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The Origins of the Concept of Belligerent Occupation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 August 2010


The contemporary international law of occupation, which regulates the conduct of occupying forces during wartime, was framed over the course of deliberations among European governments during the second half of the nineteenth century. The debates between representatives of strong and weak powers on this matter dominated the conferences in Brussels (1874) and The Hague (1899), whose goal was to formulate the laws of war through an international agreement. The outcome, enshrined in what is known as the Hague Regulations of 1899,1 represented a delicate balance that both provided protection for a civilian population brought under the control of an occupant and safeguarded the interests of the ousted government for the duration of the occupation. Occupation was conceived of as a temporary regime existing until the conclusion of a peace agreement between the enemy sides (unless the defeated party ceased to exist as a result of the war, a situation referred to as debellatio). The evolution of the law of occupation in the nineteenth century was a gradual process, shaped by changing conceptions about war and sovereignty, as well as by the balance of power emerging in Europe.

Part III. Governing Space in International Law
Copyright © the Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois 2008

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1. Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its Annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land. The Hague, 29 July 1899 ( The text concerning occupation is repeated in the 1907 Regulations: Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land. The Hague, 18 October 1907 (

2. See, in general, Benvenisti, Eyal, The International Law of Occupation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993)Google Scholar; Roberts, Adam, “What Is a Military Occupation?1984 British Year Book of International Law 55 (1985): 249Google Scholar.

3. The concept of occupation was applied in the context of both just and unjust wars. As pointed out by Vattel, the unjust enemy“can absolutely have no right whatever: every act of hostility that he commits is an act of injustice.” Vattel, Emerich de, The Law of Nations, ed. and trans. Chitty, Joseph (1758; Philadelphia, 1852), vol. 2, bk. 3, chap. 13, para. 183, see also para. 187). But the law between nations could not be based on such a principle, which would require one sovereign to judge another (para. 188). Both for reasons of principle (“[e]very free and sovereign state has a right to determine, according to the dictates of her own conscience, what her duties require of her, and what she can or cannot do with justice”) as well as for pragmatic reasons (para. 188), the law of war must accept reciprocal rights between enemy parties. As a result, “[e]very acquisition [ …] which has been made in regular warfare, is valid according to the voluntary law of nations, independently of the justice of the cause and the reasons which may have induced the conqueror to assume the property of what he has taken. Accordingly, nations have ever esteemed conquest a lawful title; and that title has seldom been disputed, unless where it was derived from a war not only unjust in itself, but even destitute of any plausible pretext” (para. 195)Google Scholar.

4. As Oppenheim wrote in 1905, “The distinction between mere temporary military occupation of territory, on the one hand, and, on the other, real acquisition of territory though conquest and subjugation, became more and more apparent, since Vattel had drawn attention to it. However, it was not till long after the Napoleonic wars in the nineteenth century that the consequences of this distinctions were carried out to their full extent by the theory and practice of International Law.” Oppenheim, Lassa, International Law: A Treatise, 1st ed. (London: Longmans, Green, 1905), 2:168.Google Scholar

5. Scholars like to portray the Peace of Westphalia (1648) as the birth of the idea of sovereignty. But as Derek Croxton shows, the concept of sovereignty remained vague and contested for centuries, reflecting the evolving balance of power in Europe. See Croxton, Derek, “The Peace of Westphalia of 1648 and the Origins of Sovereignty,” International History Review 21 (1999): 569.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

6. Benvenisti, , Occupation, chap. 6.Google Scholar

7. On the further evolution of the law of occupation during the twentieth century, see Benvenisti, , Occupation.Google Scholar

8. Grotius, Hugo, De Jure Belli ac Pacis (The Rights of War and Peace) (1625), bk. 3, chap. 11, paras. 9, 10.Google Scholar

9. Vattel, , The Law of Nations, at para. 200.Google Scholar On the emerging distinction during that period between the conqueror's rights vis-à-vis the former ruler and its more limited authority over the indigenous population, see also Korman, Sharon, The Right of Conquest (New York: Clarendon Press, 1996): 2940.Google Scholar

10. According to Grotius, , Jure Belli, chap. 15, paras. 1-3Google Scholar, the property of enemy subjects may be taken in a just war to recover the debt that the enemy has incurred or by way of reprisal in return for other goods taken by the enemy. In paragraph 4, Grotius explained the logic of his assertion but admitted that “it is in some measure a departure from the principles of humanity.”

