23 April 2024: We are investigating problems with ecommerce on Cambridge Core. We apologise for any inconvenience and hope to have full functionality restored shortly.
We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 March 2021
The Paris Agreement (2015) and the Rulebook (2018) introduce the terms ‘fair’ and ‘climate justice’ for burden-sharing and differentiation. The article analyses to what extent these terms amend the existing term ‘equity’ and the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR).
The principle of CBDR is an open balancing concept with one clear requirement: Contracting parties contribute to climate protection to a different extent. The terms which appear to have normative weight (‘equity’ and ‘climate justice’), in international climate agreements, are limited to their procedural relevance. They aim at an equal participation in sub-institutions of the Paris Agreement or at making arguments for differentiation transparent. The term ‘fair’ focuses on the discourse on individual concepts of differentiation and on narrowing down common criteria in the long-run.
Considering the operationalization of differentiation beyond the terms, it becomes clear that criteria are hardly specified, not weighted against each other and that self-differentiation dominates pre-defined criteria, in particular within the central rules on mitigation and financial transfers. However, the Paris Agreement still specifies criteria with different relevance: Capabilities are followed by vulnerability and the responsibility for emissions.
After all, the prevailing procedural terms and rules of differentiation might give orientation, inspire subsequent decisions and the nationally determined contributions (NDCs). The more transparent the various specifications of differentiation are, the more the rules of differentiation can be narrowed. If the reference of criteria to individual states is possible, the Paris Agreement might be implemented effectively which allows for better compliance with the Agreement.
An earlier version of this article was presented at an InFairCom workshop at the ZEW Mannheim. We thank all participants for the motivating and constructive discussions. Moreover, we would like to thank Joëlle Chassard, Prof. em. Dr. iur. Ludwig Gramlich, Ass. iur. Markus Gentzsch, Nicole Hoppe, Donia Mahabadi, Kostyantyn Vdovenko, and two anonymous referees for helpful comments on previous drafts of that article. All remaining errors are ours.
This article was written in the context of the InFairCom project in the funding line ‘Economics of Climate Change’ funded by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research (grant no. 01LA1825C).
1 In international climate law, a deviation from the sovereign equality of states has become the rule. C. Voigt and F. Ferreira, ‘Differentiation in the Paris Agreement’, (2016) 6 Climate Law 58, at 59; C. D. Stone, ‘Common but Differentiated Responsibilities in International Law’, (2004) 98 AJIL 276, at 281; S. Maljean-Dubois, ‘The Paris Agreement: A New Step in the Gradual Evolution of Differential Treatment in the Climate Regime?’, (2016) 25 Review of European, Comparative and International Environmental Law 151, at 151–2, 159. On differentiation in other fields of international law see Stone, ibid., at 278.
2 D. Bodansky, J. Brunnée and L. Rajamani, International Climate Change Law (2017), at 27.
3 T. Honkonen, ‘CBDR and Climate Change’, in M. Faure (ed.) Elgar Encyclopedia of Environmental Law (2016), 142, at 142. Criticizing the strategic combination of fairness and effectiveness of climate measures, E. A. Posner and D. Weisbach, Climate Change Justice (2010), at 5, 192. Against this criticism M. Prost and A. T. Camprubí, ‘Against Fairness?: International Environmental Law, Disciplinary Bias, and Pareto Justice’, (2012) 25 LJIL 379, at 389–91.
4 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1771 UNTS 107 (‘UNFCCC’).
5 1997 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 2303 UNTS 162 (‘Kyoto Protocol’).
6 The Paris Agreement always uses the qualifier ‘respective capabilities’. As Art. 4(1) UNFCCC does not use this qualifier, we use the shorter term with the acronym CBDR. See L. Rajamani, ‘The Papal Encyclical & The Role of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities in the International Climate Change Negotiations’, (2015) 109 AJIL Unbound 142; and see Bodansky et al., supra note 2, at 221.
7 Paris Agreement, Dec. 1/CP.21 Annex, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1 (2016) (‘Paris Agreement’).
8 Report of the Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement on the third part of its First Session, Held in Katowice from 2–15 December 2018, UN Doc. FCCC/PA/CMA/2018/3/Add.1 (2019), UN Doc. FCCC/PA/CMA/2018/3/Add.2 (2019); Report of the Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement on its Second Session, Held in Madrid from 2–15 December 2019, UN Doc. FCCC/PA/CMA/2019/6/Add.1 (2020). Decisions specifying the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol were also considered as ‘rulebook’. UNFCCC, ‘A Guide to the Climate Change Convention Process’, available at unfccc.int/resource/process/guideprocess-p.pdf, at 6–7, 11.
9 V. Tørstad and H. Sælen, ‘Fairness in the Climate Negotiations: What Explains Variation in Parties’ Expressed Conceptions?’, (2017) 18 Climate Policy 642, at 643; L. Rajamani and E. Guérin, ‘Central Concepts in the Paris Agreement and How they Evolved’, in D. Klein et al. (eds.), The Paris Agreement on Climate Change: Analysis and Commentary (2017), 74, at 87; see Voigt and Ferreira, supra note 1, at 60; J. Huang, ‘Climate Justice: Climate Justice and the Paris Agreement’, (2017) 9(1) Journal of Animal & Environmental Law 23, at 25, 27; F. Soltau, Fairness in International Climate Change Law and Policy (2009), at 7, 133, 177, 187, 224.
10 L. Rajamani, ‘Ambition and differentiation in the 2015 Paris Agreement: Interpretative possibilities and underlying politics’, (2016) 65 ICLQ 493; see Voigt and Ferreira, supra note 1; Huang, ibid., at 9.
11 E.g., A. Gajevic Sayegh, ‘Climate Justice after Paris: A Normative Framework’, (2018) 13 Journal of Global Ethics 344; S. P. Murphy, ‘Global Political Process and the Paris Agreement: A Case of Advancement or Retreat of Climate Justice?’, in T. Jafry, M. Mikulewicz and K. Helwig (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Climate Justice (2019), at 80–2; Z. Mi et al. ‘Assessment of Equity Principles for International Climate Policy Based on an Integrated Assessment Model’, (2019) 95(1-2) Natural Hazards 309.
