One of the most prevalent and influential themes in the literature on European imperialism has been the dichotomy between conditions in an area threatened by European conquest prior to and following the imposition of colonial rule. Even writers who have disapproved of the extension of European control normally have had little favourable to say about indigenous rulers or the state of kingdoms about to be annexed. Historians have generally pictured the pre-colonial history of these areas as periods of decadence and corruption, of administrative breakdown and social chaos, and of economic stagnation and popular unrest. In contrast, most writers have viewed the early colonial era as a time of recovery and progress. In order to justify this view, they have attempted to show that the establishment of European rule brought peace and order, stable government, educational and legal reforms, public works projects and economic development. Most historians have implicitly assumed that the indigenous peoples accepted European overlords during the first decades after conquest because conditions were far better under alien rule than they had been under the traditional elites.

The report upon the shortcomings of the Malacca jurisdiction which Extraordinary Councillor Willem de Roo sent to Johan van Hoorn, Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies, in November 1705 offered reasons for the initiative which he and his colleagues had taken in relations with the Johor Court: ‘… business in Malacca is wholly fallen into decay, with, it seems to me, little appearance of a big improvement, let alone a full recovery of the formerly flourishing trade, because people have indulgently too long allowed contracts concluded with surrounding rulers and allies to be broken without making much complaint thereupon, or themselves maintaining (the force of the contracts), principally concerning the Johorese …’

The 19th century is chosen as a period for a static section study of the population of Kedah for a number of reasons. The most important is perhaps the feasibility of the study at all, for as with the other states of Malaysia, no statistically based discussion on population or landuse can be undertaken for periods earlier than the 19th century. Secondly, the population of the State during that century provides us with a picture of what the situation was like, and what it might have continued to be, with regards to numbers, composition and distributions, prior to the drastic demographic and economic upheavals of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The existence within the State's population of certain elements and situations peculiar to the century alone provide other points of interest. Examples were the presence of a large Thai element and of the Jawi Pekan community, both of which became conspicuously absent after the census of 1911.

Thanks to Clifford Geertz, the terms and concepts of abangan, santri, and prijaji have become familiar and frequently used by students of Javanese history, politics, and society. While he did not invent them, Geertz is responsible for their earliest and most thorough development as explicit and interrelated concepts, as seen most notably in his The Religion of Java and The Social History of An Indonesian Town. These studies are based upon his academic work as an anthropologist and his intermittent field work in “Modjokuto”, Java, from May 1953 to September 1964.

In a previous study, an attempt was made to determine the extent to which South Vietnamese provincial elites represent a transition or “bridge” between the national elites and the rural values of the majority population by comparing data on the social, educational, political and occupational backgrounds among political leaders and elites supportive of the GVN from both the national and provincial levels. In that study, the conclusion was that a comparison of social background statistics in isolation may be seriously misleading. Western-educated urban elites at the provincial level who are aware of and empathisize with traditional rural concerns can serve as a transitional cultural and political bridge. Indeed a fairly recent study of constituency influence on United States' congressmen indicated that a representative's perceptions of the attitudes held by the enfranchised population of his district was the intervening variable accounting for his electoral behavior as measured by his voting on roll calls. Thus, in the United States, “;;constituency influence is not provided by candidate recruitment but by elite cognitions.”

The Franco-British rivalry over Siam in the last decades of the nineteenth century was one of the most serious of the world wide colonial conflicts between the two Powers after 1875 resolved by the Entente Cordiale agreements of 1904. Like the other colonial conflicts along the Niger and the Nile, in Morocco and Madagascar, and over the Newfoundland fisheries, the rivalry in Siam complicated and strained Franco-British relations in the last quarter of the nineteenth century and made diplomatic cooperation in European affairs very difficult, if not at times impossible.

