Pillarization, Polarization and the Rebirth of Right-Wing Organizations in Poland

Poland was perceived to be a success story of post-1989 democratization. However, three decades after the fall of communism in 1989, it was experiencing the rise of right-wing populism strongly linked to nationalism and/or conservatism, similar to other countries in the region (Wodak Reference Wodak2015; Hanley and Vachudova Reference Hanley and Vachudova2018; Mudde Reference Mudde2007). In Poland, conservatism and nationalism are two populist discursive strategies that are used to justify the governmental actions seeking a greater concentration of political power (Mudde and Kaltwasser Reference Mudde and Kaltwasser2017, 1; Magyar and Madlovics Reference Magyar and Madlovics2020). Nationalism as a discursive instrument is used to weaken the influence of the European Union (EU) on Poland and to neutralize any leverage the EU might have (for example, rejecting community efforts to tie the budget to the rule of law), justifying it as a threat that is violating national values, interests, and sovereignty. The logical consequence of this reasoning is that the political elites in power decide what is a national interest that should be protected and who the enemies who should be eliminated are. According to the current Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, PiS) government, conservative values, which derive from national or religious culture, need to be protected, and this rhetoric is used in the governmental propaganda (for example, public media).Footnote ²

Right-wing populism in Poland contributed to the revival of conservative organizations whose agenda focuses on preserving traditional values—for example, the model of family opposing gender parity, same-sex marriage, or adoption of children by same-sex couples. As scholars suggest, it is not the state that plays the decisive role in recasting nationalism but “civic actors, far-right political groups and their media outlets backed by a vigorous industry that has turned nationalist identity politics into a profitable business” (Molnár Reference Molnár2016, 170; see also Kasprowicz Reference Kasprowicz and Minkenberg2015). Indeed, in Poland right-wing political parties solicit support from the actors who help defend the status quo and oppose the LGBT+ movement, forging cooperation and establishing ties with similar organizations from Russia, Christian fundamentalists from the United States, and other external organizations (Guasti and Bustikova Reference Guasti and Bustikova2020, 241; Korolczuk Reference Korolczuk2020), as well as the national right-wing parties and populist authorities in power. Liberal organizations, however, often supported by the EU and Western donors, continue promoting democracy, human rights, women, LGBT+, and environmentalists and are beginning to feel alienated by the political elites (Piotrowski Reference Piotrowski2020; Petrova and Pospieszna Reference Petrova and Pospieszna2021; Pospieszna and Pietrzyk-Reeves Reference Pospieszna and Pietrzyk-Reeves2021).

In fact, as a consequence of this cultural shift and a growing cleavage over conservative versus liberal moral values, right-wing populism has begun to triumph, contributing to the emergence of two opposite strands of civil society: liberal and conservative; in other words, we observe pillarization of civil society (Ekiert Reference Ekiert2020). The social polarization has contributed to this pillarization because it has reinforced the cleavages, which also has consequences in the political domain. The support of conservative civil society for antiliberal and anti-European policies facilitated further mobilization of far-right parties (Enyedi Reference Enyedi2020). These parties receive support from conservative social networks or “cultural entrepreneurs” that perceive the emancipation of women, reproductive freedom, and equal rights for LGBT+ citizens as a threat (Fomina and Kucharczyk Reference Fomina and Kucharczyk2016; Płatek and Płucienniczak Reference Płatek and Płucienniczak2016; Grzebalska and Pető Reference Grzebalska and Pető2018; Ekiert Reference Ekiert2019; Kotwas and Kubik Reference Kotwas and Kubik2019, 442).