12 C. P. Carlarne and J. D. Colavecchio, ‘Balancing Equity and Effectiveness: The Paris Agreement & The Future of International Climate Change Law’, (2019) 27 New York University Environmental Law Journal 107.
13 On the importance of implicit criteria without references to the terms of differentiation see Stone, supra note 1, at 277.
14 ‘CMA’ stands for ‘Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement’.
15 Precision is decisive for the bindingness of obligations. L. Rajamani, ‘The 2015 Paris Agreement: Interplay Between Hard, Soft and Non-Obligations’, (2016) 28 Journal of Environmental Law 337, at 343. Evaluating compliance based on own normative benchmarks but without evidence in the legal text see Climate Analytics and New Climate Institute, ‘Climate Action Tracker (CAT): Comparability of Effort’, available at climateactiontracker.org/methodology/comparability-of-effort; Y. R. Du Pont et al. ‘Paris Equity Check: How Fair Are Countries’ Climate Pledges?’, available at paris-equity-check.org/multi-equity-map.html.
16 See Carlarne and Colavecchio, supra note 12, at 141.
17 Cf. supra note 11.
18 D. Schlosberg, ‘Climate Justice and Capabilities: A Framework for Adaptation Policy’, (2012) 26 Ethics & International Affairs 445.
19 L. Rajamani and D. Bodansky, ‘The Paris Rulebook: Balancing International Prescriptiveness with National Discretion’, (2019) 68 ICLQ 1.
20 Paris Agreement, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 5th, 12th preambular recital, Arts. 1, 2(1), 4(14), (16), 5(1), (2), 7(7)(b), 9(1), (8), (9), 10(3), (5), 11(2), (5), 13(3), 13(4), (5), (13), 16(1), 16(2), (3), (5), (8), 17, 18, 19(1), 20(1), 21(1), (2), 22, 23(1), 24, 28(3).
21 Adoption of the Paris Agreement, Dec. 1/CP.21, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1 (2016) (Dec. 1/CP.21), 11th preambular recital, paras. 60, 61, 80, 106(a), 107, 108.
22 These are subsequent agreements. See 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1155 UNTS 331 (VCLT), Art. 31(3)(a); see also Rajamani, supra note 10, at 500, footnote 52.
23 UNFCCC, Art. 7; Kyoto Protocol, Art. 13(1); Paris Agreement, Art. 16(1).
24 See Carlarne and Colavecchio, supra note 12, at 116.
25 Considering Arts. 31 and 32 to be customary law, see Report of the International Law Commission, Seventieth Session (30 April–1 June and 2 July–10 August 2018), UN Doc. A/73/10 (2018), 13. Considering them as emerging customary law, M. E. Villiger, Commentary on the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (2009), at 439–40, paras. 37–8.
26 Terms appearing several times in one paragraph are counted only once.
27 Preambles are part of the treaty (VCLT, Art. 31(2)). They include its aims, recognized ‘facts, principles, or ideas’. See Carlarne and Colavecchio, supra note 12, at 120; M. M. Mbengue, ‘The Notion of Preamble’, in R. Wolfrum (ed.), The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (2008). Preambles can be taken up in other rules. However, if preambles are vague, their binding effect is limited. Defining preambles as unbinding, M. P. Carazo, ‘Contextual Provisions (Preamble and Article 1)’, in D. Klein et al. (eds.), The Paris Agreement on Climate Change: Analysis and Commentary (2017), 107, at 107.
28 See Rajamani, supra note 6, at 143; Bodansky et al. supra note 2, at 27.
29 M. G. den Elzen and P. L. Lucas, ‘The FAIR model: A Tool to Analyse Environmental and Costs Implications of Regimes of Future Commitments’, (2005) 10 Environmental Modeling & Assessment 115, at 117, Table 1.
30 Referring to the right to development, Paris Agreement, 11th preambular recital and Dec. 1/CP.21, 7th preambular recital. See also Tørstad and Sælen, supra note 9, at 644–5; Stone, supra note 1, at 277. Outside the context of climate agreements, see Declaration on the Right to Development, UN Doc. A/RES/41/128 (1986).
31 References to sovereign equality speak against differentiation. See UNFCCC, 8th and 9th preambular recital, Art. 18; Kyoto Protocol, Art. 22; Paris Agreement, Art. 25; Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol Pursuant to its Article 3, Paragraph 9 (the Doha Amendment), Dec. 1/CMP.8, UN Doc. FCCC/KP/CMP/2012/13/Add.1 (2013) (‘Doha Amendment’), footnote 12; Paris Agreement, Art. 13(3).
32 The term ‘capabilities’ is used in the principle of CBDR (supra note 6), in UNFCCC, Art. 7(2)(b), (c); Kyoto Protocol, Art. 13(4)(c), (d); Doha Amendment, footnotes 7, 9, 11; Paris Agreement, Arts. 13(12), 15(2).
33 ‘Vulnerability’ is used in UNFCCC, 19th preambular recital, Arts. 3(2), 4(4), (10); Kyoto Protocol, Arts. 12(8), 12ter; Paris Agreement, 5th, 9th, 11th preambular recital, Arts. 6(6), 7(1), (2), (5), (6) (9)(c), 9(4), 11(1). Discussing vulnerability as a criterion of differentiation, Carlarne and Colavecchio, supra note 12, at 114, 132–4, 144, 159, 161–2.
34 See Posner and Weisbach, supra note 3, at 125–6.
35 In this article, the term ‘emissions’ is used for greenhouse gas emissions.
36 On the principle of CBDR, see Paris Agreement, 3rd preambular recital, Arts. 2(2), 4(3), 4(19); Matters relating to the implementation of the Paris Agreement, Dec. 3/CMA.1, UN Doc. FCCC/PA/CMA/2018/3/Add.1 (2019) (‘Dec. 3/CMA.1’), 3rd preambular recital. Referring to historical and current responsibility, UNFCCC, 3rd preambular recital. Referring to all three time dimensions, Carlarne and Colavecchio, supra note 12, at 117; Rajamani, supra note 6, at 145–6; Voigt and Ferreira, supra note 1, at 294; den Elzen and Lucas, supra note 29, at 117, Table 1; R. Dellink et al. ‘Sharing the Burden of Financing Adaptation to Climate Change’, (2009) 19 Global Environmental Change 411, at 411.
