¹ 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (1957). The Sherman Act is the basic United States antitrust statute. Section 1, relevant to the discussions in this Article, reads:

“Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared illegal.…

Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby declared illegal shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding fifty thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court”.

² See Note, Enforcement of United States Antitrust Laws over Alien Corporations, 43 Geo. L.J. 661 (1955). On the foreign commerce clause of the Sherman Act, generally, see, American Chamber of Commerce in London, the American Antitrust Laws and American Business Abroad (1955); Fugate, Foreign Commerce and the Antitrust Laws (1958); Petitpierre, L'Application Du Droit Antitrust Des Etats-Unis D'Amérique À Leur Commerce Extérieur (1956); Webbers, Contrôle op Internationale Kartels (1957); Brewster, , Extraterritorial Effects of the U.S. Antitrust Laws: “An Appraisal”, Proc. A.B.A., Section of Antitrust Law 65 (1957)Google Scholar; Carlston, , Antitrust Policy Abroad, 49 Nw. U.L. Rev. 569 (1954)Google Scholar; Dean, , Extraterritorial Effects of the U.S. Antitrust Laws: “Advising the Client”, PROC. A.B.A., Section of Antitrust Law 88 (1957)Google Scholar; Derenburg, , The Impact of the Antitrust Laws on Trade-Marks in Foreign Commerce, 27 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 414 (1952)Google Scholar; Hansen, , Extraterritorial Effects of the United States Antitrust Laws By the Department of Justice to Protect Freedom of United States Foreign Trade, Proc. A.B.A., Section of Antitrust Law 75 (1957)Google Scholar; Linowitz, , The International Businessman Meets the Anti-Trust Laws, 41 Cornell L.Q. 215 (1956)Google Scholar; Nitschke, , The Antitrust Laws in Foreign Commerce, 53 Mich. L. Rev. 1059 (1955)Google Scholar; Timberg, , Antitrust and Foreign Trade, 48 Nw. U.L. Rev. 411 (1953)Google Scholar; Whitney, , Antitrust Law and Foreign Commerce, 11 Record Ass'n Bar of City of New York 134 (1956)Google Scholar; Note, 42 Cornell L.Q,. 390 (1957); Note, 37 Cornell L.Q. 821 (1952); Comment, 26 Fordham L. Rev. 319 (1957).

³ See, e.g., authorities cited note 2 supra.

⁴ Since 1945 at least 70 corporations, organized wholly or in part by Americans with American capital, have been organized in the Netherlands.

⁵ Since most of this participation has taken the form of wholly-owned subsidiaries of American parents, it would seem that the concept of intracorporate conspiracy in particular is of importance and pertinence in this area. As to this concept, see text at note 136 infra.

⁶ 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (1957).

⁷ For an enumeration, see Att'y Gen. Nat'l Comm. Antitrust Rep. [hereinafter Att'y Gen. Rep.] 65 (1955)Google Scholar; Fugate, , op. cit. supra note 2, at 18–19Google Scholar; Toulmin, , The Law of International Private Agreements, 32 Va. L. Rev. 335, 359 (1946).Google Scholar

⁸ Under well established constitutional doctrine, American courts can and must investigate whether the congressional exercise of legislative jurisdiction, applicable but attacked in the dispute before them, transgresses constitutional boundaries, and, in the event such transgression is found, hold the legislative action invalid. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); see also Note, The Effect of Declaring a Statute Unconstitutional, 29 Colum. L. Rev. 1140 (1929). Consequently, the determination of the scope of legislative jurisdiction is required for two purposes. First, because, in statutory construction, there is a well established presumption in favor of constitutionality. Unless there is a clear indication of different legislative intent, a statute will, in accordance with this presumption, be construed so as to be constitutional. Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 348 (1936) (concurring opinion). Second, if a statute, upon proper construction, is found to be violative of the Constitution, the courts are required not to apply it.

