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The Waxing and Waning of the Acehnese Diaspora's Long-distance Politics*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 October 2012

ANTJE MISSBACH
ANTJE MISSBACH*
Affiliation:
Melbourne Law School, University of Melbourne Email: antje.missbach@unimelb.edu.au
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Abstract

This paper sheds light on the long-distance politics of a small and rather young diaspora—the Acehnese overseas—which proved to be very influential on homeland politics despite its relatively small size, especially with regard to the separatist conflict in Aceh, Indonesia. Special attention is therefore given to the close connections between the politicized migrant population overseas and their involvement back home. Born out of the suffering of people in Aceh and in Malaysia—the main destiny for refugees—the Acehnese overseas started to organize informal associations and networks to foster mutual support. During the almost 30-year-long conflict, material, financial, and other forms of support were directed not only to members of the diaspora, but also to people in Aceh, as well as the separatists, which enabled them to continue their struggle for Aceh's independence from Indonesia. Unlike larger conflict-generated diasporas that can afford to send home large sums of money, the Acehnese diaspora's greatest strength was the ideological and moral support they provided to people back in Aceh. The evolution of the diaspora and its activities were closely linked to developments in the homeland. By emphasizing the dependence of diasporas on homeland developments, which dictates the level of their political engagement, this paper draws attention to the diaspora's support for both the perpetuation of conflict and conflict resolution. After the end of the conflict in 2005, the diaspora lost its prominent role, and became involved in rudimentary forms of long-distance engagement.

Type
Research Article
Information
Modern Asian Studies , Volume 47 , Issue 3 , May 2013 , pp. 1055 - 1082
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2012

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Footnotes

*

This paper is based on my PhD thesis, which is entitled ‘Long-distance Politics in Transition: Aceh's Diaspora During and After the Homeland Conflict (1976–2009)’, submitted in January 2010 at the Australian National University in Canberra. The outcome of my research on the Acehnese diaspora is based on 14 months of fieldwork in Malaysia, Scandinavia, and the United States. Quotes from interviews conducted during this time appear throughout this paper. It must be noted that most informants—both members of the diaspora in Malaysia and former Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) members in Aceh—insisted on their anonymity. In many cases, they would only tell me their nicknames rather than their full names and so, to respect their wish for discretion, I have refrained from using any of their names in this paper.

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24 In March 1998, Acehnese inmates in the Semenyih detention camp were alleged to have been deported back to Indonesia against their will. When picked up, they violently resisted the Malaysian police. At least eight Acehnese and one Malaysian police officer died. Riots among other Acehnese broke out simultaneously in other camps (Linggeng, Macap Umbo), suggesting that there had been some communication between the inmates in different camps. See, for example, Human Rights Watch, Acehnese Deportees in Danger in Indonesia, Press release, 31 March 1998; and also Suaram, Human Rights Report Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, 1998.

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26 Schulze, ‘The Struggle for an Independent Aceh’, p. 245. For more details on the political alliance between Hasan Tiro and Muammar al-Gadhafi, see Aspinall, Islam and Nation, pp. 49–84.

27 Schulze, The Free Aceh Movement, p. 31.

28 Already in the early 1990s, there were indications that GAM collected obligatory contributions from Acehnese villagers, often paid in rice, sugar, corn, bananas, etc. (See Far Eastern Economic Review, 9 July 1992). It was also assumed that the movement's members raised money by growing marijuana. From 1999 onwards, it raised money from extortion, kidnappings, and diverse ‘illegal’ businesses. Moreover, business people, NGOs, and even private citizens had to pay pajak nanggroe (literally ‘state tax’ levied) to GAM. See, for example, Schulze ‘The Struggle for an Independent Aceh’, pp. 241–71. It is well known that both the movement and the Indonesian military were involved in semi-legal and illegal business in Aceh, such as marijuana sales, timber-felling, and the birds’ nest trade. However, the leaders in exile were not involved in orchestrating these internal money-raising methods; this was a task that fell more to local leaders. Also see McCulloch, Lesley, ‘Trifungsi: The Role of the Indonesian Military in Business’, in Brömmelhöster, Jörn and Paes, Wolf-Christian (eds), The Military as an Economic Factor: Soldiers in Business (Bonn: Bonn International Center for Conversion, 2003), pp. 94–123CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

29 For example, one informant claimed that he sold four of his five convenience stores in Kuala Lumpur to raise money for arms.

