Since the law and society movement in the 1960s, the sociology of law in the United States has been dominated by a power/inequality approach. Based on a sociological distinction between the forms and substances of law, this article outlines a “powerless” approach to the sociology of law as a theoretical alternative to the mainstream power/inequality approach. Following Simmel and the Chicago School of sociology, this new approach analyzes the legal system not by its power relations and patterns of inequality, but by its social forms, or the structures and processes that constitute the legal system's spatial outlook and temporality. Taking a radical stance on power, this article is not only a retrospective call for social theory in law and society research, but also a progressive effort to move beyond US‐centric sociolegal scholarship and to develop new social science tools that explain a larger variety of legal phenomena across the world.

We investigate the influence of subject matter expertise, opinion specialization, and judicial experience on the role of ideology in decision making in the courts of appeals in a generalized, as opposed to specialized, setting. We find that subject matter experts and opinion specialists are significantly more likely to engage in ideological decision making than their nonspecialist counterparts and that opinion specialization is a particularly potent factor in ideological decision making. Further, increased judicial experience has no effect on the conditional use of ideology. We discuss the potentially wide‐ranging implications of our findings for both theory and policy.

Lawyers who engage in misconduct can do substantial harm. To screen out “unfit” lawyers, bar examining authorities collect detailed personal information from bar applicants. The rationale for this “character and fitness” inquiry is to identify who is likely to become a problematic lawyer. Despite the history of discrimination associated with this inquiry and the highly personal information requested, there has been no rigorous test of whether such predictions are possible. This article examines the information disclosed by 1,343 Connecticut bar applicants and their subsequent disciplinary records. It reveals that while some bar application data are associated with an elevated risk of future discipline, the predictive power of the data is extremely low. Moreover, several variables are more strongly associated with less severe discipline than with more severe discipline. We argue that some of the causal mechanisms linking application data to subsequent discipline may have more to do with career trajectory than with an underlying propensity to engage in misconduct.

Increasingly punitive attempts to curb prescription drug misuse constitute an expansion of the “War on Drugs” into mainstream medicine, leaving frontline health care providers caught between competing institutional logics of treatment and punishment. This study brings an institutional approach to frontline work by empirically examining how pharmacists manage discrepant logics while deciding whether to provide abusable medications and devices. Analyses of semistructured interviews with seventy‐one retail pharmacists in the United States reveal that pharmacists manage discrepant logics by engaging in two gatekeeping processes—medical and legal—that lend themselves to different identities, epistemologies, field foci, patterns of action, and interpersonal orientations. Pharmacists' decisions have implications for patients' access to care and exposure to the criminal justice system. Findings advance theories of frontline work by systematically examining the interplay between elements of institutional environments and decision making and yield policy considerations as states increasingly monitor patients and providers through prescription monitoring programs.

Scholars of legal mobilization have long explored how litigation is used as a resource for social and political change. While most studies focus on the actions of private groups, this article considers law enforcement as a form of legal mobilization. Employing a case study of recent pharmaceutical litigation, this article examines how prosecutors have mobilized the law to reshape corporate responsibilities in the prescription drug industry. Prosecutors' litigation campaigns have forced changes in organizational practices, expanded the scope of the conflict over pharmaceutical industry actions, and established new legal norms that have spread throughout the political system. This form of prosecutor‐led legal mobilization has occurred in other contexts as well, including gun control and mortgage lending. In addition to indicating how lawyers within the state can engage in a form of cause lawyering, the government litigation explored in this article illustrates both the instrumental and constitutive power of the law.

Research shows that exposure to sexual harassment policy sometimes activates traditional gender stereotypes. This article examines whether the sex of the legal messenger moderates reactions to the enforcement of sexual harassment laws. We employ a 2 × 2 experimental design in which we measure the effect of a sexual harassment policy intervention on male participants’ gender beliefs. The design varies whether the person communicating the policy information is male or female. We find that female policy trainers activate implicit gender stereotypes, but explicit gender egalitarian beliefs. Other than improving men's perceptions of women's considerateness, the policy has little effect on beliefs in the conditions with a male trainer. These results suggest that the effect of law on social change is contingent on characteristics of the legal messengers. Findings contribute to our understanding of gender inequality and legitimacy processes and have practical implications for implementing effective policy.

