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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 13 August 2018
Japanese imperialism was one of the most important driving forces in the history of modern East Asia. One influential group of actors at the grassroots level were the so-called ‘continental adventurers’ (tairiku rōnin)—Japanese nationals who travelled in Korea and China on the lookout for adventures and employment opportunities. Some of them worked part time for the army as spies, translators, and agents for special operations. These adventurers have been studied before as agents of Japanese imperialism, but existing accounts fail to present a convincing model of the mechanism that made their activities effective. The goal of this article is to fill this gap.
This mechanism, which I shall hereafter call ‘the military-adventurous complex’, was a lobby of officers, continental adventurers, businessmen, politicians, criminal elements as well as Chinese, Manchurian, and Mongolian revolutionaries. The interests of these contingents were unique but nevertheless intertwining. Despite its decentralized character, the military-adventurous complex had a significant impact on Japanese foreign policy over an extended period. In this article, we shall explore the contours, structure, and modus operandi of that complex, its ambivalent relationship with the Japanese state, as well as several examples of its operations in the early twentieth century. Finally, we shall dwell on the ramifications of the complex on the development of Japanese imperialism.
1 Jun, Zhao, ‘“Betsudōtai” to “shishi” no hazama: kindai rai tairiku rōnin kenkyū no kaiko to tenbō’, Chiba shōdai kiyō 36:4 (March 1999), p. 118Google Scholar.
2 See, for example, Jansen, Marius, The Japanese and Sun Yat-sen (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954), p. 117Google Scholar; Anshan, Li, ‘The miscellany and the mixed: the war in Chinese nationalism’, in Steinberg, John W. et al., The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective: World War Zero (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2005), p. 498Google Scholar.
3 Duus, Peter, ‘Introduction’, in Duus, Peter et al. (eds), The Japanese Informal Empire in China, 1895–1937 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), pp. xi–xxixGoogle Scholar.
4 Crowley, James B., Japan's Quest for Autonomy: National Security and Foreign Policy, 1930–1938 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), pp. 380–384Google Scholar.
5 See, for example, Kushner, Barak, The Thought War: Japanese Imperial Propaganda (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2006), pp. 6–7, 184–185Google Scholar; Duus, Peter, The Abacus and the Sword: The Japanese Penetration of Korea, 1859–1910 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), pp. 362–363Google Scholar; Young, Louise, Japan's Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), pp. 415–437Google Scholar.
6 E. H. Norman, to name just one prominent scholar, uncritically relied on the patriotic societies’ own boastful histories and therefore overestimated their influence. For example, he attributed the solidification of the political front towards armed conflict on the eve of the Russo-Japanese War to just one threatening conversation between Tōyama Mitsuru, a leading activist in the societies, and Itō Hirobumi, president of the Privy Council. See Norman, E. H., ‘The Genyōsha: a study in the origins of Japanese imperialism’, Pacific Affairs 17:3 (September 1944), pp. 271–272CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Marius Jansen's study is meticulous and rich in detail, but it is difficult, yet again, to understand the structures and mechanism behind the events he describes. See Jansen, Marius B., The Japanese and Sun Yat-sen (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1954)Google Scholar.
7 There were multiple other operations of elements related to the military-adventurous complex that fit the model presented here. In my book, I have given extensive attention to another case, the assassination of Queen Min by Japanese officials, officers, and adventurers (1895). Other examples are the Ōsaka Incident which took place in 1885, and was analysed in detail in Sakae, Wagatsuma et al. (eds), Nihon seiji saiban shiroku: Meiji (Tokyo: Daiichi hōki shuppan, 1968–1970), Vol. 1, pp. 92–124Google Scholar, as well as the attempts to support a Chinese uprising in Amoy and Waichow (1900), already studied by Jansen, The Japanese and Sun, pp. 82–105, and the Mongolian gang organized by the new religion Ōmotokyō. See Naranoga, Li, ‘Universal values and Pan-Asianism: the vision of Ōmotokyō’, in Saaler, Sven and Koschmann, J. Viktor (eds), Pan Asianism in Modern Japanese History: Colonialism, Regionalism and Borders (London/New York: Routledge, 2007), pp. 59–63Google Scholar. For my own research, see Orbach, Danny, Curse on this Country: The Rebellious Army of Imperial Japan (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2017), pp. 101–129CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
8 For definitions and analysis of the identity of the tairiku rōnin, and the differentiation between them, see Ryūsaku, Watanabe, Tairiku rōnin: Meiji romanchishizumu no eikō to zasetsu (Tokyo: Banchō shobō, 1967), pp. 10–11Google Scholar; Norman, ‘Genyōsha’, pp. 261–284; and the historiographical survey by Zhao, ‘Betsudōtai’, pp. 105–124. On the adventurers’ sidelines, and the trades they used as cover, see Natsuo, Sekigawa, ‘Tairiku rōnin to gunji tantei’, Bungaku-kai 48:6 (1994), pp. 246–249Google Scholar; Zhao, ‘Betsudōtai’, pp. 109–111; Watanabe, Tairiku rōnin, p. 137; Kingsberg, Miriam, Moral Nation: Modern Japan and Narcotics in Global History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2014), pp. 100–101, 106, 125Google Scholar, as well as M. L. Kingsberg, ‘The Poppy and the Acacia: Opium and Imperialism in Japanese Dairen and the Kwantung Leased Territory, 1905–1945’, PhD thesis, University of California, Berkeley, 2009, pp. 174, 237; Ching-Il, Kang, ‘Tenyūkyō to “Chōsen mondai”: “Chōsen rōnin” no tōgaku nōmin sensō e no taiō to kanren shite’, Shigaku zasshi 97:8 (1988), pp. 1322–1335Google Scholar; Hiroaki, Ōsato, ‘Kankō rakuzendō no rekishi’ (1), Jinbun kenkyū—Kanagawa daigaku jinbun gakkai 155 (2005), pp. 59–87Google Scholar. For a typical description of one of these itinerant spy-peddlers, see Tsuruoka Nagatarō to the Foreign Ministry, February 1916, Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Gaikō shiryōkan) (hereafter cited as DA), 1-6-1-63, and the adventurer's own report, ‘Mōhi tōbatsu jōkyō’ (Status of Mongol brigand subjugation), which is the next document in the same file.
