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Repeated games for multiagent systems: a survey

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 March 2013

Andriy Burkov  and
Brahim Chaib-Draa
Andriy Burkov
Affiliation:
Department of Computer Science and Software Engineering, Université Laval, Québec, QC G1V OA 6, Canada; e-mail: burkov@damas.ift.ulaval.ca, chaib@ift.ulaval.ca
Brahim Chaib-Draa
Affiliation:
Department of Computer Science and Software Engineering, Université Laval, Québec, QC G1V OA 6, Canada; e-mail: burkov@damas.ift.ulaval.ca, chaib@ift.ulaval.ca
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Abstract

Repeated games are an important mathematical formalism to model and study long-term economic interactions between multiple self-interested parties (individuals or groups of individuals). They open attractive perspectives in modeling long-term multiagent interactions. This overview paper discusses the most important results that actually exist for repeated games. These results arise from both economics and computer science. Contrary to a number of existing surveys of repeated games, most of which originated from the economic research community, we are first to pay a special attention to a number of important distinctive features proper to artificial agents. More precisely, artificial agents, as opposed to the human agents mainly aimed by the economic research, are usually bounded whether in terms of memory or performance. Therefore, their decisions have to be based on the strategies defined using finite representations. Furthermore, these strategies have to be efficiently computed or approximated using a limited computational resource usually available to artificial agents.

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Articles
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The Knowledge Engineering Review , Volume 29 , Issue 1 , January 2014 , pp. 1 - 30
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2013 

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