We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 29 December 2015
This article examines the problem of colliding international regimes by reference to the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the UN Security Council. Given the different logics or rationalities of these institutions – the Security Council is first and foremost a (power) political organ, while the ICC is in charge of legal assessments – the collision potential is high. A collision rule was therefore introduced into the Rome Statute in the form of Article 16; however, all instances of its application so far have been highly controversial. While norm application is always controversial to some extent, we argue – in reference to Thomas Franck's work on the legitimacy of international norms – that regime responsiveness, secondary rules or a neutral application control of Article 16 could contribute to successful collision management.
This paper is an outcome of the research project ‘The Juridification of Dispute Settlement in International Law’ within the Collaborative Research Centre 597 ‘Transformations of the State’ at the University of Bremen; see K. Blome, A. Fischer-Lescano, H. Franzki, N. Markard and S. Oeter (eds.), Contested Regime Collisions: Norm Fragmentation in World Society (forthcoming 2016). It was presented at the International Studies Association Annual Meeting in San Francisco and at the Third Conference of the International Relations Section of the German Political Science Association in Munich. We thank our commentators for their helpful suggestions, especially Nicole Deitelhoff. The authors wish to also thank Andreas Fischer-Lescano and the other project members, especially Johan Horst and Lars Viellechner, for their support, as well as the two anonymous reviewers for their very helpful comments and criticism.
1 Final Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission: Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties arising from the diversification and expansion of international law (ILC A/CN.4/L.682, 13 April 2006). See also, Koskenniemi, M., ‘Legal Fragmentation(s) – An Essay on Fluidity and Form’, in Calliess, G.-P.et al. (eds.), Soziologische Jurisprudenz: Festschrift für Gunther Teubner zum 65. Geburtstag (2009), 795Google Scholar; Koskenniemi, M. and Leino, P., ‘Fragmentation of International Law? Postmodern Anxieties’, (2002) 15 LJIL 553CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
2 Krasner, S., ‘Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables’, (1982) 36 IO 185Google Scholar, at 185.
3 Outline of the Chairman of the ILC Study Group on Fragmentation of International Law: The Function and Scope of the Lex Specialis Rule and the Question of ‘Self-contained Regimes’ (2003), available at www.legal.un-org/ilc/sessions/55/pdfs/fragmentation_outline.pdf. This definition includes non-state regimes such as the lex mercatoria or the lex digitalis. See, Fischer-Lescano, A. and Teubner, G., ‘Regime-Collisions: The Vain Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law’, (2004) 25 MJIL 999Google Scholar, at 1010.
4 This result can be intended, see D. Pulkowski, The Law and Politics of International Regime Conflict (2014), at 90–5.
5 See for example, Koskenniemi, M., ‘Hegemonic Regimes’, in Young, M.A. (ed.), Regime Interaction in International Law: Facing Fragmentation (2012), 305Google Scholar.
6 See for example, Deitelhoff, N., ‘The Discursive Power of Legalization: Charting Islands of Persuasion in the ICC Case’, (2009) 63 IO 33Google Scholar; and Fehl, C. ‘Explaining the International Criminal Court: A “Practice Test” for Rationalist and Constructivist Approaches’, (2004) 10 EJIR 357Google Scholar.
7 See for example, Kreß, C. and von Holtzendorff, L., ‘The Kampala Compromise on the Crime of Aggression’, (2010) 8 JICL 1179Google Scholar; Paulus, A., ‘Second Thoughts on the Crime of Aggression’, (2009) 20 EJIL 1117CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
8 O.R. Young, ‘Institutional Linkages in International Society: Polar Perspectives’, (1996) 2 GG 1.
9 Gehring, T. and Oberthür, S., ‘The Causal Mechanisms of Interaction between International Institutions’, (2009) 15 EJIR 125Google Scholar.
10 Rosendal, G.K., ‘Impacts of Overlapping International Regimes: The Case of Biodiversity’, (2001) 7 GG 95Google Scholar.
11 Stokke, O.S., ‘The Interplay of International Regimes: Putting Effectiveness Theory to Work’, (2001) 14 Fridtjof Nansen Institute ReportGoogle Scholar.
12 Gehring, T. and Faude, B., ‘The Dynamics of Regime Complexes: Microfoundations and Systemic Effects’, (2013) 19 GG 119Google Scholar.