9 Watanabe, Tairiku rōnin, p. 10; Zhao, ‘Betsudōtai’, pp. 115–116.
10 Leaving one's family behind to undertake honourable ventures for lord and country had been a revered ideal in Japanese culture since the Edo period, and probably even before that. It was especially prominent from the 1860s in the culture of the shishi, the revolutionary samurais who served as role models for the continental adventurers. See, for example, Hiroshi, Yamakawa, Kyoto shugoshoku shimatsu: kyū-Aizuhan rōshin no shuki, Kaneko Mitsuharu (trans.) (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 1965–1966), Vol. 1, p. 59Google Scholar. As many adventurers came from rather poor backgrounds, the practical result of such a decision was to leave one's family to suffer great privation. The most famous cases are that of Miyazaki Torazō (Tōten): see his My Thirty-Three Years’ Dream: The Autobiography of Miyazaki Tōten, Marius Jansen and Etō Shinkichi (trans) (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1982), pp. 54–56, 139–140, 70 (footnote 28), and Kawashima Naniwa: see Harrell, Paula, Asia for the Asians: China in the Lives of Five Meiji Japanese (Portland, ME: MerwinAsia, 2012), pp. 176–177, 180Google Scholar. A moving testimony of the human cost of such a decision can be glimpsed in a letter sent in 1912 to the adventurer Okabe Kanekichi by his wife, reproduced in Tatsuo, Nakami, ‘ Manmō mondai’ no rekishiteki kōzu (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 2013), p. 159Google Scholar, as well as the earlier entries in the diary of the adventurer Munakata Kotarō: see Seihō, Hyō, Hyōden Munakata Kotarō: tairiku rōnin no rekishiteki yakuwari (Kumamoto: Kumamoto Shuppan Bunka Kaikan, 1997), p. 25Google Scholar.
11 Watanabe, Tairiku rōnin, p. 169.
12 Miyazaki, Dream, p. 86.
13 Yoshihisa, Kuzū (Kokuryūkai) (ed.), Tōa senkaku shishi kiden (Tokyo: Hara shobō, 1933–1936), Vol. 1, pp. 311–312, 345–347, 361–362, 816Google Scholar (hereafter cited as TSSK); Hyō, Munakata, p. 25; Miyazaki, Dream, pp. 29–30, 46–47; Watanabe, Tairiku rōnin, p. 115. See also Ken, Takahashi’s testimony in Inoue Masaji, Kyojin Arao Sei: denki, Arao Sei (Tokyo: Ōzorasha, 1997), p. 30Google Scholar; Saaler, Sven, ‘Overcoming the nation: creating a region, forging an empire’, in Saaler, Sven and Koschmann, J. Victor, Pan-Asianism in Modern Japanese History: Colonialism, Regionalism and Borders (London/New York: Routledge, 2007), pp. 1–16CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
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15 TSSK, Vol. 2, pp. 318–319, 555–556. For another example of the transformation from an idealistic to a cynical view on China, see Kawashima Naniwa's case in Harrell, Asia for the Asians, pp. 226–227, 229–232. For Munakata Kotarō, that process was even swifter: see Hyō, Munakata, pp. 25–28. Obviously, different adventurers stood at different points on this spectrum of idealism–cynicism. Miyazaki Tōten, who remained an idealist to the end, described this tension in his memoirs, although his judgement of Arao Sei might have been too harsh: see Miyazaki, Dream, p. 53. Arao, too, had more idealistic views on China than most adventurers: see Paul D. Scott, ‘Arao Sei and the Formation of Japan's Continental Policy’, PhD thesis, University of Virginia, 1985, p. 155.
16 Nishikawa Torajirō, Chief of Staff of the Kwantung General Government, to Fukuda Masatarō, Chief of the General Staff's Intelligence Department, 16 April 1916, Hamaomote Matasuke monjo (hereafter cited as HMM), in kenkyūkai, Kindai Nihon (ed.), Kindai Nihon to higashi Ajia (Tokyo: Yamakawa shuppansha, 1980), pp. 244–245Google Scholar. The adventurers themselves seemed to gradually realize this state of affairs in the years after the 1911 revolution. See TSSK, Vol. 2, pp. 318–319.
17 Miyazaki, Dream, p. 11.
18 Siniawer, Eiko Maruko, Ruffians, Yakuza, Nationalists: The Violent Politics of Modern Japan (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008), p. 54Google Scholar; Norman, ‘Genyōsha’, pp. 266–271; Orbach, Curse on this Country, pp. 23–25, 112–114.
19 TSSK, Vol. 1, p. 315.
20 TSSK, Vol. 1, p. 312; Scott, ‘Arao Sei’, pp. 36–71, 72–74.
21 Kitaoka Shin'ichi, ‘China Experts in the Army’, in Duus et al., Informal Empire, p. 331.
22 Katsumi, Kuroita, Fukuda taishō den (Tokyo: Fukuda taishō den kankōkai, 1937), p. 274Google Scholar; Watanabe, Tairiku rōnin, p. 251.
23 For a description of the constitutional arrangements that allowed the army to do so, see Orbach, Curse on this Country, pp. 81–101.
24 Hiroo, Sasaki, ‘Taga Muneyuki to Chūgoku tairiku: Mōko e no buki yunyū keikaku o chūshin to shite, tsu, Taga Muneyuki kankei monjo mokuroku’, Kokushikan shigaku 2 (July 1994), p. 24Google Scholar.
25 Drea, Edward J., Japan's Imperial Army: Its Rise and Fall, 1853–1945 (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2009), pp. 59, 112–113Google Scholar; Presseisen, Ernst L., Before Aggression: Europeans Prepare the Japanese Army (Tuscon: University of Arizona Press, 1965), pp. 114–124Google Scholar. Major Jacob Meckel, the German adviser to the Japanese Army, proposed a structural outline of the Army Ministry and the General Staff; intelligence was hardly mentioned (p. 118).
26 Akira, Fujiwara, ‘Kindai Nihon to Chūgoku: Aoki Norizumi to Sasaki Tōichi’, Asahi janaru 14:24 (June 1972), p. 45Google Scholar; Kitaoka, ‘China Experts’, p. 351.
