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The marriage lemma and large anonymous games with countable actions†

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 October 2008

M. Ali Khan  and
Yeneng Sun
M. Ali Khan
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, The Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD 21218, U.S.A.
Yeneng Sun
Affiliation:
Department of Mathematics, National University of Singapore, Singapore 0511.
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Abstract

We give a particularly short proof of the symmetrization of Cournot-Nash equilibrium distributions in large anonymous games with countable actions. Our proof relies on the Bollobás-Varopoulos extension of the marriage lemma.

Type
Research Article
Information
Mathematical Proceedings of the Cambridge Philosophical Society , Volume 117 , Issue 3 , May 1995 , pp. 385 - 387
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge Philosophical Society 1995

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References

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