37 On this criterion see Schlosberg, supra note 18, at 449.
38 UNFCCC, Arts. 3(2), (2)(a), 4(1), 7(2)(b), (c); Kyoto Protocol, Arts. 2(1)(a), (4), 10(1), 13(4)(c), (d); Paris Agreement, 5th preambular recital, Arts. 4(4), 13(12).
39 UNFCCC, 18th preambular recital, Art. 4(1), (7); Kyoto Protocol, Art. 10(1); Paris Agreement, 10th preambular recital, Arts. 7(d), 9(3), 13(5).
40 UNFCCC, 3rd preambular recital.
41 World Bank, ‘World Bank Open Data, CO2 emissions (metric tons per capita) 2014’, available at api.worldbank.org/v2/en/indicator/EN.ATM.CO2E.PC?downloadformat=excel; World Bank, ‘World Bank Open Data, CO2 emissions (kt) 2014’, available at api.worldbank.org/v2/en/indicator/EN.ATM.CO2E.KT?downloadformat=excel.
42 D. H. Meadows et al., The Limits to Growth: The Club of Rome’s Project on the Predicament of Mankind (1972).
43 See also Carlarne and Colavecchio, supra note 12, at 114.
44 See Maljean-Dubois, supra note 1, at 151–2; Rajamani and Bodansky, supra note 19, at 5.
45 UNCCC, 6th preambular recital, Arts. 3(1), 4(1). Art. 7(2)(b), (c) refer to ‘differing circumstances, responsibilities and capabilities’. The principle of CBDR was first included in the Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Annex I, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, UN Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (Vol I) (1992) (‘Rio Declaration’), principle 7.
46 Kyoto Protocol, Art. 10(1). The Doha Amendment entered into force as from 31 December 2020. One hundred and forty-seven of the 192 parties of the Kyoto Protocol had ratified the Doha Amendment by then. Kyoto Protocol, Arts. 20(4), 21(7). The Doha Amendment refers to the principle of CBDR in footnotes 7, 9, 11.
47 Paris Agreement, 3rd preambular recital, Arts. 2(2), 4(3), 4(19).
48 Dec. 1/CP.21, para. 27; Dec. 3/CMA.1, 3rd preambular recital; Chile Madrid Time for Action, Dec. 1/CMA.2, UN Doc. FCCC/PA/CMA/2019/6/Add.1 (2020) (‘Dec. 1/CMA.2’), para. 6.
49 This is also expressed by the term ‘common concern of humankind’ in UNFCCC, 1st preambular recital and Paris Agreement, 11th preambular recital.
50 See Rajamani, supra note 6, at 143; Carlarne and Colavecchio, supra note 12, at 117.
51 See also supra note 36. Referring responsibility also to slavery or colonialism, C. C. Ngang, ‘Differentiated Responsibilities under International Law and the Right to Development Paradigm for Developing Countries’, (2017) 11 Human Rights & International Legal Discourse 270, at 273–4. Apart from the missing reference to climate change, it seems difficult to refer these historical developments to concrete criteria for differentiation.
52 P. Vetter, W. Schmid and R. Schwarze, ‘Spatio-Temporal Statistical Analysis of the Carbon Budget of the Terrestrial Ecosystem’, (2016) 25 Statistical Methods & Applications 143.
53 See also ibid.
54 See World Bank, supra note 41, ‘World Bank Open Data, CO2 emissions (kt) 2014’.
55 S. J. Davis and K. Caldeira, ‘Consumption-Based Accounting of CO2 Emissions’, (2010) 107 Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 5687.
56 IPCC Working Group II, Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability, Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2014), at 421.
57 IPCC Working Group I, Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis, Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2013), at 57.
58 Ibid., at 165, 288; see IPCC Working Group II, supra note 56, at 379, 382, 395.
59 P. Bou-Habib, ‘Climate Justice and Historical Responsibility’, (2019) 81 The Journal of Politics, at 1299.
60 Ibid., at 1307.
61 W. Nordhaus, ‘Projections and Uncertainties about Climate Change in an Era of Minimal Climate Policies’, (2018), 10(3) American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 333.
62 Future generations were not mentioned in the Kyoto Protocol, but the 11th preambular recital of the Paris Agreement refers to intergenerational equity. See also Section 2.2, infra.
63 See also supra notes 6, 47, 48.
64 UNFCCC, Art. 7(2)(b); Paris Agreement, 3rd and 5th preambular recital, Arts. 4(4), 4(6), 13(3), 13(12), 15(2).
65 Information to Facilitate Clarity, Transparency and Understanding of Nationally Determined Contributions, Referred to in Decision 1/CP.21, Paragraph 28, Dec. 4/CMA.1 Annex I, UN Doc. FCCC/PA/CMA/2018/3/Add.1 (2019) (‘Dec. 4/CMA.1 Annex I’), para. 4(a)(ii)(a.); Further Guidance in Relation to the Adaptation Communication, Including, inter alia, as a Component of Nationally Determined Contributions, referred to in Article 7, Paragraphs 10 and 11, of the Paris Agreement, Dec. 9/CMA.1, UN Doc. FCCC/PA/CMA/2018/3/Add.1 (2019) (‘Dec. 9/CMA.1’), 5th preambular recital; Setting a New Collective Quantified Goal on Finance in Accordance with Decision 1/CP.21, Paragraph 53, Dec. 14/CMA.1, UN Doc. FCCC/PA/CMA/2018/3/Add.2 (2019), para. 2.
66 Modalities, Procedures and Guidelines for the Transparency Framework for Action and Support Referred to in Article 13 of the Paris Agreement, Dec. 18/CMA.1 Annex, UN Doc. FCCC/PA/CMA/2018/3/Add.2 (2019) (‘Dec. 18/CMA.1 Annex’), para. 59.
67 See Prost and Camprubí, supra note 3, at 387–8.
68 A. C. Abeysinghe and G. Arias, ‘CBDR as a Principle of Inspiring Actions Rather than Justifying Inaction in the Global Climate Change Regime’, in O. C. Ruppel, C. Roschmann and K. Ruppel-Schlichting (eds.), Climate Change: International law and Global Governance, vol. II (2013), 235, at 238.