What do we know about conservative organizations in Poland that today have strong links with far right-wing organizations? One important feature that distinguishes them is that they have a long tradition in Poland (Dąbrowska Reference Dąbrowska, Bluhm and Varga2019; Jasiewicz Reference Jasiewicz, Bluhm and Varga2019) that date back to when Poland was partitioned between Prussia, Russia, and Austro-Hungary for 123 years. History and how it is constructed in local/regional or national memory represents a powerful factor in right and far-right mobilization and normalization. It is often strengthened by governmental actions through delegated agencies such as the Institute of National Remembrance (Instytut Pamięci Narodowej) or the Pilecki Institute who—together with the actions of various ministries—promote a conservative vision of history and nationalist historical figures and introduce new public holidays such as Day of Remembrance of “Cursed Soldiers” (Żołnierze Wyklęci, a term coined in 1990s to generally describe the post-WWII anticommunist underground guerillas) established in 2011 by the Polish Parliament (Kończal Reference Kończal2020). The Independence March was initiated in 2009 as grassroots commemorations by the far right of the Polish Independence Day and has gained momentum and visibility since 2011 after antifascist organizations attempted to block the event. Popular and big right-wing organizations that exist today, such as “All-Polish Youth” (Młodzież Wszechpolska [MW]) as well as National Radical Camp (Obóz Narodowo-Radykalny [ONR]), with an ideology and propaganda of a nationalistic concept developed by Roman Dmowski—that is, an “ethnically homogeneous” state and Polishness associated with Catholicism, tradition, and history (Rudnicki Reference Rudnicki2018).

Undoubtedly, there is a good political opportunity for these right-wing organizations to grow, survive, and form alliances with political parties (Ekiert, Kubik, and Wenzel Reference Ekiert, Kubik and Wenzel2017; Greskovits Reference Greskovits2017; Płatek and Płucienniczak Reference Płatek, Płucienniczak, Jacobsson and Korolczuk2017; Ślarzyński Reference Ślarzyński, Kurczewska and Mach2017). They have achieved spectacular successes in the recent years using their time to introduce changes that under the former government were not possible. In fact, in the past these right-wing organizations were marginalized and often described from the perspective of youth or subcultural studies with the most common examples of the skinhead, pan-Slavic, or neo-Nazi movements (Tomasiewicz Reference Tomasiewicz, Szafrański and Kosiński2007, Reference Tomasiewicz, Gąssowska, Buryła and Ossowska2018; Kornak Reference Marcin2009; Pankowski Reference Pankowski2010). However, these movements after the regime change in 1989 were becoming more and more institutionalized and, over the years, more and more politicized, seeking opportunities in mainstream politics.

During the 2000s, the far right became active in mainstream politics and this was the first real opportunity for right-wing organizations to become more visible to the broader public. During 2005–2007, Liga Polskich Rodzin participated in the ruling coalition (Płatek and Płucienniczak Reference Płatek, Płucienniczak, Jacobsson and Korolczuk2017) and was present in the parliament. Both PiS coalition partners shared exclusionist and homogenizing visions of a Polish nation and together with PiS exploited populist slogans and narratives on the political scene (Jasiewicz Reference Jasiewicz2008). The development of right-wing and conservative spheres of the Polish politics that attracted numerous people from neo-fascist groups was essential to the entire process. These groups became partners of the mainstream organizations, and their activists later began to make careers in politics and state agencies. This coincides with the failures of the far right in numerous elections (presidential, parliamentary), in which it usually received less than 1% of votes when trying to run on their own, as the Polska Wspólnota Narodowa or Narodowe Odrodzenie Polski did. This made the far right look for other ways to influence the political system; as a result, the far right decided to run for elections from other electoral lists rather than their own.

An important political opportunity emerged for the right-wing organizations in early 2010s and more specifically the elections in 2015 and 2019 that brought PiS back to power, with two right-wing coalition partners—Agreement (Porozumienie), more neoliberal and market-oriented, and Solidary Poland (Solidarna Polska), even more radical on domestic and external issues, the EU in particular. Also, certain media outlets like The Polish Gazette (Gazeta Polska), a weekly that publishes articles with conservative to far-right sympathies, are supportive of PiS and their editors and journalists often appeared in PiS-controlled public media. The newspaper helped to mobilize voter turnout for PiS in 2015 (Ślarzyński Reference Ślarzyński2015, Reference Ślarzyński2018). Other extreme right parties became empowered and increased in popularity, which helped them to meet an electoral threshold and eventually get seats in the parliament, such as Confederation (Konfederacja), where they are considered partners in government formation and included in policy making. The members of Parliament (MPs) of Konfederacja often support nationalist activists or initiatives and introduce them to the mainstream. Other formations contributed to the success of the new nationalist, even more conservative movements, such as the electoral movement Kukiz’15, whose five MPs were associated with the Nationalist Movement (Ruch Narodowy) and later joined Konfederacja. As the result of these opportunities, some actors became agents contributing to resilience of populist parties that occupy mainstream positions in politics at the national level as either ruling parties or parties gaining electorate and overall vote shares. We believe that the close relations between main right-wing organizations and the political parties listed above might have influenced the structure of networks of right-wing organizations.

It is believed that the conservative fraction of civil society has the tendency to radicalize and move toward “uncivil society.” At the core of the definition of uncivil society is the use of—or the will to use—violence (Whitehead Reference Whitehead1997; Kopecký and Mudde Reference Kopecký and Mudde2003; Piotrowski Reference Piotrowski2009), and thus it is considered an enemy of the standards and norms of democracy (Pedahzur and Weinberg Reference Pedahzur and Weinberg2016). Uncivil behavior of organizations can take the form of demonizing LGBT+ people; raising the level of xenophobia, misogyny, and/or homophobia; and frequent targeting of immigrants and refugees as unwanted “others.” Such attitudes can also manifest in the form of exclusivism as well as through a fundamentalist version of Roman Catholicism (Stanley Reference Stanley, McDonnell, Marzouki and Roy2016; Krzyżanowski Reference Krzyżanowski2018). Uncivil society is used by the right-wing political parties to advance their goals. The governing elites’ acceptance of radical nationalism—for example, through praise of far-right marches as expressions of patriotism—contributes to further radicalization or, more precisely, to the introduction of right-wing radicalism to the mainstream. Over time these organizations began to benefit from improved access to funding and felt empowered to mobilize (Ślarzyński Reference Ślarzyński, Kurczewska and Mach2017).

In addition to political opportunities created since 2016, new forms of communication technologies have been contributing to the political participation, revival, and networking of right-wing organizations. Digital media affect the dynamics of mobilization for protest events, recruitment of new supporters, and coordination of actions (Bennett Reference Bennett2003; Earl and Kimport Reference Earl and Kimport2011; Earl et al. Reference Earl, Hurwitz, Mesinas, Tolan and Arlotti2013). It is widely accepted that most social movements protests of the current decade were born in the online world (Anduiza, Gallego, and Cantijoch Reference Anduiza, Gallego and Cantijoch2010; Tufekci and Wilson Reference Tufekci and Wilson2012). Some scholars see social media as having a profound influence on the shape of contemporary movements, sometimes arguing that social media are diluting true activism (Earl and Kimport Reference Earl and Kimport2011; Harlow and Guo Reference Harlow and Guo2014). More literature focuses on individual online participation in movements, whereas the group level of online organizations and their networks has received less attention.

Studies on radical-right activism also have proven that digital platforms are highly important for the growing far-right movement and now constitute important arenas for the dissemination of racist and extremist messages, as well as community building, recruitment, and mobilization (Wahlström and Törnberg Reference Wahlström and Törnberg2019). As has been shown by Pauwels and Schils (Reference Pauwels and Schils2016), Internet discussion forums provide an arena for the production of narratives that legitimize political violence; they can be strong indicators of an individual’s exposure to extremist content and reinforce the predisposition to commit acts of politically motivated violence. At the same time, in the entire corpus of texts on offline–online relations in the radical-right social movement, relatively little is said about the group level of participation, the structure of relations between online organizations, and how their communication is reflected on the streets.

What is particularly important in the context of this article is that there is little systematic knowledge about the structure of far-right civil society in Poland and whether there are strong grassroots connections among the various groups or whether they are tightly integrated into national organizations.

Networks of Right-Wing Organizations in Poland

Given the opportunities that emerged in mainstream politics as well as the observed revival of the right-wing organizations, in 2016, we collected data on the contacts of the Polish far right on the social media platform Facebook, as it was one of the most popular social media platforms in Poland.Footnote ³ The data set is based on mutual likes (pages liked) of far-right organizations on Facebook. We assume that the likes reflect the structure of relationships between the organizations.

The first step in the data collection procedure was to identify the names of the main far-right organizations well known to experts and journalists as organizations characterized by populist national ideology, numerous anti-immigrant and chauvinistic communications, and protests against the LGBT+ community. Having a list of five major Polish far-right organizations (All-Polish Youth–MW, National Radical Camp–ONR, National Movement–RN, Autonomous Nationalists–AN, and National Rebirth of Poland–NOP), we initiated the procedure of snowballing until the range of available actors was reached. The procedure was repeated starting with each new emerging actor identified as a far-right organization. This resulted in a single network component reflecting the organizations’ relationships based on mutual liking of each other’s Facebook accounts.Footnote ⁴

We distinguished three levels in the created network:

1. 1) Organizations operating at the national level—the largest organizations of the extreme right, with which we started the snowballing procedure.