27 Watanabe, Tairiku rōnin, pp. 141–142.
28 For a detailed survey of the interests and holdings of the Ōkura Concern, see Huggins, Harold, The Okura Interests (Tokyo: Industrial Information Services, 1928)Google Scholar. On the unprofitability and secrecy of the Chinese holdings and business ventures, see especially the introduction to Ōkura Kihachirō’s biography (no page number), as well as p. 45 (see below). According to Huggins’ data, the Ōkura Concern investments in China were a massive loss, conducted mainly to improve the owner's image among Japan's patriotic public. Sunagawa, Yukio, Ōkura Kihachirō gōkai naru shōgai (Tokyo: Soshinsha, 1996), pp. 251–255, 266–268Google Scholar; Miyazaki, Dream, pp. 248–255; Ijūin nikki, in Yoshishirō, Hirose et al. (eds), Ijūin Hikokichi kankei monjo (Tokyo: Fuyō shobō shuppan, 1996–1997), Vol. 1, pp. 223–226, 240Google Scholar (hereafter cited as IHKM); Keiichirō, Hara and Shigeru, Hayashi (eds), Hara Takashi nikki (Tokyo: Fukumura shuppan, 1965–1969), Vol. 6, pp. 397, 449 (hereafter cited as HTN)Google Scholar.
29 Ken, Kurihara, ‘Abe Gaimushō Seikyokuchō ansatsu jiken to tai Chūgoku (Manmō) mondai’, Kokusaihō Gaikō Zasshi 55:5 (1956), p. 113Google Scholar; Teranishi to Fukuda, 1 February 1916, HMM, Kindai Nihon to higashi Ajia, p. 230. US Vice Consul in Mukden to the State Department, 27 November 1911; US Consul in Qingdao to the Secretary of State, 1 November 1911, State Department Records related to the Internal Affairs of China (hereafter cited as RIAC), Reel 9, HULL. On the complicity of the South Manchurian Railway Company (SMR) (and the Japanese police in Manchuria) in smuggling, see US Consul in Andong to P. S. Reinsch, Envoy in Beijing, 6 October 1916, ‘Notes on the political situation in Southeastern Manchuria: rumors on impending annexation by Japan’, pp. 1–3, RIAC, Reel 16, HULL; Kingsberg, Moral Nation, p. 122.
30 HTN, Vol. 6, p. 450; Miyazaki, Dream, pp. 115–121, 139–140, 158.
31 Norman, ‘Genyōsha’, pp. 277–278; Siniawer, Ruffians, pp. 108–109.
32 Sekigawa, ‘Tairiku rōnin’, p. 249.
33 Byas, Hugh, Government by Assassination (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1942), p. 226Google Scholar; Siniawer, Ruffians, pp. 108–109.
34 TSSK, Vol. 1, pp. 312, 835; Shichitarō, Yada, Consul General in Mukden, to Foreign Minister Ishii Kikujirō, in Gaimushō, (ed.), Nihon gaikō bunsho (Tokyo: Gaimushō chōsabu, 1947–1953), 1916(2), p. 853 (hereafter cited as NGB)Google Scholar.
35 For information about the multi-faceted bazoku phenomenon, see US Consul General in Mukden to the Secretary of State, 24 November 1911, ‘Notes on the situation in Mukden and vicinity’, p. 3, RIAC, Reel 9, HULL; Watanabe, Tairiku rōnin, pp. 145–146; Heissig, Walther, Geschichte der mongolischen Literature (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 1994), Vol 2, pp. 538–539Google Scholar; Nakami, Manmō mondai, pp. 172–173; Billingsley, Phil, Bandits in Republican China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), pp. 19–20Google Scholar.
36 Yoshida Shigeru, Consul in Andong, to Foreign Minister Ishii, 16 March 1916; Yamauchi Shirō, Consul in Changchun, to Ishii, 11 April 1916, NGB, 1916(2), pp. 852, 860–861; Kingsberg, Moral Nation, pp. 100–101; Xiliang, Wang, ‘Manmō dokuritsu undō to tairiku rōnin’, Kanagawa hōgaku 35:1 (1993), pp. 116–117Google Scholar.
37 Chinese Commissioner of Foreign Affairs to US Vice Consul in Mukden, and US Vice Consul in Mukden to the State Department, 27 November 1911, RIAC, Reel 9, HULL.
38 N. J. Friedstrom and P. L. Danielson to US Consul in Tianjin, 3 November 1916, RIAC, Reel 16, HULL.
39 Nikame Heiji, Consul in Chichihar, to Foreign Minister Motono Ichirō, 28 March 1917, reproduced in Ken, Kurihara, Tai-Manmō seisakushi no ichimen: Nichro sen no yori Taishōki ni itaru (Tokyo: Hara Shobō, 1966), p. 376Google Scholar.
40 Billingsley, Bandits, p. 222.
41 ‘Manshū oyobi tōbu nai-Mōko ni okeru bazoku: bazoku to Nihon rōnin’ (Mounted brigands and Japanese adventurers in Manchuria and eastern Inner Mongolia), 1 May 1925, Japan Center for Asian Historical Records, National Archives of Japan (JACAR), Ref. A03023726100. This archive is available online at: http://www.jacar.go.jp, [accessed on 25 June 2018].
42 Kingsberg, Moral Nation, pp. 101, 106, 124–125.
43 Sun Yat-sen to President Yuan Shikai, 14 and 15 February 1912, RIAC, Reel 10, HULL.
44 Calhoun to the Secretary of State, 15 March 1912, p. 10, RIAC, Reel 10, HULL.
45 TSSK, Vol. 2, p. 324; Tsutomu, Aida, Kawashima Naniwa-ō: denki, Kawashima Naniwa (Tokyo: Ōzorasha, 1997), p. 145Google Scholar; Nakami, Manmō mondai, p. 116; Wang, ‘Manmō’, p. 116.
46 kenkyūkai, Utsunomiya Tarō kankei shiryō (ed.), Nihon rikugun to Ajia seisaku: Rikugun taishō Utsunomiya Tarō nikki (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 2007), Vol. 2, pp. 74–75, 80Google Scholar.
