Hostname: page-component-7c8c6479df-5xszh Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-03-27T23:49:08.317Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Thai Wartime Leadership Reconsidered: Phibun and Pridi

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 April 2011

Kobkua Suwannathat-Pian
Affiliation:
Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia

Abstract

World War II may have ended fifty years ago, yet it is clear that numerous evaluations, interpretations, and assessments made by historians and scholars on this period in Southeast Asian history have not sufficiently reflected the intrinsic values of the wartime events, personalities, and developments involved. This is particularly true in the case of two wartime leaders in Thailand — Field Marshal Phibunsongkhram and Pridi Phanomyong. The article attempts to re-assess and update both their place in Thai history and their contributions to the socio-political development of the country.

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © The National University of Singapore 1996

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 For example, Chayanam, Direk, Muang Thai kab Songkhram Lok Khrang Thi Song [Thailand and World War II], 1st ed. (Bangkok: Thai-watthanaphanit, 1967)Google Scholar; Crosby, Sir Josiah, Siam: The Crossroads (London: Hollis & Carter, 1945)Google Scholar; Thompson, Virginia, Thailand: The New Siam (New York: Macmillan, 1941)Google Scholar; Ray, Jayananta Kumar, Portraits of Thai Politics (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1972)Google Scholar; Pomphet, Wichitwong Na [Vichitvong Na Pombhejara], Pridi Banomyong [Phanomyong] and the Making of Thailand's Modem History (Bangkok: Chaiwichit Press, 1979)Google Scholar. The most recent publication in this genre is Stowe, J.A., Siam Becomes Thailand: A Study of Intrigue (London: Hurst & Hurst, 1991)Google Scholar.

2 For detail on the historiographic controversy concerning Phibun, see Suwannathat-Pian, Kobkua, Thailand's Durable Premier: Phibun through Three Decades, 1932–1957 (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1995)Google Scholar, ch. 1.

3 See DrBunnag, Duan, Than Pridi Ratthaburut Awuso Phu Wang Phansethakit Thai Khonraek [Pridi, Elder Statesman and First Planner of the Thai Economy] (Bangkok: Samakkhitham Publications, 1974)Google Scholar; Santaputra, Charivat, Thai Foreign Policy, 1932–1946 (Bangkok: Institute of Thai Khadi Studies, Thammasat University, 1985)Google Scholar; Dantrakun, Suphot, Chiwaprawat Ratthaburut Awuso Pridi Phanomhong [A Biography of Pridi Phanomyong, the Elder Statesman] (Bangkok: Prachakanphim, 19721973)Google Scholar; and Kruger, Rayne, The Devil's Discus (London: Cassell, 1964)Google Scholar. It is only recently, with the publication of Brailey's, N.J.Thailand and the Fall of Singapore: A Frustrated Asian Revolution (Boulder & London: Westview Press, 1986)Google Scholar, that Pridi's socio-political contributions have begun to be subjected to critical assessment.

4 Charivat Santaputra, writing in 1985, has this to say of Phibun: “[he] believed that Thailand ought to be a dictatorship if it wished to remain strong and independent.... Not only did he talk, his acts proved to be dictatorial too” (Thai Foreign Policy, 1932–1947, 1985, p. 123). Sir Josiah Crosby analysed Phibun's character at the close of World War II: “the initial success of Germany under Hitter went to his [Phibun's] head and to the heads of his followers.... It is the characteristic of the Siamese that they like to be in the fashion and Luang Pibul [Phibun] proved no exception to this rule.... He [Phibun] is the perfect opportunist and to this—he is prompted by intense personal ambition and that his political record is such that he is trusted by no one....” (Siam: The Crossroads, 1945, pp. 89, 102). Conversely, Crosby had profuse praise for Pridi: “A consistent democrat, but an upholder of the constitutional monarchy.... I regard him as being one of the most sincere, and perhaps the ablest, among the “promoters”.... I was on the best of terms with Luang Pradist [Pridi], and admire him greatly for the consistancy with which he stuck to his principles....” (Ibid., p. 104, emphasis added).

5 Phibunsongkhram, Anan, Chomphon Por Phibunsongkhram [Field Marshal P. Phibunsongkhram] (Bangkok: Soonkanphim, vols. 1–3, 1957Google Scholar; vols. 4–5, 1976); Suphot Dantrakun, [Chiwaprawat RatthaburutAwuso Pridi Phanomhong]; Reporters' Association of Thailand, Buangraek Prachathipat [The Preliminary Stage of Democracy] (Bangkok: Mitnara Press, 1973)Google Scholar.

6 For example, Jayananta Kumar Ray, 1972; Chandrawong, Sombat and Thanapnonphan, Rangsan (eds.), RakMuang Thai [Beloved Thailand], vol. I (Bangkok: Thai-watthanaphanit, 1976)Google Scholar; Numnonda, Thamsook, Thailand and the Japanese Presence, 1941–1945 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1977)Google Scholar; Batson, B.A., The End of the Absolute Monarchy in Siam (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1984)Google Scholar; Terwiel, B.J., Field Marshal Plaek Phibun Songkhram (St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1980)Google Scholar.

7 For example, see Samutwanit, Chai-anan, Sib-si Tulakhom: Khana Rod lae Kabot Boworadet [14 October: The People's Party and the Boworadet Rebellion] (Bangkok: Chomrom Prawatsat, Chulalongkorn University, 1974)Google Scholar; and Samutwanit, Chai-anan, Khusiphitak, Sethaphon, and Ratanamongkhonmat, Sawaeng (eds.), Sat Kanmuang [Political Animal] (Bangkok: Thai-watthanaphanit, 1971)Google Scholar; Chaloemtiara, Thak (ed.), Thai Politics,1932–1957 (Bangkok: Social Science Association of Thailand, 1978)Google Scholar.

8 Pridi's own works include “Account Concerning the Council of Regency”, in Bang Prakan kiewkab Phra Borom Wongsanuwong nairawang Songkhram Lok Khrang Thi Song [Some Account Concerning the Royal Family During World War II], ed. Phuengsunthon, Pramote and Siriphat, Pruang (Bangkok: Nitiwet Publications, 1972)Google Scholar, and Lukthan Samkhun Bangprakan kiewkab Sathana Songkhram khong Thai nairawang Songkhram Lok Khrang Thi Song [Some Important Evidence Concerning the War Status of Thailand During World War II] (Bangkok: Santitham, 1978)Google Scholar. Outstanding among contributions from scholars and writers are Kruger, The Devil's Discus; Ray, Portraits of Thai Politics; Suwannacheep, Sangworn, Anuson nai Ngan Phra-rachathan Phlueng-sop Phonrua-tri Luang Sangwornyuthakit [In Memory of the Royal-Sponsored Cremation of Vice-Admiral Luang Sangwornyuthakit] (Bangkok: Suraphai Press, 1969)Google Scholar; Wichitwong Na Pomphet, Pridi Banomyong; and the Thammasat Research in History Group, Thai Khadi Studies, Thammasat University, “Pridi Phonomyong: Chiwit lae Ngan, Ph.S. 2443–2526” [Pridi Phanomyong: Life and Work, 1900–1983], Journal of Thammasat 21,1 (March 1983): 10–23.

9 Brailey, N.J., Thailand and the Fall of Singapore: A Frustrated Asian Revolution (Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1986)Google Scholar. Brailey traces the emergence of a “Free Thai” organisation to September 1941, i.e., three months before the Japanese arrival, directed mainly against Phibun and his supporters rather than against the Japanese and seeking to further democracy and political liberalisation. Pridi himself admitted that initially in response to the Japanese ultimatum crisis of 8 Dec. 1941, he had approached Phra Sarasat, another pro-Japanese political leader, as an alternative to Phibun. Brailey quite effectively raises doubt over Pridi's commitment to the Allied cause prior to August 1942. To Brailey, it is “very likely that his eventual anti-Japanese stance was a consequence primarily of his hostility to Phibun” (pp. 110–14) and Pridi's first concern was to displace Phibun with even another pro-Japanese premier.

10 Samutwanit, Chai-anan, [Sib-si Tulakhom: Khana Rad lae Kabot Boworadet]; Answer to Pridi (Bangkok: Phikhanet Publications, 1975)Google Scholar.

n See details of the discussion in Kobkua Suwannathat-Pian, “Politics and National Interests: Negotiations for the Settlement of the Franco-Siamese territorial Dispute, 1945–1947”, paper presented at the 13th IAHA Conference, 5–9 Sep. 1994, Tokyo, Japan; see also Flood, E. Thaddeus, “The 1940 Franco-Thai Border Dispute and Phibun Songkhram's Commitment to Japan”, Journal of Southeast Asian History 10, 2 (Sep. 1969)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

12 FO [Foreign Office Files, U.K.] 371/63883. The Final Findings of the Conciliation Commission, 27 Jun. 1947. in arriving at its conclusion favourable to the French request of the status-quo-ante 9 May 1941, the report stresses that “The Commission desires to point out again that acting within the limits of its terms of reference it has confined its studies and deliberations to ethnic, geographic, and economic matters, and thus political and historic considerations have been excluded [emphasis added]. The Franco-Siamese Conciliation Commission was set up in accordance with the Article 3 of the Franco-Siamese Agreement, 17 November 1946, to examine the merits of the “revision or confirmation of the clauses of Treaty of October 3,1983, the Convention of February 13, 1904, and the treaty of March 23,1907, kept in force by Article 22 of the Treaty of December 7, 1937”. In other words, to decide on the practical merits of Siamese claims over the territory regained in 1941 from France. The Commission consisted of 5 members, one each from the two conflicting parties, and three neutrals: one British, one American, and one Peruvian. The American, ex-diplomat William Phillips, was appointed Chairman. The Commission began its deliberations around mid-1947 and submitted its findings by the end of June. The most striking feature of the Commission's decisions and recommendations was the consensus of the three neutrals in favour of France. See Sir H. Seymour t o Lord Inverchapel, 1 Jul. 1947, enclosed in Balmour to Bevin, 10 Jul. 1947, FO371/63883.

13 Judging from the fact that Pridi's supporters won handsomely in the August 1946 election for the Senate (57 seats against 11 Democrats and 7 Independents), Pridi was truly in command of both the National Assembly and the government to pursue whatever policy he deemed suitable for Thailand. See also Memo of the conversation between William Phillips and K.P. Landon, 12 Jun. 1947 (RG 59) in which Phillips was reported to have said that it was Pridi who insisted on the unreasonable demand for the territory lost since 1893.

14 Prince Wan was at the time Siamese Ambassador to the United States; Prince Sakon Worawan, Adviser to the Ministry of Interior; and Tiang Sirikhan, Member of Parliament. On the French side, M. Paul Emile Naggiar, Ambassador of France on special assignment, was appointed the Represntative; M. Francis Lacoste, Counsellor of the French Embassy in Washington, and M. Jean Burnay, Counsellor of State, as her Agent and Deputy Agent respectively.

15 Brailey, Thailand and the Fall of Singapore, p. 121.

16 The American Note is enclosed in Wilson-Young's minute, 12 May 1946. FO 371/54386.

17 Sir H. Seymour's Memo, 12 June 1947, FO 371/63882. The Siamese Communique stated that the representative and agent were ordered to negotiate with France in line with “the resolution of Parliament. The main points were that request should be made for a re-adjustment of the border agreements reached in 1893, 1904, and 1907 by which Siam lost territory.” The Government Communique, Bangkok Post, 7 Jul. 1947.

18 Memo of the conversation between William Phillips and K.P. Landon, 12 June 1947, RG 59; also see Tel. from Stanton to State Department, 15 Mar. 1947, RG 84.

19 Sec. of State Marshall to American Ambassador, Bangkok, 3 Jul. 1947, RG 84.

20 Sir H. Seymour's Memo, 12 Jun. 1947, FO 371/63882; Sir H. Seymour to Lord Inverchapel, 1 Jul. 1947, FO 371/63883. See also RG 59 Memo of the conversation between William Phillips and K.P. Landon, 12 June 1947 in which Phillips stated, “the Siamese had exceeded any reasonable request for the rectification of the Siamese-Indo-chinese border areas by requesting the retrocession of all of Laos and a large part of Cambodia”. Phillips also said that it was Pridi who “had required the Siamese Agent to make such requests although the Agent did not wish to be so extreme”. See Memo of the conversation between Prince Sakon Worawan and R.H. Bushner, 15 May 1948, RG 84; and Stanton to State Department, 13 May 1947, RG 84.

21 In my recent work, I have attempted to re-examine and evaluate Phibun and his contribution to the country. Kobkua Suwannathat-Pian, Thailand's Durable Premier, ch. 2. Drawing on materials available in U.S., British and Japanese archives, I have tried to reassess the merits and demerits of the man who has so much influenced and shaped both the physical and mental aspects of post-1932 Thai society.

22 Outstanding among other factors were the parts played by both the National Assembly and the Council of Regency. Here are some examples of “encouragement” given to Phibun: 1. The National Assembly during its twenty-ninth sitting, in 1938, voted for the expulsion of one of its members after the poor man dared to propose that 24 June should be known as the Day of Rebellion and not as National Day. Proceedings of the National Assembly (Bangkok: Government Printing House, 1938, p. 1802)Google Scholar.

22 The Council of Regency, on 28 July 1941, bestowed the rank of Field Marshal on Phibun, bypassing the ranks of lieutenant-general and full general, in recognition of his contribution to the country's victory in the Indo-Chinese War against the French. The award served as “a model for future national heroes”.

23 The Council also bestowed the highest national awards on Phibun, the first class Chulachomklao Insignia and the Noppharat-ratchaworaphan sash, because he “has done a great service for the nation”. Royal Gazette 58 (1941): 981–87Google Scholar.

23 For example see Chaloemtiarana, Thak, Thailand: The Politics of Despotic Paternalism (Bangkok: Social Science Association of Thailand, Thai Khadi Studies Institute, 1979)Google Scholar; Ngarmkhachonkunkit, Sorasak, Khabuankan Seri Thai kab Khwamkhadyaeng Thangkanmuang phainai Prathet Thai PhS. 2481–2492 [The Seri Thai Movement and International Conflicts in Thailand, 1938–1949] (Bangkok: Institute of Asia Studies, Chulakmgkorn University, 1989)Google Scholar; Soonthornrojana, Adulyasak, “The Rise of US-Thai Relations, 1945–1975” (Ph.D. diss., University of Akron, 1986)Google Scholar.

24 Tula Bunnag, Khuang's secretary, stated that “Khuang realizes that from a practical standpoint, Phibun is the only man able to run the government at present.” Memorandum of the conversation between Nai Tula Bunnag and N.B. Hannah, Second Secretary, American Embassy, Bangkok, 1 Jan. 1951, RG 84. Khuang was reported by other sources to have stated that Phibun had genuinely right ideas about the government, but he was a captive of Sarit and Phao, who were building their rival business empires. A.C.S. Adams to FO, 29 Apr. 1957, FO 371/129611.

25 Between 1932 and 1957 there were altogether ten attempts to seize political power by force. Six of these occurred between 1948 and 1957, a period of nine years, which meant an average of one coup every eighteen months. After the Wang Luang Rebellion in February 1949, the military had a complete monopoly of physical force since they had eliminated the Sen Thai, their main opponents, from the arena of Thai politics.

26 Whittington's interview with Phibun, 22 Dec. 1947, FO 371/63915.

27 Kobkua Suwannathat-Pian, Thailand's Durable Premier.

28 Iamkrasin, Charlee, King Ananda and the Case of the Royal Assassination (Bangkok: Suksasamphan, 1977), pp. 7881Google Scholar, 117–24.

29 The efforts by Pridi and company include Pridi's “Account Concerning the Council of Regency” in [Some Account Concerning the Royal Family], ed. Pramote Phuengsunthon and Pruang Siriphat; and Wichiwong Na Pomphet, Pridi Banomyong.

30 Yost to the Department of State, 10 Jun. 1946, RG 59:892.00. Luang Nitwetchawisit in his testimony to the Court referred to the same event that Pridi objected to King Ananda's choice of Prince Rangsit, Prince Dhani and Phraya Si Thammathibet as members of the Council of Regency and requested that the King accepted ex-Queen Rambhai, Prince Alongkot and Phraya Manavarajsevi instead. See Charlee Imkrasin, 1977, pp. 125–28.