13 See for example, Gehring and Oberthür, supra note 9, at 135 et seq.
14 Rosendal, supra note 10, at 96, following Oran Young.
15 Ibid., at 100–1.
17 Stokke, supra note 11, at 16.
18 Such strategies include forum shopping, i.e., choosing the most favourable forum for a specific conflict, and regime shifting, a long-term strategy of relocating rulemaking processes to other regimes. See Gehring and Faude, supra note 12, at 126; Alter, K.J. and Meunier, S., ‘The Politics of International Regime Complexity’, (2009) 7 Perspectives on Politics 13, at 14CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Pulkowski, supra note 4, at 95. For an overview in the area of trade and investment, see, Puig, , ‘International Regime Complexity and Economic Law Enforcement’, (2014) 17 JIEL 491CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 500–15.
20 Ibid., at 11.
21 According to Sebastian Oberthür, interplay management ‘denotes political efforts to purposefully shape and improve institutional interaction’. Oberthür, S., ‘Interplay Management: Enhancing Environmental Policy Integration among International Institutions’, (2009) 9 Int Environ Agreements 371, at 373CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
22 Gehring and Faude, supra note 12, at 128.
23 Stokke, supra note 11, at 16–17.
24 Ibid., at 18.
25 Stokke demonstrates this using the example of a code for the implementation of trade measures relating to environmental protection, developed by proponents of WTO and of environmental regimes. Ibid. at 19.
26 Raustiala, K. and Victor, D.G., ‘The Regime Complex for Plant Generic Resources’, (2004) 58 IO 277Google Scholar, at 297.
27 In eloquent defence of such unity, see Tomuschat, C., ‘International Law as a Coherent System’, in Arsanjani, M.H.et al. (eds), Looking to the Future: Essays on International Law in Honour of W. Michael Reisman (2011), 323Google Scholar. For an extensive discussion of unitarist vs. pluralist views, see Pulkowski, supra note 4, at 192–235.
28 On the unhelpfulness of jus cogens as a mechanism of hierarchy, see, B. Simma and D. Pulkowski, ‘Of Planets and the Universe: Self-contained Regimes in International Law’, (2006) 17 EJIL 483, at 496–7; Paulus, A., ‘Jus Cogens Between Hegemony and Fragmentation: An Attempt at a Re-appraisal’, (2005) 74 Nordic Journal of International Law 297CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
29 See N. Luhmann, Law as a Social System (2004) and id., Social Systems (1995).
30 Fischer-Lescano and Teubner, supra note 3, at 1007 et seq.
31 Ibid., at 1006–7.
32 Ibid., at 1000–1.
33 Ibid., at 1017.
34 Ibid., at 1004.
35 Ibid., at 1003–4.
36 Ibid., at 1007.
37 Ibid., at 1017.
38 Ibid., at 1018, 1024, 1030 et seq.
39 On default deference as a collision rule, see Viellechner, L., ‘Responsive Legal Pluralism: The Emergence of Transnational Conflicts Law’, in Blome et al, supra note *, and in (2015) 16 Transnational Legal Theory (published online, 29 October 2015)Google Scholar. However, systems theorists also consider the solutions of other social systems as equally valid; see A. Fischer-Lescano and G. Teubner, Regime-Kollisionen. Zur Fragmentierung des globalen Rechts (2006), 130.
40 Of course, no common good exists a priori under the conditions of a fragmented global society. But the autonomous regimes can build on the fictitious assumption of common reference points and formulate a common good in the specific terms and norms of each regime. Fischer-Lescano and Teubner, supra note 3, at 1033 et seq., and Teubner, G. and Korth, P., ‘Two Kinds of Legal Pluralism: Collision of Transnational Regimes in the Double Fragmentation of World Society’, in Young, M.A. (ed.), Regime Interaction in International Law: Facing Fragmentation (2012), 23 at 37Google Scholar.
43 Gehring and Faude, supra note 12.
44 Oberthür, supra note 21.
45 Ibid., at 374 et seq.
46 Fischer-Lescano and Teubner, supra note 3, at 1017–45.
47 See T.M. Franck, ‘Legitimacy in the International System’, (1988) 82 AJIL 705. Franck later developed this into a whole book: T.M. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy among Nations (1990), but in this paper we will refer to the briefer article version.