47 Kawashima Naniwa, ‘Tai-shi kanken’, August 1912, reproduced in Aida, Kawashima, pp. 174–175, and see also pp. 181–182, 186–189; Wang, ‘Manmō’, p. 117. Compare this with Kawashima's letter to General Fukushima Masataō, reproduced in Masaomi, Yui, ‘Shingai kakumei to Nihon no taiō’, Rekishigaku kenkyū 344 (January 1969), p. 8Google Scholar; Utsunomiya Tarō kankei shiryō kenkyūkai (ed.), Utsunomiya nikki, Vol. 2, p. 80; Tatsuo, Nakami, ‘Manmō dokuritsu undō to iu kyokō to, sono jitsuzō’, Kindai Nihon kenkyū 28 (2011), p. 80Google Scholar.
48 Utsunomiya Tarō kankei shiryō kenkyūkai (ed.), Utsunomiya nikki, Vol. 2, pp. 80–81; TSSK, Vol. 2, p. 325; Nakami, ‘Manmō dokuritsu undō’, pp. 79–80; Tsutomu, Aida, Kawashima Naniwa-ō: denki, Kawashima Naniwa (Tokyo: Ōzorasha, 1997), p. 163Google Scholar; US Consul General in Mukden to Calhoun, 24 February 1912, ‘Conditions in Mukden District’, RIAC, Reel 10, HULL; Yui, ‘Shingai kakumei’, p. 9.
49 Utsunomiya Tarō kankei shiryō kenkyūkai (ed.), Utsunomiya nikki, Vol. 2, p. 81; TSSK, Vol. 2, pp. 325–326. The American consul general in Mukden got wind of the plan as early as 11 February: see US Consul General in Mukden to Calhoun, 11 December 1912, ‘Political conditions at Mukden’, p. 4, and also the Consul General's report, 12 December, p. 5, RIAC, Reel 10, HULL.
50 Ijūin to Uchida, 18 February 1912, Vice Foreign Minister Ishii to Ōkura Kihachirō, 7 March 1912, NGB Shinkoku jihen, pp. 369, 372; W. D. Straight to J. P. Morgan and Co. to the State Department, 27 January 1912, pp. 3–4, RIAC, Reel 10, HULL; Tokyo keizai daigaku shiryō iinkai (ed.), Kōhon Ōkura Kihachirō nenpu (Tokyo: Tokyo keizai daigaku, 2012), p. 165Google Scholar.
51 TSSK, Vol. 2, p. 331; Watanabe, Tairiku rōnin, p. 170; Wang, ‘Manmō’, p. 120.
52 TSSK, Vol. 2, pp. 328–329, 332; W. D. Straight to J. P. Morgan and Co. to the State Department, 27 January 1912, pp. 3–4, RIAC, Reel 10, HULL; Nakami, Manmō mondai, p. 134.
53 Ijūin nikki, in IHKM, Vol. 1, p. 238; Ijūin to Uchida, 18 February 1912, NGB Shinkoku jihen, p. 369. For the Chinese and Japanese versions of the contract, see ibid., pp. 374–375; Nakami, ‘Manmō dokuritsu undō’, p. 82.
54 Ijūin nikki, in IHKM, Vol. 1, pp. 219–220, 242, 263–266. See also: Ijūin to Uchida, 3 February 1912; Ochiai Kentarō, Consul General in Mukden, to Uchida, 21 February 1912, pp. 313–314, 351–352, ibid. On 30 January Uchida was also notified by Terauchi Masatake, the governor general of Korea, that the army intended to help Prince Su to create an army to fight for Manchurian independence and ‘dismantle the Chinese Republic’; see Wang, ‘Manmō’, pp. 116–117 (though the author dated the letter 1913 instead of 1912). See also: Calhoun to the Secretary of State, 15 March 1912, p. 3, RIAC, Reel 10, HULL.
55 Ochiai to Uchida, 21 February 1912, NGB Shinkoku jihen, pp. 351–352.
56 Utsunomiya Tarō kankei shiryō kenkyūkai (ed.), Utsunomiya nikki, Vol. 2, p. 86; Foreign Minister Uchida to British Ambassador Claude McDonald, 20 February 1912, NGB Shinkoku jihen, pp. 348–349. Uchida announced the policy in a parliamentary question-and-answer session on 12 March, though he denied that it was a new stance: see ‘Uchida answers eight questions on China’, The Japan Advertiser, 12 March 1912, p. 1.
57 Uchida to Ochiai, 22 February 1912, NGB Shinkoku jihen, p. 352; TSSK, Vol. 2, p. 346. Nakami Tatsuo argues that army leaders such as Utsunomiya never believed that Kawashima's plot had any chance of success, and merely wanted to use it in order to extend Japanese influence among the tribal leaders of Inner Mongolia. See Nakami, ‘Manmō dokuritsu undō’, p. 85.
58 Fukushima to Taga Muneyuki, 25 March 1912, reproduced in Sasaki, ‘Taga’, pp. 15–16. Compare with Ijūin nikki, in IHKM, Vol. 1, p. 244.
59 In the Ōkura Concern records, this joint investment was registered as ‘exploration journey in Mongolia’. But the involvement of Utsunomiya, Taga, and other relevant intelligence officers and China experts, as well as Pan-Asian politicians and sponsors of the adventurers, suggest it was a cover for activities involving the Mongol soldiers. See the records in Tokyo keizai daigaku shiryō iinkai (ed.), Kōhon Ōkura, pp. 166–167.
60 It is interesting to note that the correspondence between Taga and Fukushima was preserved in the files of the Imperial Navy. Navy organs spied on the army's activity, almost as they would have done on a foreign power. See Taga to Fukushima, 1 April 1912, reproduced in Sasaki, ‘Taga’, p. 17.
61 Utsunomiya Tarō kankei shiryō kenkyūkai (ed.), Utsunomiya nikki, Vol. 2, p. 91; Ijūin nikki, in IHKM, Vol. 1, p. 258; Ijūin to Uchida, 8 March 1912, NGB Shinkoku jihen, pp. 373–376; Nakami, Manmō mondai, pp. 154–160; Watanabe, Tairiku rōnin, p. 170.
62 The Taishō political crisis of late 1912, when the army overthrew Saionji's cabinet over a budgetary dispute. Masaru, Hatano, ‘Chūgoku dai-ni kakumei to Nihon no han'nō: Yamamoto naikaku no gaikō shidō ni tsuite’, Kokusai seiji 87:3 (1988), p. 180Google Scholar.