⁹ Briggs, The Law of Nations 523–24 (2d ed. 1952); 2 François, Handboek Van Het Volkenrecht 13 (2d ed. 1950); 1 Hyde, International Law § 240 (2d ed. 1945).

¹⁰ Briggs, op. cit. supra note 9, at 575–80; 2 François, op. cit. supra note 9, at 12–13; 1 Hyde, op. cit. supra note 9, § 220.

¹¹ Briggs, op. cit. supra note 9, at 575–80; 2 François, op. cit. supra note 9, at 13–15; 1 Hyde, op. cit. supra note 9, § 241–43A.

¹² Briggs, op. cit. supra note 9, at 575–80; 2 François, op. cit. supra note 9, at 13–16; 1 Hyde, op. cit. supra note 9, § 242.

¹³ Briggs, op. cit. supra note 9, at 575–80; 2 François, op. cit. supra note 9, at 13–15; 1 Hyde, op. cit. supra note 9, §§ 241–43A.

¹⁴ Draft Convention On Jurisdiction With Respect to Crime § 7, 29 Am. J. Int'L L. (Supp.) 440 (1935).

¹⁵ Haight, International Law and Extraterritorial Application of the Antitrust Laws, 36 Yale L. J. 639 (1954); Whitney, Sources of Conflict Between International Law and the Antitrust Laws, 63 Yale L. J. 655 (1954); see also authorities cited notes 9–14 supra. But cf. Cook, The Application of the Criminal Law of a Country to Acts Committed by Foreigners Outside the Jurisdiction, 40 W. Va. L.Q. 303 (1934).

¹⁶ See authorities cited note 15 supra. Seeking support in a concept of objective jurisdiction, some writers have endeavored to defend application of. Sherman Act criminal sanctions to acts consummated abroad by foreigners against assertions of conflict with international law. According to the concept of objective jurisdiction advocated by these writers, a state may punish acts consummated abroad by foreigners which produce effects within the state's boundaries. See, e.g., Hansen, note 2 supra, at 75–76, 80–81; Timberg, Extraterritorial Effects of the U.S. Antitrust Laws, Prog. A.B.A., Section of Antitrust Law 105 (1957); see also Cook, note 15 supra, at 307–311, 329; Brewster, note 15 supra, at 69. However, although there may be some authority for the validity of a limited objective jurisdiction concept, as, for instance, in a case in which a person outside of the state shoots a bullet across its boundary and kills someone within it, see Cook, supra, such authority does not seem to support the broad concept to which resort is taken in this area. This becomes manifestly evident if it is realized that, since some effect within the state, especially in economic areas, is probably always present, consistent application of this broad concept would give every state virtually unlimited power to exercize criminal legislative jurisdiction over nationals of other states for acts committed within the nationals' own countries. Such a result is clearly unacceptable. See Shawcross, English Restrictive Practice Legislation; Extraterritorial Effect of U.S. Antitrust Laws, Prog. A.B.A., Section of Antitrust Law 111, 113–14 (1957). The unavailability of a concept of objective jurisdiction would seem particularly clear in the light of the specific prohibitions of the Sherman Act here under discussion. In the situations in which the concept has perhaps been applied, it could be argued that the person shooting across the border “killed” within the state, or that the negligent navigator, causing a collision and injuring a sailor on the other ship, actually “negligently injured” the sailor on the ship flying the flag of the punishing sovereign. In a case in which a combination outside of the state effects restraints within it, however, it is clear that only the restraint and not the conspiracy takes place within the state. Inasmuch as the Sherman Act prohibits conspiracies and combinations in restraint of trade, and not mere restraints of trade as such, the argument that can be made to support the concept of objective jurisdiction in the above described cases of the killer or the navigator is unavailable in the case of a conspiracy concededly entered into without the United States.

¹⁷ 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1957).

¹⁸ Att'y Gen. Rep. 62.Google Scholar

¹⁹ Searls, Trade or Commerce Among the Several States or With Foreign Nations, Proc. A.B.A., Section of Antitrust Law 58 (1953).