48 Ibid., at 706. Here, Franck refers to one particular aspect of legitimacy: procedural legitimacy. For the different dimensions of the term legitimacy see for instance: Cassese, A., ‘The Legitimacy of International Criminal Tribunals and the Current Prospects of International Criminal Justice’, (2012) 25 LJIL 491CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
49 Franck, supra note 47, at 716.
50 Ibid., at 713.
51 Ibid., at 713 et seq.
52 Ibid., at 725 et seq.
53 Ibid., at 726.
54 Ibid., at 712–13.
55 Ibid., at 724.
56 Ibid., at 725.
57 Ibid., at 735 et seq.
58 Ibid., at 752. In this context, Franck emphasizes the importance of adherence, i.e., the nexus between a ‘primary rule of obligation’ and ‘secondary rules of process’: rules about how rules are made, interpreted and applied. He argues that the adherence to a set of secondary rules increases the legitimacy of primary rules.
59 Ibid. at 721.
60 Ibid. at 724.
61 Koskenniemi, supra note 5, at 324 and passim.
62 K. Günther, Der Sinn für Angemessenheit. Anwendungsdiskurse in Moral und Recht (1988), at 37 et seq.
63 A. Engländer, Diskurs als Rechtsquelle (2002), 36.
64 Venzke, I., ‘Legal Contestation about “Enemy Combatants”: On the Exercise of Power in Legal Interpretation’, (2009) 5 (1)JILIR 155Google Scholar, at 158 et seq.
65 Ibid. at 162, referring to the concept of power introduced by Barnett and Duvall.
66 Ibid. at 163.
69 Deitelhoff, supra note 6, at 35.
70 The definition of the crime of aggression and its ‘trigger mechanism’ were adopted by consensus at the first Review Conference in Kampala in 2010 and cannot enter into force before 2017; ICC Res. RC/Res.6 of 11 June 2010.
71 The Security Council has extended this concept to non-international armed conflicts, acknowledging their possible cross-border effects, threatening the stability of the region, e.g., The Situation in Darfur (Sudan), UN Doc. S/RES/1564 (2004).
72 Since the 1990s, this power has included the authority to create international criminal tribunals such as the ICTY. See, Prosecutor v. Tadić, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, Case No. IT-94–1-AR72, 2 October 1995, paras. 30–9.
73 This constitutes an ‘evident overlap’ between the competences of the Security Council and the ICC; W. Schabas, The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome Statute (2010), 325.
74 See for example, UN Security Council, Security Council Resolution (1591) (2005) on Sudan, 29 March 2005, UN Doc. S/RES/1591(2005); See also, UN Security Council, Security Council Resolution 1769 (2007) on Establishment of AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), 31 July 2007, UN Doc. S/RES/1769 (2007).
75 UN Security Council, Security Council Resolution 1593 (2005) on Violations of International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law in Darfur, Sudan, 31 March 2005, UN Doc. S/RES/1593 (2005); see, L. Condorelli and A. Ciampi, ‘Comments on the Security Council Referral of the Situation in Darfur to the ICC’, (2005) 3 JICJ 590.
76 See for example, Arsanjani, M.H.et al., ‘Peace v. Justice: Contradictory or Complementary’, (2006) 100 ASIL Proceedings 361Google Scholar.
77 On the OTP, see Nouwen, S.M.H. and Werner, W.G., ‘Doing Justice to the Political: The International Criminal Court in Uganda and Sudan’, 21 EJIL 941CrossRefGoogle Scholar; for a more general analysis of the political role of international criminal tribunals, see, Krever, T., ‘Unveiling (and Veiling) Politics in International Criminal Trials’, in Schwöbel, C. (ed.), Critical Approaches to International Criminal Law. An Introduction (2014), 117Google Scholar.
78 See for example, Fremuth, M. and Griebel, J., ‘On the Security Council as a Legislator: A Blessing or a Curse for the International Community’, (2007) 76 NJIL 358Google Scholar. S. Chesterman, ‘The UN Security Council and the Rule of Law’ (2008), available at www.geneva-academy.ch/RULAC/pdf/FINAL-Report-The-UN-Security-Council-and-the-Rule-of-Law.pdf likens the Security Council to a police officer.
79 UN Security Council, Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001) on Threats to International Peace and Security Caused by Terrorist Acts, 28 September 2001, UN Doc. S/RES/1373 (2001); UN Security Council, Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) Concerning Weapons of Mass Destruction, 28 April 2004, UN Doc. S/RES/1540 (2004).