11. Vattel, , The Law of Nations, at para. 195 (note that civilians who do take arms against the conqueror may lose their property [para. 19]).Google Scholar

12. Ibid., para. 195.

13. Ibid., para. 199.

14. Ibid., para. 197. However, the conqueror's right to transfer title to a third party must await a peace treaty: “Immovable possessions, lands, towns, provinces, &c., become the property of the enemy who makes himself master of them: but it is only by the treaty of peace, or the entire submission and extinction of the state to which those towns and provinces belonged, that the acquisition is completed, and the property becomes stable and perfect. [ … ] Thus, a third party cannot safely purchase a conquered town or province, till the sovereign from whom it was taken has renounced it by a treaty of peace, or has been irretrievably subdued, and has lost his sovereignty.” Ibid., paras. 197, 198.

15. Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, The Social Contract, trans. Cole, G. D. H. (1762), bk. 14 (“War then is a relation, not between man and man, but between State and State, and individuals are enemies only accidentally, not as men, nor even as citizens, but as soldiers; not as members of their country, but as its defenders”).Google Scholar

16. Ibid.

17. As mentioned below, notes 18-22, the German scholars Heffter and Bluntschli who elaborate on this idea do not mention Rousseau in this context.

18. Bluntschli, J. C., Das Beuterecht im Krieg und das Seebeuterecht Inbesondere: Eine Völkerrechtliche Untersuchung (Nördlingen: C. H. Beck, 1878), 60.Google Scholar

19. “C'est le rapport des choses et non des personnes, qui constitue la guerre; elle est une relation d'État à État, et non d'individu à individu.” Cited by Heffter, August Wilhelm, Das Europäische Völkerrecht der Gegenwart (Berlin: E. H. Schroeder, 1844), at para. 119, n. 3.Google Scholar

20. “On the basis of the principle that war is not a relationship between men but a relationship between states, in which individuals are enemies only by coincidence … the law of nations does not permit the right of war and the right of conquest that is derived from it, to affect peaceful and unarmed [enemy] citizens.” Cited by Heffter, , Das Europäische Völkerrecht, at para. 119, n. 3Google Scholar. Note that Talleyrand does not restrict the right of conquest. This message found succinct expression in the famous statement of King William of Prussia on August 11, 1870, as the Prussian Army invaded France: “I conduct war with the French soldiers, not with the French citizens.”

21. Cited by Heffter, , Das Europäische Völkerrecht, at para. 119, n. p3Google Scholar.

22. Ibid., para. 119; Bluntschli, , Das Beuterecht, at 6070.Google Scholar

23. Bluntschli, , Das Beuterecht, at 6469Google Scholar, described the French military criminal codes of 1793 and 1796, which prohibited pillage and other takings of private property, the 1845 Prussian criminal statute, which prohibited unauthorized acts against enemy combatants and civilians, and the German military criminal statute of 1872, which prohibited “unauthorized” pillage and plunder; and, of course, there was the so-called Lieber Code of 1863 (see below note 95 and accompanying text).

24. The Rousseau-Portalis Doctrine was considered to be reflected in the Hague Regulations of 1899 and 1907. See Lemkin, Raphael, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1944), 79.Google Scholar

25. The Constitution of 3 September 1791, Title II (“Of the Division of the Kingdom and of the Status of Citizens”).

26. The Miscellaneous Provisions of the Constitution note that “the French colonies and possessions in Asia, Africa, and America, although constituting part of the French dominion, are not included in the present Constitution.”

27. The Constitution of 3 September 1791, Title VI (“Of the Relations of the French Nation with Foreign Nations”): “The French nation renounces the undertaking of any war with a view of making conquests, and it will never use its forces against the liberty of any people.”

28. On the evolution of guerrilla warfare in Europe in the early nineteenth century and its legal implications, see Lieber, Francis, Guerrilla Parties (New York: Nostrand, 1862).Google Scholar

29. See below, notes 35-43 and accompanying text.

30. Fox, Gregory H., “The Occupation of Iraq,” Georgetown Journal of International Law 36 (2005): 195297, 199.Google Scholar

31. Verzijl, J. H. W., in his International Law in Historical Perspective (Leyden: Sijthoff, 1978), 9-A: 152Google Scholar, reproduces the French Decree of 15/17 December 1792, which promised to export the French ideas of liberty, equality, and fraternity to occupied countries, which, in turn, would thereby achieve sovereignty and self-determination.