63 Ibid., pp. 170–171; Abe to Ijūin, 24 April 1913, Ijūin monjo, p. 20; Ijūin to Makino, 3 May 1913, Makino monjo, pp. 133–134; Admiral Nawa Matahachirō, Commander of the South China Fleet (3rd Fleet), to Navy Minister Saitō, 18 July 1913, Saitō Makoto kankei monjo, shokan 2, reel 50, frame 252, Kensei shiryōkan, National Diet Library, Tokyo (hereafter cited as KS-NDL).
64 TSSK, Vol. 2, pp. 516–517; ‘Official Statement on Anti-Japanese Rumours’, The Japan Advertiser, 21 July 1913; US Consul in Fuzhou to the Secretary of State, 23 May 1913, ‘Revolt in Heinghua County’, pp. 2–3; Edward T. Williams, US Envoy in Beijing to the Secretary of State, 14, 18, 21 July, 15 August 1913 (the last dispatch summed up all of the information received up to that date; see especially pp. 7–8); US Consul in Hankow to Williams, 14, 16 July 1913, RIAC, Reel 12, HULL; Hatano, ‘Chūgoku dai-ni kakumei’, pp. 174–175. The Chinese Foreign Ministry was so worried by Japanese involvement with the rebels that it tried (unsuccessfully) to appeal to the diplomatic envoys to exclude such foreigners from the extraterritoriality treaties and enable the Chinese authorities to arrest and punish them. See Chinese Foreign Ministry, diplomatic circular no. 147, 25 July 1913, ‘Foreigners in complicity with rebels’, RIAC, Reel 12, HULL; Kingsberg, Moral Nation, p. 125.
65 HTN, Vol. 5, p. 271. This was in accordance with the policy of fiscal saving drafted by Yamamoto and Finance Minister Takahashi Korekiyo. The cabinet fell before Takahashi was able to pass a budget, but his proposals (as well as the structural reforms he and Yamamoto implemented in the government) were aimed at simplifying the bureaucracy, eliminating waste, and deducting resources from non-productive sectors (except for the navy). Specifically, the cabinet refused to give the army additional funds to form two new divisions. This, too, can be seen as an attempt to limit the army's capacity to launch independent initiatives in Manchuria. See Takeo, Imamura, Takahashi Korekiyo (Tokyo: Jiji Tsūshinsha, 1985), pp. 75–76Google Scholar; Smethurst, Richard J., From Foot Soldier to Finance Minister: Takahashi Korekiyo, Japan's Keynes (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2007), pp. 204–206CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
66 HTN, Vol. 5, p. 271, as well as Foreign Minister Makino Nobuaki's Diet speech of 3 February 1917, Ko hakushaku Yamamoto kaigun taishō denki hensankai (ed.), Hakushaku Yamamoto Gonnohyōe den (Tokyo: Hara Shobō, 1968), Vol. 2, pp. 992–993Google Scholar. For echoes of the government's decision in the press, see ‘Tai-shi gaikō tōitsu’, Asahi shinbun, 29 July 1913, p. 1. The Asahi reported that every official or officer who did not obey the policy would be punished. It also reported widespread dissatisfaction among officers. See also ‘Japan not interfering’, The Japan Times, 22 July 1913, p. 1. In the same edition, the new envoy to Beijing, Yamaza Enjirō, admitted that Japanese adventurers, and officers in reserve, were active in the south: ‘New minister in China’, The Japan Times, 22 July 1913, p. 1. About Yamamoto's restraining policy towards the army, see also: Hatano, ‘Chūgoku dai-ni kakumei’, p. 176. On 26 September 1913, Army Minister Kususe asked (unsuccessfully) for a budget increase. The additional funds were intended to form two new divisions, a long-standing demand of the army, and not for the China experts whom Prime Minister Yamamoto tried to restrain. See HTN, Vol. 5, p. 300.
67 ‘Official statement on anti-Japanese rumours’, The Japan Advertiser, 21 July 1913; Yoshizawa Kenkichi, ‘A warning to adventurers’, China Central Post, 23 July 1913.
68 Gaimushō, (ed.), Nihon gaikō nenpyō narabi shūyō bunsho (Tokyo: Hara Shobō, 1965–1966), Vol. 1, pp. 369–376Google Scholar.
69 ‘Ichi-ryū gaikōkan shi’, Asahi shinbun, 7 September 1913, p. 2. The assassins’ letter is reproduced in Kurihara, Tai Manmō, pp. 88–89. See also TSSK, Vol. 2, pp. 560–561.
70 TSSK, Vol. 2, pp. 551–552. The blood-stained map was preserved by the patriotic societies as a relic.
71 HTN, Vol. 5, p. 304.
72 HTN, Vol. 5, pp. 290–291, 295.
73 TSSK, Vol. 2, pp. 552–553, 556–558, 562–563, 568; Jansen, The Japanese and Sun, p. 180; Hatano, ‘Chūgoku dai-ni kakumei’, p. 177. For background information on the crisis that precipitated the government change, see Tetsuo, Najita, Hara Kei in the Politics of Compromise, 1905–1915 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967), pp. 188–191Google Scholar.
74 HTN, Vol. 6, pp. 449–450.
75 Dickinson, F., War and National Reinvention (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), p. 129CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Kitaoka, ‘China Experts’, p. 353. For details on Tanaka's Manchurian vision, see also Matsusaka, Yoshihisa Tak, The Making of Japanese Manchuria, 1904–1932 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2001), pp. 180–182Google Scholar.
76 Tanaka to Morioka Morishige, Qingdao Garrison Commander, mid-May 1916 (precise date unclear), HMM, Kindai Nihon to higashi Ajia, p. 253.
77 Tetsuichi, Takakura et al., Tanaka Giichi denki (Tokyo: Tanaka Giichi denki kankōkai, 1957–8), Vol. 1, p. 629Google Scholar (hereafter cited as TGD); Kuniaki, Koiso, Katsuzan kōsō (Tokyo: Koiso Kuniaki jijōden kankōkai, 1963), pp. 326–327Google Scholar; Kuroita, Fukuda taishō den, pp. 274–277; HTN, Vol. 6, p. 449; Banzai to Tanaka (undated, probably sent in December 1915; see Dickinson, War and National Reinvention, p. 299, note 52 about the date), HMM, Kindai Nihon to higashi Ajia, p. 216. Aoki, the same China expert whom Prime Minister Yamamoto had tried to remove in 1913, was at that time the garrison commander at Port Arthur, Manchuria.
78 TGD, Vol. 1, p. 630.
79 Teranishi to Uehara, 7, 16 February 1916; Uehara to Aoki (undated, probably from late March 1916), HMM, Kindai Nihon to higashi Ajia, pp. 233, 237, 242; HTN, Vol. 6, pp. 383–384; Tanaka to Army Minister Oka, 21 February, 9 March 1916, in Oka Ichinosuke kankei monjo, an appendix to Terauchi Masatake kankei monjo, pp. 198–212, KS-NDL.
80 Hara Takashi, then leader of the opposition, suspected that this propaganda campaign was staged by the continental adventurers on behalf of the General Staff. The army, he wrote, wanted to use the disturbances in China to win an unlimited budget increase. See HTN, Vol. 6, pp. 383, 415. See also Ken, Kurihara, ‘Dai ichi-ji, dai ni-ji Manmō dokusen undō’, in Gakkai, Nihon Kokusai Seiji (ed.), Nihon gaikōshi kenkyū: Taishō jidai (Tokyo: Nihon Kokusai Seiji Gakkai, 1958), p. 147Google Scholar; Uchida Ryōhei, ‘Memorandum for a Solution of the China Problem’, full translation in Putnam-Weale, B. L., The Fight for the Republic in China (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1917), pp. 125–138Google Scholar, see especially pp. 133–135. For the Japanese original, see kurabu, Kokuryū (ed.), Kokushi Uchida Ryōhei den (Tokyo: Hara Shobō, 1967), pp. 529–531Google Scholar; TSSK, Vol. 2, pp. 591–592. For context and analysis, see Jansen, The Japanese and Sun, pp. 180–183.
81 HTN, Vol. 6, pp. 369–370.
82 Tokyo keizai daigaku shiryō iinkai (ed.), Kōhon Ōkura, p. 182.
83 Imperial Cabinet decision, 7 March 1916, ‘Shina mokka no jikyoku ni taishi Teikoku no toru beki seisaku’, reproduced in Kurihara, Tai-Manmō, pp. 369–374.
84 See, for example, the protest of the Japanese consul in Andong: Yoshida to Foreign Minister Ishii, 16 March 1916, NGB, 1916(2), p. 852.
85 Kuroita, Fukuda taishō den, pp. 270–275; TGD, Vol. 1, pp. 629–630; Teranishi to Uehara Yūsaku, Chief of the General Staff, HMM, Nihon to higashi Ajia, p. 233.
86 Some Japanese sources, especially sources close to the military-adventurous complex, argue that Babojab's gang helped the Imperial Army's special operations during the Russo-Japanese War. See TSSK, Vol. 2, pp. 625–626. However, Nakami Tatsuo examined the relevant documents in the Russian Imperial Archives and found no mention of Babojab, so the entire story is probably a myth. See Nakami, Manmō mondai, p. 172.
87 Russian Foreign Ministry to the diplomatic envoy in Mongolia, 5 March 1916, Mezdunarodnye otnosnija v epochu imperializma: dokumenty iz archivov carskogo i vremennogo pravitel'stv 1878–1917 (Leningrad: Gosd.izd.polit.lit., 1940), Vol. 10, p. 424; Heissig, Geschichte der mongolischen Literature, Vol. 2, pp. 519, 538, 551–552, 826–827; Nakami, Manmō mondai, pp. 177–178, 182–183. In a detailed intelligence report on Babojab's rebellion, a Japanese agent wrote that Mongols of all classes detested the Han Chinese immigrants who encroached on their land, as well as the government troops who raped the women and pillaged property. Most of them, however, did not dare to join the rebellion. See ‘Mōhi tōbatsu jōkyō’, pp. 32–33, DA, 1-6-1-63.
88 Nakami, ‘Manmō dokuritsu undō’, pp. 89–90, 94–96.
89 TSSK, Vol. 2, pp. 625, 628; Nakami, Manmō mondai, pp. 201–204.
90 In fact, the agents of the Japanese Foreign Ministry had already recommended that Japan use Mongol brigands (like those of Babojab) against China. See ‘Mōhi tōbatsu jōkyō’, p. 37, DA, 1-6-1-63. About the delegation to Babojab, see ‘Hailaru ryokō-shi, zokujō—ippan’ (secret: record of trip to Hailar, situation of the brigands-general), 17 March 1916, pp. 39–40, 86–101. Both sources are included in ‘Mōko ni kan-suru jijō mittei ikken shoshū’ (secret espionage reports on the situation in Mongolia), submitted on 17 March 1916, pp. 39–40, DA, 1-6-1-63.
91 TSSK, Vol. 2, pp. 630–631. For the assessment of the number of Babojab's troops, see ‘Mōhi tōbatsu jōkyō’, p. 21, DA, 1-6-1-63.
92 Aida, Kawashima, pp. 214–215, 217–219, 220, 226, 229; TSSK, Vol. 2, pp. 630–631; Captain Kuroki, Harbin, to Chief of the General Staff Uehara, Prince Su to Baron Ōkura Kihachirō, 30 March 1916, NGB, 1916(2), p. 855. We know that the Ōkura Concern invested one million yen in both cash and military supplies. For the precise terms of the contract between Kawashima, Prince Su, and Ōkura, see Tokyo keizai daigaku shiryō iinkai (ed.), Kōhon Ōkura, p. 183.
93 Ōuchi Ushinosuke to Fukuda, 5 May 1916, HMM, Kindai Nihon to higashi Ajia, p. 250; Masaru, Hatano, Manmō dokuritsu undo (Tokyo: PHP Kenkyūjo, 2001), p. 173Google Scholar; Koiso Kuniaki's testimony, in Kuroita, Fukuda taishō den, pp. 276–277.
94 Yada to Ishii, 13 April 1916, NGB, 1916(2), pp. 861–862. For the Russian estimate, see the Russian Embassy in Tokyo to the Japanese Foreign Ministry, 1 August 1916, ibid., pp. 895–896.
