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Minding the Gap: Subjectivism and the Deduction

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 February 2018

Anil Gomes
Anil Gomes*
Affiliation:
Trinity College, University of Oxford
*
Email: anil.gomes@trinity.ox.ac.uk
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Abstract

Chapter 4 of Dennis Schulting’s book Kant’s Radical Subjectivism targets those commentators who take there to be a gap in the transcendental deduction of the categories, arguing instead that there is no gap between the necessary application of the categories and their exemplification in the object of experience. In these comments on the chapter, I suggest a minimal sense in which the fact that there is a gap is non-negotiable. The interesting question is not whether there is a gap which needs to be bridged, but how and why Kant makes the step from subjectivity to objectivity.

Keywords

Kanttranscendental deductiongaptranscendental idealism

Information

Type
Author Meets Critics
Information
Kantian Review , Volume 23 , Issue 1 , March 2018 , pp. 99 - 109
Copyright
© Kantian Review 2018 

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