69 UNFCCC, Arts. 3(1), 4(2)(a) second sentence, 11(2). The Kyoto Protocol refers to the general principles of the UNFCCC in the 4th preambular recital.
70 Paris Agreement, 3rd, 8th, 11th preambular recital, Arts. 4(1), 14(1).
71 Dec. 1/CP.21, para. 103; Dec. 3/CMA.1, 3rd preambular recital; Dec. 4/CMA.1 Annex I, para. 6; Modalities, Work programme and Functions of the Forum under the Paris Agreement on the Impact of the Implementation of Response Measures, Dec. 7/CMA.1, UN Doc. FCCC/PA/CMA/2018/3/Add.1 (2019) (‘Dec. 7/CMA.1’), para. 4(f); Dec. 9/CMA.1, 5th preambular recital; Matters Relating to Article 14 of the Paris Agreement and Paragraphs 99–101 of Decision 1/CP.21, Dec. 19/CMA.1, UN Doc. FCCC/PA/CMA/2018/3/Add.2 (2019) (‘Dec. 19/CMA.1’), para. 10; Modalities and Procedures for the Effective Operation of the Committee Referred to in Article 15, Paragraph 2, of the Paris Agreement, Dec. 20/CMA.1 Annex, UN Doc. FCCC/PA/CMA/2018/3/Add.2 (2019) (‘Dec. 20/CMA.1 Annex’), paras. 5, 11; Dec. 1/CMA.2, 1st preambular recital; Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage Associated with Climate Change Impacts and its 2019 Review, Dec. 2/CMA.2, UN Doc. FCCC/PA/CMA/2019/6/Add.1 (2020) (‘Dec. 2/CMA.2’), 5th preambular recital, para. 40; Rules of Procedure of the Katowice Committee of Experts on the Impacts of the Implementation of Response Measures, Dec. 4/CMA.2 Annex I, UN Doc. FCCC/PA/CMA/2019/6/Add.1 (2020) (‘Dec. 4/CMA.2 Annex I’), para. 11; Workplan of the Forum on the Impact of the Implementation of Response Measures and its Katowice Committee of Experts on the Impacts of the Implementation of Response Measures, Dec. 4/CMA.2 Annex II, UN Doc. FCCC/PA/CMA/2019/6/Add.1 (2020), No. 9.
72 See also P. B. Gove, Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged (1986), at 815. Critically, M. White, ‘Equity – A General Principle of Law Recognised by Civilised Nations’, (2004), 4 Queensland University of Technology Law and Justice Journal 103, at 104, 111.
73 See White, supra note 72, at 104, 107.
74 M. Akehurst, ‘Equity and General Principles of law’, (1976) 25 ICLQ 801, at 809–10.
75 J. Pearsall and P. Hanks, The New Oxford English Dictionary of English (2001), at 623.
76 See Gove, supra note 72, at 769. Rightness is also emphasized by White, supra note 72, at 105–6.
77 T. M. Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions (1995), at 19.
78 J. Konow, ‘Which Is the Fairest One of All?: A Positive Analysis of Justice Theories’, (2003) 41 Journal of Economic Literature 1188, at 1194–5.
80 Paris Agreement, 8th preambular recital; Dec. 9/CMA.1, 5th preambular recital. The term ‘sustainable development’ is used in the 8th preambular recital, Arts. 2(1), 4(1), 6(1), (2), (4)(a), (8), (9), 7(1), 8(1), 10(5) of the Paris Agreement, in paras. 55, 109 of Dec. 1/CP.21.
81 UNFCCC, Art. 11(2); Dec. 1/CP.21, para. 103; Dec. 7/CMA.1, para. 4(f), (g); Dec. 20/CMA.1 Annex, paras. 5, 11; Dec. 2/CMA.2, para. 40; Dec. 4/CMA.2 Annex I, para. 11.
82 Paris Agreement, Art. 14(1); Dec. 19/CMA.1, para. 10.
83 UNFCCC, Art. 3(1). The 11th and 23rd preambular recital of the UNFCCC refer to different UNGA resolutions dealing with present and future generations.
84 Paris Agreement, 11th preambular recital.
85 See also the frequent mention of the term ‘sustainable development’. See supra note 80. On intergenerational equity and sustainable development, E. Brown Weiss, ‘Implementing Intergenerational Equity’, in M. Fitzmaurice, D. M. Ong and P. Merkouris (eds.), Research Handbook on International Environmental Law (2010), 100, at 114; B. Lewis, ‘The Rights of Future Generations within the Post-Paris Climate Regime’, (2018) 7 TEL 69, at 76.
86 See Carazo, supra note 27, at 117; Brown Weiss, ibid., at 85, at 110–13.
87 The discount rate lowers the relevance of future utility compared to current utility based on the assumption of progress. See, for example, Nordhaus, supra note 61, at 336, 340, 342, 347, 349–55. Critically, H. Kim, ‘An Extension of Rawls’s Theory of Justice for Climate Change’, (2019) 11 International Theory 160, at 162; Dellink et al., supra note 36, at 415.
88 E. Brown Weiss, ‘Intergenerational Equity: A Legal Framework for Global Environmental Change’, in E. Brown Weiss (ed.), Environmental Change and International law: New Challenges and Dimensions (1992), 385, at 393–5.
90 The discount rate lowers the relevance of future utility compared to current utility based on the assumption of progress. See, for example, Nordhaus, supra note 61, at 336, 340, 342, 347, 349–55. Critically Kim, supra note 87, at 162; Dellink et al., supra note 36, at 415.
91 See also Brown Weiss, supra note 88, at 395.
92 See Brown Weiss, ibid.
93 Ibid., at 401–5; see Brown Weiss, supra note 85, at 102–3, 113.
94 E. Brown Weiss, ‘Climate Change, Intergenerational Equity and International Law: An Introductory Note’, Reprint: ‘In Fairness to Future Generations International Law, Common Patrimony, and Intergenerational Equity’, (1989/2008) 15(1-2) Vermont Journal of Environmental Law 615, at 625.
