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Institutional Environment and IPO Strategy: A Study of ChiNext in China

  • Jing Zhang (a1), Wei Zhang (a2), Andreas Schwab (a3) and Sipei Zhang (a4)
Abstract
ABSTRACT

Taking an institution-based view, we investigate how entrepreneurs respond to immature regulatory environments in order to be listed on stock markets in countries with an emerging economy. Unlike stock markets in developed countries, in emerging markets, gaining government approval for listing is a critical and more unpredictable process for entrepreneurs. Hence, entrepreneurs who are preparing for a public offering might give substantially discounted shares to venture capital (VC) investors. This will lead to higher investment returns in pre-IPO deals than those at earlier stages, which distorts the risk-return tradeoff found in developed markets. In particular, the VC investors affiliated with powerful organizations that can promise entrepreneurs preferential access to stock market gatekeepers will gain even higher pre-IPO investment returns. The associated additional institutional rents earned by VC investors, however, are expected to decrease over time, as the stock markets mature. Related hypotheses with regard to the investment timing, VC firm affiliations with government agencies, securities traders, and universities are tested using data from ChiNext in China (2009–2013). This study highlights that institutional factors impact the behavior of participants in emerging markets. It extends current theories derived almost exclusively from developed markets.

摘要:

我们以制度基础观研究企业家如何应对不成熟监管环境以在新兴经济体国家股票市场上市。不同于发达国家的股票市场, 在新兴市场取得政府的上市批准对企业家来说是一个至关重要和不可预测的过程。因此, 准备公开募股的企业家可能会给风险资本 (VC) 投资人大幅度打折的股票。这将导致上市前交易比早期阶段交易有更高的投资回报, 从而扭曲发达市场中的风险 - 收益权衡。特别是, 附属于强大的能够保证企业家优先接近股市守门人的组织的风险投资人将获得更高的首次公开招股前的投资回报。然而, 风险投资人获得的额外机构租金随着股市的成熟预计将随时间减少。关于投资时机的有关假说, 风险投资企业与政府机构、券商和大学的隶属关系用中国 (2009-2013) 创业板数据进行了测试。这项研究凸显了制度因素对新兴市场参与者行为的影响超过发达市场。它还扩展了几乎全部出自于发达市场的现有理论。

संस्थागत परिप्रेक्ष्य लेते हुए हमने यह अन्वेषण किया है की उदीयमान अर्थव्यवस्थाओं में उद्योगपति शेयर बाजार में सूचीकृत होने के लिए किस प्रकार अपरिपक्व नियंत्रण व्यवस्था का सामना करते हैं. विक्सित अर्थव्यवस्थाओं की शेयर मार्किट परिस्थिति के विपरीत उदीयमान अर्थव्यवस्थाओं में शेयर बाजार में सूचीकृत होने के लिए सरकारी अनुमोदन महत्वपूर्ण और अनुनमेय है. इसलिए सार्वजनिक शेयर प्रस्तावों की ओर अग्रसर उद्यमी अपने शेयर अत्यधिक रियायत पर उद्यम पूंजीपतियों को दे देते हैं. इस कारण से आईपीओ-पूर्व के लें-दें में प्रारंभिक स्थिति से अधिक नफ़ा होगा, जिसके कारण विकसित बाज़ारों में देखे जाने वाले जोखिम-मुनाफ़े के आकलन में विकृति हो जाती है. खासतौर पर प्रभावशाली संगठनों से जुड़े उद्यम पूंजीवादी जो उद्यमियों को शेयर मार्केट तक पहुँचने में तरजीह दे सकते हैं, और भी अधिक पूर्व आई-पी-ओ नफ़े के भागी होंगे. लेकिन समय के साथ शेयर मार्किट की परिपक्वता के विकास से सम्बद्ध अतिरिक्त संस्थागत नफ़े में कमी आएगी. निवेश का समय, उद्यम पूंजीपति फर्म के सरकारी संस्थानों से सम्बन्ध, शेयर व्यापारी व विश्वविद्यालयों से सम्बंधित परिपालपनाओं का चीन के चिनेक्सट (2009-13) प्रदत्त आंकड़ों के आधार पर परीक्षण किया गया है. इस शोध में इस बात पर प्रकाश डाला गया है की संस्थागत आयाम विक्सित अर्थव्यवस्थाओं की तुलना में उदीयमान अर्थव्यवस्थाओं में प्रतिभागियों के व्यवहार पर अधिक असर डालते हैं. इस शोध में समकालीन पूर्णतया विकसित अर्थव्यवस्थाओं के अध्ययन से जनित सिद्धांतों का भी विस्तार किया गया है.