²⁰ 322 U.S. 533, 558 (1944).

²¹ 286 U.S. 427 (1932).

²² 286 U.S. at 435.

²³ Accord, Searls, note 19 supra.

²⁴ See note 8 supra. Although the United States Government has a choice of criminal or civil remedies, may bring both types of suits at the same time, and, in addition, private parties may bring civil suits on the basis of Sherman Act violations, it is not contested that the antitrust offenses are of an inherently criminal nature. Fugate, op. cit. supra note 2, § 2.8. Accordingly, the assumption seems justified that the appropriate search is for the permissible extent of legislative criminal jurisdiction. See Haight, note 15 supra; Whitney, note 15 supra.

²⁵ See text at notes 9–16 supra.

²⁶ U.S. Const., art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.

²⁷ The leading case is probably Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), in which Justice Douglas reviewed the prior decisions and summarized their holdings. The decisive question in the area of interstate commerce seems to be whether interstate commerce is materially affected. United States v. Women's Sportwear Manufacturers Ass'n, 336 U.S. 460, 464 (1949) (“If it is interstate commerce that feels the pinch, it does not matter how local the operation which applies the squeeze.”). However, the Supreme Court has shown its awareness of the fact that commerce among the states is not a technical legal conception, but a practical one, drawn from the course of business. Swift and Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 398 (1905). This approach is commendable. It might very well be argued that the lower courts have approached the problems in the foreign commerce area by automatically applying the interstate commerce test without sufficient awareness of the practical consequences. Cf. Att'y Gen. Rep. 80–83.Google Scholar

²⁸ See, e.g., authorities cited note 2 supra.

²⁹ Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932).

³⁰ Accord, Haight, note 15 supra; Whitney, note 15 supra.

³¹ 213 U.S. 347 (1909). On this case, see Att'y Gen. Rep. 66–67Google Scholar; Hunting, , Extra-Territorial Effect of the Sherman Act: American Banana Company Versus United Fruit Company 6 Ill. L. Rev. 34 (1911).Google Scholar

³² 213 U.S. at 355.

³³ 213 U.S. at 357.

³⁴ Under this doctrine, American courts refuse to examine into the legality of acts of foreign governmental agencies consummated within the territory of the foreign sovereign. Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918); Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897); Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Frères Société Anonyme, 163 F. 2d 246 (2d Gir.), cert, denied, 332 U.S. 772 (1947). But see Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maat-schappij, 210 F. 2d 375 (1954) (examination may ensue upon State Department's indication of its considering the acts illegal).

³⁵ 213 U.S. at 357–58.

³⁶ 213 U.S. at 359.

³⁷ 221 U.S. 106 (1911). On this case, see also Att'y Gen. Rep. 68–69.Google Scholar

³⁸ 221 U.S. at 171–72.

³⁹ 221 U.S. at 184.

⁴⁰ 223 U.S. 512 (1912).

⁴¹ 34 Stat. 904 (1907).

⁴² 223 U.S. at 517–18.

⁴³ A demurrer is a procedural motion challenging the legal sufficiency of the allegations of a pleading. On demurrers generally, see Clark, Handbook of The Law of Code Pleading 499–574 (2d ed. 1947).

⁴⁴ 228 U.S. 87 (1913). On this case, see also Att'y Gen. Rep. 69–70.Google Scholar

⁴⁵ 228 U.S. at 106.

⁴⁶ 228 U.S. at 106.

⁴⁷ 243 U.S. 66 (1917).

⁴⁸ 243 U.S. at 88.

⁴⁹ 274 U.S. 268 (1927). See also Att'y Gen. Rep. 69 (1955).Google Scholar

⁵⁰ See note 43 supra.

⁵¹ 274 U.S. at 276.

⁵² 344 U.S. 280 (1952).

⁵³ 344 U.S. at 282.

