¹ For a comprehensive overview of recent work on meta-ethical normativity, see David Copp and Justin Morton, ‘Normativity in Metaethics’, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2022 Edition), eds by Edward N. Zalta and Uri Nodelman <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2022/entries/normativity-metaethics/>.

² Christine M. Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), and Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); T.M. Scanlon, Being Realistic about Reasons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).

³ Self-Constitution 2–3.

⁴ Self-Constitution 2.

⁵ Self-Constitution xii.

⁶ Self-Constitution 27.

⁷ Self-Constitution 28.

⁸ Korsgaard limits her metaphysical analysis to living creatures, and indeed, seems to deny the possibility of non-living creatures, although she does not say so explicitly. She does, however, deny that artifacts can exist in the full way presupposed by her analysis; see Self-Constitution 37. All this is very Aristotelian; and to me, at least, quite persuasive. Aquinas does apparently believe that there can be non-living entities that are sustained by goal-directed operations of a sort, but this is not a major issue for him, and I believe that he could readily accommodate Korsgaard’s point.

⁹ Self-Constitution 32.

¹⁰ Self-Constitution 7.

¹¹ Self-Constitution 25.

¹² Being Realistic about Reasons, 2.

¹³ Being Realistic about Reasons 2.

¹⁴ Being Realistic about Reasons 6.

¹⁵ Being Realistic about Reasons 99.

¹⁶ Being Realistic about Reasons 2.

¹⁷ This argument is developed in Being Realistic about Reasons 76–104.

¹⁸ Throughout this paper, I focus on the logic of ‘good’, correlated to desire, operation, and pursuit. I assume that the logic of ‘bad’ can be readily grasped, once we realize that ‘bad’ is the contrary of ‘good’.

¹⁹ This view was forcefully defended by Germain Grisez in a widely influential article, ‘The First Principle of Practical Reason: A Commentary on the Summa Theologiae, 1–2, Question 94, Article 2’, Natural Law Forum, 10 (1965), 168–201. Although I do not agree with Grisez’s overall interpretation of Aquinas’ account of practical reason, I do think that he is right on the fundamental point that the FPPR is the starting point for all practical reasoning, whether sound or flawed.

²⁰ The FPPR, as the name suggests, is the first principle of practical reasoning, that is to say, reasoning that is directed toward action. Hence, not every kind of evaluative reasoning counts as practical reasoning; for example, reasoning about the kinds of goods that are proper to chipmunks or oaks. However, this sort of evaluative reasoning would reflect the same general Aristotelian notion of the good as desirable which Aquinas associates with the FPPR (see I-II 94.2, discussed at length below). Aquinas apparently assumes that this notion is itself grounded in reflection on the FPPR, and I believe that he could justify this assumption, although I will not attempt to do so now. I do think that his account of the good runs into difficulties with respect to evaluative judgments that are not grounded in desire and fulfillment in the same straightforward way – aesthetic judgments, for example. With respect to aesthetic judgments in particular, he could frame these in terms of a normative notion of beauty, rather than good, the point being that beauty implies a kind of rational clarity, but does not carry the same implications of desirability (II-II 145.2).

²¹ Hence, the notion of good is attributive, rather than predicative, in Peter Geach’s terms; that is to say, good and bad are always understood by reference to some criterion proper to whatever it is that is said to be good or bad. See Peter Geach, ‘Good and Evil’, Analysis, 17 (1956), 32–42. It is important at this point to guard against a misunderstanding, however. For Aquinas, ‘good’ properly so called is attributive by reference to criteria set by the kind of creature whose good (or bad) is in question; he is not saying that anything whatever can be an appropriate object of desire for anything else. A good man, a good cheetah, and a good mushroom are all good, and they seek the good and avoid the bad by reference to the criteria inherent in the kinds of creatures that they are. Instrumental goodness is also a kind of attributive goodness, but the criteria in question are set by the kind of creature that is making use of the good instrument. A good sharp stick, used to scoop out ants for one’s snack, is good by reference to the goodness intrinsic to the bonobo that is using it. The stick itself has no formal structure of its own – as Korsgaard would say, it is a mere heap – and therefore, nothing is good or bad for the stick.

²² Again: something good is desirable, sought, done, etc., by an entity of a specific kind because it promotes or preserves the existence, development, and propagation of that entity. As Aquinas would say, it promotes the perfection of the creature in accordance with the operations proper to its specific form (I 5.1, 5.5)

²³ For further details, see Self-Constitution 133–158.

²⁴ Self-Constitution 32; all the remarks in this paragraph should be read in the context of the chapter, ‘The Metaphysics of Normativity’, in which she spells out her understanding of normativity in some detail. See Self-Constitution 27–44.

²⁵ Self-Constitution 35.

²⁶ Self-Constitution 39.

²⁷ Self-Constitution 38.

²⁸ Self-Constitution 39.

²⁹ Self-determining, not self-constituting? It seems clear that Aquinas would not accept Korsgaard’s claim that human agents are not self-constituting in the Platonic sense that she defends. However, he would agree that every rational agent acts in such a way as to express and promote her perfection as a being of a certain kind, which is in turn determined by whatever the agent conceives herself to be. The most salient difference between them is that Aquinas also holds that someone can cogently identify himself with, and pursue his perfection through an end that he knows to be morally bad; this is referred to as a sin from perfect malice, that is to say, malice stemming from the will (I-II 78.1). That is a major difference, of course; nonetheless, it presupposes a more fundamental agreement on the teleological structure of human action.

³⁰ If she is in fact a metaphysical realist, as we have seen, that is not entirely clear. Nonetheless, she is prepared to endorse the main lines of an Aristotelian metaphysical view of being and goodness as a basis for normative claims, provisionally if not without reservation, and that is close enough to metaphysical realism for our purposes.

³¹ Self-Constitution 32

³² Scanlon acknowledges that Korsgaard connects action to personal identity in this way, but he argues that this approach does not work, since the choice of a practical identity must itself be grounded in reasons. But Korsgaard accepts this; indeed, it is a central point in her overall theory. She would say that the choice of a practical identity is motivated by the most cogent reason possible, namely, one’s self-constitution as an agent. The normativity of self-constitution is thus grounded in the normative structure of human existence as a rational and free agent.

³³ Being Realistic about Reasons 10.

³⁴ Being Realistic about Reasons 14.

³⁵ Being Realistic about Reasons 105–123.