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Sympathy for Whom? Smith's Reply to Hume

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 July 2016

HANS D. MULLER
HANS D. MULLER*
Affiliation:
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF BEIRUThm38@aub.edu.lb
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Abstract:

This essay presents a critical examination and development of an exchange between Adam Smith and David Hume on the nature of sympathy. I identify four objections to Smith's account in a letter from Hume and then argue that Smith's system has the resources to reply to all of them. As such, this essay shows that Smith's system provides a more robust foundation for a sentiment-based system of ethics than has been traditionally recognized.

Keywords

SmithHumesympathysentimentalismphilosophical psychologyethics
Type
Articles
Information
Journal of the American Philosophical Association , Volume 2 , Issue 2 , Summer 2016 , pp. 212 - 232
Copyright
Copyright © American Philosophical Association 2016 

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