2. 2) Regional organizations—organizations which are regional chapters of national organizations. These organizations are embedded in regions of the country that are equivalent to voivodeships or historical provinces of Poland.

3. 3) Local organizations—organizations connected with the previous two types of organizations, but who do not have their formal counterparts at the regional or national levels.Footnote ⁵

For reasons of visibility and the need to reduce the network size, we have excluded local chapters of national far-right organizations. Only local organizations that were not formal branches of national organizations remained in the network component. These organizations can be called grassroots, especially because they took their name from the place from which they originated: National Myszków (Narodowy Myszków), Patriots from Kluczbork (Kluczborscy Patrioci), and alike.

Below we present three network graphs depicting the three levels of relationships between organizations. Eighteen actors representing national organizations are visible in Figure 1. This component is divided into two clusters (communities). They represent two groups of the Polish far right. On the right, the largest nationalist organizations such as ONR, NOP, MW, and RN are linked to where smaller groups, Narodowy Świt (National Dawn), Nacjonaliści RP (Nationalists RP), Związek Jaszczurczy (Lizard Union), and Białe Orły (White Eagles) are situated. The second cluster is populated by organizations of a neo-Nazi profile, including Autonomous Nationalists, groups belonging to the so-called Third Position, and neopagan organizations. One such organization, Niklot, is the strongest broker between the nationalist’s cluster and the neo-Nazi’s community.

Figure 1. Network of national organizations.

The second level (Figure 2) of the network is composed of regional organizations. There are 59 organizations of this type. It should be noted that this level mirrors the structure of the network of national organizations. As in the previous case, there are two subgroups here, a larger group of nationalists on the left and neo-Nazi organizations in the smaller community.

Figure 2. Network of regional organizations.

Here, the strongest brokers between the two clusters are organizations from the Podkarpacie region. This is the region dubbed as the “bastion of PiS” (Law and Justice). The ruling party Law and Justice won the majority of votes in Podkarpacie in the 2015 parliamentary elections. It is also here that the strongest support was given to Andrzej Duda in the 2020 presidential election for a second term, and the far-right candidate Grzegorz Braun came third in the election for mayor of the city of Rzeszow in 2019. The network analysis proves that this is also a point of contact between activists of nationalist organizations and more radical neo-Nazi activists.

Finally, the third level (Figure 3) contains the grassroots organizations that are of most interest to us. It contains 78 actors and the density of the whole component is low, as it is only 0.05, which means that only 5% of the connections are active. Even though we cannot compare the density between levels because density is a function of network size—the smaller the level, the higher the density—we expected that local organizations would have stronger ties to each other and be composed of numerous smaller local communities. We found that this level tended to be focused on “liking” national organizations (see Figure 4) than their neighbors in other localities.

Figure 3. Network of local organizations.

Figure 4. Interorganizational densities.

Figure 4 shows that far-right organizations are pillarized forming local–regional–national connections. The links from local to national organizations are the densest in the whole component. National organizations give likes back only by a small percentage. We expect that organizations at the national level rely on local organizations because they secure an electorate for political parties they support. However, it is open for interpretation why grassroots organizations are focused on national organizations to this extent. This may be a reflection of the popularity of these organizations in the media and not necessarily the real contacts these groups have with each other. Simply put, local activists may know national organizations from the mass media, but grassroots organizations do not appear in the media, as previous studies prove (Płatek and Płucienniczak Reference Płatek, Płucienniczak, Jacobsson and Korolczuk2017). In terms of the relationship between the local and regional levels, grassroots activists no longer exhibit such a strong affinity for organizations known at the national level. On the other hand, the relationship of regional activists with their counterparts at the national level is relatively strong and again suggests a one-sided vertical relationship.

We decided to look closer at one of the subgroups of the local right-wing organizations because the algorithm distinguished just one extremely dense community, composed of organizations located in the Lubelskie voivodeship in southeast Poland. We expected that this community of organizations might be more interested in local affairs than in issues at the national level and therefore are less into mainstream politics. We chose to further investigate through interviews conducted with these organizations.

Why Horizontal Connections? Insights from Local Right-Wing Organizations

The social network analysis conducted in the previous section allowed us to reconstruct the network of right-wing organizations. We have found the pillarized nature of links, and this might be because local right-wing organizations in Poland are driven financially and organizationally by national organizations. However, we found a cluster of local organizations that is an exception because these organizations form strong horizontal ties, and this guided our further analysis that was directed at deepening our understanding of how the networks could have shaped the nature of right-wing organizations in Poland. We expect to find that the identified cluster of local organizations that form stronger horizonal ties with like-minded organizations from other communes and with other members of the local community might care less about issues at the national level (and thus mainstream politics) and emphasize grassroots activities unrelated to participation in political party activities. We also might anticipate these organizations to be less radical in their behavior and attitudes, thus more civil.

We have found that all of these organizations have been locally driven, and when it comes to their size, they are rather small, not exceeding 20–30 members, and began as small informal groups that evolved into officially registered nongovernmental organizations. They were all formed at the same time on the wave of several events building the ideological ground for right-wing activism, such as the aforementioned Day of Remembrance of “Cursed Soldiers” and Independence Marches taking place annually in Warsaw.

The new opportunities to commemorate events and figures in Polish history gave an impetus to some citizens to manifest their pride in Poland’s history within the framework of martyrdom and to speak up about the “true version of history” (Interview 1). Thus, the initiators of group formation were enthusiasts of history, like-minded friends, mostly young men, knowing each other from school, neighborhood, or stadium. Some felt empowered by either volunteering or attending the Independence March and wanted to cultivate nationalistic values locally. Others felt disappointed after their economic emigration to the West—in particular different norms, culture, and lack of Christian values—and came back homesick to build a “stronger Poland” (Interview 2 and Interview 4).

The common element of the activities of local, right-wing organizations was the sense of the mission to popularize “forgotten history” and biographies of “Cursed Soldiers” who fought against the communists (Interview 3), as well as to promote patriotism in general. To achieve these goals, activists focused mostly on organizing historical ceremonies, marches, sporting events to honor soldiers, lectures with historians and writers, and patriotic film screenings, as well as lobbying local authorities to build new monuments, rename streets and public places in order to commemorate important historical events and figures, etc. Historical events that these organizations consider to be important to promote and to spread awareness about refer to the tragic moments in Polish history, in particular Hitler’s and Stalin’s invasions of Poland on September 1 and 17, 1939, the Warsaw Uprising (1944), massacres of Poles in Volhynia (1943–1945), and the introduction of martial law (1981). All these events are marked by the existence of enemies—Nazis, Soviets, Ukrainians, and communists—which the members of organizations demonize, instead glorifying the sacrifice of victims.

The commemoration of the abovementioned historical events helps these organizations to strengthen an ideological foundation captured in the motto “God, Honor, Fatherland” that was a national symbol of Poland during the interwar period; it was placed on the banners of the armed forces and later appropriated by the far right and nationalists. It has been frequently mentioned during the interviews that right-wing activists perceive this motto as an embodiment of Polishness and justify their activities in its name to defend and promote the values that this slogan underlines. The activists often demonstrate their attachment to Catholic values by organizing holy masses in the memory of Cursed Soldiers or veterans of the Warsaw Uprising. “Honor” from the motto means, for the right-wing activists, opposing and quietly advocating against the present enemies of Poland—that is, political elites, who are seen as the direct “heirs of the communists” (Interview 2); the European Union (Interview 5), perceived as the oppressor; refugees; and “the LGBT ideology” (Interview 7), seen as a symbol of liberal values and immorality that came from the West. In opposition, the right-wing activists highlight the traditional values, which according to them are embodied in the role of the family as the basic social unit. Finally, organizations attach a great role to “Fatherland,” which for them means promotion of patriotism in the form of spreading national ideas established at the beginning of the 20th century, commemorating history, supporting families in need, or taking care of the environment. Therefore, organizations’ names often contain the word or phrase “national” or “patriotic” in addition to a geographical location that identifies the organization from among others of the same type.