In an age of widespread background checks, we ask how managers in different organizational contexts navigate legal ambiguity in assessing applicants' criminal history information, based on interview data obtained in a recent field experiment. The study builds on institutional analyses of the social sources of workplace legality to describe how employers consider applicants with criminal histories. We find that some organizations set explicit standards to guide hiring decisions, providing concrete policies on how to treat applicants with records. Where such procedural mandates are lacking, however, hiring managers turn to a micro‐rational decision process to evaluate potential risk and liability. These individualized approaches create inconsistencies in how the law is interpreted and applied across organizations, as evidenced by actual hiring behavior in the field experiment.

Family treatment court (FTC) is an example of an increasing number of problem‐centered courts currently operating in the United States. Problem‐centered courts such as FTC encompass the ideas of therapeutic jurisprudence but operate within the broader court system. Presented are the results of an FTC case study that seeks to understand the evolution of courtroom norms and practice over time. Observations of courtroom interactions and interviews with courtroom personnel show that initial observations are consistent with the ideals of therapeutic jurisprudence. However, over time, daily demands and pressures on the courtroom undermine the therapeutic approach.

Kunal Parker's Common Law, History, and Democracy in America, 1790–1900: Legal Thought Before Modernism shows how nineteenth‐century thinkers thought about law and history differently than do post‐Holmesian modernist sociolegal scholars, whose ahistorical law appears contingent on politics, power, or will. Understanding time and history to be essential to law, nineteenth‐century jurists conceived of a common law that was able to work with and to shape democracy, Parker argues. Contra modernist histories then, Parker claims that the common law was not a reactionary force that stood in the way of democracy and economy. His history of legal thought before modernism suggests, further, the predicament of antifoundationalist modern law and modernist scholars: stripped of time and without its own history, how can law be anything other than politics, power, or will?

Parker's Common Law, History, and Democracy in America joins an ongoing effort to turn the tables on “law and …” by replacing the familiar question “What can history, sociology, and cultural studies tell us about law?” with a new line of inquiry asking “What can law teach us about the reach and limits of disciplinary thinking?” In his study of the reception of common law into nineteenth‐century American jurisprudence, Parker unearths a notion of time based on stability and repetition that challenges the dominant modernist and historicist approach to the writing of law and history. Parker, however, shies away from drawing the full implications of this move and it remains unclear whether, in the final analysis, he escapes the spell of legal historicism.

In this essay, I situate Kunal Parker's Common Law, History, and Democracy in America, 1790–1900, within a broader set of intellectual currents engaged with questions of time and temporality. Although Parker's book centers on the common law and history and develops specific conceptions of time, in so doing, he invites legal historians and legal scholars to ruminate on the times of law, particularly the temporal relations that law has with itself. Placing Parker in conversation with Henri Bergson and the recent Bergsonian revival in critical theory, I suggest that law has a duration, a formulation that opens other itineraries to consider the dynamic times of law.

In my response to the reviews of my book by Marianne Constable, Shai Lavi, and Renisa Mawani, I situate the argument of Common Law, History, and Democracy in America, 1790–1900: Legal Thought Before Modernism within a concern with contemporary forms of historical knowledge. Where contemporary historical knowledge practices subsume their objects of investigation, I adopt the temporality of the object of investigation—namely, the common law—as the structure my book. In different registers, Constable, Lavi, and Mawani urge me to take up more explicitly the foundational questioning about which they care. I welcome their readings. However, given the distinct problematic from which I start, I argue, the book is not in the first instance an argument about the ontology of history or law.

New work on the “history of capitalism” reveals how the personal freedom enjoyed by people living within the liberal capitalist mainstream is often purchased by coerced labor at the social margins. Walter Johnson's book River of Dark Dreams: Slavery and Empire in the Cotton Kingdom makes this argument with force, utilizing the concept of “slave racial capitalism” to suggest how race‐based slavery constituted a necessary component of early American economic expansion. Using Johnson's framework as a starting point, this essay argues that the legal institutions of property and contract, institutions underwriting a genuinely “slave racial capitalist” regime, also contained certain subversive possibilities within themselves, eventually challenging unfree labor as a modality of rule within the modernizing United States.