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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 19 September 2024
1 E. Pobjie, Prohibited Force: The Meaning of ‘Use of Force’ in International Law (2024), 60.
2 The author states that several scholars believe that only a narrow core of the prohibition is jus cogens, that some authors believe that only Article 2(4) is, and that others believe that the entire jus contra bellum is a jus cogens principle. Ibid., at 72.
3 Ibid., at 58.
4 Ibid., at 85.
5 Ibid., at 111.
6 H. Lauterpacht, Private Law Analogies in International Law (1926), PhD thesis, The London School of Economics and Political Science, 70–7.
7 One example can be the Cuba case, where the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion (unlawful) turned into a 60-year-long economic embargo (lawful).
8 See Pobjie, supra note 1, at 186. Specifically, the author uses some case examples to prove the difficulty in determining the use of force within the maritime framework. For example, she uses the case of Fisheries Jurisdiction to determine the competing legal framework between the boundaries of the Charter and its conflict with the Convention on Future Multilateral Co-Operation in the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries.