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On a Practical Way of Describing Formal Deductions

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 January 2016

Katuzi Ono*
Affiliation:
Mathematical Institute, Nagoya University
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Even though the logical structure of any formal deduction can be nicely expressed in a tree-form diagram, it is more practical to write it down in a series of propositions. In each step of inference, we usually deduce a proposition on basis of some foregoing propositions. However, global aspects of mathematical theories show us that this is not always the case. For, in mathematical theories, theorems are usually stated before their proofs. In fact, also in proofs of theorems, it is often practical that we prove propositions after stating them. Accordingly, in our real way of thinking, we arrange propositions going back and forth in the logical order.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Editorial Board of Nagoya Mathematical Journal 1962

References

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[3] Ono, K., A theory of mathematical objects as a prototype of set theory. Nagoya J. of math., vol. 20 (in press).Google Scholar