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Dilemma of Tarasoff: Must Physicians Protect the Public or Their Patients?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 April 2021

Extract

Physicians nationwide, already worried by an increasing number of professional liability lawsuits and an expanding scope of liability, now face a new and potentially more troublesome development that had its genesis in what many thought was an extraordinary court decision. In Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California, a psychiatrist was held, in a suit brought by the victim's parents, to be liable for negligence in the death of a woman who was murdered by a patient of that physician. The court held that even though the physician had complied with the traditional duty of protecting the patient's confidentiality, he nonetheless had a duty to warn the victim of the potential threat against her life. Tarasoff was eventually followed by a number of decisions that imposed liability on physicians under similar circumstances.

This article reviews and analyzes the original Tarasoff decision and subsequent judicial rulings on this subject. In addition, the authors briefly explore the historical backdrop of this decision and suggest practical steps that physicians can take to deal with the conflicting duties of protecting confidentiality and protecting potential victims from the danger posed by patients.

Type
Article
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of Law, Medicine and Ethics 1983

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References

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