Hostname: page-component-6766d58669-r8qmj Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-05-15T03:24:54.145Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Diffusion and protection across a random graph

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 September 2015

ANDREA GALEOTTI
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, University of Essex, Wivenhoe Park, Colchester, Essex CO3SQ, UK (e-mail: agaleo@essex.ac.uk)
BRIAN W. ROGERS
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, Washington University in St. Louis, St. Louis, MO 63130, USA (e-mail: brogers@wustl.edu.)

Abstract

We study the interplay between the diffusion of a harmful state in a network of contacts and the possibility of individual agents to undertake costly investment to protect themselves against infection. We characterize how equilibrium diffusion outcomes, such as the immunization rate, total prevalence and welfare, respond to changes in the architecture of the network, and show that these responses depend on the details of the diffusion process.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2015 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable