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The United Malays National Organization, the Malayan Chinese Association, and the Early Years of the Malayan Emergency, 1948–1955

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 April 2011

Richard Stubbs
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In the decade following the Second World War, two aspects of Malaya's political life were predominant. First, there was an increased political awareness among Malayans which led to the formation of political organizations, the political mobilization of a significant proportion of the population, and eventually, in 1955, to the holding of Malaya's first federal elections. Second, there was the “Emergency”, the name commonly given to the guerrilla war waged by the Malayan Communist Party (M.C.P.) and its supporters from June 1948 to August 1960. Both of these aspects have been chronicled and examined in some detail by students of Malayan history. And yet, interestingly enough, rarely have the effects of one upon the other been fully considered. Indeed, the usual pattern of analysis in the, often otherwise excellent, general studies that examine this period is for each aspect to be treated in a separate section or chapter. Moreover, accounts which focus solely on the Emergency are even less encouraging in this respect. Mr. Anthony Short's impressive history of the Colonial Government's activities in countering the Communist guerrillas is typical in the scant attention which is given to the political parties' role in undermining the Communists' cause. The purpose of this paper, therefore, is to explore some of the links between the development of the political parties, especially the United Malays National Organization (UMNO) and the Malayan Chinese Association (M.C.A.), prior to 1955, and the course of the Emergency.

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Articles
Information
Journal of Southeast Asian Studies , Volume 10 , Issue 1 , March 1979 , pp. 77 - 88
Copyright
Copyright © The National University of Singapore 1979

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References

1 See for instance Mills, Lennox A., Malaya: A Political and Economic Appraisal (Minneapolis: Universiiy of Minnesota Press, 1958), chs. 3 & 4Google Scholar; Gullick, J. M., Malaya (London: Ernest Benn, 1965), chs. 10 & 11Google Scholar; Milne, R.S., Government and Politics in Malaysia (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967), pp. 32–33 and 34–36Google Scholar. Ratnam's, K.J.Communalism and the Political Process in Malay (Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press, 1965Google Scholar) makes no mention of the impact of the Emergency on the political process. One exception is Means, Gordon P., Malaysian Politics (London: University of London Press, 1970), ch. 9Google Scholar. Here there is a good, but short, discussion of the initial impact of the Emergency on the political process.

2 Short, Anthony, The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948–1960 (London: Frederick Muller, 1975)Google Scholar. Other examples include O'Ballance, Edgar, Malaya: The Communist Insurgent War, 1948–1960 (London: Faber & Faber, 1966Google Scholar) and Clutterbuck, Richard, Riot and Revolution in Singapore and Malaya, 1945–1963 (London: Faber & Faber, 1966)Google Scholar.

3 See the review in Means, Malaysian Politics, pp. 81–117.

4 For a detailed description of the events which centre on the establishment and eventual demise of the Malayan Union see Allen, J. de V., The Malayan Union (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967)Google Scholar. The role of the UMNO in drawing up the Federation Agreement is also discussed in Tadin, Ishak bin, “Dato Onn and Malay Nationalism, 1946–1951”, Journal of Southeast Asian History 1, no. 1 (1960)Google Scholar.

5 For discussions of the activities of the All-Malaya Council of Joint Action see Wah, Yeo Kim, “The Anti-Federation Movement in Malaya, 1946–1948”, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 4, no. 1 (1973)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Stenson, M.R., Industrial Conflict in Malaya: Prelude to the Communist Revolt of 1948 (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 176–79Google Scholar; and Means, Malaysian Politics, pp. 83–88.

6 A review of the theories as to why the M.C.P. chose this course of action may be found in Short, Communist Insurrection in Malaya, pp. 496–99. For an interesting “discussion” of the M.C.P. decision see Stenson, M.R., The 1948 Communist Revolt in Malaya: A Note on Historical Sources and Interpretation, with a Reply by Gerald de Cruz, Occasional Paper No. 9 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1971)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

7 Interestingly enough the M.C.P. and its front organizations the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army Ex-Comrades Association, the New Democratic Youth League, and the Ika.tan Pembela Tanah Ayer Malaya were not declared unlawful until over a month after the Emergency Regulations were introduced. See The Times, 24 July 1948.

8 See letter to the Editor from de Cruz, Gerald, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 1, no. 1 (1970): 125CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Wah, Yeo Kim, “A Study of Three Early Political Parties in Singapore, 1945–1955”, Journal of Southeast Asian History 10, no. 1 (1969)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and The Times, 26 July 1948.

9 See Means, Malaysian Politics, p. 119.

10 For a review of the problems faced by non-Communist Chinese groups in general-and Dato Tan Cheng Lock, the widely acknowledged leader of the Malayan Chinese, in particular see Lim, Soh Eng, “Tan Cheng-lock: His Leadership of the Malayan Chinese”, Journal of Southeast Asian History 1, no. 1 (1960): 45CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Means, Malaysian Politics, p. 120.

11 One group that was also important at this time, but in a more informal way, was the Communities Liaison Committee. Initiated by the Commissioner General, Mr. Malcolm MacDonald, and Dato Onn, it was separate from the UMNO and the M.C.A. and was encouraged by the Government in order to build intercpmmunal co-operation. See Sopiee, M. Noordin (ed.), The Communities Liaison Committee and “Post” War Communal Relations in Malaya: A Historical Sourcebook (Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya, n.d.)Google Scholar; and Means, Malaysian Politics, pp. 122–24.

12 Guerrilla Communism in Malaya (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 353.Google Scholar

13 The Straits Echo, 12 June 1950.

14 See the criticism levelled at him by the editors of the Malay language paper, Utusan Melayu, as reported in the Straits Echo, 27 May 1950, 23 Oct. 1950, and 4 Dec. 1950. The Maria Hertogh case concerned the custody of a Dutch girl who had been adopted by a Malay couple after the war which had separated the girl from her parents. The decision went in favour of the Dutch parents. See Ishak bin Tadin, “Dato Onn”, pp. 77–78.

15 Leong Yew Koh to Tan Cheng Lock, 15Oct. 1951, “The Private Papers of Tan Cheng-Lock”, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore. (Hereinafter cited as TCL Papers, Singapore.) TCL/XV/64a.

16 See Soh, “Tan Cheng Lock”, p. 46; Federation of Malaya, Communist Banditry in Malaya: The Emergency, June 1948 – June 1951 (Kuala Lumpur: Department of Information, n.d.), p. 17Google Scholar; and Means, Malaysian Politics, p. 129.

17 See Federation of Malaya, Communist Banditry in Malaya, p. 28.

18 Straits Echo, 6 Aug. 1949.

19 See a note in the handwriting of Sir Henry Gurney found after his death (typed version), “The Private Papers of Tan Cheng Lock”, National Archives of Malaysia, Malaysia. (Hereinafter cited as TCL Papers, Malaysia.) Item 144.

20 This problem forced Mr. Malcolm MacDonald, the Commissioner General, to note at a meeting in King's House (the official residence of the High Commissioner) after Gurney's death, that “he hoped that the Chinese leaders were fully assured that at the top at least there was no lack of trust in them. The M.C.A. must not wait until there was evidence of 100 per cent trust at all lower levels, but should get on with the collection of funds for the establishment of their organization on a firmer basis in alt states and settlements and down to district levels.” TCL Papers, Malaysia, Item 144. Dato Tan Cheng Lock noted at the time: “The whole tragedy has been that Government and officialdom do not trust the Chinese and think the Malayan Chinese have an idea to make Malaya a province of China. …” Tan Cheng Lock to Sir George Maxwell, 18 Dec. 1951, TCL Papers, Singapore, TCL/V/232.

21 See Ong Seong Tek, M.C.A. Pahang Branch, to Tan Cheng Lock, n.d. TCL Papers, Malaysia, Item 175.

22 The Communists described the M.C.A. as “nothing hut a big iron chain and a mouse trap” that was out to “massacre the people and cripple their strength of resistance”. See Federation of Malaya, Anatomy of Communist Propaganda, July 1948 to December 1949 (Kuala Lumpur: Department of Public Relations, Dec. 1949), p. 5.Google Scholar

23 See Times of Malaya, 11 Apr. 1949.

24 Leong Yew Koh to Tan Cheng Lock, 15 Oct. 1951, TCL Papers, Singapore, TCL/XV/64a.

25 See the discussion in Means, Malaysian Politics, pp. 133–34.

26 See in particular the directive issued to General Gerald Templer, the High Commissioner from 1952 to 1954, which spelt out this point and to which Templer often referred. The directive is reprinted in Purcell, Victor, Malaya: Communist or Free? (London: Victor Gollancz. 1954)Google Scholar.