To students of British diplomatic history during the period before the First World War the recognition of the existence of strong anti-German feelings among the more influential officials at the Foreign Office is as significant as the politics of the Wilhelmstrasse with regard to German foreign policy is for German diplomatic historians. In the last few years, a considerable amount of work has appeared on the manner in which foreign policy was formulated in England from about the middle of Lord Salisbury's third ministry to the Foreign Secretaryship of Sir Edward Grey. Although the initial conclusions about the influence of the so-called anti-German clique may be still open to debate, there has been comparatively wide acceptance of the view that relations between the new Foreign Secretary after 1900, Lord Lansdowne, and the more important members of the clique were generally poor. While it is not the aim here to discuss this particular matter any further, some new light will be thrown on the unusual agreement in principle that existed between Lansdowne and some of the members of the anti-German clique over the question of British policy towards Siam and the Malay Peninsula in 1901 – 02. The chief personalities who were involved in this matter were Sir Francis Bertie, senior Assistant Under-Secretary and former head of the American and Asiatic Department at the Foreign Office, and Louis Mallet, who was at that time précis writer to the Foreign Secretary. In examining the common ground that existed between Lansdowne and his official advisers, it is hoped to correct a somewhat mistaken impression that has recently been created of the Foreign Office's attitude towards British strategic interests in the Siamese Malay States.

Malaya's creditable economic performance prior to the Second World War was very much the product of growth without planning. It would be a mistake, to be sure, to attribute early Malayan economic growth solely to the initiative and enterprise of private individuals and firms acting independently of government. Certainly the British colonial administration, indirectly through fiscal measures and directly through the activities of an increasingly important public sector, had a significant role to play in determining the direction, and incidentally the magnitude, of pre-war economic expansion. Colonial government policy nevertheless remained compartmentalized and its objectives were defined narrowly. There was no idea of maximizing the development of Malaya's economy as a whole. Indeed, the Malayan economy during the decades before the War even lacked fundamental functional integration, for in the words of a World Bank mission, “… Malaya in many respects was rather a geographic region where capital and labor belonging to other economies found it convenient to carry on certain specialized operations, within the British monetary as well as political framework”. Whatever economic growth that did occur involved unplanned, and largely uneven, development.

Though non-indigenous strains of rubber-yielding trees were first introduced into South and South-East Asia in 1876–77, it was not until after 1900 that this crop was widely planted for commercial purposes. Thereafter development proceeded at a pace outstanding in tropical agriculture. During the span of some two decades a major raw material industry was established, totalling 4,250,000 acres by 1922 and situated principally in Malaya (2,260,000 acres), the Netherlands East Indies (1,229,000 acres) and Ceylon (443,000 acres). The main features of this process, such as the company flotation boom of 1909–10, have long been known but much of the work to date has been of a descriptive, very general, nature. The object of this paper is to examine the course of investment in a more detailed and analytical manner. To do the subject full justice, equal attention should be devoted to the activities of European and Asian rubber growers, but the sources of comparable quantitative evidence for the period under review are much more detailed for the former group.

Australia's defence commitment in Malaysia-Singapore is of long standing. In the 1920's and 1930's non-Labour governments in particular had seen the Singapore base as the linchpin of Australian security. Despite Singapore's failure to play this role during World War II, the Malaysian area continued to play an important role in Australian defence thinking in the post-1945 period. Australia began participating in the ANZAM arrangement in 1949, and subsequently committed forces in the campaign against the Malayan Communists. As early as May 1950 the Menzies Government decided to send a squadron of Dakota aircraft to Malaya. In April 1955 this commitment was considerably enlarged to include an infantry battalion, a fighter wing of two squadrons and a bomber wing of one squadron, as well as a permanent naval force of either two destroyers or two frigates. This commitment has provided the basis of the Australian military presence in the area ever since Australia “associated” herself with the Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement in 1959, and the extension of this agreement to Malaysia in 1963. Australia adopted a cautious policy during the period of confrontation and, for fear of antagonising Indonesia unduly, did not finally make combat forces available for service in East Malaysia until February 1965. This article is concerned primarily with developments which have affected the Australian defence presence in Malaysia-Singapore since the Wilson Government took office in the United Kingdom in October 1964. It examines the Australian reaction to the march of events in Britaín which culminated in the decision to withdraw British forces from Malaysia-Singapore by the end of 1971, and the attempt by Australia to redefine her role in the light of the new situation.