32. See Bhuta, Nehal, “The Antinomies of Transformative Occupation,” European Journal of International Law 16 (2005): 733 (“The revolutionary government in France renounced the right of conquest, and offered instead ‘fraternity’ with peoples who rejected the dynastic principle of legitimacy in favour of popular sovereignty”);CrossRefGoogle ScholarBaty, Thomas, “The Relations of Invaders to Insurgents,” Yale Law Journal 36 (1927): 974–77 (“When the French in 1792 invaded Italy, they had no scruple in summoning the invaded populations to repudiate all allegiance to their sovereigns…. Nys may tell us that the French generals ‘limited themselves’ to breaking the ties between invaded peoples and their princes and to convoking assemblies to determine the form of government”)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

33. Challine, Paul, Le droit international public dans la jurisprudence française de 1789 à 1848 (Paris: Domat-Montchrestien, 1934): 116Google Scholar. Challine also noted the Decree of 15/17 December 1792 (see above, note 31), which provided, inter alia, that it was not necessary to sign a treaty of cession to effect sovereignty change when the people situated in the occupied area, being the sovereign there, had manifested their wish to be reunited with France.

34. Edgar Löning reported on an early decision of the Paris Cour de cassation from 23 Frimaire year V, which determined that a French area occupied by an enemy was no longer to be considered part of France.Löning, Edgar, Die Verwaltung des General-Gouvernements im Elsaβ (Strassburg: K. J. Trübner, 1874), 27, n. 1Google Scholar.

35. Challine, , Le droit international public at 116–19.Google Scholar

36. Ibid., 119. This was later discussed byHeffter, , Das Europäische Völkerrecht, at para 186, 350Google Scholar; Halleck, Henry W., International Law (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1861), 775 and followingGoogle Scholar.

37. Halleck, , International Law, 782 (quoting Ortolan's Diplomatie de la Mer).Google Scholar

38. “L'occupation temporaire de cette colonie par la Puissance anglaise n'a pu porter aucune attainte aux droits de la France ni changer le caractére de sa possession sur la Martinique, possession momenanément suspendue par l'effet de la conquête, mais qui n'a pas cessé quant au droit d'être régie par la loi française.” Rousseau, Charles, Le droit des conflits armés (Paris: Pedone, 1983), 136–37 (citing the French Cour de cassation decision of February 1, 1837, Magill v. Héritiers Monnel-Gonnier).Google Scholar

39. Challine, , Le droit international public at 122–24.Google Scholar

40. Ibid., 124-25.

41. Ibid., 119-22.

42. According to Schulze, , “notice nécrologique,” Annuaire de l'institut de droit international 5 (1882): 2540Google Scholar, Heffter (1796-1880) was influenced by French law and culture while serving as a young professor in Bonn. When he later moved to Berlin, he came to be influenced by his friend Eduard Gans, who had been Hegel's student. In fact it was Gans who suggested to Heffter that he write the 1844 book. Heffter also served as a consultant to governments and as a high-ranking judge. According to one commentator, his dual role kept him from pushing his ideas forward and from seeing through the chrysalis of the modern state (Ibid., 38).

43. His 1844 book is the first attempt of a “real” lawyer to tackle international law. This is probably the reason for some of his normative refinements and the book's impact within the German and international academia (Ibid.).

44. Heffter, , Das Europäische Völkerrecht, 220–21Google Scholar: “Der eindringende Feind tritt nicht sofort durch die bloβe Besitzgreifung des anderseitigen Gebietes oder eines Theiles desselben an die Stelle der bisherigen Staatsgewalt, so lange der letztern noch eine Fortsetzung des Krieges, mithin auch eine Umkehr des Kriegsglückes ist…. eine vollkommene Subjugation des eingedrungenen Feindes in die Staatsgewalt des Andern, vermag juristisch nicht sofort gefolgert zu werden.”

45. Ibid., 221, n. 1. He did single out one commentator, Cocceji, in his book “de iure victoriae” and his commentary on Grotius, who had been, according to Heffter, “on the right track.”

46. Ibid., 221.

47. Heffter understood sovereign equality and independence as implying “complete equality” among states under international law (Ibid., para. 27). States, just like individuals, have the fundamental right to exist and to develop themselves physically and morally (para. 29). Moreover, states are entitled to respect for their physical personalities as members of human society (para. 31) (“Achtung des fremden Staates in seiner physischen Persönlichkeit, als eines Theiles des Menschengeschlechtes”).

48. Heffter's principle of necessity, articulated as a “fundamental maxim”: “Do not cause more harm to your enemy, even during the war, beyond what is necessary for accomplishing the goal.” (“[F]üge Deinen Feinden auch im kriege nicht mehr Uebel zu, als es für die Durchsetzung des Zweckes unvermeidlich ist.”) Ibid., para. 119.