80 See for example, Talmon, S., ‘The Security Council as World Legislature’, (2005) 99 AJIL 175CrossRefGoogle Scholar; V. Popovski and T. Fraser (eds.), The Security Council as Global Legislator (2014); Fremuth and Griebel, supra note 78; for the opposite assessment, see, Rosand, E., ‘The Security Council as “Global Legislator”: Ultra Vires or Ultra Innovative?’, (2004) 28 Fordham Int’l L.J. 542Google Scholar.
81 See the account in Peskin, V., ‘Caution and Confrontation in the International Criminal Court's Pursuit of Accountability in Uganda and Sudan’, (2009) 31 HRQ 655CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
82 See for example, UN Security Council, Security Council Resolution 808(1993), 22 February 1993, UN Doc. S/RES/808(1993) establishing the ICTY: ‘[C]onvinced that in the particular circumstances of the former Yugoslavia the establishment of an international tribunal would enable this aim to be achieved and would contribute to the restoration and maintenance of peace. . . .’
83 See, Galtung, J., ‘Violence, Peace and Peace Research’, (1969) 6 JPR 167Google Scholar.
84 Relationship Agreement between the United Nations and the International Criminal Court, New York, 4 October 2004, UNTS Vol. 2283, II-1272. Since the Court is its own international organization and not a subsidiary of the Council, unlike the ad-hoc tribunals established under Chapter VII, its relationship with the UN requires spelling out.
85 Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1994, Vol. II, Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court, Article 23(1) and (3).
86 UN General Assembly, General Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Official Records, Fiftieth Session, Supplement No. 22 (A/50/22), 1995, para. 120.
87 Ibid. para. 121.
89 On the relationship between the Security Council and ICJ, cf. Section 5.3, infra.
90 The amendments, proposed by Singapore, Costa Rica and Canada were finally supported by the United Kingdom and France. See Schabas, supra note 72, at 326–7.
91 This was a demand from Jordan. New Zealand suggested establishing a general connection between the UN human rights organs and the Court, Afghanistan advocated a referral right for the Red Cross. United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Rome, 15 June–17 July 1998, Official Records, Volume II, at 114 and 193 et seq.
92 Ibid. at 127 et seq. This was a request from Sudan (representing the group of Arabic States) and Syria.
93 See Deitelhoff, supra note 6.
95 Schabas, supra note 73, at 333.
96 See Jain, N., ‘A Separate Law for Peacekeepers: The Clash between the Security Council and the International Criminal Court’, (2005) 16 EJIR 239Google Scholar, at 240–1. A similar advance for the mission in East Timor failed in May 2002. Stahn points out that, at that time, there was no mission which could have led to a threat of prosecution for US troops: Stahn, C., ‘The Ambiguities of Security Council Resolution 1422 (2002)’, (2003) 14 EJIL 85CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 87; see also, M.E. Kurth, Das Verhältnis des Internationalen Strafgerichtshofes zum UN-Sicherheitsrat. Unter besonderer Berücksichtigung von Sicherheitsratsresolution 1422 (2002) (2006).
97 Canada, New Zealand, South Africa (for the AU), Costa Rica (for the Rio Group), Jordan and Brazil shared this view; Security Council, Meeting Record S/PV.4568, 10 July 2002.
98 Stahn, supra note 96, at 88–9, adding that peacekeeper immunity was already a topic at Rome and contradicts Art. 27 of the RS; ibid., at 95.
100 Security Council Meeting Record 4568, supra note 97. Canada, New Zealand and Brazil, as well as the (non-permanent) Security Council members Mauritius and Mexico, were among the Resolution's most avid critics.
101 Security Council, Meeting Record S/PV.4772, 12 June 2003, at 23–4.
102 Canada, Greece, Uruguay, Argentina, Nigeria, France, Germany, Syria. Ibid.
103 See Krzan, B., ‘Frieden und Gerechtigkeit nach der Kampala-Konferenz: Einige Überlegungen zur Rolle des Sicherheitsrates in der Völkerstrafgerichtsbarkeit’, (2010) 48 Archiv des Völkerrechts 467, at 471–2CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
104 Such a practice existed already in the form of Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs) between the sending state and the UN or the UN and the mission state. This practice, mainly used by the US, is incorporated in Art. 98(2) of the RS, which relieves member states of the obligation to extradite in contravention of international agreements, however, this does not affect the ICC's jurisdiction. See Jain, supra note 96, at 245; Condorelli and Ciampi, supra note 75, at 598; Happold, M., ‘Darfur, the Security Council, and the International Criminal Court’, (2006) 55 ICLQ 226CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 235 (on Res. 1593). These scholars call this a political victory for the US.