95 See also Lewis, supra note 85, at 76.
96 See supra note 80.
97 On the human rights perspective of intergenerational equity, see Huang, supra note 9, at 48–9. Critically, Lewis, supra note 85, at 76–8.
98 Draft Report of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Framework Convention on Climate Change on the Work of its Second Session, Held at Geneva from 19 to 28 June 1991, UN Doc. A/AC.237/L.7 (1991), para. 30(a).
99 Compilation of Possible Elements for a Framework Convention on Climate Change, UN Doc. A/AC.237/Misc.2/Rev.1 (1991), at 23–7.
100 UNFCCC, Art. 3(1) and the Annexes; Kyoto Protocol, Annex B; Paris Agreement, 16th preambular recital, Arts. 2(2), 4(4), 9(3); Further Guidance in Relation to the Mitigation Section of Decision 1/CP.21, Dec. 4/CMA.1, UN Doc. FCCC/PA/CMA/2018/3/Add.1 (2019) (‘Dec. 4/CMA.1’), para. 5. On the leadership role see Bodansky et al., supra note 2, at 28; Maljean-Dubois, supra note 1, at 156–7; Voigt and Ferreira, supra note 1, at 61, 65, 67.
101 Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, UN Doc. A/Res/70/1 (2015) (‘SDGs’). Referring to the SDGs, Dec. 1/CP.21, 4th preambular recital; Preparations for the Implementation of the Paris Agreement and the First Session of the Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement, Dec. 1/CP.24, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2018/10/Add.1 (2019), para. 10; Report of the Adaptation Committee, Dec. 9/CP.24, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2018/10/Add.1 (2019) (‘Dec. 9/CP.24’), paras. 6, 14, 14(b); Report of the Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage Associated with Climate Change Impacts, Dec. 10/CP.24, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2018/10/Add.1 (2019), para. 5(c). Although being non-binding recommendations (Arts. 10, 11 of the UN Charter), resolutions of the UNGA can clarify the terms of differentiation as far as climate agreements refer to them.
102 See also F. Sindico, ‘Paris, Climate Change, and Sustainable Development’, (2016) 6 Climate Law 130.
103 Addis Ababa Action Agenda of the Third International Conference on Financing for Development, UN Doc. A/RES/69/313 (2015) (‘Addis Ababa Action Agenda’). Reference to this resolution is made in Dec. 1/CP.21, 4th preambular recital.
104 Dec. 9/CP.24, para. 14(b).
105 SDGs, Goals 4, 4(1), 6(1), 9(1), paras. 7, 25.
106 Ibid., Goal 17(10), para. 68.
107 Ibid., Goals 2(5), 15(6).
108 Ibid., para. 8.
109 Ibid., Goals 2(5), 4, 6, 9(1), 15(6), 17(1), paras. 7, 8, 25, 68.
110 Addis Ababa Action Agenda, paras. 6, 7, 10, 29, 78, 79, 105.
111 SDGs, 6th preambular recital, paras. 18, 53; Addis Ababa Action Agenda, para. 64. Using ‘intergenerational equity’, Addis Ababa Action Agenda, paras. 7, 10.
112 In other fields of international law, equity can aim at defining the proportionate share of a resource. See, for example, Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia), Merits, Judgment of 25 September 1997, [1997] ICJ Rep. 7, at 56, para. 85.
113 The term ‘just’ also refers to structural changes in work life. See Paris Agreement, 10th preambular recital; Modalities, Work Programme and Functions under the Paris Agreement of the Forum on the Impact of the Implementation of Response Measures, Dec. 7/CMA.1 Annex, UN Doc. FCCC/PA/CMA/2018/3/Add.1 (2019), para. 2(b).
114 See Gove, supra note 72, at 1228.
115 See Pearsall and Hanks, supra note 75, at 993.
116 Ibid., at 992. See also Adam Smith’s reference to ‘right and wrong’: A. Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759), at 502.
117 See also Carlarne and Colavecchio, supra note 12, at 124–5.
118 C. R. Beitz, ‘International Liberalism and Distributive Justice: A Survey of Recent Thought’, (1999) 51 World Politics 269, at 270.
119 Emphases added.
120 See also supra note 27.
121 J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971). Rawls is aware of the role also of single actions for justice but considers institutions and rules to be the most relevant issue. Ibid., at 7, 9.
122 A. K. Sen, The Idea of Justice (2009), at 10, 15, 398–400.
123 See, for example, Konow, supra note 78, at 1195–9; Beitz, supra note 118, at 271–80, 283, 288, 292–5; J. E. Vinuales, ‘Balancing Effectiveness and Fairness in the Redesign of the Climate Change Regime’, (2011) 24 LJIL 223, at 232, 235.
124 See Kim, supra note 87.
125 See Rawls, supra note 121, at 4, 10, 11, 112–13.
126 J. Rawls, ‘Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical’, (1985) Philosophy & Public Affairs 223, at 235.
127 See Rawls, supra note 121, at 7, 35; Rawls, supra note 126, at 235–7, 244, 342–3.
128 See Rawls, supra note 121, at 17, 35, 37–8, 112–13.
129 Ibid., at 17, 29; Rawls, supra note 126, at 227.
130 See Rawls, supra note 121, at 238, 343.
131 The limited scope and non-universality of Rawls ‘Theory of Justice’ concentrating on closed societies is partly misunderstood or ignored. See T. W. Pogge, ‘Moral Universalism and Global Economic Justice’, (2002) 1 Politics, Philosophy & Economics 29, at 42; Franck, supra note 77, at 13–14, 23; Sen, supra note 122, at 90, 143.
132 J. Rawls, ‘The Law of Peoples’, (1993) 20 Critical Inquiry 36.
133 See Rawls, supra note 132, at 46–7, 52.
134 Ibid., at 62; see also Beitz, supra note 118, at 276; Pogge, supra note 131, at 42.
135 See Rawls, supra note 132, at 62.
136 Ibid., at 47. Criticizing Rawls’ support requirement for being vague and suggesting that societies ‘must do what they can to assist’, Beitz, supra note 118, at 275.