49. Ibid., para. 130.

50. Immediately following the “fundamental maxim” of necessity (see above, note 48) Heffter recognizes the doctrine of the “reason of war” (“Kriegsräson”), which accepts that, in situations of extreme danger or in the face of a need to reestablish equality in combat, one is released from the principle of necessity.

51. Heffter, , Das Europäische Völkerrecht, paras. 181–86. At para. 185Google Scholar, he states, “Der Eroberer ist dabei auch keinesweges, wie Manche behaupten, an die Regel des früheren Staates gebunden. Er hat nur die allgemeinen Menschenrechte, so wie die demgemäβ erworbenen speciellen Privatrechte der Unterthanen zu beachten; aber die Form des öffentlichen Verhältinsses hat er allein als freier Inhaber der Staatsgewalt zu bestimmen. Das Staatsgut steht unter seiner Disposition.”

52. Ibid., 186.

53. On Fiore's (1837-1914) humanitarian-liberal philosophy and his approach to the study of international law, seeKoskenniemi, Martti, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001): 5457CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

54. Fiore, Pasquale, Nuovo dritto internazionale pubblico (Milan: Casa Ed. e Tip. degli autori-ed, 1865), 177 (“[S]econdo I nostri principii essendo le nazioni tutte eguali ed autonome, ed avendo l'egual dritto di sovranità nel loro territorio, non possono soggiacere al dritto della forza, nè le loro terre possono passare nel domino del vincitore se questo arbitrariamente e violentemente le avesse occupate”).Google Scholar

55. Ibid., 443: “Il dritto di postliminio, che secondo la nostra dottrina si fonda sul principio che il fatto della Guerra non è sufficiente a distruggere I dritti legittimi, e che questi non posson perdre senza il consenso degli individui a cui appartengono, si applica ai rapporti privati ed ai rapporti pubblici.”

56. Ibid., 444: “[T]utti gli atti amministrazione fatti per ordine del sovrano invasore cessano di aver vigore, tutte le modificazioni fatte alla costituzione dello Stato e alle relazioni politiche dei citadini, cessano egualmente, a menochè non siamo volute e consentite dalla nazione…. per quello che si riferisce ai giudizii compiuti, questi sono validi a meno che non contraddicano il dritto pubblico costituzionale voluto e consentito dalla nazione.” (“When the occupation ends, all administrative acts made by the invading sovereign expire, all amendments made to the constitution of the State and to the political relations of the citizens cease equally, unless the nation sought and consented to them…. With respect to final judgments, these shall be valid as long as they do not contradict the public constitutional law sought and consented to by the nation.”) See alsoCalvo, Charles, Le droit international théorique et pratique, 4th ed. (Paris: Guillaumin, 1888), vol. 4, para. 2181 (p. 220)Google Scholar: “Le droit international ne reconnaît pas à l'occupant la faculté de changer les lois civiles et criminelles des territories sur lesquels se trouvent ses troupes, ni d'y faire administrer la justice en son nom…. Cependant, si des necessities militaries l'y contraignent, l'occupant peut empêcher l'application de certaines lois et substituer le pouvoir militaire à l'autorité legal du pays, mais uniquement dans la mesure où cette authorité constitue une force pour l'ennemi et par consequent un danger pour l'armée d'occupation.” (Calvo, an envoy for Argentina, was a founding member of the Institute de droit international.)

57. Fiore, Pasquale, Nouveau droit international public, trans. Antoine, Charles, 2nd ed., (Paris: Durand, 1885), vol. 3.Google Scholar

58. Ibid., 317-18.

59. Ibid., 323.

60. Calvo, , Le droit international, vol. 4, para. 2181 (p. 220). See above, note 56.Google Scholar

61. On the codification efforts, see below, Part II (B).

62. This should not be surprising, given the European view at the time that international law encompassed relations only among “civilized nations.” SeeOppenheim, , International Law, 1:31Google Scholar(the family of civilized nations has the discretion to consent to the entry of a new member based on the family's assessment of the new entrant's being a “civilized State which [wa]s in constant intercourse with members of the Family of Nations”). On the law of occupation as a European project, see alsoBhuta, , “The Antinomies of Transformative Occupation.”Google Scholar