27 “Address to the National Convention”, First National Convention, 23 Aug. 1953, UMNO Files, National Archives of Malaysia, no. 7, UMNO/SG No. G. 12/1954.

28 See H.S. Lee to Tan Cheng Lock, 18 Feb. 1952, in which he notes Tengku Abdul Rahman's delight at the success of the UMNO-M.C.A. in the Kuala Lumpur elections and suggests that the Tengku and Tan Cheng Lock, as the Presidents of the UMNO and M.C.A. respectively, should meet to discuss future plans. TCL Papers, Singapore, TCL/TX/33. See also letter from H.S. Lee to Tan Cheng Lock, 22 Feb. 1952, in which Lee details a discussion with the Tengku concerning plans for future co-operation. Included in these plans was the idea of sending a letter to local branches of UMNO suggesting that contact with the leaders of the various M.C.A. branches be established. TCL Papers, Singapore, TCL/IX/35. In a letter from Tan Cheng Lock to Sir George Maxwell, 11 Mar. 1952, he notes that “Onn with his I.M.P. does not appear to be getting on well with Tungku Rahman, the President of UMNO, who has been co-operating with H.S. Lee of the Selangor M.C.A. to bring about an M.C.A.-UMNO “alliance” throughout the country.” TCL Papers, Singapore, TCL/V/261.

29 See UMNO Files, Malaysia, UMNO/SG No. 38/1953.

30 For instance, of the 37 municipal council seats contested in six cities of the Federation in December 1952, the UMNO-M.C.A. alliance won 26 while the I.M.P. won only one. See Means, Malaysian Politics, p. 137.

31 Tan Cheng Lock stated in a speech in 1953 that “opposition or competition will make Malayan politics all the better and healthier. We should strive all the harder to render the Alliance a strong and dynamic political force capable of winning its goal and accomplishing its historic mission in the teeth of all opposition which should stimulate and strengthen the Alliance.” TCL Papers, Malaysia, Box 1, no. 63. Tunku Abdul Rahman noted in a letter to Col. H.S. Lee, 12 Apr. 1953: “On the whole, I think that the doings of Bukit Gantang and his associates have given us and our supporters added zeal and enthusiasm in our struggle.” UMNO Files, Malaysia, UMNO/SG 35/1953.

32 See “Memorandum on the Organization of the M.C.A.”, Malacca, 28 Oct. 1951. TCL Papers, Malaysia, Item No. 171; “Reorganization of the Malayan Chinese Association, 1952”, TCL Papers, Malaysia, Item 167(xi); and Tan Cheng Lock to Leong Yew Koh, 31 Oct. 1952, TCL Papers, Malaysia, Item 61. Of particular importance was the appointment of the highly efficient Mr. T.H. Tan as Secretary-General of the M.C.A.

33 See “Minutes of a Meeting between M.C.A. and Government Officials”, 21 Apr. 1952, TCL Papers, Singapore, TCL/111/274.

34 For a discussion of the resettlement programme, see Stubbs, Richard, Counter-Insurgency and the Economic Factor: The Impact of the Korean War Boom on the Malayan Emergency, Occasional Paper No. 19 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1974), pp. 24–40CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

35 Examples of M.C.A. members being able to establish contacts with villagers and government officials were noted in TCL Papers, Malaysia, Item 175; and “Minutes of a Meeting of the Chinese Advisory Board, held in Malacca, 24 May 1952”, TCL Papers, Malaysia, Item 144(i).

36 In Perak, for example, a block visiting scheme was introduced whereby M.C.A. members visited rural communities, giving talks on various subjects. “The Private Papers of Leong Yew Koh”, National Archives of Malaysia, Malaysia, Item 16.

37 The first lottery draw was in February 1950, with the total pool amounting to nearly M$350,000. The sixth draw held in January 1951 had a million-dollar pool. By the end of 1952 draws were being held every couple of months with M$l,500,000 pools. See Straits Echo, 27 Feb. 1950,22 Jan. 1951, and Means, Malaysian Politics, p. 138. The importance of the lotteries to the M.C.A. social welfare programme was outlined in Tan Cheng Lock to Sir Gerald Templer, 15 May 1953, TCL Papers, Singapore, TCL/XIV/60. The story which surrounds the use of lotteries by the M.C.A. and the introduction of legislation in 1953, which limited the advantages that the M.C.A. could gain from them is told in Means, Malaysian Politics, pp. 137–39.