The purpose of the present article is to analyse the voting at the Sarawak elections of 1970, particularly at the state, as opposed to the parliamentary, election. The administration of the elections, election issues, and the methods of campaigning used by the parties are described elsewhere. Nevertheless, a few words of background explanation may be useful.

The term “cooperative nationalism” is a difficult one in the Indonesian context. In the Netherlands Indies the terms “cooperation” and “non-cooperation” had a much more restricted meaning than they did, for instance, in connection with Indian nationalism. The determining factor was merely the decision whether or not to seek seats in the representative councils established by the Dutch. Although in this sense the period 1936–1942 can be called an era of cooperative nationalism in the Indies, because at that time most active nationalist parties agreed to participate in the councils, it is doubtful whether the term is very useful. The cooperating nationalists were themselves reluctant to be classified as such, and the Dutch, with whom the expression implies they were cooperating, generally regarded them as far from cooperative. To the uninitiated the term would seem to indicate that the cooperators took a more moderate, pro-Dutch stand than did the non-cooperators, and because it gives rise to such preconceptions the label may prove a hindrance. Various questions arise. What did the Indonesians and the Dutch understand by cooperation? In what way, apart from participation in the councils, did the cooperators differ from the non-cooperators? Why did the nationalists decide to “go back to cooperation” as they themselves phrased it? What did they hope to gain by the move? Why did cooperation fail to achieve results in terms of political reforms? The answers depend very largely on how the Dutch and the cooperators regarded each other. This paper will consider these problems in relation to the first and largest of the cooperating parties, Partai Indonesia Raja, or Parindra.

Political scientists have long neglected the phenomena of rural development; this in spite of its overwhelming importance (See Figure 1) to lesser developed nations. In much of Africa, Asia and Latin America large proportions of the population live in villages and more scattered settlements. For Africa and Asia, 70–90 per cent of the population live and work in these areas. Their occupations are primarily agricultural.

On the night of September 30 to October 1, 1965, a coup d'etat was attempted in Djakarta and parts of Central Java, by some leaders of the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia — PKI) and members of its youth and women's front organizations, and by units of the Indonesian Army and Airforce, including a general as well as several staff and field grade officers. Virtually crushed within 48 hours, the abortive coup — usually referred to as Gestapu by Indonesians (from Gerakan Tiga Pulu September or “Thirty September Movement) — was to inaugurate drastic changes in Indonesia's domestic power structure and foreign relations. These changes included the accelerating fall from power of President Sukarno and a rapid deterioration in Djakarta's erstwhile exceptionally cordial rapprochement with Peking. Although in the years since 1965 much of the background and the events of the Gestapu affair have remained controversial, there has also emerged a certain consensus among students as to the major “trigger” factors in the coup. Some of these factors as well as principal alternative explanations will be considered briefly in the following pages.

During the last ten years an increasing number of scholars have turned their attention to examining the history of American relations with Eastern Asia. Almost without exception these studies have focused on American relations with China, Japan and Korea and have tended to ignore the areas of Southeast Asia which are at present the focus of so much attention and concern on the part of the American public and government. This is all the more surprising when one considers that American interests and activities in this area are at least as old as those in China. American Marines first landed in Vietnam in 1846 not 1965. There are records of American pirates and traders (sometimes it was hard to distinguish between them) in the East Indies as early as the 17th century, and before the beginning of the 19th century Americans had already opened a thriving trade with Java, Sumatra and the Philippine Islands.

In American diplomatic history it is common to refer to the start of American imperialism with the acquisition of the Philippines in 1898. This paper seeks to prove, however, the existence of United States imperialism in Southeast Asia before that event.