ABSTRACT:

Partindo de uma visão baseada em instituições, investigamos como os empresários respondem a ambientes regulatórios imaturos para serem listados em mercados de ações em países com uma economia emergente. Ao contrário dos mercados de ações nos países desenvolvidos, obter aprovação do governo para ser listado em mercados emergentes é um processo crítico e imprevisível para empreendedores. Assim, empreendedores que estão se preparando para uma oferta pública (IPO) podem oferecer ações substancialmente subprecificadas para investidores de capital de risco (VC). Isso levará a maiores retornos de investimento em negócios pré-IPO do que aqueles em estágios anteriores, o que distorce a relação risco-retorno encontrada nos mercados desenvolvidos. Em particular, os investidores do VC afiliados a organizações poderosas que podem prometer aos empresários um acesso preferencial aos reguladores do mercado de ações obterão retornos de investimentos pré-IPO ainda maiores. As relacionadas rendas institucionais adicionais obtidas pelos investidores da VC, no entanto, deverão diminuir ao longo do tempo, a medida em que os mercados de ações amadurecem. Hipóteses relacionadas com o timing do investimento, as afiliações das firmas de VC com agências governamentais, negociantes de títulos e universidades são testadas usando dados da ChiNext na China (2009-2013). Este estudo destaca que os fatores institucionais afetam o comportamento dos participantes nos mercados emergentes mais do que nos mercados desenvolvidos. Ele também amplia as teorias atuais derivadas quase que exclusivamente de mercados desenvolvidos.

АННОТАЦИЯ:

В соответствии с институциональной теорией, мы исследуем, как предприниматели ведут себя в условиях недостачно развитой нормативно-правовой среды, чтобы выйти на фондовые рынки в странах с развивающейся экономикой. В отличие от фондовых рынков в развитых странах, получить одобрение правительства на листинг в развивающихся странах является критически важным и непредсказуемым для предпринимателей. Следовательно, предприниматели, которые готовятся к публичному размещению, могут предоставить акции с существенным дисконтом венчурным инвесторам. Это приведет к увеличению доходности инвестиций в сделках до IPO, по сравнению с предыдущими этапами, что нарушает баланс между риском и доходностью, который наблюдается на развитых рынках. В частности, венчурные инвесторы, связанные с мощными организациями, которые могут обеспечить предпринимателям преференциальный доступ на фондовый рынок, получат еще более высокие доходы от инвестиций до IPO. Вместе с тем, дополнительные институциональные доходы, которые получают венчурные инвесторы, со временем уменьшатся, поскольку фондовые рынки развиваются. Гипотезы относительно сроков инвестиций, связей венчурных фирм с государственными учреждениями, профессиональными участниками рынка ценных бумаг и университетами тестируются с использованием данных ChiNext в Китае (2009-2013). В этом исследовании подчеркивается, что институциональные факторы влияют на поведение участников рынка в развивающихся странах больше, чем в развитых странах. Данная работа также расширяет современные теории, которые возникли почти исключительно на материале из развитых стран.

RESUMEN:

Tomando una visión basada en la institución, investigamos como los emprendedores responden a ambientes regulatorios inmaduros con el fin de cotizarse en las bolsas bursátiles de países con una economía emergente. A diferencia de los mercados bursátiles de países desarrollados, en los mercados emergentes conseguir la aprobación del gobierno para poder ser cotizadas es un proceso crítico e impredecible para los empresarios. Por lo tanto, los empresarios que se están preparando para una oferta pública inicial podrían dar acciones substancialmente descontadas a los inversionistas de capital de riesgo. Esto llevará a un retorno más alto de las inversiones en las ofertas antes de la salida pública inicial que aquellas en etapas anteriores, lo cual distorsiona la compensación del riesgo-retorno que se encuentra en mercados desarrollados. En particular, los inversionistas de capital de riesgo afiliados con organizaciones poderosas que pueden prometer a los emprendedores, acceso preferencial a controladores de acceso a mercados bursátiles ganarán incluso más altos retornos de las inversiones antes de la salida pública inicial. Sin embargo, las rentas institucionales adicionales asociadas ganadas por los inversionistas de capital de riesgo, se espera que disminuyan con el tiempo, a medida que los mercados bursátiles maduren. Las hipótesis relacionadas con el calendario de inversión, la afiliación de la empresa de capital de riesgo con las agencias gubernamentales, los operadores de valores, y las universidades son probados utilizando los datos de ChiNext en China (2009-2013). Este estudio resalta que los factores institucionales impactan el comportamiento de los participantes en mercados emergentes más que en los mercados desarrollados. Esto también extiende las teorías actuales derivadas casi que exclusivamente de mercados desarrollados.

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Corresponding author: Wei Zhang (zhangw3@sem.tsinghua.edu.cn)
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