38 See Sandhu, Kernial Singh, “The Saga of the Malayan Squatter”, Journal of Southeast Asian History 5, no. 1 (1964): 120CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Sixth Annual Meeting of the M.C.A., Leong Yew Koh Papers, Malaysia File 43; and Federation of Malaya, Annual Report on Education, 1952 (Kuala Lumpur: Government Printer, 1953), p. 10.Google Scholar

39 For an outline of the problems which UMNO faced in re-establishing branches in Perak after the expulsion of Dato Panglima Bukit Gantang, see the series of correspondence between Tengku Abdul Rahman and Enche Cherose bin Haji Abdullah, UMNO Files, Malaysia, UMNO/SG125/1953 and UMNO/SG 35/53.

40 Tengku Abdul Rahman Putra to Mr. M.A. Hamid, Muslim University, India, 22 June 1953, UMNO Files, Malaysia, UMNO/SG 35/53.

41 See Short, Communist Insurrection in Malaya, p. 318; and Hanrahan, Gene Z., The Communist Struggle in Malaya (Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press, 1971), pp. 121–23, 220–24.Google Scholar

42 In 1953, H.S. Lee for the M.C.A. and Dr. Ismail bin Dato Abdul Rahman for the UMNO accepted positions as the Member for Railways and Ports and the Member for Lands, Mines and Communications, respectively. With regard to election victories, between February 1952 and June 195SOhe UMNO-M.C.A. alliance won 226 of the 268 municipal and town council seats up for election. See The Economist, 25 June 1955, p. 1139.

43 Government officials and I.M.P. members dominated the Committee of the Federal Legislative Council which was set up to examine the problem of federal elections. A majority report was produced favouring less than 50 per cent of elected seats and a “proper” (presumably 1956 or later) date for elections. The minority report of the UMNO-M.C.A. members called for three-fifths elected majority and November 1954 as the date for elections. See Federation of Malaya, Report of the Committee Appointed to Examine the Question of Elections of the Federal Legislative Council (Kuala Lumpur: Government Printer, 1954), pp. 7–8, 23–24Google Scholar. Within the 46-man committee, the split between Onn and his I.M.P. supporters on the one hand, and the UMNO-M.C.A. people on the other was usually in the neighbourhood of 26–16 with a few absentees or abstentions. See “Minutes of the 3rd Meeting of the Federal Elections Committee”, 21 Jan. 1954, UMNO Files, UMNO/Y.O.P. 15/1954. The UMNO and the M.C.A. therefore had to resort to pressure tactics to get their position accepted. The culmination of their campaign was a boycott in the form of mass resignation of the UMNO and M.C.A members who held positions on executive or legislative councils at every level of government. See Miller, H., Prince and Premier (London: Harrap, 1959), pp. 129–61Google Scholar; and Means, Malaysian Politics, pp. 147–50. UMNO-M.C.A. correspondence on this matter may be found in “The Private Papers of Leong Yew Koh”, National Archives of Malaysia, Malaysia, Item 16. Irene Tinker in her article “Malayan Elections: Electoral Patterns for Plural Societies”, Western Political Quarterly 9 (1956): 274Google Scholar, notes that the slogan “merdeka” (freedom) was particularly crucial to the overwhelming victory (51 out of 52 seats) achieved by the UMNO-M.C.A-M.I.C. Alliance Party in the Federal Elections of July 1955.

44 Tunku Abdul Rahman in a speech to the First National Convention, 23 Aug. 1953, stated: “In the words of the Honourable Harold E. Hall at the parliamentary conference in Canda, we have a common belief in adherence to the practice of ordered liberty, ordered liberty under a well conducted rule of law.” UMNO Files, No. UMNO/SG No. G12/1954.

45 See Pye, Lucian W., “Communication Patterns and the Problems of Representative Government in Non-Western Societies”, Public Opinion Quarterly 20 (1956)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Wilson, Peter J., A Malay Village in Malaysia (New Haven: HRAF Press, 1967), p. 137Google Scholar; Hsu, F.L.K., Clan, Caste and Club (Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand, 1963), pp. 50–54Google Scholar; and Freedman, Maurice, Chinese Family and Marriage in Singapore (London: H.M.S.O., 1957), p. 225.Google Scholar