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The Role of Business Entertainment in Economic Exchanges: A Governance Perspective and Propositions

  • Francis Sun (a1) and Shih-Fen S. Chen (a2)

Abstract

While entertainment activities in private business settings (i.e., business entertainment) are widely seen all over the world, issues about their prevalence have remained unresolved in the literature. This study takes an institutional approach to elucidate (1) the governance role of business entertainment in economic exchanges, (2) the mechanism through which business entertainment plays this role, and (3) the conditions under which business entertainment plays a greater role to facilitate economic exchanges. Our starting point is that economic transactions are governed through a combination of market rules, legal restraints, and social norms. We argue that business entertainment plays a governance role by boosting the power of social norms to regulate the behaviors of economic actors. As such, business entertainment should be more prevalent under the conditions where social fabrics are dense but market and legal infrastructures are underdeveloped. This governance approach provides a common ground to accommodate the positive versus negative views on business entertainment advocated by two camps of researchers in management, economics, and sociology. It also offers useful guidelines for policymakers to regulate, and for executives to manage, this prevalent but often misunderstood business practice.

摘要:

私人商务环境里的娱乐活动 (即商务娱乐) 世界各地四处可见, 然而有关它们流行的问题文献仍没解决。本研究采用制度方法来阐述 (1) 经济交往中商务娱乐的治理作用, (2) 商务娱乐起作用的机制, 和 (3) 商务娱乐为促进经济交往发挥更大作用的条件。我们的出发点是经济交易是通过市场规则、法律约束和社会规范的组合来治理的。我们认为, 商务娱乐是通过促进社会规范以调节经济行为者的行为发挥其治理作用的。因此, 商务娱乐应在社会组织密集但市场和法律基础设施不发达的条件下更为流行。这种治理方法提供了一个共识以包容管理学、经济学和社会学里两大阵营的研究人员所主张的对商务娱乐正面与负面的看法。它还为政策制定者和高管去管控和管理这种流行的但常被误解的商业做法提供了有用的指南。

यद्यपि निजी कारोबार के परिवेश में पूरे विश्व में मनोरंजक गतिविधियां देखने को मिलती हैं, तथापि उनके प्रचलन से जुड़े मुद्दे अनिर्णीत हैं. यह शोध संस्थागत उपागम से (1) आर्थिक विनिमय में कारोबारी मनोरंजन कि शासकीय भूमिका, (2) कारोबारी मनोरंजन कि यह भूमिका निभाने कि प्रक्रिया और (3) स्थितियां जिनमें कारोबारी मनोरंजन आर्थिक विनिमय बढ़ने में अधिक भूमिका निभाता है, का निरूपण किया गया है. हमारा प्रथमदृष्ट्या तर्क यह है कि आर्थिक विनिमय बाजार के उसूलों, वैधानिक सीमाओं व सामाजिक आदर्शों के मेल से स्थापित होते हैं. हमारा यह मत है कि कारोबारी मनोरंजन सामाजिक मानकों कि शक्ति बढ़ा कर आर्थिक कर्ताओं के व्यवहार को नियमित कर शासकीय भूमिका निभाता है. इस प्रकार कारोबारी मनोरंजन वहां प्रचलित होना चाहिए जहां सामाजिक ढांचा सुदृढ़ हो पर बाजार व वैधिक संरचना अल्प-विकसित हो. शासकीय उपागम कारोबारी मनोरंजन के बारे में सकारात्मक व नकारात्मक शोध के दो धड़ों को सन्निहित करने का सामान्य आधार प्रदान करती है. यह उपागम नीतिनिर्धारकों को इस कारोबारी प्रक्रिया को बेहतर नियंत्रित करने को और अधीक्षकों को इसका बेहतर प्रबंधन करने के लिए मानदंड प्रदान करता है.