137 See Rawls, supra note 132, at 47.
138 Ibid., at 37, 44–5.
139 Ibid., at 39, 63.
140 See, for example, Beitz, supra note 118; Pogge, supra note 131.
141 See Beitz, supra note 118, at 277.
142 See Sen, supra note 122, at 143, 172, 243, 251–3, 373. On collective identities, see Smith, supra note 116, at 188.
143 See Beitz, supra note 118, at 279.
144 See Sen, supra note 122, at 106–13. Applying Sen’s theory to climate issues, Schlosberg, supra note 18, at 452–6; S. Fesmire, ‘Pragmatist Ethics and Climate Change’, in D. E. Miller and B. Eggleston (eds.), Moral Theory and Climate Change: Ethical Perspectives on a Warming Planet (2020), 215.
145 See Sen, supra note 122, at 259, 266–7.
146 Ibid., at 383, 392.
147 See Smith, supra note 116, at 183, 309, 502, 527.
148 Sen, supra note 122, at 19, 44–5, 70, 117, 122–3, 128, 136–7, 305–9, 324, 402, 404 (footnote), 405; A. Sen, ‘Reason and Justice: The Optimal and the Maximal’, (2017) 92 Philosophy 5, at 18. See also Schlosberg, supra note 18, at 450–2.
149 See Sen, supra note 122, at 140, 157, 161.
150 ‘Capabilities’ include the freedom to do things a person has a reason to value and the actual opportunities of living. Sen, supra note 122, at 231–3.
151 Ibid., at 228–31, 235–8, 249, 265, 287, 310–14.
152 Ibid., at 226, 234, 253f.
153 Ibid., at 226–7, 234, 253.
154 Ibid., at 206–7, 271.
155 For example, a person with disabilities needs more resources than healthy persons. Hence, income is not the only indicator for capabilities. This logic can be transferred to all disadvantaged members of societies. See Sen, supra note 122, at 255–8, 262. These arguments become particularly relevant for adaptation. See Schlosberg, supra note 18, at 458. On people with disabilities, see also Paris Agreement, 11th preambular recital; Dec. 1/CP.21, 7th preambular recital.
156 See Sen, supra note 122, at 295, 298.
157 Ibid., at 239–41, 272–90, 298, 395; see also Smith, supra note 116, at 452.
158 Ibid., at 11–16, 57, 65–6, 90, 201, 105, 243, 251, 394–6, 397 (footnote).
159 Ibid., at 398–400; see also Sen, supra note 148, at 5, 17–18.
160 See Sen, supra note 122, at 57, 68, 70, 77, 80–2, 90–1, 108. Criticizing the empirical relevance of the maximin rule, Konow, supra note 78, at 1196.
161 Referring to global warming, Sen, supra note 148, at 18.
162 See Sen, supra note 122, at 249; Section 3.1, infra.
163 Action Aid International et al., ‘The People’s Demands for Climate Justice’, available at peoplesdemands.org; see Carlarne and Colavecchio, supra note 12, at 123.
164 Draft Paris Outcome: Revised Draft Conclusions Proposed by the Co-Chairs, UN Doc. FCCC/ADP/2015/L.6 (2015) (‘Draft Paris Agreement’), Art. 3(1)(e), Art. 11 Option 2 and paras. 21, 112; Carlarne and Colavecchio, supra note 12, at 121–2.
165 Draft Paris Agreement, para. 21.
166 SDGs, 8th preambular recital, Goal 16, paras. 3, 8, 35.
167 Addis Ababa Action Agenda, para. 18.
168 See supra notes 166, 167.
169 See supra note 167.
170 SDGs, para. 8.
171 Ibid., para. 35.
172 Para. 14 of the Lima Call for Climate Action remained relevant after Lima. Lima Call for Climate Action, Dec. 1/CP.20, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2014/10/Add.1 (2015). The draft in the Annex of Dec. 1/CP.20 also contained further references to fairness in paras. 16(1) Option 2, 35(2)(k) 76 Option 2, Option a(a), (b), 76(5)(d), 85 Option 1(c).
173 Dec. 1/CP.21, para. 27; Long-term Climate Finance, Dec. 3/CP.24, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2018/10/Add.1 (2019), para. 11; Dec. 4/CMA.1, para. 9; Dec. 4/CMA.1 Annex I, para. 6; Dec. 2/CMA.2, para. 40.
174 See Sen, supra note 122, at 72 (footnote).
175 A. S. Hornby, Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary of Current English (2005), at 548.
176 See Pearsall and Hanks, supra note 75, at 659.
177 See Gove, supra note 72, at 815.
178 Ibid. Also referring to judgments and evaluations, Murphy, supra note 11, at 72–3.
179 See Pearsall and Hanks, supra note 75, at 659.
180 See Gove, supra note 72, at 815.
181 See White, supra note 72, at 103.
182 See Rawls, supra note 121, at 142–3, 343–5; see also supra Section 2.3. Referring to Rawls’ but also including distributional aspects, Franck, supra note 77, at 7, 10–15, 23–5, 47; Soltau, supra note 9, at 7, 133, 177–227.
183 See Sen, supra note 122, at 9, 54, 62–3, 293–5.
184 See Konow, supra note 78, at 1189–92, 1202.
185 See Franck, supra note 77.
186 Ibid., at 7, 25, 47.
187 Ibid., at 13f., 23.
188 Ibid., at 10–15, 23.
189 J. Dator, ‘What Is Fairness?’, in J. Dator, D. Pratt and Y. Seo (eds.), Fairness, Globalization, and Public Institutions: East Asia and Beyond (2006), 19, at 27–8. See also supra note 62.
190 Emphases added.
191 Dec. 4/CMA.1, para. 7.
192 Dec. 1/CP.21, para. 27; Dec. 4/CMA.1, para. 9 (emphases added).
193 See supra note 34.
194 See also supra note 33.
195 See supra Section 2.1.
196 Framework for Meaningful and Effective Actions to Enhance the Implementation of Article 4, Paragraph 5, of the Convention, Dec. 4/CP.7 Annex, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.1 (2002), paras. 12, 14.
197 The Cancun Agreements: Outcome of the Work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention, Dec. 1/CP.16, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1 (2011) (‘Dec. 1/CP.16’), para. 80(a). In this decision, the term ‘equitable’ was also used in the same context.
