress of Singapore”, May 1937, paras. 10–11, 24, 29–31, 40, P21/41, Percival Papers, I.W.M.
109 “In contrast, there was no discussion about the retention of regular troops on the mainland or about defending the whole of Malaya in Dobbie's earlier correspondence or Percival's lecture in Jan. 1937. Percival in fact assumed in his Jan. 1937 lecture that the enemy would launch a direct attack on Singapore and some units on the mainland would be withdrawn into Singapore. See “The Strategical Problems of Singapore”, Jan. 1937, P23/69/1 & P23/69/2, Percival Papers, I.W.M.
110 “Appreciation of Situation in the Far East, 1937”, C.O.S. Paper No. 596, 14 June 1937, paras. 166–235, CAB 16/182; and CAB 53/32.
111 Dobbie to Haining, D.M.O.I., letter, 29 June 1937, para. 3, WO 106/2441.
112 Percival, , “Operations of Malaya Command, From 8 December 1941 to 15 February 1942”, Second Supplement to the London Gazette of 20 February 1948, No. 38215, 26 02 1948, para. 21Google Scholar. (Listed hereafter as Percival, Despatch.) Percival claimed subsequently in his book that the appreciation was done at his suggestion. He acknowledged though that the appreciation received Dobbie's approval and on his instruction Percival brought it back to the W.O. See Percival, , Malaya, p. 17Google Scholar. In the opinion of this author, the appreciation was a collective work, based on the experience of the Malaya Command. Though it was drafted by Percival, it was obviously done under the overall supervision of Dobbie and clearly bore the imprint of Dobbie. This came through when it was read and compared with the correspondence preceding the appreciation. And Dobbie specially requested that the W.O. give due consideration to the appreciation and the W.O. subsequently gave its reply direct to Dobbie. See Dobbie to Haining, letter, 27 Nov. 1937, WO 106/2441; Haining to Dobbie, letter, 31 Dec. 1937, WO 106/2441; and Pownall to Dobbie, letter, 11 Mar. 1938, WO 106/2441.
113 Percival. “Appreciation from the Point of View of the Japanese for An Attack on the Fortress of Singapore”, Nov. 1937, paras. 5–8. 22, WO 106/2440.
114 Ibid., paras. 23–25.
115 Ibid., paras. 11, 26–30, 35–36.
116 Ibid., paras. 31–46.
117 “Deductions from Japanese Appreciation of the Attack on the Fortress of Singapore”, Nov. 1937, paras. 1–2, WO 106/2440; P20/39, Percivai Papers, I.W.M.; and Percival, Despatch, Appendix A. For other discussion of this appreciation, see Neidpath, , Singapore, pp. 161–63Google Scholar; and Allen, , 1941–1942, p. 45Google Scholar.
118 Pownall, D.M.O.I. designate to Dobbie, letter, 11 Mar. 1937, para. 3, WO 106/2430; and WO 106/2441. The C.I.G.S. was General Viscount Gort (6 Dec. 1937 to 4 Sept. 1939).
119 Minutes by staff officers, Jan. to Feb. 1938, WO 106/2430.
120 Pownall to Dobbie, letter, 11 Mar. 1938, paras. 4–6, WO 106/2430; and WO 106/2441. Pownall noted that Haining was not allowed to send a copy of the “Far East Appreciation” to Singapore. Dobbie finally received a copy. See Dobbie to Pownall, 14 June 1938, WO 106/2441. It was incredible that the G.O.C. directly concerned with the defence problems should not receive a copy of this major appreciation, drafted in May 1937 and approved in June 1937, till about June 1938. This was probably due to misplaced emphasis on secrecy.
121 Pownall to Dobbie, letter, 11 Mar. 1938, paras. 4–5, 10–13, WO 106/2430; and WO 106/2441.
122 Dobbie to Pownall, letter C.R.M.C. 34064/G, 20 May 1938, para. 1, WO 106/2441. Dobbie suggested a joint service war game, which would help planners to avoid two great dangers: keeping a force larger than necessary, thereby wasting resources; and “living in a fool's paradise, if we rely on a force which is not strong enough”. Pownall replied that senior personnel could not be spared for a war game, but suggested that the three services in Malaya conduct a joint appreciation. See Pownall to Dobbie, No. 51546, 13 July 1938, WO 106/2441. But Air Ministry (A.M.) declined on the grounds that the C.O.S. Far East Appreciation of June 1937 was still valid, and the Adm. stated that it was not practicable to do so. See A.M. to WO., S. 31663/111/S.6, 26 Aug. 1938, AIR 2/1351; and Adm. to W.O., 28 Feb. 1939, AIR 2/1351. A joint appreciation was not done till Oct. 1940. In the meantime, Dobbie submitted his own requirements, bearing in mind the roles of the navy and air force.
123 Dobbie to Pownall, 14 June 1938, WO 106/2441.
124 Dobbie to W.O., letter C.R.M.C. 34300/G, 19 July 1938, para. 2, WO 106/2440. The letter was entitled “Infantry Garrison of Malaya: Inadequacy of”.
125 Ibid., para. 4.
126 Ibid., paras. 13, 22. Dobbie did not give the source for his intelligence on the Japanese plan. But in early 1938, a Royal Australian Navy Reserve Commander reported that after a number of drinks, some Japanese naval officers spoke freely about the Far East. They asserted that Japan must fight Britain and agreed that Singapore was a great base. But they “consider that it is vulnerable from the north, by land, and also that it is useless without a fleet”. See Australian Station Intelligence to Adm., 1 Feb. 1938, FO 371/22192. This report was probably passed on to Dobbie.
127 Dobbie to W.O., letter C.R.M C. 34300/G, 19 July 1938, paras. 13–19, 26–27, WO 106/2440. The two main roads were: Mersing-Jemaluang-Kluang-Ayer Hitam-Johore Bahru; and Mersing-Jemaluang-Kota Tinggi-Johore Bahru. Dobbie's plan was to defend the general line Johore River-Kota Tinggi-Kulai-Pulai River. For other details on defence of Johore, see “An Appreciation of the Defence Problem in Johore”, May 1938, attached to Dobbie's letter. This appreciation was written by Malaya Command's General Staff for the Sultan of Johore.
128 Ibid., paras. 21–25.
129 Ibid., paras. 27–31, Appendix A. Dobbie did not include in the total of 19 the Indian battalion that was due to be sent back to India.
130 Ibid., paras. 27–31, Appendix A. Dobbie's specific proposal was that the Indian battalion, the 1st Battalion 2nd Punjab Regiment, which was due to go back to India once the Malay Regiment battalion was operational, should be retained in Malaya as the 5th regular battalion. The Malay Regiment was raised and paid by the Federated Malay States government.
131 Ibid., paras. 5, 12, 28–29.
132 Eady to Pownall, D.M.O.I., minute, 2 Sept. 1938, WO 106/2440. Eady's specific recommendation was that the possible retention or replacement of the Indian battalion and the provision a second brigade in the reinforcement scheme be investigated.
133 “Retention of the Indian Infantry Battalion at Taiping”, C.I.D. Paper No. 480-C, 15 Nov. 1938, CAB 5/9. The C.I.G.S. did not give the complete plan for the deployment of forces within the Malaya Command, possibly because the total forces to be allocated had to be worked out. But he did confirm that “the defence of the mainland was allocated” to the 4 regular battalions which would arrive under the reinforcement scheme, the Johore Military Force and the 7 volunteer units.
134 C.I.D. 338th Mtg., 17 Nov. 1938, CAB 2/8.
135 W.O. to Dobbie, No. 52529, 22 Nov. 1938, WO 32/9366; and Pownall to Dobbie, letter, 28 Nov. 1938. WO 106/2441. Dobbie was also told it was not possible, at least for the time being, to increase the number of battalions under the reinforcement scheme.
136 “Singapore: Reinforcements from India”, C.O.S. Paper No. 805, 14 Dec. 1938, CAB 53/42. Chatfield's letter of 22 Nov. 1938 was included as Annex I. See also C.O.S. 264th Mtg., 14 Dec. 1938, CAB 53/10.
137 “The Situation in the Far East in the Event of Japanese Intervention Against Us”, C.O.S. Paper No. 592 (Revise), 15 Aug. 1940, paras, xviii, 47, 79–81, CAB 66/10; and CAB 80/15. In contrast, the C.O.S. June 1937 appreciation laid down that the main units on the mainland would be withdrawn into Singapore in time of crisis. See “Appreciation of Situation in the Far East, 1937”, C.O.S. Paper No. 596, 14 June 1937, paras. 216–17, CAB 16/182; and CAB 53/32.