63. This was made clear in the case of The Foltina, 1 Dodson 450, 451 (1814), 165 Eng. Rep. 1374, 1375 (1752-1865). (“No point is more clearly settled in the Courts of Common Law than that a conquered territory forms immediately part of the King's dominions.”) Despite the asserted “clarity” of the law, the High Court of Admiralty was breaking ground in this decision. The case it cited as authority for its decision, Campbell v. Hall, 98 ER 1045, 1047 (1774), referred to a territory (Grenada) that had been formally ceded by France to Britain in a peace treaty. But Heligoland, where the Foltina had been seized, had not been ceded (by Denmark) to Britain at the time of seizure. In The Foltina, the court acknowledged as “somewhat extraordinary, that, in the course of the numerous and long wars in which this country has been engaged, no case should have been determined which might serve as a guide to the Court in the decision of the present question.” Ibid. The claimant was probably relying on the distinction made by Vattel between title based on possession, which becomes complete upon a treaty, and title based on right (see above note 12 and accompanying text); the court, however, rejected this distinction as “more formal than real and substantial” (Ibid., 452, 1375).

64. Halleck, , International Law, 784Google Scholar: “[F]oreign territory becomes a dominion, and its inhabitants the subjects of the king, ipso facto, by the conquest made by the British arms, without any action of the legislature.”

65. For a critical assessment of these occupations, see Baty, , “The Relations of Invaders to Insurgents,” 974–77Google Scholar; Bhuta, , “The Antinomies of Transformative Occupation,” 729Google Scholar. It would not be surprising to learn that the British government was, in principle, not very enthusiastic about the European efforts to codify the laws of war on land during the nineteenth century. It opposed the Russian idea of convening the conference in Brussels, initially rejecting the invitation to participate. Later, after receiving proper assurances, the British government instructed its delegate to monitor the negotiations without taking an active part. See Martens, Fedor F. de, La paix et la guerre, trans. Sancé, N. de (Paris: A. Rousseau, 1901), 106–9Google Scholar.

66. United States v. Rice, 4 Wheat. 246, 17 U.S. 246, 254, 4 L.Ed. 562 (1819). Justice Taney further noted, “The sovereignty of the United States over the territory was, of course, suspended, and the laws of the United States could no longer be rightfully enforced there, or be obligatory upon the inhabitants who remained and submitted to the conquerors. By the surrender the inhabitants passed under a temporary allegiance to the British government, and were bound by such laws, and such only, as it chose to Recognise and impose. … Castine was, therefore, during this period, so far as respected our revenue laws, to be deemed a foreign port; and goods imported into it by the inhabitants, were subject to such duties only as the British government chose to require.” Ibid., 254.

67. Ibid.

68. Fleming v. Page, 9 How. 603, 50 U.S. 603, 612, 13 L. Ed. 276 (1850) at 50 U.S 603, 615. On this doctrine, see also Birkhimer, William, Military Government and Martial Law, 3rd ed. (Kansas City, Mo: F. Hudson, 1914), 5458.Google Scholar

69. The key test is possession: “while the victor maintains the exclusive possession of the conquered country.” United States v. Rice, above, note 66, Ibid. See also Halleck, , International Law, 780 (same emphasis).Google Scholar

70. U.S. v. Rice, above note 66, Ibid.

71. See the decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals in State of Netherlands v. Federal Reserve Bank, 201 F2d 455, 461 (2d Cir. N.Y. 1953) (citations omitted): “The nineteenth century American view that military conquest completely displaced the sovereignty of the prior possessor, was substantially modified by the Regulations respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, ratified by the United States as an annex to the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907. Since the adoption of these Regulations it is generally agreed that the occupant does not succeed to sovereignty over the occupied territory, but has only limited administrative authority.”

72. Röben, Betsy, Johann Caspar Bluntschli, Francis Lieber und das moderne Völkerrecht, 1861-1881 (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2003)Google Scholar; Röben, Betsy Baker, “The Method behind Bluntschli's ‘Modern’ International Law,” Journal of the History of International Law 4 (2002): 249CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

73. Röben, , Bluntschli, at 6768.Google Scholar

74. Lieber was born in Germany in 1800. He moved to the United States in 1827. SeeRolin-Jaequemyns, G., “François Lieber,” Revue de Droit international et de legislation comparée 4 (1872): 700705Google Scholar.

75. In the Preface to the 1866 French edition, Heffter noted the success of his earlier versions. The book had been favorably mentioned by American, British, and Russian authors and translated into Greek, Russian, and Polish. It was subsequently translated also into Japanese and Spanish (see Preface of the 8th German edition by Geffken, 1888).