198 Rules of Procedure of the Advisory Board of the Climate Technology Centre and Network, Dec. 25/CP.19 Annex II, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2013/10/Add.3 (2014), para. 3.
199 Work Programme on Results-based Finance to Progress the Full Implementation of the Activities Referred to in Decision 1/CP.16, Paragraph 70, Dec. 9/CP.19, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2013/10/Add.1 (2014), para. 5.
200 Elements for a Draft Negotiating Text, Dec. 1/CP.20 Annex, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2014/10/Add.1 (2015), para. 16(1) Option 2.
201 B. Antonich et al., ‘Summary of the Lima Climate Change Conference 1-14 December 2014’, (2014) 12(619) Earth Negotiations Bulletin, available at enb.iisd.org/download/pdf/enb12619e.pdf, at 28, 31, 34; B. Antonich et al., ‘Lima Highlights: Friday, 5 December 2014’, (2014) 12(613) Earth Negotiations Bulletin, available at enb.iisd.org/download/pdf/enb12613e.pdf, at 4.
202 See Dec. 4/CMA.1 Annex I, para. 6; Dec. 2/CMA.2, para. 40.
203 SDGs, Goals 2(5), 15(6).
204 Addis Ababa Action Agenda, paras. 18, 22, 26, 36, 28, 98, 99, 101.
205 The authentic language versions are defined in UNFCCC, Art. 26; Kyoto Protocol, Art. 28; Paris Agreement, Art. 29.
206 We thank Donia Mahabadi for the translation of the Arabic version.
207 We thank Nicole Hoppe and Kostyantyn Vdovenko for the translation of the Russian version.
208 This point was made clear by John Rawls in discourse with Amartya Sen. See Sen, supra note 122, at 72–3.
209 VCLT, Art. 33(3).
210 See Villiger, supra note 25, at 459, para. 10.
211 VCLT, Art. 33(4).
212 See supra note 13.
213 Paris Agreement, Arts. 13(12), 15(2).
214 On the leadership role, Paris Agreement, Arts. 4(4), 9(3); see also supra note 100.
215 UNFCCC, 3rd, 10th, 20th, 21st, 22nd preambular recital, Art. 3(2), Annex I.
216 See Bodansky et al., supra note 2, at 222; Rajamani and Guérin, supra note 9, at 88; Tørstad and Sælen, supra note 9, at 650–1; Rajamani, supra note 10, at 494, 506, 513.
217 Paris Agreement, Art. 2(1).
218 See Voigt and Ferreira, supra note 1, at 65–7.
219 ‘Developed countries’ are mentioned in Paris Agreement, 16th preambular recital, Arts. 4(4), 9(1), (3)(5), (6), (7), 13(9). ‘Developing countries’ are used in Paris Agreement, 5th preambular recital, Arts. 4, 4(1), (4), (5), (6), (15), 5(2), 6(6), 7(2), (3), (6), (7)(d), (10), (13), (14)(a), 9(1)(3), (4), (5), (7), (9), 10(5), (6), 11(1), (2), (3), (4), 13(2), (3), (9), (10), (11), (12), (13), (14), (15).
220 See Rajamani and Guérin, supra note 9, at 88.
221 Paris Agreement, Art. 9(2), (5), 13(9), Art. 9(7).
222 See Maljean-Dubois, supra note 1, at 156; cf. Rajamani and Guérin, supra note 9, at 86.
223 Paris Agreement, Art. 9(2), (5).
224 Ibid., Art. 13(9).
225 Ibid., Art. 9(7).
226 See also supra note 214.
227 UNFCCC, Arts. 3(5), 4(3), (4), (5), (7), (8), (9), 5(b), (c), 6(b)(ii), 8(2)(c), 9(2)(d), 11(5), 12(4), (7), Annex II.
228 Paris Agreement, Arts. 3, 4(5), 7(13).
229 Ibid., Art. 9(3).
230 Modalities, Procedures and Guidelines for the Transparency Framework for Action and Support Referred to in Article 13 of the Paris Agreement, Dec. 18/CMA.1, UN Doc. FCCC/PA/CMA/2018/3/Add.2 (2019), 4th preambular recital; see Dec. 18/CMA.1 Annex, paras. 3, 5, 10(d), (e), 118.
231 See Dec. 18/CMA.1 Annex, para. 29.
232 UNFCCC, Art. 12(5); Paris Agreement, Arts. 4(6), 13(3); Dec. 18/CMA.1 Annex, para. 3(a), 11.
233 See Dec. 18/CMA.1 Annex, para. 143.
234 Paris Agreement, Art. 4(5).
235 Ibid., Art. 7(13).
236 See also ibid., Art. 3.
237 See also H. Winkler, ‘Mitigation (Article 4)’, in D. Klein et al. (eds.), The Paris Agreement on Climate Change: Analysis and Commentary (2017), 141, at 152.
238 See supra Section 2.1.
239 See supra note 38.
240 See supra note 39.
241 Paris Agreement, 10th preambular recital.
242 UNFCCC, 8th and 9th preambular recital, Art. 12(5); Doha Amendment, footnote 12; Paris Agreement, Arts. 13(3), 14(3); Dec. 1/CP.21, para. 91; Modalities and Procedures for the Operation and use of a Public Registry Referred to in Article 4, Paragraph 12, of the Paris Agreement, Dec. 5/CMA.1 Annex, UN Doc. FCCC/PA/CMA/2018/3/Add.1 (2019), para. 1(b); Dec. 9/CMA.1, para. 2(a); Modalities and Procedures for the Operation and use of a Public Registry Referred to in Article 7, Paragraph 12, of the Paris Agreement, Dec. 10/CMA.1 Annex, UN Doc. FCCC/PA/CMA/2018/3/Add.1 (2019), para. 1(d); Matters Referred to in Paragraphs 41, 42 and 45 of Decision 1/CP.21, Dec. 11/CMA.1, UN Doc. FCCC/PA/CMA/2018/3/Add.1 (2019), paras. 3, 10; Dec. 18/CMA.1 Annex, paras. B(3)(a), 148(VII)(A), 22, 150(c), 192; Dec. 20/CMA.1 Annex, para. I(4); Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples Platform, Dec. 2/CP.24, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2018/10/Add.1 (2019), 5th preambular recital; Dec. 19/CMA.1, paras. 3(c), 14.
243 Paris Agreement, Arts. 9(3), (4), 11(2); Types of Information to be Provided by Parties in Accordance with Article 9, Paragraph 5, of the Paris Agreement, Dec. 12/CMA.1 Annex, UN Doc. FCCC/PA/CMA/2018/3/Add.1 (2019) (‘Dec. 12/CMA.1 Annex’), paras. (j), (l); Technology Framework under Article 10, Paragraph 4, of the Paris Agreement, Dec. 15/CMA.1 Annex, UN Doc. FCCC/PA/CMA/2018/3/Add.2 (2019), para. 25(c); Dec. 18/CMA.1 Annex, para. 121(p). The discretion is emphasized only for LDCs and SIDS in Dec. 1/CP.21, para. 91; Dec. 18/CMA.1, para. 4; Dec. 18/CMA.1 Annex, para. 11; Dec. 1/CP.21, para. 65 emphasizes country-driven strategies of all contracting parties and reminds of support of developing countries.
244 Paris Agreement, Art. 7(1).
245 Ibid., 9th and 11th preambular recital, 7th preambular recital, Arts. 7(5), (9)(c); Dec. 1/CP.21.
246 UNFCCC, Art. 4(9); Paris Agreement, 6th preambular recital, Arts. 4(6), 9(9), 11(1).
247 Paris Agreement, Art. 7(9)(c).
248 Ibid., 6th preambular recital, Arts. 9(9), 11(1), 13(3). See also UNFCCC, Arts. 4(9), (6), 12(5).
249 Paris Agreement, Arts. 4(6), 9(4), (9), 11(1), 13(3).
250 Paris Agreement, 5th preambular recital, Arts. 6(6), 7(2), (6), 9(4), 11(1).
251 The Paris Agreement and the Paris Rulebook use LDCs and SIDS as examples for particularly vulnerable developing countries. See Paris Agreement, Art. 11(1); see Dec. 12/CMA.1 Annex, para. (j).
252 UN Committee for Development Policy, Handbook on the Least Developed Country Category: Inclusion, Graduation and Special Support Measures (2018), available at www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/wp-content/uploads/sites/45/2018CDPhandbook.pdf, at 13, Box I.4.
253 United Nations, Committee for Development Policy, ‘List of Least Developed Countries (as of December 2018)’, available at www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/wp-content/uploads/sites/45/publication/ldc_list.pdf.
254 United Nations, ‘Sustainable Development Goals, Knowledge Platform’, availble at sustainabledevelopment.un.org/topics/sids/list.
255 UNCTAD, ‘UNCTAD’s Unofficial List of SIDS’, unctad.org/en/pages/aldc/Small%20Island%20Developing%20States/UNCTAD%C2%B4s-unofficial-list-of-SIDS.aspx.
256 See supra note 101.
257 L. Rajamani, Differential Treatment in International Environmental Law (2006), at 165.
258 Paris Agreement, Art. 4(6).
260 Paris Agreement, Art. 9(4), (9).
261 Ibid., Art. 13(3).
262 Ibid., Art. 11(1).
263 Cf. supra Section 2.1.
264 Ibid.
265 Paris Agreement, Arts. 4(13), (14), 13(7)(a); Dec. 1/CP.21, paras. 31(a), (c), (d), 37.
266 Paris Agreement, Art. 4(6).
267 Kyoto Protocol, Arts. 6, 12, 17.
268 The Paris Agreement has formulated the framework for a new flexible mechanism in Art. 6 Paris Agreement but it is not yet established. E. Davies, ‘Recommendations for an International Carbon Currency Market under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement’, (2018) 12 CCLR 132.
269 Paris Agreement, Art. 6(2), (5); Dec. 1/CP.21, paras. 93(d), (f), 108.
270 Paris Agreement, Arts. 7(7), 9(1).
271 Ibid., Art. 8.
272 Dec. 1/CP.21, paras. 42, 45, 46, 50, 127, 131.
273 Contracting parties ‘shall set a new collective quantified goal from a floor of USD 100 billion per year’ by 2020. Dec. 1/CP.16, para. 98; Dec. 1/CP.21, paras. 54, 115; Chile Madrid Time for Action, Dec. 1/CP.25, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2019/13/Add.1 (2020), para. 11. Criticizing this sum for not being part of the differentiation, Rajamani and Guérin, supra note 9, at 89.
274 UNFCCC, 3rd preambular recital.
276 The Brazilian president Bolsonaro: ‘We preserve more [rainforest] than anyone. No country in the world has the moral right to talk about the Amazon. You destroyed your own ecosystems.’ See Z. Sullivan, ‘The Real Reason the Amazon Is on Fire’, Time, 26 August 2019, available at time.com/5661162/why-the-amazon-is-on-fire.
277 Kyoto Protocol, Art. 3(3), (4); Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Seventh Session, Held at Marrakesh from 29 October to 10 November 2001, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.1 (2002) (Marrakesh Accords); Land use, Land-use Change and Forestry, Dec. 2/CMP.7, UN Doc. FCCC/KP/CMP/2011/10/Add.1 (2012).
278 These questions were negotiated in 2020. See Matters Relating to Article 6 of the Paris Agreement, Dec. 9/CMA.2, UN Doc. FCCC/PA/CMA/2019/6/Add.1 (2020); Terms of Reference for the Review of the Doha Work Programme on Article 6 of the Convention, Dec. 15/CP.25, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2019/13/Add.2 (2020).
279 A. Lange et al., ‘On the Self-Interested Use of Equity in International Climate Negotiations’, (2010) 54 European Economic Review 359, at 363–4, 370.
280 See supra notes 15, 16.
281 Transparency and co-ordination problems are other reasons the Paris Agreement addresses without dissolving them.
282 See supra note 11.
283 See also Franck, supra note 77, at 368.
284 See also supra Section 2.4.
285 U. Will, ‘The Specification of Rules of Differentiation in the NDCs to the Paris Agreement’, available at www.europa-uni.de/de/forschung/institut/recap15/downloads/recap15_DP031.pdf, Section IV.