⁵⁴ Lanham Act § 45, 60 Stat. 443 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1953).

⁵⁵ See note 29 supra.

⁵⁶ 344 U.S. at 288.

⁵⁷ 344 U.S. at 292.

⁵⁸ 63 F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1945), aff'd, 332 U.S. 319 (1947), Att'y Gen. Rep. 70–71.Google Scholar

⁵⁹ 63 F. Supp. at 525.

⁶⁰ 332 U.S. 319, 325–28 (1947).

⁶¹ 148 F. 2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945), Att'y Gen. Rep. 70–72.Google Scholar

⁶² 148 F. 2d at 421.

⁶³ 148 F. 2d at 443.

⁶⁴ 148 F. 2d at 443.

⁶⁵ 148 F. 2d at 443–44.

⁶⁶ 148 F. 2d at 444.

⁶⁷ 148 F. 2d at 444.

⁶⁸ See note 44 supra.

⁶⁹ See note 47 supra.

⁷⁰ See note 49 supra.

⁷¹ See note 40 supra.

⁷² 100 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), Att'y Gen. Rep. 74–75.Google Scholar

⁷³ 100 F. Supp. at 509, 513.

⁷⁴ 100 F. Supp. at 592.

⁷⁵ 100 F. Supp. at 593.

⁷⁶ United States v. Impérial Chemical Industries, Ltd., 105 F. Supp. 215, 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).Google Scholar

⁷⁷ 82 F. Supp. 753 (D.C.N.J. 1949), Att'y Gen. Rep. 73–75.Google Scholar

⁷⁸ 82 F. Supp. at 830.

⁷⁹ 82 F. Supp. at 890.

⁸⁰ 82 F. Supp. at 891.

⁸¹ 82 F. Supp. at 891.

⁸² 82 F. Supp. at 891.

⁸³ For a somewhat different alignment of relevant factors, see Note, Extraterritorial Application of the Anti-trust Laws, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 1452 (1956).Google Scholar

⁸⁴ See authorities cited notes 11–16 supra. Even Fugate, who considers the lower cases to have settled the law, criticizes the intent requirement of the Aluminum Co. case. Fugate, op. cit, supra note 2, at 45.

⁸⁵ See authorities cited notes 9–14 supra.

⁸⁶ For instances of United States activity in persuading foreign governments to adopt antitrust legislation, see Verloren van Themaat, Documentatie Over Enkele Buitenlandse Kartelpolitieke Invloeden, [1953] Sociaal-Economische Wet-geving 289.

⁸⁷ This is a fact disregarded by those who state without any qualification that the Aluminum Co. case is the law today. See, e.g., Molloy, , Application of the Anti-trust Laws to Extraterritorial Conspiracies, 49 Yale L.J. 1312, 1316 (1940)Google Scholar; Toulmin, , The Law of International Private Agreements, 32 Va. L. Rev. 335, 359 (1946)Google Scholar. It might, of course, be argued that on a strict stare decisis rationale, since the Second Circuit decided the Aluminum Co. case in the Supreme Court's stead, the holding of that case must be considered equivalent to a holding by the Supreme Court. However, it would seem somewhat irrealistic to assume that the Supreme Court, in a subsequent case, would consider itself bound by the Aluminum Co. case, if it considered that case incorrectly decided. Its inclination to reach the correct result would in such a situation most probably prevail more easily over the countervailing force of the Aluminum Co. case than if the latter case had been decided by the Supreme Court itself. It is of some significance in this context that the Supreme Court has never explicitly overruled the American Banana Co. case and has denied certiorari in Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 133 F. Supp. 522 (S.D.N.Y. 1955)Google Scholar, aff'd, 234 F. 2d 633 (2d Gir.), cert, denied, 352 U.S. 871 (1956)Google Scholar, a case reflecting the better approach. See note 101 infra.

⁸⁸ See note 40 supra.

⁸⁹ See note 44 supra.

⁹⁰ See note 31 supra.

⁹¹ 213 U.S. at 359.

⁹² Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951).Google Scholar

⁹³ See note 52 supra.

⁹⁴ See text at note 87 supra.

⁹⁵ If it is assumed that in the American Tobacco Co. case Imperial itself performed no acts within the United States, the mere fact that it had a resident general agent in New York might be considered a distinguishing and material factor. However, it would seem that Imperial did itself perform acts in the United States in furtherance of the conspiracy and thus subjected itself to the exercize of permissible legislative criminal jurisdiction.

⁹⁶ See, e.g., .United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 252–54 (1945).Google Scholar

⁹⁷ See, e.g., Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 359 (1911)Google Scholar (venue case); Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440 (1948)Google Scholar (statement by coconspirator held not in furtherance of conspiracy). Venue denotes what in continental terminology would be called relative or geographical competence.

⁹⁸ In no case decided under the Sherman Act has the Supreme Court explicitly held this doctrine to apply for the purpose of establishing legislative jurisdiction. In fact, no decision to that effect seems to exist. In none of the cases decided by the Supreme Court did legislative criminal jurisdiction depend solely on the defendants' having performed acts within the United States, except perhaps in the American Tobacco Co. case. It would seem clear, however, that in that case the foreign defendant acted itself within the United States. See note 95 supra.

⁹⁹ The American participant is, under recognized rules of international and internal law, exposed to attack under the Sherman Act. See text at notes 9, 17–23, 52–56 supra.

¹⁰⁰ See text at notes 15–16 supra.

¹⁰¹ The case of Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 133 F. Supp. 522 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), aff'd, 234 F. 2d 633 (2d Gir.), cert, denied, 352 U.S. 871 (1956)Google Scholar, forms a notable and hopegiving exception. In that case, plaintiff, proceeding under the Lanham Act, sought to enjoin the Canadian defendant from using his Canadian trademark in Canada. Judge Dawson, in a well reasoned opinion, refused to carry the learning of the Aluminum Co. case to its logical, but clearly unacceptable, conclusion. Referring to the conflict which had arisen in the Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd. case, as to which see note 110 infra, he characterized such conflict as unseemly and admonished the American judiciary not to try to tell his neighbor how to manage affairs in his own household. Id. at 529.

¹⁰² There have been some indications of judicial tendencies to consider foreign commerce restricted to imports and exports. That view has been explicitly rejected by the Attorney General's Report. Att'y Gen. Rep. 77–80.

¹⁰³ See note 77 supra.

¹⁰⁴ See note 80 supra.

¹⁰⁵ 92 F. Supp. 947, 962 (D.C. Mass. 1950).

¹⁰⁶ See note 77 supra.

¹⁰⁷ 82 F. Supp. at 891.

¹⁰⁸ See text at notes 14–16 supra.

¹⁰⁹ See authorities cited note 15 supra; cf. Cheatham & Reese, Choice of the Applicable Law, 52 Colum. L. Rev. 959, 967–68, 971–73 (1952).Google Scholar

¹¹⁰ Judge Ryan's assumption of authority was apparently considered quite presumptuous by the English courts which issued an injunction enjoining Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd. from complying with the American decree. See Att'y Gen. Rep. 75; Fugate, op. cit. supra note 2, at 319–20. Nor is a saving clause as employed in the General Elec. Co. decree, United States v. General Elee. Co., 115 F. Supp. 835 (S.D.N.Y. 1953)Google Scholar, permitting deviation from its provisions if required by the law or government under whose authority the defendant is incorporated, a satisfactory device to avoid such complications. The foreign sovereign understandably insists that its subjects be allowed to do within the ambit of its sovereignty whatever the law permits them to do, not that they be allowed to do only what the law requires them to do. Accordingly, it is not surprising that section 34 of the new Netherlands antitrust statute, Law of June 28, 1956 (Wet Economische Mededinging) [1956] Staatsblad No. 401, which has already been passed by Parliament, but has not yet been promulgated, explicitly forbids compliance with foreign antitrust laws and decrees. It is no secret that this provision was inspired by resentment against the decision in the Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd. case. Samkalden, , Het Wets-ontwerp Economische Mededinging, [1954] Sociaal-Economische Wetgeving 1, 9.Google Scholar