105 UN Security Council, Security Council Resolution 1593 (2005) on Violations of International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law in Darfur, Sudan, 31 March 2005, UN Doc. S/RES/1593 (2005); UN Security Council, Security Council Resolution 1970 (2011) on the Situation in Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 17 March 2011, UN Doc. S/RES/1970 (2011).
106 UN Security Council Resolution 1593, supra note 75.
107 The warrant was issued in March 2009 for crimes against humanity and war crimes, a second warrant was issued for genocide in 2010. Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Second Warrant of Arrest for Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05–01/09, 12 July 2010. Critical of the timing: Ssenyonjo, M., ‘The International Criminal Court and the Warrant of Arrest for Sudan's President al-Bashir: A Crucial Step Towards Challenging Impunity or a Political Decision?’, (2009) 78 NJIL 379Google Scholar, at 427–30; Ciampi, A., ‘The Proceedings against President Al Bashir and the Prospects of their Suspension under Article 16 ICC Statute’, (2008) 6 JICJ 885Google Scholar, at 891–3; while Cassese pushed the matter: Cassese, A., ‘Is the ICC Still Having Teething Problems?’, (2006) 4 JICJ 434Google Scholar; see also, Nouwen and Werner, supra note 77, at 954 et seq.
108 AU Peace and Security Council, Communiqué PSC/MIN/Comm(CXLII), Rev. 1, 21 July 2008; Reports on the Arab League Council's Statement of 19 July 2008 available at www.iccnow.org/?mod=newsdetail&news=2783.
109 AU Peace and Security Council, supra note 108.
110 Ciampi, supra note 107, at 886.
111 UN Security Council Meeting Record S/PV.5947, 31 July 2008, at 4–5. Costa Rica, Belgium, and Italy advanced similar arguments.
112 Ibid. at 8.
113 Ibid. at 3, 6.
114 UN Security Council, Security Council Resolution 1828 (2008) on Extending the Mandate of UNAMID in Darfur, Sudan, 31 July 2008, UN Doc. S/RES/1828 (2008).
115 Ssenyonjo, supra note 107, at 422–3.
116 Assembly of the AU, 13th Ordinary Session, 1–3 July 2009, Sirte (Assembly/AU/Dec. 243–267 (XIII) Rev. 1 / Decision 245).
117 A study conducted by an African Expert Group argued that the concerns of the African States should be taken seriously, but to also consider that Sudan had not been making serious efforts for a domestic prosecution, and that the peace process was essentially stagnating. This suggests a reverse instrumentalization of Art. 16, and a concurrent danger of de-legalizing the ICC system. D. Akande, M. du Plessis and C. C. Jalloh, ‘Position Paper. An African Expert Study on the African Union Concerns about Article 16 of the Rome Statute of the ICC’ (2010), at 20 et seq., available at www.issafrica.org/anicj/uploads/ISS_Position_Paper_Article_16.pdf; see also, C. Ero, ‘Understanding Africa's Position on the International Criminal Court’ (2010), Oxford Transitional Justice Research Working Paper Series, available at www.csls.ox.ac.uk/documents/Ero_Africas_PositionFinalOTJR.pdf.
118 AU Executive Council, 16th Ordinary Session, 25–29 January 2010, Report on the Ministerial Meeting on the Rome Statute (EX.CL/568 (XVI) Annex 1).
119 ICC Assembly of State Parties Eighth Plenary Meeting, Res. ICC-ASP/8/Res. 6, para. 4, UN Doc. ICC-ASP/8/20, 18–26 November 2009, Vol. I, 70 (Appendix VI).
120 AU Peace and Security Council, 207th Meeting at the Level of the Heads of State and Government, 29 October 2009, Report of the African Union High Level Panel on Darfur (AUPD) (PSC/AHG/2(CCVII)). (Ext/Assembly/AU/Dec.1., Oct. 2013).
121 ‘UNSC Refers Situation in Libya to ICC, Sanctions Gaddafi & Aides’, Sudan Tribune, 27 February 2011.
122 UN Security Council, Security Council Resolution 1970 (2011) on the Establishment of a Security Council Committee to Monitor Implementation of the Arms Embargo Against the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 26 February 2011, UN Doc. S/RES/1970 (2011).