76. Röben, , Bluntschli, at 6970.Google Scholar

77. Ibid., 69, n. 411 (citing Lieber's letter from 1863 and other letters). See also Vöneky, Silja, “Der Lieber's Code und die Wurzeln des modernen Kriegsvölkerrecht,” Zeitschrift fur Ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 62 (2002): 424–60.Google Scholar

78. Halleck, , International LawGoogle Scholar

79. Ibid., 781.

80. Ibid., 811-12.

81. Halleck attributed this to the peculiar nature of the U.S. governmental structure. Ibid., 784.

82. Ibid., 785.

83. Under the U.S. constitutional arrangement, the president, as commander-in-chief, can wage war and therefore conquer territory but cannot “extend the limits, or enlarge the boundaries of the Union.” Ibid., 784-85.

84. Fleming v. Page. See above, note 68, Ibid.

85. Halleck, , International Law, 784–85.Google Scholar

86. The same rationale applied to the so-called insular cases, where the Supreme Court asserted that the U.S. Constitution does not automatically extend to areas (such as Hawaii, the Philippines, and Puerto Rico) that have come under American control. See, e.g., DeLima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901)Google Scholar, Goetze v. United States, 182 U.S. 221 (1901)Google Scholar.

87. For example, this doctrine was invoked to set up governments in New Mexico and California in 1846 and 1847, respectively.Birkhimer, , Military Government, at 5556Google Scholar.

88. The Netherlands Case, above note 71 (describing American practice until ratifying the 1907 Hague Regulations). The incorporation of Hawaii in 1898 is a case in point.

89. “The government of the conqueror being de facto and not de jure, it must always rest upon the fact of possession, which is adverse to the former sovereign, and therefore can never be inferred or presumed…. Not only must the possession be actually acquired, but it must be maintained.”Halleck, , International Law, 780 (emphasis in original)Google Scholar.

90. American Insurance Company v. Canter, 26 U.S. 511.

91. Von Glahn presented this case as a departure from the British approach. See Glahn, Gerhard von, The Occupation of Enemy Territory (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1957), 7.Google Scholar

92. American Insurance Company v. Canter, above note 90, at 542.

93. Ibid.

94. This was also Halleck's interpretation when he referred, inter alia, to this case while emphasizing that “[d]uring mere military occupation the sovereignty of the conqueror is unstable and incomplete.” Halleck, , International Law, 791.Google Scholar

95. Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field (Lieber Code), 24 April 1863.

96. Lieber Code, Art. 3: “Martial Law in a hostile country consists in the suspension, by the occupying military authority, of the criminal and civil law, and of the domestic administration and government in the occupied place or territory, and in the substitution of military rule and force for the same, as well as in the dictation of general laws, as far as military necessity requires this suspension, substitution, or dictation.” According toFutrell, Robert J., “Federal Military Government in the South, 1861-1865,” Military Affairs 15.4 (1951): 190–91CrossRefGoogle Scholar, the Lieber Code was interpreted by the Union's various military governments to allow them considerable latitude. The Federal military governors “assumed a broad direction of Southern civil affairs.” These governors issued orders to protect public order and public health, regulated, inter alia, the sale of liquor and gambling, organized local militias, introduced new taxes, and, in general, “made themselves masters of the Southern population.” The secretary of war of the Confederate states criticized the Code for allowing the military governors unfettered discretion under the concept of “military necessity” (cited inGraber, Doris Appel, The Development of the Law of Belligerent Occupation, 1863-1914 [New York: Columbia University Press, 1949], 1718)Google Scholar.

97. Lieber Code, Art. 4.

98. Ibid., Art. 37. See also Arts. 5, 6, 31, 38.

99. See above, notes 78-82. Bluntschli, Lieber's closest colleague, deemed the Lieber Code “particularly noteworthy because it annunciates the modern rules with clarity and energy.” Bluntschli, , Das Beuterecht, at 66.Google Scholar

100. Moore, John Basset, A Digest of International Law (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1906), 7:273.Google Scholar

101. Ibid., 262.

102. Ibid., 315-16.

103. See The Netherlands decision, above note 71. In 1901, the U.S. Supreme Court (inDooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 222 [1901]) reaffirmed Halleck's description of the doctrine, in a case concerning duties imposed on individuals in occupied Puerto Rico in 1898-1900Google Scholar.

104. Löning, , Die Verwaltung, 1315.Google Scholar

105. Rolin-Jaequemyns, G., “Chronique du droit international,” Revue de Droit international et de legislation comparée 2 (1870): 645, at 691Google Scholar. Bordwell mentions a forth district. See Bordwell, Percy, The Law of War between Belligerents (Chicago: Callaghan, 1908), 98Google Scholar.

106. Rolin-Jaequemyns, “Chronique du droit international.” See also Löning, , Die Verwaltung;Google ScholarPhillipson, Coleman, Alsace-Lorraine, Past, Present and Future (London: T. F. Unwin, 1918), 155Google Scholar; Graber, , Development of the Law, 268–70Google Scholar.

107. Declaration of 30 August 1870. “[C]es territories se touvent, par ce fait même, soustraits à la souveraineté imperiale, en lieu et place de laquelle est établie l'autorité des puisances allemandes.” Quoted inLorriot, A., De la nature de l'occupation de guerre (Paris: Lavauzelle, 1903): 7677Google Scholar.

108. Declaration of 8 October 1870, reprinted in Lorriot, De la nature de l'occupation, at 42.

109. See Koskenniemi, , Gentle Civilizer, 1315.Google Scholar

110. Rolin-Jaequemyns, G., “Essai complémentaire sur la guerre franco-allemande dans ses rapports avec le droit international,” Revue de droit international et de legislation comparée 3 (1871): 335.Google Scholar

111. Ibid., 357.

112. Montluc, A. de, “Le droit de conquéte,” Revue de droit international et de legislation comparée 5 (1873): 581.Google Scholar

113. Merquiol, André, Les occupations etrangères en France au XIXme siècle (Nice: Imprimerie de “L'Eclaireur de Nice,” 1944): 5153.Google Scholar

114. Phillipson, , Alsace-Lorraine, at 145–47Google Scholar, cites German writers who, although writing generally about the illegitimacy of conquest, stated that Germany's demand to annex Alsace-Lorraine was not a conquest, but, rather, a “restoration” or a response to earlier French provocations.

115. Rolin-Jaequemyns, G., “Note,” Revue de droit international et de legislation comparée 5 (1873): 588, 589Google Scholar. Among these considerations, he mentioned the historic and ethnic ties of the population in the ceded territory and evident considerations of security.

116. Martens, de, La paix et la guerre, 9398.Google Scholar

117. Martens credited himself with the initiative. In January 1873, he published an article in a St. Petersburg journal, in which he stated that a code on military regulations was a prerequisite in an era of general conscription: “Au moment où le service militaire obligatoire est en vue d'être introduit chez nous … l'opportunité de fixer par la loi les droits et les devoirs des troupes s'impose impérieusement. Il serait desirable que chaque défenseur de la patrie entrat en campagne, non seulement armé d'aprés toutes les règles de l'art militaire, mais encore pénétré de cet vérité que la guerre n'est pas une lutte physique, qu'aucune prescription de droit et de morale ne contient.” This article caught the attention of the emperor and his ministers (Martens, de, La paix et la guerre, at 102).Google Scholar

118. Breucker, Jean De, “La Declaration de Bruxelles de 1874 concernant les lois et coutumes de la Guerre,” Chronique de Politique Étrangère 27 (1974): 22Google Scholar(noting that the parties to the Brussels negotiations could not deny the validity of Heffter's distinction between occupation and conquest).

119. Article 1: L'occupation par l'ennemi d'une partie du territoire de l'État en guerre avec lui y suspend, par le fait même, l'authorité du pouvoir legal de ce dernier et y substitute l'authorité du pouvoir militaire de l'État occupant. SeeAnnuaire de l'institut de droit international 1 (1877): 277, 278Google Scholar.

120. This distinction between general recognition of the principle and the details implied by the principle for an occupation regime is reflected in the description of the project to assess the Brussels text undertaken by the Institut de droit international. See Session de La Haye (1875),IDI Examen de la Déclaration de Bruxelles de 1874 (Rapporteur: M. Gustave Rolin-Jaequemyns) (rep. in The project was to focus on the implications of the fact that occupation is a provisional regime: “VI. Les dispositions du projet de Déclaration relatives à l'occupation du territoire ennemi sont l'application de ce principe vrai: que le seul fait de l'occupation ne confère aucun droit de souveraineté, mais que la cessation de la résistance locale et la retraite du gouvernement national, d'une part, la présence de l'armée envahissante, de l'autre, créent pour celle-ci et pour le gouvernement qu'elle représente un ensemble de droits et d'obligations essentiellement provisoires. Le projet tend surtout, dans cet ordre d'idées, à tracer les limites de ces droits, et à déterminer ces obligations, dictées par la nécessité de maintenir l'ordre social et de protéger la sécurité individuelle et la propriété privée, en l'absence momentanée de tout gouvernement régulier.”Google Scholar

121. See above, notes 54-60 and accompanying text.

122. “Article 2: L'ennemi qui occupé en territoire peut, selon les exigencies de la guerre et en vue de l'intérêt public, soit maintenir la force obligatoire des lois qui étaient en vigueur en temp de paix, soit les modifier, soit les susprendre entièrement.” See Annuaire de l'institut de droit international 1 (1877): 277, 278.Google Scholar

123. Project of an International Declaration concerning the Laws and Customs of War. Brussels, 27 August 1874, Articles 2 and 3 (

124. “VI. Les règles tracées à cet égard sont sans doute susceptibles d'améliorations de détail, mais, dès à présent, elles sont au fond plus favorables aux citoyens paisibles et aux propriétés publiques et privées du pays occupé, que la pratique suivie jusqu'ici et que la doctrine de la plupart des auteurs.” IDI Examen de la Déclaration, above note 120.

125. Article 44 of the Manual: “Art. 44: The occupant should maintain the laws which were in force in the country in time of peace, and should not modify, suspend, or replace them, unless necessary.” Institut de droit international, Session d'Oxford (1880)Google Scholar; Manuel des lois de la guerre sur terre (Rapporteur: M. Gustave Moynier) (rep. in

126. Martens, Fedor de, Traité de droit international, trans. Leo, Alfred (Paris: Marescq, 1877), 3:257Google Scholar: “L'occupation prend un autre aspect quand elle n'a pas un caractère temporaire et qu'elle a lieu en vue d'une annexion, ou si le but même la guerre est de changer ou d'améliorer l'organisation d'une province appurtenant àl'ennemi. Dans ce cas, la puissance, qui procède à une annexion, a tout à fait le droit de transformer complètement les institutions régnantes et l'ordre établi, afin de les mettre en harmonie avec ses interérêts politiques, ou afin de procurer quelque avantage aux habitants.” (“The occupation acquires a different aspect when it is not of a temporary nature but instead annexation is envisioned or the aim of the war itself was to change or ameliorate the organization of a province belonging to the enemy. In this case, the power that executes annexation has the right to transform the ruling institutions and establish order, so as to harmonize them with its political interests or to procure some advantage for the inhabitants.”)Martens, de, La paix et la guerre, at 267–96Google Scholar.

127. Martens, de, La paix et la guerre, at 271.Google Scholar

128. Lapradelle, de, “La conference de la paix,” Revue générale de Droit International Public 6 (1899): 736–38.Google Scholar

129. Session of 6 June 1899, quoted in Lapradelle, , “La conference,” at 736–37.Google Scholar

130. Ibid., at 738.

131. Art. 43, Hague Regulations. See above note 1.

132. See above note 24 and accompanying text.

133. Koskenniemi, , Gentle Civilizer, at 98Google Scholar. On the modes of unilateral acquisition of non-Christian territories, seeKorman, , Conquest, at 4266Google Scholar.

134. As Chief Justice Marshal observed with respect to the rights asserted by the Europeans concerning the New World (Johnson, and Graham's, Lessee v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 572–73 [1823])Google Scholar, “On the discovery of this immense continent, the great nations of Europe were eager to appropriate to themselves so much of it as they could respectively acquire. Its vast extent offered an ample field to the ambition and enterprise of all; and the character and religion of its inhabitants afforded an apology for considering them as a people over whom the superior genius of Europe might claim an ascendancy. The potentates of the old world found no difficulty in convincing themselves that they made ample compensation to the inhabitants of the new, by bestowing on them civilization and Christianity, in exchange for unlimited independence. But, as they were all in pursuit of nearly the same object, it was necessary, in order to avoid conflicting settlements, and consequent war with each other, to establish a principle, which all should acknowledge as the law by which the right of acquisition, which they all asserted, should be regulated as between themselves. This principle was, that discovery gave title to the government by whose subjects, or by whose authority, it was made, against all other European governments, which title might be consummated by possession. The exclusion of all other Europeans, necessarily gave to the nation making the discovery the sole right of acquiring the soil from the natives, and establishing settlements upon it. It was a right with which no Europeans could interfere. It was a right which all asserted for themselves, and to the assertion of which, by others, all assented. Those relations which were to exist between the discoverer and the natives, were to be regulated by themselves. The rights thus acquired being exclusive, no other power could interpose between them.”

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