¹¹¹ For a discussion of efforts aimed at international regulation, see, e.g., Kopper, , The International Regulation of Cartels — Current Proposals, 40Google Scholar Va. L. Rev. 1005 (1954); Timberg, , Restrictive Business Practices as an Appropriate Subject for United Nations Action, 1 Antitrust Bulletin 409 (1955)Google Scholar; Note, 14 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 626 (1946).

¹¹² Recent decrees, and abo consent decrees, show United States awareness of possible conflicts with foreign sovereigns. It seems to be the now prevailing practice to incorporate in such decrees a saving clause as used in the General Elec. Co. case. See Fugate, op. cit. supra note 2, at 320.

¹¹³ See, generally, Fugate, op. cit. supra note 2, §§ 3.1–3.9; Note, 43 Geo. L.J. 661 (1955).

¹¹⁴ 38 Stat. 736 (1914, 15 U.S.C. § 22 (1952)).

¹¹⁵ International Shoe Mach. Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945)Google Scholar; see also Latimer v. S/A Industrias Reunidas F. Matazarro, 175 F. 2d 184 (2d Cir.), cert, denied, 338 U.S. 867 (1949)Google Scholar; Kilpatrick v. Texas & Pac. Ry., 166 F. 2d 788 (2d Cir.), cert, denied, 335 U.S. 814 (1948).Google Scholar

¹¹⁶ Cf. Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U.S. 333 (1925)Google Scholar; Note, 43 Geo. L.J. 661, 662–63 (1955).

¹¹⁷ 267 U.S. 333 (1925).

¹¹⁸ 333 U.S. 795 (1948).

¹¹⁹ 333 U.S. at 807.

¹²⁰ 333 U.S. at 807.

¹²¹ CCH Trade Reg. Rep. (1946 Trade Cases) par. 57, 481 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 1946).

¹²² Ibid.

¹²³ In the Matter of Siemens & Halske A.G., CHH Trade Reg. Rep. par. 68,763 (S.D.N.Y. June 28, 1957); In the Matter of Elee. & Musical Industries, Ltd., CGH Trade Reg. Rep. par 68,773 (S.D.N.Y. June 27, 1957); United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center, Inc., 133 F. Supp. 40 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).Google Scholar

¹²⁴ Accord, Note, 43 Geo L.J. 661, 668 (1955).Google Scholar

¹²⁵ Under American common law, agreements in unreasonable restraint of trade are invalid, apart from any statutory prohibition. Common antitrust law still prevails in areas not preempted by federal and state legislation. For a concise summary of the common law, see Restatement, Contracts §§513–519 (1932); Handler, A Study of the Construction and Enforcement of the Federal Antitrust Laws (TNEC Monograph No. 38, 1941) 3–9; see also Dean, note 3 supra, at 97–102.

¹²⁶ Att'y Gen. Rep. 80–83; see also Burns, , A Summary of a Study of the Antitrust Laws, 1 Antitrust Bulletin 695 (1956)Google Scholar; Note, 4 Stanford L. Rev. 559 (1952)Google Scholar. But see Hale & Hale, Monopoly Abroad: The Antitrust Laws and Commerce in Foreign Areas, 31 Texas L. Rev. 493 (1953).Google Scholar

¹²⁷ Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 605 (1951) (dissenting opinion).Google Scholar

¹²⁸ Section 1 of the Sherman Act forbids all agreements in restraint of trade. See note 1 supra. However, it was held in Standard Oil Co. v. United States., 221 U.S. 1 (1911)Google Scholar, that section 1 contains a standard of reason and outlaws, only unreasonable restraints. This standard of reason is commonly called the rule of reason. The rule of reason has nevertheless not prevented the courts from holding certain types of agreements illegal per se, i.e. without a showing of the actual anticompetitive effect of such agreements being necessary. Holdings of per se illegality are, as a general rule, based on the rationale that the type of agreement in question is so basically incompatible with competitive conditions that it must be obliterated at its roots. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 78 S. Ct. 514, 518 (1958).Google Scholar

¹²⁹ For a similar argument in the interstate area, see United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927)Google Scholar. At this time, it is not clear whether per se doctrines traditional in the domestic situation will be transposed undiscrim-inatingly into the foreign area. However, there definitely seems to be a tendency in that direction. See also note 131 infra.

¹³⁰ See, e.g., Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951)Google Scholar. In this area, see further Dean, note 125 supra; cf. Fugate, , op. cit. supra note 2, §§ 4.2–4.6.Google Scholar

¹³¹ See, e.g., United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 Fed. 271 (6th Cir. 1898)Google Scholar, modified, 175 U.S. 211 (1899)Google Scholar. There are judicial indications that the per se rules, described in the text at notes 130 and 131, apply also to international price-fixing and division of territory agreements. United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd., 100 F. Supp. 504, 592 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); United States v. General Dyestuff Corp., 57 F. Supp. 642, 647 (S.D.N.Y. 1944).

¹³² See, e.g., International Business Mach. Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936).Google Scholar

¹³³ See, e.g., Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436 (1940).Google Scholar

¹³⁴ See, e.g., United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 207 (1948).Google Scholar

¹³⁵ See, e.g., Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953)Google Scholar; Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939).Google Scholar

¹³⁶ See, e.g., Kiefer Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951)Google Scholar. On this concept, see further Att'y Gen. Rep. 30–36; Handler, , Contract, Combination or Conspiracy, Proc. A.B.A., Section of Antitrust Law 38, 46 (1953)Google Scholar; McQuade, , Conspiracy, Multicorporate Enterprises, and Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 41Google Scholar Va. L. Rev. 183 (1955); Sprunk, , Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy, Proc. A.B.A., Section of Antitrust Law 20 (1956)Google Scholar; Note, 4 Stanford L. Rev. 559 (1952); Comment, 63 Yale L.J. 372 (1954). At least the language of the majority opinion in the Timken Roller Bearing Co. case indicates that this concept also applies to foreign subsidiaries. Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951)Google Scholar; see also Dean, note 125 supra.

¹³⁷ Sannes, , Legislation in The Netherlands Concerning International Cartels, [1955] Sociaal-Economische Wetgeving 25Google Scholar; van Themaat, Verloren, Het Kartelbeleid Sinds de Bevrijding, [1952] Sociaal-Economische Wetgeving 129.Google Scholar

¹³⁸ Decree of November 5, 1941, [1941] Staatsblad No. S. 614, as amended. Blz. 46

¹³⁹ Decree of November 5, 1941, [1941] Staatsblad No. S. 614, art. 2 (1).

¹⁴⁰ Decree of November 5, 1941, [1941] Staatsblad No. S. 614, art. 1. In the leading case of J.A.Th.M.W. v. State of The Netherlands, Hoge Raad (Strafkamer), June 2, 1953, [1953] Nederlandsche Jurisprudentie [hereinafter N.J.] No. 590, the Supreme Court held that an agreement as meant in this section of the Cartel Decree may be present although it is not legally binding on the parties thereto; see also [1953] Sociaal-Economische Wetgeving 465–71.

¹⁴¹ Decree of November 5, 1941, [1941] Staatsblad No. S. 614, art. 1.

¹⁴² Decree of November 5, 1941, [1941] Staatsblad No. S. 614, art. 15; Law of June 22, 1950 (Wet op de Economische Delicien), [1950] Staatsblad No. 258, artt. 1 (3) (f), 6, 82; see also text at note 156 infra.

¹⁴³ van Strafrecht, Wetboek artt. 2–8 (Fruin 1947).Google Scholar

¹⁴⁴ van Thernaat, Verloren, Les cartels internationaux devant les législations nationales d'un point de vue juridique, [1955] Sociaal-Economische Wetgeving 1, 8.Google Scholar

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

¹⁴⁶ G.R. v. State of The Netherlands, Raad, Hoge (Strafkamer), 06 8, 1936, [1936] N.J. No. 954Google Scholar; R.S.R. v. State of The Netherlands, Raad, Hoge (Strafkamer), 11 13, 1922, [1923] N.J. 100Google Scholar, Weekblad van het Recht No. 10,985; Pompe, Handboek van het Nederlands Strafrecht 81 (4th ed. 1953); 1 Van Bemmelen & Van Hattum, Hand- en Leerboek van het Nederlands Strafrecht 212–13 (Van Hattum 1953).

¹⁴⁷ See text at notes 14–16 supra.

¹⁴⁸ Van Strafrecht, Wetboek art. 8 (Fruin 1947).Google Scholar

¹⁴⁹ See text at notes 143–146 supra.

¹⁵⁰ Van Strafvordering, Wetboek art. 2 (Fruin 1947).Google Scholar

¹⁵¹ Van Strafrecht, Wetboek art. 5 (2) (Fruin 1947).Google Scholar

¹⁵² See text at note 138 supra; see, generally, Sannes, note 137 supra; Van Netten, , Cartel Regulation in The Netherlands, 2 Cartel 91 (1951)Google Scholar; Wijsen, , Cartel Legislation in The Netherlands, 6 Cartel 110 (1956).Google Scholar

¹⁵³ Decree of November 5, 1941, [1941] Staatsblad No. S. 614, art. 6.

¹⁵⁴ Decree of November 5, 1941, [1941] Staatsblad No. S. 614, art. 2.

¹⁵⁵ Decree of November 5, 1941, [1941] Staatsblad No. S. 614, art. 7a, as amended.

¹⁵⁶ Decree of November 5, 1941, [1941] Staatsblad No. S. 614, art. 11, 15, 16; Law of June 22, 1950 (Wet op de Economische Delicien), [1950] Staatsblad No. 258, artt. 1 (3) (f), 6, 82.

¹⁵⁷ Aor a discussion of the measures taken, see van Themaat, Verloren, Toe- passing van het Kartelbesluit, [1955] Sociaal-Economische Wetgeving 182Google Scholar; van Themaat, Verloren, Het Kartelbeleid Sinds de Bevrijding, [1952] Sociaal-Economische Wetgeving 129, 214.Google Scholar

¹⁵⁸ Law of April 11, 1951 (Wet Schorsing Bedrijfsregelen), [1951] Staatsblad No. 107.

¹⁵⁹ Law of June 28, 1956 (Wet Economische Mededinging), [1956] Staatsblad No. 401. The Netherlands government is now preparing a proposal of law covering the constitution of such tribunal. Once this proposal has become Jaw, the royal promulgation will probably soon follow.

¹⁶⁰ The act is considerably more extensive than the Cartel Decree and would warrant a separate, more elaborate, discussion. However, the more important jurisdictional problems arising under the Cartel Decree will continue their existence under the analogous provisions of the new act. Consequently, the discussion of those problems will retain whatever is its value also under the new act.

¹⁶¹ Law of June 28, 1956 (Wet Economische Mededinging), [1956] Staatsblad No. 401, art. 28.

¹⁶² See note 110 supra; Fugate, , op. cit. supra note 2, at 46–47 n. 16.Google Scholar

¹⁶³ The common market of Europe will probably lead to such growth.

¹⁶⁴ See note 111 supra.

¹⁶⁵ Cf. Brewster, , note 2 supra, at 70.Google Scholar

¹⁶⁶ See note 99 supra.