123 AU Heads of State and Government meeting, 17th Ordinary Session, 23 June–1 July 2011, Decisions Adopted during the 17th African Union Summit, 1 July 2011, at 3.
124 Prosecutor v. Saif Al-Islam Gaddhafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi, Decision on the Admissibility of the Case Against Saif Al-Islam Gaddhafi, Case no. ICC-01/11–01/11, Pre-trial Chamber I, 31 May 2013.
125 Prosecutor v. Saif Al-Islam Gaddhafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi, Decision on the Admissibility of the Case Against Abdullah Al-Senussi, Case no. ICC-01/11–01/11, Pre-trial Chamber I, 11 October 2013.
126 See, Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua Arap Sang, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and(b) of the Rome Statute, Case No. ICC-01/09–01/11, Pre-Trial Chamber II, 23 January 2012; Prosecutor v. Frances Kirmi Mathaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and Mohammed Hussein Ali, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and(b) of the Rome Statute, Case No. ICC-01/09–02/11, Pre-Trial Chamber II, 23 January 2012. The Kenyan government first called for a deferral when the suspects were summoned to The Hague; on the prior failure of domestic investigations, see, Hansen, T.O., ‘The International Criminal Court in Kenya: Three Defining Features of a Contested Accountability Process and their Implications for the Future of International Justice’, (2012) 18 AJHR 187Google Scholar, at 191–4.
127 Extraordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union, Decision on Africa's Relationship with the ICC (Ext/Assembly/AU/Dec.1., Oct. 2013), 12 October 2013.
128 Ibid.
129 UN Security Council, Security Council Draft Res. UN Doc. S/2013/660, brought by several African states; voting record in UN Doc. S/PV.7060, 15 November 2013.
130 ICC Assembly of State Parties, 12th Plenary Meeting, Res. ICC-ASP/12/Res. 7, UN Doc. ICC-ASP/12/Res.7, 27 November 2013. A reform of the Rules of Procedure passed, among others concerning the requirement of presence during the proceedings.
131 Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, on the withdrawal of charges against Mr. Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, 5 December 2014; Prosecutor v. Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, Notice of Withdrawal of the Charges Against Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, OTP, ICC-01/09–02/11–983, 5 December 2014.
132 OTP, Statement to the United Nations Security Council on the Situation in Darfur, pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 1593 (2005), 12 December 2014.
133 These concerns also apply to the selective referral practice of the Security Council. See, Popovski, V., ‘The Security Council and the International Criminal Court’, in Popovski, and Fraser, (eds.), The Security Council as Global Legislator (2014), 266Google Scholar.
134 In the Kenyan case, it was enough to abstain. UN Security Council Draft Resolution, supra note 129.
135 Teubner and Korth, supra note 40, at 37.
136 Remarks at a Conference on the ICC in Cairo, 15 January 2009, cited in Nouwen and Werner, supra note 77, at 962.
137 See for example, Akande, D., ‘The International Court of Justice and the Security Council: Is There Room for Judicial Control of Decisions of the Political Organs of the United Nations?’, (1997) 46 ICLQ 309CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Cronin-Furman, K.R., ‘The International Court of Justice and the United Nations Security Council: Rethinking a Complicated Relationship’, (2006) 106 CLR 435Google Scholar.
138 Condorelli, L. and Villalpando, S., ‘Referral and Deferral by the Security Council’, in Cassese, A., Gaeta, P., Jones, J.R.W.D. (eds.), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary (2002) 627, at 646Google Scholar.
139 Krzan, supra note 103, at 480. He argues that the decision has to clearly show that the Security Council found a Chapter VII situation and is not just providing information under Art. 15 of the RS.
140 Thus, in the case of Libya, the non-extradition of two terrorism suspects (Lockerbie case) was enough to constitute a threat to international peace and security. UN Security Council, Security Council Resolution 731 (1992), 21 January 1992, UN Doc. S/RES/731 (1992); UN Security Council, Security Council Resolution 748 (1992), 31 March 1992, UN Doc. S/RES/749 (1992); UN Security Council, Security Council Resolution 883 (1993), 11 November 1993, UN Doc. S/RES/883 (1993).
141 Prosecutor v. Tadić, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, Case No. IT-94–1-AR72, A.Ch., 2 October 1995, para. 28.