Sumário:

Embora as atividades de entretenimento em ambientes de negócios privados (ou seja, entretenimento de negócios) sejam observadas amplamente em todo o mundo, questões sobre sua prevalência permanecem sem solução na literatura. Este estudo adota uma abordagem institucional para esclarecer: (1) o papel de governança do entretenimento empresarial nos intercâmbios econômicos, (2) o mecanismo pelo qual o entretenimento empresarial desempenha esse papel, e (3) as condições sob as quais o entretenimento empresarial desempenha um papel mais importante para facilitar os intercâmbios econômicos. Nosso ponto de partida é que as transações econômicas são governadas por uma combinação de regras de mercado, restrições legais e normas sociais. Argumentamos que o entretenimento empresarial desempenha um papel de governança, impulsionando o poder das normas sociais para regular os comportamentos dos atores econômicos. Como tal, o entretenimento empresarial deve ser mais prevalente nas condições em que os tecidos sociais são densos, mas as infra-estruturas de mercado e legal estão subdesenvolvidas. Esta abordagem de governança fornece um terreno comum para acomodar as visões positivas versus negativas sobre entretenimento empresarial defendidas por dois campos de pesquisadores em gestão, economia e sociologia. Ela também oferece orientações úteis para que os formuladores de políticas regulem e para que os executivos gerenciem essa prevalente prática empresarial, por vezes mal compreendida.

АННОТАЦИЯ:

В то время как представительская деятельность в контексте частного бизнеса (т. е., деловое гостеприимство) широко принята во всем мире, вопросы о ее значении остаются без ответа в научной литературе. Это исследование применяет институциональный подход, чтобы выяснить (1) какова институциональная роль делового гостеприимства в экономических отношениях, (2) каков механизм, с помощью которого деловое гостеприимство играет эту роль, и (3) каковы условия, при которых деловое гостеприимство играет более значительную роль в содействии экономическим отношениям. Наша отправная точка заключается в том, что экономические сделки регулируются путем сочетания рыночных правил, правовых ограничений и социальных норм. Мы считаем, что деловое гостеприимство имеет институциональное значение, так как оно увеличивает силу социальных норм для регулирования поведения экономических субъектов. Таким образом, деловое гостеприимство должно быть более распространено в условиях, когда социальные связи плотны, а рыночная и правовая инфраструктура недостаточно развита. Этот институциональный подход позволяет примирить положительные и отрицательные мнения о деловом гостеприимстве, которых придерживаются исследователи из противоположных лагерей в области менеджмента, экономики и социологии. Данный подход также предлагает полезные рекомендации для законодателей в области регулирования и для руководителей в области управления этой распространеной, но часто непонятной деловой практикой.

RESUMEN:

Mientras que las actividades de entretenimiento en entornos empresariales privados (es decir, entretenimiento empresarial) se ven ampliamente en todo el mundo, los asuntos acerca de su prevalencia han quedado sin resolverse en la literatura. Este estudio adopta una perspectiva institucional para aclarar (1) el rol de la gobernanza en el entretenimiento empresarial en los intercambios económicos, (2) los mecanismos mediante los cuales el entretenimiento empresarial juega su rol, y (3) las condiciones bajo las cuales el entretenimiento empresarial juega un mayor rol en facilitar intercambios económicos. Nuestro punto de partida es que las transacciones económicas se rigen por una combinación de reglas del mercado, restricciones legales, y normas sociales. Argumentamos que el entretenimiento empresarial juega un papel de gobernanza al impulsar el poder de las normas sociales para regular los comportamientos de los actores económicos. Como tal, el entretenimiento empresarial debe ser más frecuente bajo las condiciones en donde los tejidos sociales son densos pero las infraestructuras de mercado y legales están subdesarrolladas. Este enfoque de gobernanza da un denominador común para acomodar las posturas positivas versus las negativas sobre el entretenimiento empresarial promovido por dos bandos de investigadores en administración, economía, y sociología. También ofrece lineamentos útiles para legisladores para regular, y para ejecutivos que manejan, esta frecuente práctica empresarial, pero con a menudo mal entendida.

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