1 The author I will use as the primary account of the practical contradiction interpretation is Christine Korsgaard, ‘Kant's formula of universal law’, in Creating the Kingdom of Ends (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 77–105
. In her early work, Onora O'Neill presented a similar account which Korsgaard cites. See, Nell, Onora(O'Neill), Acting on Principle: An Essay on Kantian Ethics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975), pp. 59–93.
2 Korsgaard states:
I should say from the outset that although there is one important piece of textual evidence for this answer [favouring the practical contradiction reading], it is my view that no interpretation can be based on textual consideration alone… My defense of the practical contradiction interpretation will therefore be based primarily on philosophical considerations.
The considerations she mentions are: the types of cases this procedure can handle; how well it addresses standard objections to Kant's system; how it distinguishes between the two forms of contradiction; and what it assumes about rationality. , Korsgaard, ‘Kant's formula of universal law’, pp. 80–1.
3 , Korsgaard, ‘Kant's formula of universal law’, p. 92.
4 , Korsgaard, ‘Kant's formula of universal law’, pp. 93–4.
5 , Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Ellington, James (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1993), p. 417. Page references to Kant's Grounding follow the Akademie edition of Kant's works.
6 Korsgaard does not pay attention to Kant's distinction between the two types of hypothetical imperatives, viz., between ‘rules of skill’ and ‘counsels of prudence’.
7 , Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, pp. 417–18.
8 See , Korsgaard, ‘Kant's formula of universal law’, pp. 95–7.
9 Korsgaard points out: ‘Often proponents of the Logical Contradiction Interpretation for the contradictions in conception end up with something like a utilitarian or a teleological view about contradictions in the will.’ She criticizes both of these views as ‘presupposing a morality-laden conception of rationality’. , Korsgaard, ‘Kant's formula of universal law’, p. 96.
10 Mill was one the first commentators to point out the lack of a logical contradiction in a strict sense in Kant's examples. See Mill, John Stuart, Utilitarianism, ed. Sher, George (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1979), p. 4. For a more contemporary version of this criticism see Harrison, Jonathan, ‘Kant's examples of the first formulation of the categorical imperative’, in Kant: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. Wolff, Robert Paul (New York: Anchor Books, 1967), pp. 228–45.
11 See , Korsgaard, ‘Kant's formula of universal law’, p. 97.
12 For a representative of this approach, see Kemp, J., ‘Kant's examples of the categorical imperative’, in Kant: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. Wolff, , pp. 246–58.
13 Paton, H. J., The Categorical Imperative: A Study in Kant's Moral Philosophy (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), pp. 157–64. While phrasing the test in terms of logical impossibilities, Kemp remains quite faithful to Paton's position.
14 , Korsgaard, ‘Kant's formula of universal law’, pp. 91–2.
15 , Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, p. 422.
18 Allen Wood argues that Kant is simultaneously presenting two different arguments for the impossibility of the maxim in favour of offering false promises. He claims that the argument which concentrates on the impossibility of attaining the end of promising cannot produce a contradiction in conception but only a contradiction in the will. In effect, the agent holding the universalized maxim is both willing to attain the end and willing to undermine her ability to realize this end. The result is a contradiction in the will wherein it holds contrary volitions. The will holding contrary volitions is something which we can conceive of and is, therefore, not the same as a contradiction in conception. Wood concludes that while Kant presents two possible arguments against the maxim in favour of offering false promises, one does not produce the type of contradiction for which Kant is looking and, hence, should be disregarded. Allen W. Wood, ‘Kant on false promises’, in Proceedings of the Third International Kant Congress, ed. Beck, Lewis White (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1972), pp. 614–19. Korsgaard's model for deriving contradictions in conception by negating the analytic structure of hypothetical imperatives seemingly evades Wood's potential criticism that undermining the end of receiving needed money only produces a contradiction in the will. However, if my critique of the practical contradiction procedure is upheld, Wood's treatment of Kant's ambiguous passage may prove useful.
19 , Korsgaard, ‘Kant's formula of universal law’, p. 94.
20 See , Korsgaard, ‘Kant's formula of universal law’, pp. 96–7.
22 , Korsgaard, ‘Kant's formula of universal law’, p. 97.
24 This example is borrowed from Hill, Thomas Jr, ‘The hypothetical imperative’, in Dignity and Practical Reason in Kant's Moral Theory (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), p. 24.
25 In response to the possible argument that the universalized maxim would create so much competition that the Nazi party member would undermine his advancement, one can argue that the competition is only heightened and that advancement does not rely upon one's activities being exceptional, only that one is ‘better’ at it.
26 The ensuing immanent critique is directed at the procedure for deriving practical contradictions in conception. If it could be agreed upon, that is, fully justified, that general efficacy is an essential purpose of the will, then the practical contradiction procedure should be internally consistent with regard to determining contradictions in the will. The interpret-ation's seeming consistency with respect to imperfect duties rests upon the fact that general efficacy is to a great extent not determined by contin-gent circumstances. As opposed to when one considers the efficacy of an action type or specific deed (for example, receiving a needed loan), one's general ability to attain desired ends is not affected by as many social conventions and other contingently determined circumstances. While one could still imagine that contingent factors such as being born into a specific social class could very well affect one's ability to attain desired ends in general, such factors would fall under the category of luck and the means for improving one's general efficacy would remain the same.
27 Korsgaard admits that there is a class of actions which challenge the practical contradiction procedure because they do not rely upon either social conventions or contingent circumstances existing. Suicide is an example of such a ‘natural action’ since an effective suicide depends only upon the individual picking a ‘poison’ that will produce the desired end of death according to the laws of nature. See , Korsgaard, ‘Kant's formula of universal law’, pp. 92, 100.
28 The contingent circumstance that allows the universalized maxim in favour of deceiving inexperienced customers may be the empirical fact that there is a constantly renewing pool of callow customers to be deceived. See pp. 123–4, above.