Part of the interview guide referred to cooperation and linkages with other organizations. We find that organizations at the local level from the extracted community do not look up to national organizations and are more interested in horizonal linkages. As expected, we found that this cluster is preoccupied with the idea of locality and all the activities have been directed to local beneficiaries and concerned local historical figures or events. The local organizations found it important to limit their activities to grassroot initiatives and to form ties with like-minded organizations in the region that are also locally organized and focused. Because of their location in the east part of Poland, they often identified “their own cursed soldiers” (Interview 2) describing guerillas who operated in the region, and “their own, traditional beliefs and values” that in their opinion differed from the Western parts of Poland (Interview 6). Cooperation between local groups was based on a shared vision of history, heroes, patriotism, and similar political views; as one of the patriots stated, “There were almost no differences between us” (Interview 6). Members usually got to know each other during events they held locally and later maintained regular contacts due to ideological ties and personal friendships. The cooperation was usually informal and consisted of increasing attendance at marches, celebrations, sports competitions, and concerts organized by other organizations, as well as of sharing information and valuable contacts. The organizations cooperate not only with local like-minded organizations but also with other organizations (cultural, social, and other local associations) and members of the local community, such as the Farmer’s Wives’ Association, local sports clubs, Catholic priests, schools, social welfare centers, firemen, musicians, local authorities, businessmen, and ordinary people.

The analyzed local communities choose to form stronger horizonal ties (communities) with other organizations and other members of the local community, as they care less about issues at the national level (and thus mainstream politics) and emphasize grassroots activities unrelated to participation in political party activities. In general, the cooperation with local, patriotic groups has been more frequent, stronger, and more consistent than with bigger, nationwide organizations such as All-Polish Youth or National Radical Camp operating at the regional or national levels. One reason for the rather loose ties with these big right-wing organizations is that the interviewed local cluster did not want to be dependent on these organizations’ resources, including structural, ideological, and financial ones, in the first place. As stated by interviewees, “We did not want to take orders from above” or “to beg for money” (Interview 2 and Interview 8) and “ask for alms like left-wing groups” (Interview 1). The fact of being self-sufficient was repeatedly emphasized using the example of the lack of funding from large organizations and the state. Local organizations were proud to be almost fully self-financed and to receive some support from the local community, small business, or sometimes local authorities.

A second reason mentioned was that local organizations did not search for popularity, access to politics, and other opportunities. Groups working on a small scale had clearly stated that they have fewer benefits from this type of network than from local connections. However, whereas joint offline activities of local organizations with national ones are rare, an online activity demonstrates a greater sense of belonging and similarity between organizations. Online networking creates an opportunity for both types of organizations to share posts about events and to have access to a bigger fan base on Facebook. This confirms research findings on social movement mobilization mediated by digital technologies mentioned earlier, where social media is perceived as a tool to mobilize and disseminate information. Unlike traditional mobilization explanations, in which people must make intentional decisions, Facebook creates a stream of information that encourages the local organizations to share news and posts.

Interestingly, some local activists have demonstrated disapproval or even derision toward some of the activities taken by organizations at the national level. The interviewees referred to negative experiences with national organizations, such as the recruitment attempts, conflicts, and unclear intentions toward them, which in the opinion of the interviewees stem from the closeness of national organizations to politics and an overall radicalization of views. It was often expressed during the interviews that the local organizations stay away from the activities involving right-wing activists who are the closest to National Movement or Confederation, such as collecting signatures and sharing information, as well as using its infrastructure and contacts.

Local right-wing organizations of the identified cluster clearly distance themselves from politics and seek to achieve this by focusing on historical issues, anchoring in local affairs. We have also found these organizations to be deradicalized in their behavior and attitudes because they do not resort to violence or hate speech and do not activate “against” but rather “in favor of.” However, at the same time we are aware of two facts. First, they chose to focus on historical issues because they fit into Poland’s historical policy that has been especially embraced in the last few years, with highly funded institutions such as the Institute of National Remembrance (Instytut Pamięci Narodowej) or the Pilecki Institute. Both—together with the actions of the Ministries of Culture or Education and Science—promote a conservative vision of history and nationalist historical figures and at times also provide working places for far-right activists. In recent years, further opportunities opened for far-right activism with the establishment of the government-controlled Patriotic Fund or Institute of Nationalist Thought, which provide grants for right-wing groups. Second, they are still right-wing organizations that do share values, objectives, and practices with other organizations, thus creating a solid ground for far-right narratives in the public sphere. More specifically, even if they do not conduct political activity per se and are not interested in politics, they are still important and influential actors because they are effective in creating and diffusing values/norms and thus building a potentially strong conservative electorate without which right-wing political parties could not be sustained.