Published online by Cambridge University Press: 22 April 2026
Baker & Brame, in this issue of Language, correctly observe that, in three of the cases cited in my paper on global rules (Lakoff 1970), the effect of global rules can be obtained by the use of ad hoc coding mechanisms using arbitrary grammatical elements, in one case an infinite number of such elements. This raises the question of whether the elements used in grammatical descriptions should be arbitrary or whether they should have a natural basis. In addition, Baker & Brame incorrectly claim in three other cases to be able to handle global phenomena within the Aspects theory. In each case they use apparatus that goes beyond that theory. Moreover, they claim that a theory of global grammar is necessarily ‘more powerful’ than the Aspects theory and their proposed extensions. This is shown to be false.*
I would like to thank Paul Postal for reading an earlier version of this paper and making valuable suggestions for improvement. This work was partially supported by grant GS-2939 from the NSF to the University of Michigan, by a grant from the American Council of Learned Societies, and by the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, where I am in residence during 1971–72.