30 For monthly payments GAM issued numbered receipts for Dana Wadjeb (obligatory donation).

31 Compulsory donations from Acehnese in Scandinavia, the United States, and Australia were much higher than those from living in Malaysia; however, their numbers were much smaller. GAM leaders in Stockholm assigned a number of people to collect donations. In Denmark, community elders regularly collected contributions at meetings. Monthly payments ranged between 150 DKK (US$ 32) and 500 DKK (US$ 105), depending on whether the contributor was single (bujangan) or had a family to support. In Sweden, Acehnese had to pay SEK 500 (US$ 84) per month. In Norway, regular monthly payments ranged between NOK 500 (US$ 100) per family and NOK 250 (US$ 50) for single people. Emergency payments amounted to as much as NOK 1,000 (US$ 200) or more. In the United States, monthly contributions ranged between US$ 50 and US$ 200 per month. Financial support for the movement from the diaspora in Australia was relatively small and collections took place rather irregularly.

32 Generally, people who contributed weapons were easily accepted as comrades within GAM. However, it was considered sufficient to provide funds for arms, so Acehnese overseas did not necessarily have to organize the purchase or transport of weapons from Malaysia to Aceh. Prices for weapons dropped after 2003: the cost of an AK 47 automatic rifle, which would have normally have been between US$ 3,000 and US$ 3,500, fell to about US$ 2,400.

33 Although Kirsten Schulze noted that some weapons were ‘ordered directly from arms dealers by expatriate supporters in Malaysia and Singapore’, she claimed that GAM bought most of its arms from Tentara National Indonesia (Indonesian National Armed Forces) soldiers in Aceh. See Schulze, The Free Aceh Movement, p. 33; and also Human Rights Watch, Indonesia, The War in Aceh, New York, 13 (4) 2001. Not only did Indonesian soldiers sell their arms in order to supplement their meagre salaries, GAM captured arms during their raids. Some of the arms were also purchased in areas that had experienced conflict in the past, such as East Timor. Last, but not least, fighters also built their own weapons (senjata rakitan).

34 Aspinall, Islam and Nation, p. 188.

35 International Crisis Group, Aceh: Why Military Force Won't Bring Lasting Peace (Jakarta; Brussels: Asia Report 17, 2001), p. 8.

36 The transfer of funds often gave rise to suspicion and frustration. Contributors did not know what their money was used for and how much of it arrived in Aceh or Stockholm, or how much might have been diverted into the pockets of carriers and/or recipients. Among members of the diaspora, rumours about the misuse of funds were widespread; many suspected certain collectors of using some of the money for private purposes.

37 Zaini Abdullah, interview with DeTAK, 24 July 1999.

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42 Among the activists overseas were students who had had to leave Aceh because their security was endangered back home. Moreover, a number of Acehnese students also became politicized abroad, where information was more freely obtainable and there was access to wider networks of activists, scholars, and lobbyists.

43 Aguswandi, ‘Breaking the Deadlock: Civil Society Engagement for Conflict Resolution’, in Hedman, Eva-Lotta E. (ed.), Aceh Under Martial Law: Conflict, Violence and Displacement (Oxford: Refugee Studies Centre, 2005), pp. 45–52Google Scholar. The chairman of the International Forum for Aceh, Jafar Siddiq Hamzah, assisted human rights organizations and journalists from Indonesia and overseas to enter Aceh. On a return trip from Medan to Aceh in August 2000, he was kidnapped and murdered, causing an outcry among both Acehnese and international activists. See Siegel, James, ‘Jafar Siddiq Hamzah’, Indonesia, 70, 2000, pp. 171–74Google Scholar.

44 For more information on the peace process, see, for example, Aspinall, Edward and Crouch, Harold, The Aceh Peace Process: Why it Failed (Washington: Policy Study, East-West Center, 2003)Google Scholar; Aspinall, Islam and Nation; Missbach, ‘The Acehnese Diaspora’, pp. 22–43.

45 Among them were Kautsar, Radhi Darmansyah, Taufik Abda, Tarmizi, and Cut Farah. Some of them had escaped persecution in Aceh by enrolling as students at Malaysian universities while continuing to work as full-time activists for peace in Aceh. In order to be admitted as advisers, they had to be screened and accepted by GAM as a result of their reputation as activists and/or their renowned family backgrounds.

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47 International Crisis Group, Aceh's Local Elections: The Role of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) (Jakarta; Brussels: Asia Briefing 57, 2006).

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