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On the evolving relation between Belief Revision and Argumentation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 February 2011

Marcelo A. Falappa ,
Alejandro J. García ,
Gabriele Kern-Isberner  and
Guillermo R. Simari
Marcelo A. Falappa*
Affiliation:
Artificial Intelligence Research and Development Laboratory, Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Universidad Nacional del Sur, Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas, Av. L.N. Alem 1253, B8000CPB, Bahía Blanca, Argentina; e-mail: mfalappa@cs.uns.edu.ar; ajg@cs.uns.edu.ar; grs@cs.uns.edu.ar
Alejandro J. García*
Affiliation:
Artificial Intelligence Research and Development Laboratory, Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Universidad Nacional del Sur, Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas, Av. L.N. Alem 1253, B8000CPB, Bahía Blanca, Argentina; e-mail: mfalappa@cs.uns.edu.ar; ajg@cs.uns.edu.ar; grs@cs.uns.edu.ar
Gabriele Kern-Isberner*
Affiliation:
Department of Computer Science, University of Dortmund, Otto-Hahn-Str. 16, 44227Dortmund, Germany; e-mail: gabriele.kern-isberner@cs.uni-dortmund.de
Guillermo R. Simari*
Affiliation:
Artificial Intelligence Research and Development Laboratory, Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Universidad Nacional del Sur, Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas, Av. L.N. Alem 1253, B8000CPB, Bahía Blanca, Argentina; e-mail: mfalappa@cs.uns.edu.ar; ajg@cs.uns.edu.ar; grs@cs.uns.edu.ar
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Abstract

Research on the relation between Belief Revision and Argumentation has always been fruitful in both directions: some argumentation formalisms can be used to define belief change operators, and belief change techniques have also been used for modeling the dynamics of beliefs in argumentation formalisms. In this paper, we give a historical perspective on how belief revision has evolved in the last three decades, and how it has been combined with argumentation. First, we will recall the foundational works concerning the links between both areas. On the basis of such insights, we will present a conceptual view on this topic and some further developments. We offer a glimpse into the future of research in this area based on the understanding of argumentation and belief revision as complementary, mutually useful disciplines.

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Type
Articles
Information
The Knowledge Engineering Review , Volume 26 , Special Issue 1: 25th Anniversary Issue , 07 February 2011 , pp. 35 - 43
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2011

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