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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 January 2018
This paper compares and contrasts state emergency responses to national security crises with responses deployed in a period of economic crisis. Specifically, this paper challenges the appropriateness and legitimacy of the standard emergency response of legislative (as distinct from judicial) deference to the executive when confronting such economic crises. This will be done by questioning the significance in periods of economic crisis of the two principal factors that justify deferring to the executive during a state of emergency pertaining to national security: (i) the necessity of the action taken; and (ii) that the executive has an expertise in decision making in the specific area in question. Ultimately, this paper questions the application of the emergency paradigm to economic crises, arguing that such responses are rarely temporary and instead usher in a ‘new normalcy’.
I would like to thank Fiona de Londras, Aoife Nolan, Natasa Mavronicola and the anonymous reviewers for their comments on earlier drafts of this paper. I presented this paper at the Durham Law School Staff Seminar Series, and the IACL–AIDC World Congress of Constitutional Law in June 2014. I am grateful to the participants at these events for their feedback.
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