Hostname: page-component-89b8bd64d-ksp62 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-05-05T19:05:56.219Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

BINDING MINIMUM WAGE AS AN EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION DEVICE

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 May 2012

Julie Beugnot*
Affiliation:
CIRPÉE—Université Laval
*
Address correspondence to: Julie Beugnot, Office 2116, Pavillon JA DeSève, Département d'Économique, Université Laval, Québec, Qc G1K 7P4, Canada; e-mail: julie.beugnot@ecn.ulaval.ca.

Abstract

This paper investigates the effects of a binding minimum wage in an economy which exhibits multiple unemployment equilibria. For this purpose, we develop a theoretical model based on the simple imperfectly competitive model of Manning [In Conference Papers, Economic Journal 100, 151–162 (1990)], in which we introduce labor heterogeneity and knowledge spillovers in the individual production technology. Then, using numerical simulations, we show that a binding minimum wage rules out the occurrence of an inefficient equilibrium. Last, we analyze the effects of a minimum wage increase on the labor market's outcomes.

Information

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2012 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable