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Default non-monotonic logic

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 July 2009

Peter Mott
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Lancaster, Bailrigg, Lancaster

Abstract

This paper is a review of certain non-monotonic logics, which I call default non-monotonic logics. These are logics which exploit failure to prove. How each logic uses this basic idea is explained, and examples given. The emphasis is on leading ideas explained through examples: technical detail is avoided. Four non-monotonic logics are discussed: Reiter's default logic, McCarthy's circumscription, McDermott's modal non-monotonic logic, and Clarks's completed database. The first two are treated in some detail. The recent Hanks-McDermott criticism of non-monotonic logic is discussed, and some conclusions drawn about the prospects for non-monotonic logic. Recommendations for further reading are given.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1988

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