95 TSSK, Vol. 2, p. 632; Andong Consul Yoshida, Mukden Consul General Yada to Foreign Minister Ishii, 16, 17 March 1916; Ishii to Yada, 18 March 1916; Yada to Ishii, 2 April 1916; Kwantung Governor General Nakamura to Ishii, 7 April 1916, NGB, 1916(2), pp. 852–853, 856–857, 859. Hara Kei wrote in his diary on 24 June and again on 9 July 1916 about similar behaviour by Japanese adventurers in Shandong, including ‘robbery and rape’. See HTN, Vol. 6, pp. 438, 449. It was not clear even to Kawashima Naniwa whether or not officers in the field were acting on General Staff orders. See Kawashima to Oshikawa and Kamiizumi, 18 May 1916, HMM, Kindai Nihon to higashi Ajia, p. 253.
96 Wang, ‘Manmō’, pp. 128–129. About the assassination attempt, see US Consul General in Mukden to Reinsch, ‘Attempted assassination of the Military Governor, Chang Tso-lin’, 5 June 1916, pp. 2–4, RIAC, Reel 15, HULL. According to the consul, the assassins were assisted by local Japanese police, as well as by a shady arms firm called ‘Mukden Guarantee and Trust Company’.
97 Tsutomu, Kawashima, pp. 230–231; TSSK, Vol. 2, pp. 634–635; Koiso, Katsuzan, pp. 327–328; Ishii to Yada, 9 April 1916; Tanaka to Nishikawa, 10 April 1916; Yada to Ishii, 30 May 1916, NGB, 1916(2), pp. 860, 879.
98 Doi, ‘Manmō’, in TGD, Vol. 1, pp. 634–638; Tanaka to Aoki, Tanaka to Nishikawa, 20 May 1916, HMM, Kindai Nihon to higashi Ajia, pp. 255–257.
99 Ishii to Yada, 7 June 1916; the Russian ambassador in Tokyo to Ishii, 27 June 1916; Hioki Eki, envoy to Beijing, to Ishii, 9 July 1916, NGB, 1916(2), pp. 886–981. These discussions are summed up in the cabinet decision of 9 January 1917, reproduced in Kurihara, Tai-Manmō, pp. 373–374.
100 Tani to Tanaka, 18 July 1916; Nishikawa to Tanaka, 22 July 1916; Tanaka to Nishikawa, 1 August 1916, NGB, 1916(2), pp. 891–892, 896–897; Doi, ‘Manmō’, TGD, Vol. 1, pp. 638–639.
101 About Ishimoto's opium business, see Kingsberg, Moral Nation, pp. 100–101.
102 TSSK, Vol. 2, pp. 641–642; Yamauchi to Ishii, 31 July, 1 August 1916; Tanaka to Nishikawa, 1 August 1916; Nishikawa to Tanaka, 3 August 1916, NGB, 1916(2), pp. 893–899.
103 Ishimoto Kantarō to Koike Chōzō, Chief of the Foreign Ministry Bureau for Political Affairs, 1 August 1916; Nishikawa to Tanaka, 5 August 1916, NGB, 1916(2), pp. 897, 900.
104 Shirani, Chief of civil administration of the Kwantung General Government to Ishii, 11 August 1916; Nishikawa to Tanaka, 16, 17 August 1916, NGB, 1916(2), pp. 901–902.
105 HTN, Vol. 6, p. 437.
106 Tani to Tanaka, 18 July 1916, NGB, 1916(2), p. 892.
107 Nikame to Motono, 28 March 1917, reproduced in Kurihara, Tai-Manmō, pp. 376–377; Hatano, Manmō, p.170.
108 Harrell, Asia for the Asians, p. 222.
110 Masao, Inaba, ‘Chō Sakurin bakusatsu jiken’, in honbu, Sanbō (ed.), Shōwa sannen Shina jihen shuppeishi (Tokyo: Gannandō Shoten, 1971), p. 12Google Scholar.
111 Kōmoto to Isogai, 18 April 1928, reproduced in Kazuhiro, Kobayashi, ‘ Shina-tsū’ ichi gunjin no hikari to kage: Isogai Rensuke chūjō den (Tokyo: Kashiwa shobō, 2000), pp. 48–50Google Scholar.
112 ‘Pingye lingfu zhengci’, 5 August 1954, Zhongyang dang an guan et al. (eds), Heben Dazuo yu Rijun shanxi ‘can liu’ (Beijing: Zhonghua shu ju, 1995), p. 18 (hereafter cited as HBDZ); Shunsuke, Sagara, Akai yūhi no Manshū nogahara ni: kisai Kōmoto Daisaku no shōgai (Tokyo: Kōjinsha, 1978), pp. 19–22, 29–31Google Scholar.
113 Kōmoto to Isogai, 18 April 1928, reproduced in Kobayashi, Isogai, pp. 47–48.
114 ‘Heben Dazuo kou gong’, 6 April 1954, HBDZ, p. 34; Kawagoe Moriji, Chō Sakurin bakushi jiken, pp. 30–34, National Institute for Defense Studies (Bōeishō bōei kenkyūjo), Military Archives, Tokyo (hereafter cited as Chō Sakurin, NIDS), itaku no. 251; Sagara, Akai yūhi, p. 153; Iboshi Ei, ‘Chō Sakurin bakusatsu jiken no shinsō’, Geirin 4 (June 1982), p. 40.
115 Iboshi, ‘Chō Sakurin’, p. 33; Sagara, Akai yūhi, p. 16; Japanese Special Committee of Inquiry's findings (second meeting, 23 October 1928), NGB, 1928(2), pp. 196–197; Heikichi, Ogawa, ‘Manshū mondai hiroku-hi’, Ogawa Heikichi kankei monjo, Yoshitake, Oka (ed.) (Tokyo: Isuzu Shobō, 1973), Vol. 1, pp. 626–627Google Scholar.
116 ‘Heben Dazuo kou gong’, 6 April 1954, and ‘Heben Dazuo bigong’, 2 August 1953, HBDZ, pp. 36, 42; Yoshizawa, Envoy in Beijing, to Prime Minister Tanaka Giichi, 16 June 1928, NGB, 1928(2), p. 158; ‘Special committee meeting’, 23 October 1928, NGB, 1928(2), pp. 196–197; Kawagoe, Chō Sakurin, NIDS, pp. 79–81.
