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Cooperative games and multiagent systems

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 May 2013

Stéphane Airiau
Stéphane Airiau*
Affiliation:
LAMSADE – Université Paris-Dauphine, Place du Maréchal de Lattre de Tassigny, 75775 PARIS Cedex 16, France; e-mail: stephane.airiau@dauphine.fr
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Abstract

Forming coalitions is a generic means for cooperation: people, robots, web services, resources, firms; they can all improve their performance by joining forces. The use of coalitions has been successful in domains such as task allocations, sensor networks, and electronic marketplaces. Forming efficient coalitions requires the identification of matching synergies between different entities (finding complementary partners, or similar partners, or partners who add diversity). In addition, the different parties must negotiate a fair repartition of the worth created by the coalition. The first part of this paper is a tutorial on cooperative game theory (also called coalitional games). We then survey the different scenarios and the key issues addressed by the multiagent systems community.

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The Knowledge Engineering Review , Volume 28 , Issue 4 , December 2013 , pp. 381 - 424
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Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2013 

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