143 Jain, supra note 96, at 253. Therefore, ultra vires decisions of the Security Council are considered neither binding, nor as superseding international treaties such as the Rome Statute in accordance with Art 103 of the Charter.
145 Stahn, supra note 96, at 90.
146 Ibid.
147 Condorelli and Villalpando, supra note 138, at 647; Jain, supra note 96, at 247; Stahn, supra note 96. On whether Art 16 can exclusively apply to a specific situation, see also, Deen-Racsmány, Z., ‘The ICC, Peacekeepers and Resolution 1422: Will the Court Defer to the Council?’, (2002) 49 NILR 353CrossRefGoogle Scholar; J. Pichon, Internationaler Strafgerichtshof und Sicherheitsrat der Vereinten Nationen. Zur Rolle des Sicherheitsrats bei der Verfolgung völkerrechtlicher Verbrechen durch den IStGH (2011), at 39 et seq.
148 Condorelli and Villalpando, supra note 138, at 647; Stahn, supra note 96; see also, Hoven, E., ‘Frieden versus Gerechtigkeit? Zur Aussetzung der Ermittlungen gegen Omar Hassan al-Bashir nach Art. 16 IStGH-Statut’, (2011) 6 ZIS 230Google Scholar, at 236. Hoven considers individualized deferrals legitimate.
151 For an adverse opinion, see Pichon, supra note 147, at 217 et seq.
152 ‘It is a general principle of law that judicial organs themselves can decide whether they are competent to exercise jurisdiction in a specific case. . . . In this context, the ICC would, in light of concerns expressed about the legality of the Resolution, have to examine whether it should consider Resolution 1422 as binding on itself.’ Deen-Racsmány, supra note 147, at 381–2.
153 Condorelli and Villalpando, supra note 138, at 641 et seq.
155 Condorelli and Villalpando, supra note 138, at 641; R. Frau, Das Verhältnis zwischen dem ständigen Internationalen Strafgerichtshof und dem Sicherheitsrat der Vereinten Nationen: Art. 13 lit. b) IStGH-Statut und der Darfur-Konflikt vor dem Gerichtshof (2010), at 282 et seq; for a denial of a reviewing power in relation to Security Council referrals, see for example, Deen-Racsmány, supra note 147, at 383; Pichon, supra note 147, at 335.
156 See, Peskin, supra note 81.
157 OTP Policy Paper on the Interests of Justice, 2007, available at www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/library/organs/otp/ICC-OTP-InterestsOfJustice.pdf (emphasis added).
158 Teubner and Korth, supra note 40, at 37.
159 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. USA), Judgment of 27 June 1986, [1986] ICJ Rep. 14. Nicaragua brought the case after the US had vetoed a Security Council resolution.
160 Gray, C., ‘The Use and Abuse of the International Court of Justice: Cases concerning the Use of Force after Nicaragua’, (2003) 14 EJIL 867CrossRefGoogle Scholar. She discusses the arguments advanced in depth.
161 See supra note 137.
162 Case Concerning Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United Kingdom), Judgment of 27 February 1998, [1998] ICJ Rep. 115; Case Concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia-Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro) Judgment of 26 February 2007, [2007] ICJ Rep. 43. In these cases, the ICJ would have been able to incidentally examine the legality of Security Council resolutions but avoided this in both instances; see, Martenczuk, B., ‘The Security Council, the International Court and Judicial Review: What Lessons from Lockerbie?’, (1999) 10 EJIL 517CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
164 All declarations are available at www.icj-cij.org/jurisdiction/.
165 US Department of State, Letter and Statement Concerning Termination of Acceptance of the Compulsory Jurisdiction, 7 October 1985, (1985) 24 ILM 1742.
166 Krzan, supra note 103, at 475.
167 UN General Assembly, Resolution for Uniting for Peace, 3 November 1950, UN Doc. A/RES/377. This power is now also recognized where the Security Council does act; see also, Certain Expenses of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion of 20 July 1962, [1962] ICJ Rep. 151.
168 The German Federal Constitutional Court, for instance, leaves the protection of fundamental rights up to the Court of Justice of the European Union in its area of competence, as long as a comparable standard of protection is generally observed within the EU. BVerfGE 73, 339. It also takes into consideration the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, which itself relies on the CJEU, bound as it is by primary law to the observation of the ECHR. BVerfGE 111, 307.
169 Viellechner, supra note 39.
170 Tomuschat, supra note 27, describes further practice examples.