117 Inaba, ‘Chō Sakurin’, pp. 19, 21.
118 Orbach, Curse on this Country, pp. 181–182.
119 ‘Manshū mondai hiroku-hi’, Ogawa Heikichi kankei monjo, Vol. 1, pp. 626–629 (the account is undated, but according to Ogawa's own side note on p. 627, it must have been written before 1931).
120 Maejima Shōzō, ‘Shishiteki pucchi to kokka kenryoku’, Nihonshi kenkyū 24 (May 1955), p. 57; Takahashi Hikohiro, ‘Ingaidan no keisei: Takeuchi Takeshi-shi no kikigaki o chūshin ni’, Shakai rōdō kenkyū 30:3–5 (March 1984), p. 107; Jansen, The Japanese and Sun, p. 185.
121 Hayashi Kyūjirō, Consul General in Mukden, to Prime Minister Tanaka, 8, 18 June 1928, NGB, 1928(2), pp. 140–142, 46–50.
122 On the chain of events that led to Tanaka's political demise, and his fall with Emperor Hirohito, see Orbach, Curse on this Country, pp. 183–188, as well as Hidenari, Terasaki, Shōwa Tennō dokuhakuroku: Terasaki Hidenari goyōgakari nikki (Tokyo: Bungei Shunjū, 1991), pp. 22–23Google Scholar; Kumao, Harada, Saionji-kō to seikyoku (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1950–1956), Vol. 1, p. 11Google Scholar; Takeji, Nara, Jijū bukanchō Nara Takeji nikki kaisōroku (Tokyo: Kashiwa shobō, 2000), Vol. 4, p. 152; TGD, Vol. 2, p. 1043Google Scholar.
123 Lytton, V. G. R. B. et al., Appeal by the Chinese Government. Report of the Commission of Enquiry (also known as the Lytton Report) (Geneva: League of Nations Publications, 1932), pp. 67–68Google Scholar. See also the description in Orbach, Curse on this Country, pp. 210–214.
124 Kingorō, Hashimoto, Hashimoto taisa no shuki, Masao, Nakano (ed.) (Tokyo: Misuzu shobō, 1963), p. 123Google Scholar.
126 Hashimoto shuki, p. 163; Ogata, Sadako, Defiance in Manchuria: The Making of Japanese Foreign Policy, 1931–2 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1984), pp. 80, 94Google Scholar; Tanaka Ryūkichi's Interrogation, International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Record of proceedings, Tokyo, Japan: The United States of America [et al.] against Araki, Sadao . . . Tojo, Hideki [et al.], accused / official court reporters, Jack Greenberg, Chief . . . [et al.], Microfilm Reels, Center for Research Libraries, Chicago, Reel 2:2017; Morishima Morito's affidavit, Court papers, journals, exhibits and judgments of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Microfilm Reels, Center for Research Libraries, Chicago, Reel 12, Exhibit 245, p. 6. For analysis of the Manchurian Incident as a manifestation of a long-standing tradition of disobedience, rather than mere disagreements on substantive policy, see Orbach, Curse on this Country, pp. 210–214.
127 Peattie, Mark, Ishiwara Kanji and Japan's Confrontation with the West (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975), p. 129Google Scholar.
128 For a study of this incident, see Kahn, B. Winston, Doihara Kenji and the ‘North China Autonomy Movement’, 1935–6 (Tempe: Arizona State University, 1973)Google Scholar.
129 Kiyotada, Tsutsui, Shōwaki Nihon no kōzō: sono rekishi shakaiteki kōsatsu (Tokyo: Yūhikaku, 1984), p. 97Google Scholar.
130 Shigeru, Honjō, Emperor Hirohito and his Aide-de-Camp: The Honjō Diary, Mikiso Hane (trans. and ed.) (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1982), pp. 221, 226Google Scholar; Shin'ya, Ōmae, Seiji seiryoku to shite no rikugun: yosan hensei to niniroku jiken (Tokyo: Chūō Kōron Shinsha, 2015), pp. 228–229Google Scholar.
131 Billingsley, Bandits, pp. 221–224.
132 TGD, Vol. 1, p. 629; ‘Ryojun yōsai chūshō Aoki Norizumi’, 26 December 1915, National Archives of Japan, Call number 00484100. In the course of 1913, Aoki served as the military attaché in the Beijing embassy, traditionally a key supervisory post over the various China experts.
133 Kitaoka, ‘China Experts’, p. 360.
134 Calhoun to the Secretary of State, 15 March 1912, p. 14, RIAC, Reel 10, HULL.
135 Tanaka to Nishikawa, 20 May 1916, HMM, Kindai Nihon to higashi Ajia, p. 256.
136 HTN, Vol. 6, pp. 449–450.
137 Kawashima to Oshikawa and Kamiizumi, 18 May 1916, HMM, Kindai Nihon to higashi Ajia, p. 254.
138 HTN, Vol. 6, p. 479; US Consul General in Mukden to Reinsch, ‘Attempted assassination of the Military Governor, Chang Tso-lin’, 5 June 1916, p. 3, RIAC, Reel 15, HULL. ‘It is known,’ the consul general wrote, ‘that there are many Chinese who are employed by the Japanese for secret service purposes. These men are provided with documents indicating their employment, and the Japanese insist that such a document renders its holder immune from arrest by the Chinese authorities.’ About the protection given to smugglers (many of them adventurers) by the Japanese police in Manchuria, and the way in which they used the extraterritoriality treaty provisions, see US Consul in Andong to Reinsch, 6 October 1916, ‘Notes on the political situation in Southeastern Manchuria: rumors on impending annexation by Japan’, pp. 1–3, RIAC, Reel 16, HULL.
139 This paragraph was adapted from my book: see Orbach, Curse on this Country, p. 256. The detailed evidence should appear in Andrew Levidis’ forthcoming work. For his findings, see Andrew Levidis, ‘Conservatism and Japanese Army Factionalism, 1937–1939: The Case of Prince Konoe Fumimaro and Baron Hiranuma Kiichirō’, Talk given at the Forum for US–Japan Relations, Harvard University, 17 November 2015. Levidis's claim is mainly based on two unpublished sources: the diary of General Araki Sadao (late July 1937) and a manuscript written by Colonel Tanaka Shin'ichi (Shina jihen kiroku), kept in the National Institute for Defense Studies, Tokyo.
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