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Epistemic Paternalism via Conceptual Engineering

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 July 2022

EVE KITSIK Open the ORCID record for EVE KITSIK [Opens in a new window]
EVE KITSIK*
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UNIVERSITY OF COLOGNE ekitsik@gmail.com
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Abstract

This essay focuses on conceptual engineers who aim to improve other people's patterns of inference and attention by shaping their concepts. Such conceptual engineers sometimes engage in a form of epistemic paternalism that I call paternalistic cognitive engineering: instead of explicitly persuading, informing and educating others, the engineers non-consultatively rely on assumptions about the target agents’ cognitive systems to improve their belief forming. The target agents could reasonably regard such benevolent exercises of control as violating their sovereignty over their own belief formation. This is a pro tanto reason against such engineering. In addition to the relevant projects of conceptual engineering, paternalistic cognitive engineering plausibly includes certain kinds of nudging and evidence suppression. I distinguish the sovereignty-based concern from other ethical worries about conceptual engineering and discuss how one might justify the relevant conceptual engineering projects despite the sovereignty-based reason against them.

Keywords

epistemic paternalismconceptual engineeringnudgingevidence suppressionepistemic autonomy

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Type
Article
Information
Journal of the American Philosophical Association , Volume 9 , Issue 4 , December 2023 , pp. 616 - 635
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the American Philosophical Association

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Footnotes

I am thankful to the participants of the Cologne Center for Contemporary Epistemology and the Kantian Tradition brown-bag seminar at the University of Cologne, where I presented a previous version of the essay—especially Sven Bernecker, Sofia Bokros, Adam Bricker, Thomas Grundmann (who also provided helpful written comments on the essay), Luis Rosa, César Schirmer dos Santos, and Paul Silva. The constructive comments of the referees for the Journal of the American Philosophical Association and other journals have also improved the essay significantly. The research was generously supported by the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation.

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